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Since 2006, the United States has imposed countervailing duty, in addition to 
antidumping duty, on imports from Vietnam. This application of countervailing duty 
has been paradoxical: in order to apply the duty, the U.S. Department of Commerce 
must recognize that market forces exist in Vietnam, which are distorted by government 
intervention; at the same time, however, the Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) 
uses a “nonmarket economy” (“NME”) methodology to calculate the amount of 
countervailing duty. This NME methodology looks to surrogate country prices to 
approximate the extent of government distortion of market forces, and thus the amount 
of countervailable subsidies, in Vietnam.  
The NME methodology poses problems for Vietnamese enterprises, the 
Government of Vietnam, and global trade more generally. First, the methodology 
provides discretion for Commerce to impose unpredictable duty rates. Second, 
Commerce has taken an all-or-nothing approach to recognizing market-oriented 
industries within Vietnam; as it stands, unless all significant inputs within an industry 
are subject to market-driven prices, Commerce looks to surrogate-country prices as 
benchmarks to calculate countervailable subsidies. This paper analyzes a series of 
countervailing duty cases against Vietnam to determine which government programs 
are most frequently treated as providing countervailable subsidies, to make 
recommendations for Vietnamese enterprises and the Government of Vietnam, and to 
analyze trends in the development of Commerce’s practice of imposing countervailing 
 ii 
duty against Vietnam as a nonmarket economy country. The author recommends that 
Commerce adopt a “mix and match,” or “bubbles of capitalism” approach to calculating 
countervailing duty that makes greater use of in-country benchmarks to impose 
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In the years since 1990, Vietnam has undergone a remarkable economic 
transformation: foreign investment and private enterprise have proliferated, and even 
the formerly state-run banking system has opened to private commercial operators. As 
a result of these and other market-driven reforms, Vietnam entered global trade regime: 
in the early 1990s, the IMF and World Bank resumed lending to Vietnam, and the 
United States lifted its Vietnam War-era trade embargo.1 And after a decade of 
normalized trade relations, Vietnam formally became a member of the WTO in January 
2007. Since then, Vietnam’s economy has skyrocketed, as has its role in global trade: 
by 2019, Vietnam-U.S. trade flows had grown to $77.6 billion, making Vietnam the 
seventh-largest source of U.S. imports and 27th-largest destination for U.S. exports.2  
Along with this historic trade growth has come a series of trade disputes 
between American and Vietnamese producers, chiefly regarding the imposition of the 
antidumping duty (“ADD”) and countervailing duty (“CVD”) laws by the United 
States against Vietnamese exports. Historically (prior to 2006), the CVD law did not 
apply to Vietnam: CVD is meant to offset distortions to the market caused by 
government intervention in the form of grants or subsidies to producers, and thus the 
CVD law was not used against “nonmarket economy” countries where the prevailing 
view was that there was no private market for the government to distort. Rather, against 
such countries, the United States focused on dumping and other trade remedies. As of 
2006, however, the U.S. Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) changed course and 
determined that sufficient market forces were at play even in nonmarket economies to 
 
1 See infra, notes 957-958. 
2 See infra, note 980. 
 2 
permit the identification and measurement of government distortion and thus to permit 
the imposition of the CVD law.3 Against that background, the author conducted 
research into problems and their potential solutions concerning the imposition of the 
CVD law against Vietnamese producers. 
 
1.2. Specific Scope and Questions of Research 
 
Applying the CVD law to nonmarket economy countries has caused several 
conflicts in the international trade regime. One problem, for instance, is double-
counting, or the idea that ADD and CVD will be duplicative of each other and thus 
unfairly harm the foreign producer of American imports; this paper discusses that 
concept somewhat as it pertains to the imposition of the CVD law in Vietnam.4 But a 
far greater problem has been the method of calculating the CVD itself. When the U.S. 
applies the CVD law to a market economy country, it is fairly easy in most cases to 
measure the countervailable subsidy: for instance, if a foreign producer is able to 
purchase raw materials at a reduced price due to a government subsidy on those 
materials, one can ordinarily compare the price paid by the producer to the market price 
of those materials in the country to determine the benefit of the subsidy (and thus the 
amount of CVD that the United States would impose). But when it comes to a 
nonmarket economy country, Commerce takes a different approach: because it does 
not trust that the prevailing prices in such a country are actually market-driven prices 
to begin with, Commerce uses benchmark prices from surrogate countries as the prices 
against which to measure the subsidies received by the foreign producer.5 This 
 
3 See infra, Section 4.3.2.4.3. 
4 See infra, Section 4.3.2.5. 
5 See infra, Sections 3.2.1.2.3 and 5.4.1.4. In some cases, even when imposing CVD against a market 
economy country, Commerce uses surrogate country benchmarks, but this practice is generally limited 
to cases in which there is no domestic market within the foreign producer’s country for the good or 
service being measured. 
 3 
methodology has prompted criticism that it is applied unfairly, inconsistently, or 
arbitrarily—and invariably to the detriment of the foreign producer.6  
This dissertation analyzes the imposition of the U.S. CVD law against Vietnam, 
with a particular focus on the implications of Vietnam’s status as a nonmarket economy 
country. Much has been said about the nonmarket economy method for determining 
antidumping duty rates, but this paper focuses on the methodology for calculating the 
CVD. This paper analyzes three problems that particularly afflict Vietnamese 
producers: (1) Commerce’s discretion in determining when a government program 
does or does not count as a countervailable subsidy; (2) the International Trade 
Commission’s discretion in determining when a subsidy does or does not cause actual 
or threatened injury to American industry; and (3) most of all, Commerce’s decision to 
treat Vietnam categorically as a nonmarket economy country despite the great increase 
in the prevalence of market-driven prices in many industries in recent decades. 
This third problem is this paper’s primary focus: Vietnam has been treated as 
having a nonmarket economy since that label was first imposed against it in 2002 in an 
antidumping investigation.7 But this paper will argue that Vietnam should take steps—
including the development of diplomatic ties with the United States and permitting 
greater proliferation of market-driven prices—that will lead to revocation of the 
nonmarket-economy label.8 As this paper will discuss, even countries like Russia and 
Ukraine have gained market economy treatment despite the prevalence of non-market-
driven prices in many arenas in those countries;9 it is possible that Vietnam could do 
likewise. Further, even if Vietnam cannot categorically be treated as having a market 
economy, this paper contends that it (and Vietnamese producers) should argue in trade 
proceedings that certain industries within Vietnam are “market-oriented industries” or, 
at a minimum, operate as “bubbles of capitalism” within which the market economy 
methodology should fairly be applied rather than the unfavorable nonmarket economy 
 
6 See, e.g., infra, Section 5.4.6.3 (discussing the risk of inaccuracy when Commerce compares province-
wide prices in Vietnam to city-wide benchmarks in dissimilar Indian cities). 
7 See infra, Section 5.2.2. 
8 See infra, Section 6.2. 
9 See infra, Section 5.3. 
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methodology.10 Moreover, in the interim, this paper argues that Commerce should 
decrease its use of third-country surrogate benchmark prices when measuring 
countervailable subsidies.11 Finally, this paper offers recommendations for Vietnamese 
entities facing a U.S. ADD or CVD investigation.12 
To some extent, Vietnam has assented to its misfortune in being treated as a 
nonmarket economy; after all, when it acceded to the WTO, it agreed to permit 
application of the nonmarket economy formulations through 2018 or until it 
demonstrated adoption of a market economy.13 Vietnam, however, has not yet sought 
review to challenge Commerce’s treatment of it as a nonmarket economy country. It is 
with that in mind that this paper sets forth recommendations for the Government of 
Vietnam and for Vietnamese producers as they continue to contend with the imposition 
of the nonmarket economy methodology. 
 
1.3. Structure of Research 
 
This paper proceeds in five subsequent chapters. In Chapter 2, this paper will 
discuss the history of the statutory language that underlies the U.S. trade regime. The 
purpose of the CVD law has been to offset subsidies granted by a foreign government 
to that country’s exporters, but identifying when government intervention counts as a 
“subsidy” has proved to be a complex undertaking. Understanding the history of the 
statutory language—and the longstanding ambiguities and lack of clear definitions for 
interpreting that language—is integral to understanding the trade disputes that continue 
to arise. In Chapter 3, this paper explores the elements of a subsidy with a focus on the 
distinction between permissible country-wide government benefits and countervailable 
industry-specific subsidies and on some of the difficulties in determining when a 
particular government intervention actually produces a market distortion that should be 
 
10 See infra, Section 6.3. 
11 See infra, Section 6.4. 
12 See infra, Section 6.5. 
13 See infra, Section 5.2.1. 
 5 
treated as a countervailable subsidy. Chapter 3 also discusses briefly the change 
wrought by the decision to apply the U.S. CVD law to nonmarket economy countries, 
which was permitted by a statute that Congress passed in 2012 and made retroactive to 
2006. In Chapter 4, this paper further analyzes the treatment of nonmarket economy 
countries in CVD proceedings, together with relevant U.S. and WTO litigation. In 
Chapter 5, this paper analyzes a series of cases involving Vietnam. These case studies 
will reveal which kinds of government programs are more or less likely to be treated 
as countervailable subsidies for the purpose of the CVD law, and they provide great 
lessons to Vietnamese producers in determining how to prepare for future CVD 
investigations. These case studies also provide insight into steps that the Vietnamese 
government and producers may take in order to minimize the risk of unfavorable 
outcomes in CVD investigations. Finally, in Chapter 6, the author makes several 
recommendations for the Government of Vietnam, for Vietnamese producers, and for 
the U.S. Department of Commerce. Even if Vietnam is not presently in a position to be 
treated as a market economy, the author contends that the U.S. Department of 
Commerce should apply the market economy methodology for calculating CVD 
against products made in a market-oriented industry or a “bubble of capitalism” within 
Vietnam. Likewise, the author recommends that the Government of Vietnam and 
Vietnamese producers take steps to increase the prevalence of such industries, as 





This paper employs a historical research methodology to analyze the legislative 
evolution of the countervailing duty laws. Based on the same methodology, the author 
also analyzes the origin and development of nonmarket economy treatment within the 
world trading system, particularly as the United States employs that treatment against 
nonmarket economy countries like Vietnam. The author’s methodology involved 
 6 
analysis of primary source documents such as analysis of filings and arguments made 
during trade disputes, documents concerning the accessions of various countries to 
trade organizations such as the WTO, and official documents imposing or challenging 
trade remedies. The purpose of this historical research is to clarify how Commerce 
practically utilizes the countervailing duty law in identifying and measuring subsidies 
in nonmarket economy countries, and how that utilization has developed 
contemporaneously with the relevant legislation.  
The author also employs a comparative analysis between administrative 
decisions and judicial decisions to clarify the interpretation and application of the 
countervailing duty law by relevant authorities. Finally, the author uses case study 
analysis of Chinese cases as a basis for further case study analysis of Vietnamese cases, 
which comprises a core component of this paper. The chronological presentation of 
case studies is intended to present the development of Commerce’s CVD methodology 
in a systematic manner that permits analysis of which features from each case were 
likely to contribute to a favorable or unfavorable resolution for the Vietnamese 
producer under investigation. This research aims to clarify issues of great practical 
importance for industry in Vietnam and for global trade more generally, particularly 
for businesses that have not yet faced a CVD proceeding and for their respective 
governments. The author’s recommendations aim to aid those entities in better 
understanding and navigating such a proceeding, and in taking the risks and 
consequences of such a proceeding into account when engaging in trade with the U.S. 
market.  
 
1.5. Originality and Value of Research 
 
This dissertation will, for the first time, analyze the legislative development of 
the U.S. CVD law, the origins of the disfavored treatment of nonmarket economy 
countries in CVD proceedings, and the application of the CVD law to Vietnam as a 
nonmarket economy country. This dissertation is also the first to present systematically 
 7 
all relevant CVD cases involving Vietnam. The aim of the research is to contribute to 
a clearer and more robust legal scholarship regarding the application of the CVD law 
to Vietnam.  
 8 
Chapter 2. Key Statutory Language 
 
 
This brief chapter discusses some of the important terminology that has been 
used in American trade regulations since the late 1800s. As later chapters will reveal, 
one of the persistent problems for foreign producers navigating American trade 
regulation has been the uncertainty of whether and when the United States will deem 
that an exporting country’s government has subsidized the production of exported 
goods. Integral to this uncertainty are both the lack of clear definitions in the governing 
statutes and the lack of clear guidance for the Department of Commerce in executing 
the governing statutes. Understanding the history of these statutes and the key language 
on which they rely is thus useful towards understanding current and future problems 
that arise as the United States applies antidumping or countervailing duties in 
previously unforeseen ways. 
The United States enacted the first “countervailing duty” provision as early as 
1890, but the core countervailing duty law was developed more extensively in 1930 in 
the Tariff Act of 1930, which was then amended in the following years. The concept 
of “countervailing duty” was originally established in 1890 to counteract “bounty” 
granted by European countries to exporters of beet sugar. Since enacting the Tariff Act 
of 1930, the U.S. government has been authorized to impose “countervailing duties” 
more generally on imported goods that had received some “bounty” or “grant” paid or 
bestowed by the government of an exporting country. Throughout the historical 
development of the U.S. trade remedy laws, the Tariff Act of 1930 has been amended 
several times to address issues pertaining to “subsidies,” especially “subsidies” from 
“nonmarket economy” countries. Under the U.S. countervailing duty law, 
countervailing duties are imposed on imported merchandise when its production or 
exportation benefits from government subsidies if such imports cause or threaten to 
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cause economic injuries to domestic U.S. industry.14 Some of the key terms to 
understand in relation to the countervailing duty law are “bounty or grant,” 
“countervailing duty,” “subsidy,” “market economy,” and “nonmarket economy.” 
Clarifying the definitions of such key terms in the context of the historical development 
of the countervailing duty laws will thus aid an understanding of how the countervailing 
duty law is interpreted and applied in specific investigations by U.S. government 
agencies. 
 
2.1. “Bounty” or “Grant” 
 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “bounty” as “a premium or benefit offered or 
given, especially by a government, to induce someone to take action or perform a 
service.”15 As for the term “grant,” the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary defines 
“grant” as “a sum of money that is given by government or by another organization to 
be used for a particular purpose.”16 In practice, the term “bounty” was used more 
frequently than the term “grant” during the legislative development of the U.S. 
countervailing duty laws in the 1930s.  
Historically, the term “bounty” was used for the first time in the Tariff Act of 
1890, which was a very basic countervailing duty law. Under this Act, the United States 
provided a bounty of 1.75 to two cents per pound for certain American sugar producers 
who satisfied various legal requirements.17 Importers of refined sugars, however, did 
not receive these benefits.18 On the other hand, an additional duty (above the ordinary 
duty) of one-tenth of one cent per pound applied to certain sugars that were imported 
from countries that paid bounties, directly or indirectly, on the export of such sugars, 
the idea being that the additional duty would at least partially offset the benefit of the 
 
14 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a). 
15 Bounty, Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). 
16 Grant, Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (8th ed. 2015). 
17 Tariff Act of 1890, para. 231, sched. E, 26 Stat. 567, 583 (1890). These bounties were provided to 
protect the domestic producers of refined sugars from imported sugars. 
18 Id. 
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bounty.19 Thus, the concept of “bounty” has been used for over 130 years, both to 
describe payments for American producers to promote domestic production and to 
describe payments made by foreign countries to support their sugar production and 
exportation (e.g., from Russia) that were then subject to an additional duty when 
importing into the American market. 
The Tariff Act of 1897, which is commonly recognized as the first general 
countervailing duty law, added the term “grant” and used it interchangeably with the 
term “bounty.”20 Although these two terms, “bounty” and “grant,” are very important 
in determining the levy to be imposed on imported merchandise, the U.S. Congress did 
not define what either term meant and offered little guidance on its intended scope or 
meaning, leaving the interpretation of the term and its scope to the enforcement 
authorities and to federal courts.21  
In a landmark 1903 case, Downs v. United States,22 the U.S. Supreme Court 
analyzed the definition of “bounty” to determine whether Russia’s remission of excise 
taxes upon exported sugar was a bounty. Justice Brown relied on one dictionary 
definition that a “bounty” was as “a premium offered or given to induce men to enlist 
into the public service; or to encourage any branch of industry, as husbandry or 
manufactures.”23 Another dictionary defined it as “an additional benefit conferred upon 
or a compensation paid to a class of persons.”24 All nine Justices agreed with the 
 
19 Peter D. Ehrenhaft, Protection Against International Price Discrimination: United States 
Countervailing and Antidumping Duties, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 44 (1958), at 52. 
20 Tariff Act of 1897, sec. 5, 30 Stat. 151, July 24, 1897. Section 5 of the Act provides: 
“That whenever any country … shall pay or bestow, directly or indirectly, any bounty or grant upon the 
exportation of any article or merchandise from such country, … then upon the importation of any such 
article or merchandise into the United States, … there shall be levied and paid […] an additional duty 
equal to the net amount of such bounty or grant, however the same be paid or bestowed.” 
21 PERCY W. BIDWELL, THE INVISIBLE TARIFF, Council of Foreign Relations 87 (1939). 
22 Downs v. United States, 187 U.S. 496 (1903) (The Court held that an export “bounty” had been 
conferred by a complicated Russian scheme for the regulation of sugar production and sale involving 
remission of excise taxes in the event of export and involving the issuance of a transferable export 
certificate; the value of this certificate was based on the difference between the domestic and foreign 
market prices of sugar at the time of export. The Court reviewed the Russian export scheme, which, 
while imposing a tax on all sugar produced, remitted the tax on all sugar exported.). See also Eric 
Garfinkel, Export Subsidies: Countervailing Duties, 11 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 187 (1979). 
23 Id. at 501. 
24 Id. 
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holding that the government of Russia had in fact conveyed a bounty when it secured 
to the exporter “a money reward or gratuity whenever [the exporter] exports sugar from 
Russia.”25 
In Carlisle Tire and Rubber Co. v. United States,26 the Court of International 
Trade (“CIT”) noted, in evaluating the reasonableness of an estimated bounty or grant, 
that “nowhere in the legislative history of section 303 [of the Tariff Act of 1930] is 
there a definition of ‘bounty’ or ‘grant’.”27 The CIT opined that Congress refrained 
from “spelling out” the standards for determining what constitutes a bounty or grant 
because Congress intended for that term to be interpreted “judicially and through 
administrative practice.”28 In this case, the court agreed with an interpretation by the 
Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) that “bounty or grant” connotes “some 
special or comparative advantage conferred upon an industry or group of industries” 
and that is “not available to all manufacturers and producers within a given country.” 
Commerce also believed that there can be no bounty or grant if there is no industry-
specific or regional preference: that is, the provision of generally applicable 
government services or policies that are available to all industries could not on its own 
be treated as a bounty or grant.29 
During more recent legislative development of the countervailing duty law 
since 1974, the terms bounty and grant were replaced with the term “subsidy,” which 





25 Id. at 516. 
26 Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 564 F. Supp. 834 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1983). 
27 Id. at 838. 
28 Id. Under § 303(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 687, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (1976 
ed.), whenever a foreign country pays a “bounty or grant” upon the exportation of a product from that 
country, the Secretary of the Treasury is required to levy a countervailing duty, “equal to the net amount 
of such bounty or grant,” upon importation of the product into the United States. See Zenith Radio Corp. 
v. United States, 437 U.S. 443 (1978). 
29 Id. 
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Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “subsidy” as: 
[A] grant, usually made by the government, to any enterprise whose 
promotion is considered to be in the public interest. Although 
governments sometimes make direct payment (such as cash grants), 
subsidies are usually indirect. They may take the form of research-
and-development support, tax breaks, provision of raw materials at 
below market prices, or low-interest loans or low-interest export 
credits guaranteed by a government agency.30 
In the Trade Act of 1974,31 the term “subsidy” appeared for the first time in the 
statutory language, but, unsurprisingly, the Act did not define what “subsidy” meant. 
In a landmark administrative case, Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland,32 Commerce 
defined it as follows: “a subsidy (or bounty or grant) is any action that distorts or 
subverts the market process and results in a misallocation of resources, encouraging 
inefficient production and lessening world wealth.”  
Notably, the Trade Act of 1974 marked a turning point that called for the 
President to seek “any revisions necessary to define the forms of subsidy to industries 
producing products for export and the forms of subsidy to attract foreign investment 
which are consistent with an open, nondiscriminatory, and fair system of international 
trade.”33 This provision paved the way for the term “subsidy” to be defined, and its 
definitions further refined in the international trade regime.  
When Congress enacted the Trade Agreements Act of 197934 to conform the 
U.S. countervailing duty law to the GATT Subsidies Code,35 the term “subsidy” was 
defined as having the same meaning as the term “bounty or grant.”36 In essence, the 
 
30 Subsidy, Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 15. 
31 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978. 
32 Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland; Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determination, 49 FR 19374 
(May 7, 1984). 
33 19 U.S.C. § 2131(a)(11). 
34 The Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 144 (1979). 
35 Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade, concluded on April 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619, 1186 U.N.T.S. 
204 [hereinafter Subsidies Code]. 
36 Trade Act of 1974, supra note 31, at Sec. 771(5). 
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term “subsidy” was seen to be very broad, such that it may include both bounties and 
grants. Although the Subsidies Code had not defined “subsidy,” it did provide a list of 
prohibited export subsidies in an illustrative Annex to the Subsidies Code.37 
Since the Subsidies Code lacked a definition of “subsidy,” theoretically, all 
kinds of government interventions that potentially distorted trade could be 
countervailable, as was the case under the U.S. law.38 As successfully urged by many 
developed countries, a definition of “subsidy” was finally included in the 1994 WTO 
Subsidies Agreement.39 Unlike the GATT Subsidies Code, the Subsidies Agreement 
made considerable improvements in defining certain key terms, and notably it provides 
an “internationally agreed-upon definition” of the term “subsidy.”40 Its definition 
appears to apply throughout the agreement, including the provisions of the 
countervailing duties as well.41 Right from the beginning article of the Subsidies 
Agreement, the term “subsidy” is defined as “a financial contribution by a government 
or any public body,” which can occur with various practices such as direct funds 
transfer, foregone revenue, or the provision of goods or services other than general 
infrastructure.42  
To be consistent with the Subsidies Agreement, the U.S. Congress amended the 
related countervailing duty provisions by passing the Uruguay Round Agreements Act 
 
37 There are twelve categories of prohibited export subsidies listed in the Annex, Illustrative List of 
Export Subsidies, to the Subsidies Code. These include, for example, direct subsidies by a government 
to a firm or an industry contingent upon export performance; currency retention schemes that involve a 
bonus or exports, etc. 
38 DOMINIC COPPENS, WTO DISCIPLINES ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES: BALANCING 
POLICY SPACE AND LEGAL CONSTRAINTS 33 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2014). 
39 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Annex 1A, Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, April 15, 1994, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1533 (1994) 
[hereinafter Subsidies Agreement or SCM Agreement]. 
40 GARY N. HORLICK, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: ANTIDUMPING, 
SUBSIDIES AND TRADE AGREEMENTS 203 (World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. 2014). 
41 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS 291 (2nd ed., MIT 1997). 
42 Subsidies Agreement, supra note 39, at Article 1. 
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of 1994.43 Similarly, that law provides that a “subsidy” occurs when an “authority”44 
provides a “financial contribution”45 or “any form of income or price support within 
the meaning of Article XVI of the GATT 1994.” Importantly, a subsidy exists only 
where “a benefit is thereby conferred.”46 In other words, the definition of “subsidy” is 
limited only to those benefits conferred by a government or a public entity.47 In the 
case studies discussed in Chapter 5, this concept will play out in the trade battles 
between Vietnamese exporters and the U.S. Department of Commerce: over and over 
again, the question arises whether the Government of Vietnam’s participation in 
markets for raw materials, its influence upon land rents, or its tax policies, for instance, 
count as a countervailable “subsidy.” 
As compared with the Subsidies Agreement, the U.S. law provides a narrower 
definition in terms of focusing only on identifying countervailable subsidies, while the 
Subsidies Agreement provides not only what constitutes a countervailable subsidy, but 
also how to measure a benefit more generally.48 
 
2.3. “Countervailing Duty”  
 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term “countervailing duty” as “a tax 
imposed on manufacturers of imported goods to protect domestic industry by offsetting 
subsidies given by foreign governments to those manufacturers.”49 This definition is 
 
43 The Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) [hereinafter 
URAA]. 
44 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (5)(B) (The term “authority” means a government of a country or any public entity 
within the territory of the country). 
45 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (5)(B)(i) and (D) (The term “financial contribution” means: (i) the direct transfer of 
funds, such as grants, loans, and equity infusions, or the potential direct transfer of funds or liabilities, 
such as loan guarantees; (ii) foregoing or not collecting revenue that is otherwise due, such as granting 
tax credits or deductions from taxable income; (iii) providing goods or services, other than general 
infrastructure; or (iv) purchasing goods). 
46 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (5)(B). 
47 Sanghan Wang, U.S. Trade Laws Concerning Nonmarket Economies Revisited for Fairness and 
Consistency, 10 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 593 (1996), at 594. 
48 HORLICK (2014), supra note 40, at 204. 
49 Countervailing duty, Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 15. 
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very close to how the countervailing duty is employed under applicable U.S. 
countervailing duty law.  
In the past, a countervailing duty was used as a kind of surtax, imposed in 
addition to normal customs duties, upon those imports whose exportation had been 
subsidized by bounties or grants or similar assistance in the exporting country.50 Such 
additional duty was believed to be used intentionally to help neutralize foreign 
subsidies, and therefore to prevent injury to the American producers of comparable 
products who operate without the benefit of such subsidies.51 
Historically, there were two types of countervailing duties: (i) countervailing 
duties imposed upon imports receiving a bounty for manufacture, production, or export, 
and (ii) countervailing duties imposed upon imports from a country imposing higher 
rates on products from the United States.52 The term “countervailing duties” was 
originally applied to denote not only duties designed to offset bounties, but also 
“contingent” duties, i.e., duties contingent upon the rate of duty assessed by foreign 
governments upon certain American products.53 The concept of using countervailing 
duties was assumed to make the American protective system “watertight” or insulated 
(i.e., to prevent foreign governments or foreign business associations from offsetting 
through bounties the import duties of the United States).54 Throughout the evolution of 
U.S. legislation together with its integration into the global trade system, countervailing 
duty has been limited to being imposed only on a subsidized product, and the amount 
of duty must be equal to the amount of net subsidy.55 In other words, a countervailing 
duty is basically a duty equal to a grant or bounty extended or paid to an exporter by 
 
50 Ehrenhaft (1958), supra note 19, at 54. 
51 Id. 
52 Tariff Act of 1922, Ch. 356, 42 Stat. 858 (1922), at 909, 925, and 935 (or § 303). 
53 BIDWELL (1939), supra note 21, at 86. (The author also provides an example that under the original 
Tariff Act of 1930, bicycles were dutiable at 30 percent ad valorem, but if any country taxed American 
bicycles at more than 30 percent, then the American duty on bicycles from that country was increased 
to equal to the foreign duty, but in no case above 50 percent. This provision and similar provisions for 
duties on automotive products, paper board, etc. were generally considered to violate MFN commitments 
in American treaties and commercial agreements and on that account were repealed by the Reciprocal 
Trade Agreements Act of 1934). 
54 Id. at 87. 
55 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2). 
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its home country to encourage exportation, or to aid the exporters and manufacturers 
in confronting fierce competition.56 Thus, countervailing duties are intended to 
eliminate the competitive advantage sought to be gained by government subsidization 
of its own exporters.57 
Under the WTO regime, the term “countervailing duty” meant “a special duty 
levied for the purpose of offsetting any subsidy bestowed directly or indirectly upon 
the manufacture, production or export of merchandise,” and that regime likewise limits 
the amount of countervailing duty being imposed to “an amount equal to the estimated 
bounty or subsidy determined to have been granted.”58  
 
2.4. “Market Economy” v. “Nonmarket Economy” 
 
Drawing a bright line between “market” and “nonmarket” economies is always 
a controversial endeavor because, to some extent, all world economies are mixed.59 It 
may seem that the concept of a “nonmarket economy” is simply the opposite of a 
“market economy.”60 However, the reality of defining these terms is more complicated 
because each economic system has had many variants during the evolution of modern 
economic reforms as well as on account of the development of nations’ laws and 
principles to meet market demands. Hence, it is a gross oversimplification to say that a 
“nonmarket economy” is simply the opposite of a “market economy.”61 
 
56 See generally Paul W. Jameson, The Administration of the U.S. Countervailing Duty Laws with Regard 
to Domestic Subsidies: Where It’s Been, Where It Is, Where It May Go, 12 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 
59 (1985); Craig M. Brown, Bounty or Grant: A Call for Redefinition in Light of the Zenith Decision, 9 
LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1229 (1977). 
57 See Brown (1977), supra note 56, at 1252. 
58 The definition of “countervailing duties” in footnote 36 to Article 10 of the SCM Agreement echoes 
the definition of that term in Article VI:3 of the GATT 1994. See SCM Agreement, supra note 39, at 
Article 10 (footnote 36); General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 
(1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994], at Article VI:3. 
59 Gary N. Horlick & Shannon S. Shuman, Nonmarket Economy Trade and U.S. 
Antidumping/Countervailing Duty Laws, 18 INT’L LAW. 807, 830 (1984). 
60 Francis Snyder, The Origins of the Nonmarket Economy: Ideas, Pluralism and Power in EC Anti-
Dumping Law about China, 7 EUR L.J. 369, 373 (2001). 
61 Id. 
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And yet, the international trade regime has continually sought to draw such a 
bright line between market and nonmarket economies, for reasons not particularly well 
articulated, let alone justified, by anyone. Neither GATT nor the U.S. antidumping and 
countervailing duty laws specify why the distinction has persisted, but as a result of the 
distinction, only the costs and prices in market economy countries are treated as 
legitimate.62 Although developed countries such as the United Kingdom and the United 
States - important drafters and founders of GATT - understand their own economic 
systems and the market or nonmarket features of other economic systems,63 they have 
not provided clear definitions to distinguish a market economy from a nonmarket 
economy for the purpose of applying multilateral trade agreements or even in applying 
their own domestic laws. This glaring omission has worked to the detriment of such 
countries as Vietnam, which is broadly categorized as a nonmarket economy and which 
can only escape the negative consequences of that categorization if other countries, in 
their generally unfettered discretion, see fit to recognize Vietnam’s economic reforms 
as sufficiently market-oriented to make it a market economy. Perhaps a statutory 
criterion defining “market economy” or “nonmarket economy” would be “too brief to 
be truly meaningful.”64 In practice, some of Commerce’s investigators used to say: 
“You know it if you see it.”65 And so, it remains the case that nebulous standards govern 
whether a country is considered by other governments to engage primarily in market 
or nonmarket behaviors.66 
 
 
62 William P. Alford, When is China Paraguay? An Examination of the Application of the Antidumping 
and Countervailing Duty Laws of the United States to China and Other “Nonmarket Economy” Nations, 
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 79 (1987), at 114. 
63 See PAUL R. GREGORY AND ROBERT C. STUART, COMPARING ECONOMIC SYSTEMS IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 19 (Seventh Ed., Houghton Mifflin Company 2004), (discussing and comparing various 
economic systems. According to Gregory and Stuart, “an economic system is a set of institutions for 
decision making and for the implementation of decisions concerning production, income, and 
consumption within a given geographic area. According to this definition, the economic system consists 
of mechanisms, organizational arrangements, and decision-making rules.”). 




2.4.1. “Market economy”  
 
As is commonly understood, a market is a place of commercial activity in which 
goods and services are bought and sold,67 and an economy is the management or 
administration of the wealth and resources of a state or a country.68 As defined by the 
Corporate Finance Institute, a “market economy” is an economy where the production 
and provision of goods and services operate in accordance with the laws of supply and 
demand in the general market; the market players—individuals and corporations, 
instead of governments—take a key role in directing that market.69 In reality, the 
definition of “market economy” is highly complex because each country has its own 
economic system with different levels of market orientation in their laws and principles. 
There are, however, countries that are either “market-driven” or “government-driven” 
to varying degrees.70 
 
2.4.2. “Nonmarket Economy” 
 
Generally, the term “nonmarket economy” is understood to be an economy in 
which the allocation of goods and resources is planned by the government rather than 
by prices set in a market in a free manner.71 Such operation is contrary to the rules of 
supply and demand commonly utilized in a market economy. In fact, however, the role 
of the government is present in the operations of most economies, even in classic 
market economies. But depending on the extent of the government’s involvement, its 
economic form may be classified as a “state-trading”, or a “state-controlled economy,” 
 
67 Market, Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 15. 
68 Economy, Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 15. 
69 See Corporate Finance Institute, What is a Market Economy?, available at 
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/economics/definition-market-economy/, 
accessed on March 29, 2019. 
70 DOMINIQUE DE RAMBURES, WHAT IS THE SOCIALIST MARKET ECONOMY? THE CHINA DEVELOPMENT 
MODEL BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE MARKET 9-10 (Palgrave Macmillan UK 2015). 
71 JOHN H. JACKSON AND WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 1174 (2nd ed., West 1986). 
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“centrally-planned economy,” or “transition economy.” All of these economic forms 
are generally classified within the set of nonmarket economy (“NME”).  
One scholar opines that in an NME country, the government usually claims 
ownership of most means of production and makes decisions as to what is produced 
and how it is distributed within the society in question.72 Therefore, there is no price 
mechanism wherein the supply and demand interact to allocate resources or incentivize 
or disincentivize various production decisions.73 It has also been claimed that in an 
NME country, the government “heavily intervenes in the setting of relative prices” and, 
as a result, “the ultimate prices and costs” usually “reflect[] political, economic or 
bureaucratic factors rather than local supply and demand.”74 Such an assessment is 
closer to a description of the operations of a so-called “centrally-planned economy.” In 
a centrally planned economy country, every trading activity is planned. The flow of 
trade or the flow of export–import is planned according to the government’s economic 
plan. Such economic plans may be set for five years at a time, as was in the case in the 
former Soviet Union, China, and Vietnam, for the purposes of economic development. 
According to Edmond M. Ianni, a centrally-planned economy or a nonmarket 
economy has four features: (1) a national economic plan of the state that determines 
resource allocation; (2) the determination of imports and exports by national economic 
planning; (3) the state’s fixing of domestic prices, which, therefore, do not fluctuate 
freely in response to supply and demand; and (4) nonconvertible currencies, which may 
be neither transferred outside the country nor freely converted into any Western 
currency.75 
Importantly, the global trade economy has operated in a mix of countries with 
different economic mechanisms including market economies, nonmarket economies or 
 
72 David James Cichanowicz, Countervailing Duties and Non-Market Economies: The Case of the 
Peoples Republic of China, 10 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 405 (1983). 
73 Id. (citing footnote 2; the author also stated that nonmarket economy countries are simply those in the 
former Communist and Eastern Bloc.). 
74 Horlick & Shuman (1984), supra note 59, at 818. 
75 Edmond M. Ianni, State Trading: Its Nature and International Treatment, 5 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 
46, 49 (1983). (Cited in footnote 19, citing K. DAM, THE GATT-LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
ORGANIZATION 318 (1970)). 
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mixed economies. Further, there are other more nuanced descriptors, such as state-
trading economy, state controlled (or centrally planned) economy, transition economy, 
etc.76 Since a national economy is complex, labeling a country simply as having a 
nonmarket economy or market economy will not always be accurate.77 Furthermore, it 
is difficult and complicated to draw a clear line between a nonmarket economy and a 
market economy, especially in the case of a mixed economy (i.e., a planned economy 
that incorporates features of a market economy)78 or a transition economy (i.e., an 
economy that is transforming from a planned economy to a market-oriented economy 
in order to adapt to the requirements of international trade commitments) operating 
based on market-oriented principles. And, of course, even in the most developed market 
economy there are some resources owned or controlled by the government.79 In a 
socialist country with public ownership, if a government is too involved or interferes 
too much in its economic operations, that country is deemed to be “more non-market” 
than other countries. 
Therefore, defining a country as having a nonmarket economy is only 
meaningful and helpful to the extent that it helps one country use that distinction to 
enforce its antidumping and countervailing duty laws advantageously against countries 
that it defines as having nonmarket economies, in order to protect domestic industry 
from injuries caused by dumped or subsidized exports from a purportedly nonmarket 
economy country.  
In the case of the United States, its trade law defines a “nonmarket economy” 
country as a country that the Department of Commerce determines “does not operate 
on market principles of cost or pricing structures, so that sales of merchandise in such 
 
76 See Alexander Polouektov, Non-Market Economy, Issues in the WTO Anti-Dumping Law and 
Accession Negotiations: Revival of a Two-tier Membership?, 36(I) J. WORLD TRADE 1, 1-37 (2002) 
(describing a group of countries such as the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern European countries 
that adopted a centrally planned economic system rather than a market mechanism for economic 
activities). 
77 Horlick & Shuman (1984), supra note 59, at 819. 
78 Ianni (1983), supra note 75, at 62. 
79 BIN ZHANG, THE EVOLUTION OF THE NON-MARKET ECONOMY TREATMENT IN THE MULTILATERAL 
TRADING SYSTEM 3 (Springer, Singapore 2018). 
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a country do not reflect the fair value of the merchandise.”80 This amorphous definition 
was used against purported nonmarket economies only in antidumping cases, and it 
was used regardless of whether the target of the antidumping case had a mixed or 
transition economy, until Congress changed the law in 2012 to apply the countervailing 
duty law to target purported nonmarket economies as well. The Department of 
Commerce has designated the following eleven countries as NMEs: Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.81 As this paper will argue, Vietnam should take steps to be 
recategorized as a market rather than a nonmarket economy—and Commerce should 
exercise its discretion to recognize Vietnam as such—in order to avoid the negative 
trade consequences that attend nonmarket economy status. 
 
2.5. “Double Counting” 
 
Although this paper focuses primarily on countervailing duty laws, many of the 
countervailing duty cases operate alongside parallel antidumping investigations, in 
which case an allegation of “double counting” may arise. The term “double counting,” 
also known as “double remedy,” refers to the simultaneous imposition of both 
countervailing duties and antidumping duties upon the same imported merchandise at 
issue. In some cases, the targets of the investigation have argued that imposing both 
duties is duplicative because it offsets the same subsidization twice.82 
 
 
80 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(A). 
81 U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, NME Country List, available at 
https://www.trade.gov/nme-countries-list, accessed on April 30, 2019. 
82 WT/DS379/AB/R of 11 March 2011, US - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on 
Certain Products from China, para. 541. 
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Chapter 3. U.S. Countervailing Duty Legislation 
 
 
It can be said that the U.S. countervailing duty laws were initially aimed at 
protecting fairness in international trade. Likewise, the antidumping laws aim to 
prevent imported merchandise from being sold in the United States at less than its fair 
value. Unlike antidumping duties, countervailing duties are used to countervail or 
offset bounties, grants, or subsidies provided by a foreign government to its exporters 
and producers by imposing countervailing duties to the imported goods. Indeed, the 
playing field is not fair when a country is using public funds to grant advantages to 
private exporters and producers. 
In this Chapter, the author will first delve into enactments and developments of 
the U.S. countervailing duty laws. Then, the author analyzes the provisions of the 
countervailing duty law in the application of countervailing duties to subsidized 
imports. 
 
3.1. Historical Background and Legislative Evolution 
 
3.1.1. Pre-1930 Laws 
 
The goal of protecting American manufacturers from foreign competing 
imports, while simultaneously encouraging or aiding them to gain more advantages in 
domestic home market has long been a concern of the United States, present even in 
1791.83 In 1791, Alexander Hamilton proposed that a special duty be imposed on 
 
83 Alexander Hamilton’s Final Version of the Subject of Manufactures (December 5, 1791, available 
online at 
https://founders.archives.gov/?q=countervailing%20AND%20duty&s=1511311111&r=6#ARHN-01-
10-02-0001-0007-fn-0125, accessed on March 13, 2018. See also Peter Buck Feller, Mutiny against 
the Bounty: An Examination of Subsidies, Border Tax Adjustments, and the Resurgence of the 
Countervailing Duty Law, 1 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 17, 19 (1969). 
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certain subsidized foreign commodities imported into the United States and that the 
received revenue be used in turn to provide bounties for the domestic production 
(including production for export) of such commodities.84 Hamilton’s rationale was 
based on an assumption that “certain nations grant bounties on the exportation of 
particular commodities to enable their own workmen to undersell and supplant all 
competitors, in the countries to which those commodities are sent.”85  
However, Hamilton’s concept for imposition of a kind of countervailing duty 
had to wait for a century to be adopted in the Tariff Act of 1890.86 It was an important 
historical milestone for the beginning of using countervailing duties against subsidized 
imports. At that time, the countervailing duty provision was very simple. The Act was 
enacted simply to protect American sugar producers from unfair foreign competition.87 
The purpose of the Act was to provide for a fixed countervailing duty (i.e., a fixed 
amount per pound) on refined sugar imported from the nations that “pay, directly or 
indirectly, a [greater] bounty on the exportation of” refined sugar than on raw sugar.88  
In 1894, the first countervailing duty provision under the Tariff Act of 1890 
was reenacted, but this time it was extended to all imported sugar, raw as well as refined 
sugar.89 Thus, under the 1894 Act, all sugars imported from any country that “pays, 
directly or indirectly, a bounty on the export thereof” would be subject to a fixed duty.90  
Both Tariff Acts of 1890 and 1894 imposed countervailing duties only to sugar 
as a bountied product. In 1897 came the first time that a generally applicable 
countervailing duty law was passed, in Section 5 of the Tariff Act of 1897.91 The 1897 
Act expanded its scope of application to all dutiable products receiving bounties or 
 
84 Alexander Hamilton (1791), supra note 83. (Hamilton proposed that “one per cent duty on the foreign 
article converted into a bounty on the domestic, will have an equal effect with a duty of two per cent, 
exclusive of such bounty; and the price of the foreign commodity is liable to be raised.”. 
85 Id. 
86 Tariff Act of 1890, para. 237, sched. E, 26 Stat. 567, 583 (1890). 
87 Id. 
88 Zenith Radio Corporation v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 451-52 (1978). 
89 Id. 
90 Tariff Act of 1894, para. 182, sched. E, 28 Stat. 521 (1894). 
91 Tariff Act of 1897, para 205, § 5, 30 Stat. 151, 205 (1897). 
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grants upon exportation.92 Under this Act, “countervailing duty” was clearly defined as 
“an additional duty equal to the net amount of such bounty or grant” to be imposed, in 
addition to all other levied duties, upon countries that “pay or bestow, directly or 
indirectly, any bounty or grant upon the exportation of any article or merchandise from 
such country.”93 That means that the amount of countervailing duty to be imposed 
would be equal to the net amount of any bounty or grant paid directly or indirectly on 
exportation.94 Also, by this Act, Congress authorized the Secretary of Treasury to 
administer and determine the amount of countervailing duty. Remarkably, there was 
no requirement for finding an injury caused to a domestic producer or an industry, and 
imposition of countervailing duties was mandatory.95 The Secretary of Treasury and 
the President had no authority to waive the mandatory duties.96  
Subsequently, the countervailing duty on imports contained in the 1897 Act was 
reenacted without any changes in the Tariff Acts of 1909 and 1913.97 
In 1922, Congress amended the countervailing duty law to cover both export 
and domestic subsidies.98 In particular, section 5 of the 1922 Act extended the 
imposition of countervailing duties to those bounties or grants that were bestowed upon 
the manufacture or production of goods and on their exportation.99 According to 
Barceló, export subsidies are defined as those grants paid by the foreign government 
upon export.100 On the other hand, manufacture or production bounties are domestic 




94 Zenith Radio Corporation v. United States, supra note 88, at 452-53. 
95 D.B. King, Countervailing Duties - An Old Remedy with New Appeal, 24 BUS. LAW. 1179 (1969). 
96 John J. Barceló III, A History of GATT Unfair Trade Remedy Law - Confusion of Purposes, CORNELL 
LAW FACULTY PUBLICATIONS, Paper 517 (1991). 
97 Tariff Act of 1909, § 6, ch.6, 36 Stat. 11 (1909) and Tariff Act of 1913, para. E, § IV, 38 Stat. 114 
(1913). 
98 Tariff Act of 1922, supra note 52. 
99 Id. 
100 John J. Barceló III, Subsidies, Countervailing Duties and Antidumping After the Tokyo Round, 13 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 257, 261 (1980). 
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the end product.101 The Act also applied to bounties or grants bestowed by a private 
source such as “person, partnership, association, cartel, or corporation.”102 Besides 
such changes, all other concepts inherited from the 1897 Act still remained. 
 
3.1.2. The Tariff Act of 1930 
 
In 1930, Congress reenacted the Tariff Act of 1922 and incorporated it into 
Section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930.103 The purpose of the Act was to provide revenue, 
to regulate trade with foreign countries, to promote domestic industries, and to protect 
American jobs.104 Notably, the Tariff Act of 1930, also known as the Smoot-Hawley 
Act, was blamed for being the most highly protectionist act.105 In reality, the Act, 
however, offered many significant contributions to U.S. trade laws. It provided an 
important basis for the current tariff system, for example, by establishing a uniform 
U.S. tariff schedule.106  
More importantly, Section 303 of the Act has become the principal provisions 
for countervailing duties imposed against foreign subsidies, and it is also the legislative 
foundation for trade remedy laws in effect today. The imposition of countervailing 
duties is applied to all dutiable goods that have received export bounties or grants, 
whether that source of subsidy be public or private, collective or individual.107 The Act 
allows the Secretary of the Treasury, with broad discretion, to “ascertain and determine, 
or estimate” the net amount of the bounty or grant.108 Then the Secretary of Treasury 
 
101 John J. Barceló III, Subsidies and Countervailing Duties - Analysis and a Proposal, 9 LAW & POL’Y 
INT’L BUS. 779, 780-81 (1977). (citing JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 365-
66 (1969)). 
102 John J. Barceló III (1977), supra note 101, at 936. 
103 Tariff Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 590 (1930). 
104 Id. at preamble. 
105 JAE WAN CHUNG, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE: U.S. TRADE LAW, POLICY, 
AND SOCIAL COST 15 (Lexington Books 2006). (According to Chung, the Act raised the average tariff 
rate from 38.2 percent in 1930 to 55.3 percent in 1931). 
106 Id. 
107 Tariff Act of 1930, supra note 103, at § 303. See Ehrenhaft (1958), supra note 19, at 55. 
108 Tariff Act of 1930, supra note 107. 
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will declare its findings and assess a duty equal to the net amount.109 The Secretary of 
the Treasury also has power to make all regulations necessary for finding the bountied 
products and for assessing and collecting the additional duties.110 
Importantly, there were efforts to add an injury test and other amendments to 
the countervailing duty law, but these proposed amendments died in Congress in 1951, 
1952, and 1953.111  
 
3.1.3. The Trade Act of 1974 
 
From 1967 to 1974, with the effects of multilateral trade negotiations (i.e., the 
Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations) leading to the creation of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947, there were efforts in the United 
States to extend the President’s authority in trade negotiations and, concurrently, 
“potent forces’’ from developing countries in calling for changes from tariff barriers to 
non-tariff trade barriers.112 As a result, the Trade Act of 1974 was enacted, and it 
substantially extended the scope of the countervailing duty law under Section 303 of 
the Tariff Act of 1930.113  
First, the Act authorizes the President to enter into trade agreements with 
foreign countries and also grants the power to proclaim any modification or 
continuance of any existing duty-free policy or to impose additional duties if the 
President determines such to be required or appropriate to carry out any trade 
agreement.114 Second, to impose the countervailing duties upon any imported product 
that falls into the list of duty-free merchandise, the International Trade Commission 




111 Feller (1969), supra note 83, at 26. 
112 Mark H. Barth & Barry H. Nemmers, A Roadmap to the Trade Act, 8 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 125 
(1976). 
113 Trade Act of 1974, supra note 31. 
114 Id. § 101(a) (1) and (2), at 1982. 
115 Id. § 171(a), at 2009. Under this Act, the U.S. Tariff Commission was renamed as the U.S. 
International Trade Commission. 
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in question “is being or is likely to be injured or is prevented from being established.”116 
Accordingly, an injury test clause was for the first time established under this Act, but 
it applied only to duty-free merchandise, and all dutiable imports were still not subject 
to the injury test.117 Before 1974, there was no injury test to any dutiable items because 
Section 303’s application predated the GATT and, as such, fell within its “grandfather 
clause” exemption; however, an extension of such coverage to duty-free goods was not 
covered by the exemption.118 
Notably, the Act had no specific provisions on the application of Section 303 
of the Tariff Act of 1930 to nonmarket economy countries. However, it provided 
separate provisions on “market disruption” to tackle imports from Communist 
countries.119 Such action was considered an alternative trade remedy to protect the 
American industry from market disruption caused by imports from Communist 
countries. Besides these major changes, the definition of countervailing duties under 
Section 303 of the 1930 Act remained the same and was incorporated into Section 331 
of the Act.120 
A remarkable change of the Act was the requirement that the Secretary of 
Treasury publish a notice of initiation and the investigation determination (whether 
affirmative or negative) in the Federal Register.121 Prior to this procedural change, the 
Treasury Department merely released a very simple determination and did not include 
the findings of fact and law in its determinations.122 
 
3.1.4. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 
 
 
116 Id. § 331 (a) (2), at 2049. 
117 Robert David Arkin, Countervailing Duty Law after Zenith: Unanimity Can be Beguiling, The, 18 
VA J. INT’L L. 245 (1978). 
118 Philip D. Jr. O’Neill, United States Countervailing Duty Law: Renewed, Revamped and Revisited--
Trade Act of 1974, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 832, 856 (1976). 
119 Trade Act of 1974, supra note 31, at Section 406 (a)(1) (codified at 19 U.S.C.§ 2436). 
120 Id. at § 331(a), at 2049. 
121 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(6). 
122 Jameson (1985), supra note 56, at 64. 
 28 
In 1979, to approve and implement the trade agreements negotiated under the 
Trade Act of 1974, U.S. Congress enacted the Trade Agreements Act (TAA) of 1979.123 
Specifically, the TAA of 1979 was enacted to implement the GATT Subsidies Code 
under U.S. law.124 The TAA of 1979 substantially amended the countervailing duty law 
and created procedures, much like those applicable to antidumping proceedings, to 
implement the Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and 
XXIII of the GATT, commonly called the Subsidies Code.125 In particular, the TAA of 
1979 added a completely new title (Title VII - Countervailing and Antidumping Duties) 
to the Tariff Act of 1930. The TAA of 1979 also requires an injury determination in all 
cases involving nondutiable goods. In cases involving dutiable goods, the TAA of 1979 
requires an injury determination if the goods are from a signatory to the Subsidies Code 
or from a country that has a reciprocal obligation with the United States similar to that 
under the GATT, or from a country accorded most favored nation status.126 Imports 
from a country that does not fall into one of the above conditions are regulated by the 
Tariff Act of 1930 (as amended), and an injury test is not required.127 When conducting 
an injury test, the ITC was responsible for determining whether an American industry 
was “materially injured” or “threatened with material injury,” or whether the 
establishment of the American industry was “materially retarded.”128  
It is important to note that the TAA of 1979 also provided some much-needed 
clarification on which subsidies were countervailable.129 In compliance with the 
GATT’s treatment of export subsidies, the TAA of 1979 provided that all such 
subsidies would be countervailable.130 Importantly, a “specificity test” was introduced 
 
123 The Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 144 (1979). 
124 JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY, AND ALAN O. SYKES, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 923 (5th ed., West 2008). 
125 Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the GATT, April 12, 
1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619 [hereinafter the Subsidies Code]. See Judith Hippler Bello, 
Current Subsidy and Antidumping Issues after the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, 21 STAN. J. INT’L L. 
299, 303 (1985); Jackson el al. (2008), supra note 124, at 923. 
126 Subsidies Code, supra note 125, at Section 701(2)(A)(B) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1671(c)). 
127 Id. at Section 701(c) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1303). 
128 Id. 
129 JACKSON et al. (2008), supra note 124, at 923. 
130 Id. 
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explicitly in the TAA of 1979, but it was actually not required by the Subsidies Code 
and such a test is probably not found in the laws of other nations.131 In particular, the 
“specificity test” requires that a countervailable subsidy would be found in cases where 
a foreign government program provided benefits to a “specific enterprise or group of 
enterprises.”132 The Act also included a non-exhaustive list of subsidy programs in case 
of specificity, such as direct payments, the forgiveness of debts, or the provision of 
services in terms inconsistent with commercial considerations.133  
Following this Act, effective from January 2, 1980, the administration of the 
antidumping and countervailing duty laws was transferred from Treasury to 
Commerce, Exec. Order No. 12,188, 3 C.F.R. 131 (1980).134 However, the U.S. 
Congress did not enact any specific provisions concerning the treatment of nonmarket 
economy countries when it made this amendment. 
 
3.1.5. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 
 
In 1988, Congress enacted a comprehensive trade act called the Omnibus Trade 
and Competitiveness Act.135 The 1988 OTCA is a major revision to U.S. trade law since 
the amendment in 1974. The primary purpose of the 1988 OTCA is to enhance the 
competitiveness of the domestic industry.136 Importantly, the Act altered the method of 
calculating the dumping margins of NME imports in antidumping proceedings.137 
However, the Act was still silent on subsidies from NME countries. For many decades 
since the first countervailing duty laws originated, there was no clear statutory 
provision on the applicability of the countervailing duty law to NME countries. 
 
131 JACKSON (1997), supra note 41, at 926. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 796 F. Supp. 517 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1992). 
135 The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988) 
[hereinafter 1988 OTCA]. 
136 Id. at preamble. 
137 McKay M. Pearson, Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws: The Quest to Control Nonmarket 
Economy Countries, 1989 BYU L. REV. 717, 720-21 (1989). 
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Although there have been several cases brought to competent courts, there were 
cases that firmly answered the question of the applicability of the countervailing duty 
law to NME countries until 2012 when Congress enacted a law implementing such 
applicability. Because the 1988 OTCA and prior acts did not support the proposition 
that countervailing duties were to be applied against NME countries, there were two 
alternative remedies to deal with subsidies by NME countries: section 406 of the Trade 
Act of 1974, and the antidumping law.138 
 
3.1.6. The Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994 
 
Following the conclusion of GATT/WTO’s trade agreements (WTO 
Agreement), the United States agreed to change its legislation to conform with the 
WTO Agreement. In December 1994, U.S. Congress enacted the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act (“URAA”) for the primary purpose of implementing the trade 
agreements concluded in the Uruguay Round.139 Since then, the URAA has established 
a relationship between U.S. law and the WTO Agreement. However, it is important to 
note that the URAA confirms that U.S. federal law prevails over a Uruguay Round 
agreement in case of a conflict.140 The U.S. courts have also made it clear that the 
GATT/WTO or panel determinations do not have a precedential effect in American 
jurisprudence and, therefore, are not binding upon U.S. courts.141  
One of the advanced points of the WTO’s Subsidies Agreement in 1994, as 
compared to the prior Subsidies Code in 1979, is that the former provided multilateral 
standards for subsidy discipline, while the latter focuses on unilateral application of 
 
138 Id. at 725-26. Under the 1988 OTCA, section 406 was strengthened to provide protection against 
unfair trade by Communist countries. The provisions of section 406 were viewed as a better device to 
employ, rather than trying to initiate a new countervailing duty law against NMEs. 
139 The Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994). 
140 Id. Section 102(a)(1), Subtitle A, Title I (codified as 19 U.S.C. § 3512). This section provides: “No 
provision of any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, nor the application of any such provision to any 
person or circumstance, that is inconsistent with any law of the United States shall have effect.” 
141 JOSEPH E. PATTISON, ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAWS 34 (2016 Edition, Thomson 
Reuters 2016). 
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national remedies against subsidized imports.142 The Subsidies Agreement provided a 
broader definition of actionable subsidies, relying on standards of “specificity” 
previously developed in U.S. law.143  
The URAA, as consistent with the Subsidies Agreement, repealed Section 303 
of the Tariff Act of 1930. Although Section 303 was repealed, the URAA provides that 
countries that did not sign the Subsidies Agreement are not entitled to an injury test.144 
For countervailing duty investigations involving imports from a country that is not a 
WTO Member, a material injury test is not required.145 Therefore, until the passage of 
the URAA, the United States maintained two sets of statutory provisions for 
administering the countervailing duty law, including section 303 of the Tariff Act of 
1930, codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1303; the second statutory provision was codified at 19 
U.S.C. § 1677. 
 
3.1.7. The Nonmarket Economies Act of 2012 
 
In 2012, in response to the ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit (CAFC) in the GPX Case,146 U.S. Congress enacted Public Law 112-
99 (“NME Act”). This NME Act amended the Tariff Act of 1930 to authorize 
Commerce to impose countervailing duties on identified subsidies from nonmarket 
economy countries.147 Section 1 of this Act does provide an exception to this 
requirement when [Commerce] is unable to identify and measure subsidies provided 
by the government of the NME country or a public entity within the NME country 
because the economy of that country is essentially comprised of a single entity.  
 
142 Id. at 33. 
143 Id. 
144 19 U.S.C. § 1671(b). 
145 19 U.S.C. § 1671(c). 
146 GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, 780 F.3d 1136; 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 3940; 36 Int’l Trade 
Rep. (BNA) 1433. 
147 The Nonmarket Economies Act of 2012, Public Law 112-99, 112 Congress. 126 Stat. 265 (2012) 
[hereinafter NME Act or P.L. 112-99]. 
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Notably, the NME Act also requires Commerce to account for potential 
overlapping remedies by reducing the antidumping (“AD”) rate to the extent that 
Commerce is able to reasonably estimate the amount that the countervailable subsidy 
has increased the “normal value” used in the NME AD methodology.148 The purpose 
of this provision is to resolve the problem of double counting arising from Commerce’s 
simultaneous application of both countervailing duties and antidumping duties on the 
same merchandise imported from NME countries. The U.S. Congress agreed to pass 
this provision to mitigate the double counting risks that had been claimed by NME 
countries under previous investigations, especially from China, and as was also 
recommended by the WTO’s dispute settlement body. 
A notable controversy was that the NME Act applies retroactively to all 
proceedings initiated on or after November 20, 2006,149 although this Act was enacted 
in 2012. This controversy shall be discussed in more detail in section 4.3.2.6 of this 
dissertation. 
In conclusion, from the inception of the countervailing duty law, which was a 
simple provision merely protecting the domestic sugar industry in the early 1890s, the 
U.S. trade laws including the countervailing duty law have evolved as influenced by 
both domestic industry forces and the international trade community. Each revision of 
the countervailing duty law has been an “ad hoc series of amendments” derived from 
specific proposals from domestic industries “involved in recent or anticipated cases.”150 
Hence, each major revision in U.S. trade laws, notably beginning from 1974, has seen 
amendments to both antidumping and countervailing duty laws to make it easier for 
domestic industry to obtain relief against imports.151 A cycle of change was born: the 
easier it became to get relief, the more cases were brought, generating more interest in 
the use of these laws, and so on.152 The most recent change in the countervailing duty 
law in 2012 to apply it to nonmarket economies has been perhaps the most controversial 
 
148 Id. 
149 Id. sec. 1(b)(1). 




issue in the history of U.S. trade laws. Of course, it may be the result of a natural 
legislative process that any law may be changed to adapt to American interests and 
especially for the protection of American industry as part of the nation’s economic 
development. But the imposition of countervailing duties upon countries that have been 
categorized as NME countries has had a multibillion-dollar impact, and producers and 
NME governments must be prepared to navigate the challenges that have resulted. In 
Chapter 4, the author will discuss in more detail on the applicability of the 
countervailing duty law to nonmarket economy countries by analyzing its practical 
application and related cases at executive and judicial levels. And in Chapter 5, the 
author will highlight several cases in which the countervailing duty law has been 
applied to Vietnam in a manner that has disfavored Vietnam’s producers on account of 
the duty-calculation methodology that applies particularly to NME countries. 
In summary, the contemporary imposition of countervailing duties under U.S. 
trade law is currently stipulated by Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, added by Title I 
of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, as amended by the Uruguay Round Agreements 
Act of 1994 and the 2012 NME Act. 
 
3.2. Imposition of Countervailable Subsidies 
 
The U.S. countervailing duty law, among other trade remedy laws such as those 
related to antidumping and safeguards, has been developed as a critical component of 
the U.S. trade laws to mitigate against unfair foreign competition. As explained in 
section 3.1 above, the imposition of countervailing duties under U.S. law is specifically 
stipulated under Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, added by Title I of the Trade 
Agreement Act of 1979, as amended by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, 
and the NME Act of 2012. In general, countervailing duties will be imposed on 
imported merchandise when its manufacture, production or exportation receives 
benefits from foreign government subsidies and such imports cause or threaten to cause 
injuries to a U.S. domestic industry. The fundamental goal of imposing countervailing 
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duties is to level the playing field in international trade by counteracting or offsetting 
the unfair trade advantage that a foreign manufacturer or producer or exporter receives 
from its government subsidies. 
In fact, throughout the historical evolution of the U.S. trade laws, the Tariff Act 
of 1930, as amended, is currently the principal Act that governs the imposition of 
countervailing duties.153 From a U.S. government agency’s perspective, foreign 
government subsidies distort the free flow of goods and adversely affect American 
business in the global marketplace.154 The U.S. Department of Commerce 
(“Commerce”), the administering authority for both U.S. antidumping and 
countervailing duty laws, among many other things, is responsible for protecting U.S. 
domestic producers from unfair competition within the U.S. that results from unfair 
government subsidies granted to exporting companies.155 
Therefore, as a tool to protect the American industry from foreign subsidies, a 
countervailing duty is imposed to offset the foreign government subsidies that exist 
under many forms, such as export or production subsidies that do not reflect market 
conditions. 
Like the antidumping law, the countervailing duty law employs a bifurcated 
system. In a countervailing duty proceeding, Commerce and ITC are concurrently 
required to be involved. Specifically, Commerce’s mission is to determine when an 
unfair subsidy has been conferred and then measure or calculate the amount of subsidy 
that the foreign producer has received from its government, establishing a basis for the 
subsidy rate by which the subsidy is offset, or “countervailed,” through higher import 
duties, which are known as countervailing duties.156 
 
3.2.1. Elements of a Subsidy 
 
 
153 Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, § 701-709 and § 751-753 (19 U.S.C. §1671 et seq.). 
154 U.S. Department of Commerce, Enforcement and Compliance, “An Introduction to U.S. Trade 




Under the U.S. countervailing duty law, a subsidy is countervailable if it meets 
the three following elements: 
Element 1: There must be a “financial contribution.”  
Element 2: That financial contribution must confer a “benefit.”  
Element 3: A subsidy must be “specific.” 
Specifically, the statute provides that a subsidy is one in which an “authority”: 
(i) provides a “financial contribution”, 
(ii) provides any form of income or price support within the meaning of Article 
XVI of the GATT 1994, or 
(iii) makes a payment to a funding mechanism to provide a financial 
contribution, or entrusts or directs a private entity to make a financial contribution, if 
providing the contribution would normally be vested in the government and the practice 
does not differ in substance from practices normally followed by governments, 
to a person and a benefit is thereby conferred.157  
The first two items, (i) and (ii), are considered to be direct subsidies when the 
government provides funding directly to producers or exporters of the goods upon their 
export.158 The last item (iii) is a form of indirect subsidy, in which the government 
provides financial contribution through a funding mechanism or “entrusts or directs”159 
a “private entity” to make such financial contribution to the producers or exporters of 
the subject merchandise.160 The term “private entity” is not necessarily limited to a 
single entity but it can include a group of entities or persons.161 
 
157 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B). 
158 See also Subsidies Agreement, supra note 39, at Article 1.1(a)(1)(i-iii). 
159 As directed by Congress, Commerce has its own discretion to broadly interpret “entrusts or directs.” 
See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Statement of Administrative Action, H.R. Doc No. 103-316 (1994) 
(“SAA”), at 926. 
160 This provision is similar to Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the Subsidies Agreement, supra note 39. 
161 SAA, supra note 159 The SAA is the Statement of Administrative Action. When the U.S. Congress 
enacted the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, it also approved an accompanying Statement of 
Administrative Action (SAA) and it serves as “an authoritative expression by the United States 
concerning the interpretation and application of the URAA… in any judicial proceeding in which a 
question arises concerning such interpretation or application”. 
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The statute further explains that the determination of whether a subsidy exists 
shall be made without regard to whether the recipient of the subsidy is publicly or 
privately owned and without regard to whether the subsidy is provided directly or 
indirectly on the manufacture, production, or export of merchandise.162 Furthermore, 
Commerce is not required to consider the effect of the subsidy in determining whether 
a subsidy exists.163 On the other hand, the ITC is responsible for finding the effect of 
the subsidy by conducting an injury test separately. 
The countervailing duty law defines an “authority” as a government of a 
country or any public entity.164 During its longstanding practice, Commerce has treated 
“most government-owned corporations as the government itself.”165 To consider 
whether an entity is a “public entity,” Commerce has in the past considered the 
following factors: (1) government ownership; (2) the government’s presence on the 
entity’s board of directors; (3) the government’s control over the entity’s activities; (4) 
the entity’s pursuit of governmental policies or interests; and (5) whether the entity was 
created by statute.166 In Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Korea, 
when Commerce considered whether a government-owned bank was a public entity or 
authority, it examined the issues of government ownership and control only and 
concluded “a government-owned or controlled bank, be it a commercial bank or a 
policy bank is considered a public entity or authority.”167 
 
3.2.1.1. Element 1: Financial Contribution 
 
 
162 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(C). 
163 Id. 
164 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B). 
165 19 C.F.R. Part 351, Countervailing Duties; Final Rule, 63 FR 65348. 
166 Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Dynamic Random Access Memory 
Semiconductors from the Republic of Korea, 68 FR 16766 (April 7, 2003), at 16771. (citing, e.g., Final 
Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determinations: Pure Magnesium and Alloy Magnesium from Canada, 
57 FR 30946, 30954 (July 13, 1992); Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain 
Fresh Cut Flowers from the Netherlands, 52 FR 3301, 3302, 3310 (February 3, 1987); and Sheet and 
Strip, 64 FR 30642-43). 
167 Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from the Republic of Korea: Preliminary Results of 
Countervailing Duty Administrative Review, 73 FR 52315 (September 9, 2008), at 52321. 
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Element 1: There must be a “financial contribution.” 
The first key element in determining whether there is a subsidy is whether there 
is a “financial contribution,” which means:  
(i) the direct transfer of funds, such as grants, loans, and equity infusions, or the 
potential direct transfer of funds or liabilities, such as loan guarantees, 
(ii) foregoing or not collecting revenue that is otherwise due, such as granting 
tax credits or deductions from taxable income, 
(iii) providing goods or services, other than general infrastructure, or 
(iv) purchasing goods.168 
Thus, the above provision lists the four generic categories of government 
practices that constitute a “financial contribution.” The list is set out as a guideline for 
Commerce in its subsidy findings. Congress has not indicated an intent for the 
examples of particular types of practices falling under each category to be 
exhaustive.169  
For the first category, in practice, loans from a government policy bank or a 
commercial bank controlled or owned by the government are considered as a direct 
financial contribution and, therefore, are countervailable.  
Another category of financial contribution, as usually considered in 
countervailing duty cases, is the foregoing of revenue by the government such as by 
the exemption of duties or by the reduction or exemption of income taxes. For instance, 
in Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods “OCTG” from China,170 Commerce concluded 
that the exemption or reduction of the income tax paid by productive foreign-invested 
enterprises confers a countervailable subsidy. In fact, the exemption/reduction is a 
financial contribution in the form of revenue foregone by the government of China 
(“GOC”) and it provides a benefit to the recipient in the amount of tax savings.171  
 
168 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(D)(i-iv). 
169 SAA, supra note 159, at 927. 
170 Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods from the People’s Republic of China: Final Affirmative 
Countervailing Duty Determination, Final Negative Critical Circumstances Determination, 74 FR 64045 
(December 7, 2009). 
171 Id. 
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In addition, another controversial issue that has percolated for many years is 
whether the provision of land is a financial contribution and thus countervailable. For 
example, in Laminated Woven Sacks (LWS) from China172, GOC claimed that the sale 
of land-use rights is not a “financial contribution” because it does not fall into any of 
the four categories of “financial contribution” as defined by the U.S. countervailing 
duty law.173 However, Commerce identified the nature of the financial contribution for 
the provision of land-use rights as a “good or service” based on the past practice in 
many cases and its regulations.174 Commerce also noted that the statutory definition of 
a financial contribution is written broadly, recognizing that governments have a variety 
of mechanisms at their disposal to confer a financial advantage on specific domestic 
enterprises or industries.175 According to Commerce, the SAA176 confirms that the 
sweep of the statute is intended to be broad to ensure that such mechanisms are subject 
to the countervailing duty law.177 Thus, as supported by Congress, Commerce has broad 
authority to define what a financial contribution is based on its practice and its 
interpretation beyond the above four generic categories of government practices. The 
case below will show how Commerce has employed its broad interpretative authority 
in determining whether a provision of goods or service other than general infrastructure 
constituted a financial contribution. 
In Royal Thai Gov’t v. United States,178 the Royal Thai Government (“RTG”) 
challenged Commerce’s final affirmative countervailing duty (“CVD”) determination 
that RTG’s provision of electricity constituted a financial contribution. RTG appealed 
on the grounds that Commerce had erred in its finding that the provision of electricity 
 
172 Laminated Woven Sacks from the People's Republic of China: Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty 
Determination and Final Affirmative Determination, in Part, of Critical Circumstances, 73 FR 35639 
(June 24, 2008). 
173 Id. at Comment 8. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 See SAA, supra note 159, for explaining the SAA’s functions. 
177 Id. at 927. It is also stated Commerce believes that these generic categories are sufficiently broad so 
as to encompass the types of subsidy programs generally countervailed by Commerce in the past, 
although determinations with respect to particular programs will have to be made on a case-by-case 
basis. 
178 Royal Thai Gov't v. United States, 30 C.I.T. 1072 (2006). 
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to a Thai steel exporter (i.e., SSI, a mandatory respondent in the related CVD case) 
constituted a financial contribution. RTG argued that the governmental provision of 
electricity to SSI “properly should have been considered ‘general infrastructure,’” and 
was therefore exempt from the U.S. CVD law.179 The Court rejected RTG’s position 
and found that Commerce reasonably determined that RTG’s provision of electricity to 
SSI was a potentially countervailable financial contribution and not merely the 
provision of general infrastructure.180 The Court explained that “general infrastructure” 
is “a term of art in U.S. countervailing duty law.”181 The Court stated that the CVD law 
“directs that goods or services which constitute general infrastructure may not be 
countervailed.”182 However, Commerce has interpreted this statutory language to 
encompass “infrastructure that is created for the broad societal welfare of a country, 
region, state or municipality.”183 Further, Commerce already elaborated on this 
interpretation by noting that “the type of infrastructure per se is not dispositive of 
whether the government provision constitutes ‘general infrastructure.’” Rather, the key 
issue is whether the infrastructure is developed for the benefit of society as a whole.184 
Accordingly, Commerce referred to this analysis as the “public welfare concept.”185 
For such reasons, the Court upheld Commerce’s determination that RTG’s provision 
of electricity to SSI was not for the general welfare where the subsidies were intended 
to serve three purposes: “(1) provide electricity to low-income consumers; (2) ensure 
rural electrification; and (3) promote economic activity outside of the congested 
Bangkok metropolitan area.”186 As a result, the Court concluded that while the Thai 
energy subsidy program had “broad social goals,” it primarily benefited only a portion 
of Thai society.187 
 
179 Id. at 1355. 




184 Id. (citing CVD Preample, 63 FR 65378). 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 1356 (citing Decision Memo at 36-37). 
187 Id. at 1351. 
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3.2.1.2. Element 2: Benefit 
 
Element 2: The financial contribution must confer a “benefit.” 
After finding a financial contribution, the second element in determining the 
existence of a subsidy is “benefit” (i.e., whether one of the defined and identified 
financial contributions conferred an actual benefit). The U.S. countervailing duty law 
and the Subsidies Agreement both call for a “benefit-to-recipient” standard.188 Simply 
put, for a government subsidy to be countervailable, it must provide a benefit to the 
recipient of that subsidy, and the U.S. statute provides that a “benefit” shall “normally 
be treated as conferred where there is a benefit to the recipient.”189  
Together with “financial contribution” and “specificity,” the concept of 
“benefit” is obviously central to the administration of countervailing duty law.190 
Adopting a more technical (and less circular) definition, Commerce has described “a 
benefit to be conferred where a firm pays less for its input (e.g., money, a good, or a 
service) than it otherwise would pay in the absence of the government program, or 
receives more revenues than it otherwise would earn.”191 In other words, a benefit exists 
to the extent that the subsidy recipient gets a financial contribution or in-kind assistance 
on terms more favorable than those that would otherwise be available on the market. 
As a benefit is a critical element in identifying a subsidy, the statute lays out specific 
 
188 LAW AND PRACTICE OF UNITED STATES REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1-382 (Volume I, 
Thomson Reuters 2016). 
189 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(E). 
190 19 C.F.R. Part 351, §351.503. 
191 Id. Commerce further explains: “We have adopted this definition because it captures an underlying 
theme behind the definition of benefit contained in section 771(5)(E) of the Act and, in our estimation, 
reflects the fundamental principles that we have articulated over the years with respect to programs and 
practices that we have determined confer either direct or indirect countervailable subsidies. One common 
element the four illustrative examples set forth in the statute share is that, in the overwhelming majority 
of cases, the recipient of a government financial contribution, income or price support, or indirect 
subsidy, enjoys a reduction in input costs or revenue enhancement that it would not otherwise have 
enjoyed absent the government action. As explained below, we are using the terms ‘input’ and ‘cost’ 
broadly.” 
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rules for how benefits from certain categories of financial contribution would normally 
be identified; specifically, a benefit is conferred: 
(1) in the case of an equity infusion, if the investment decision is inconsistent 
with the usual investment practice of private investors, including the practice regarding 
the provision of risk capital, in the country in which the equity infusion is made;192 
(2) in the case of a loan, if there is a difference between the amount the recipient 
of the loan pays on the loan and the amount the recipient would pay on a comparable 
commercial loan that the recipient could actually obtain on the market;193 
(3) in the case of a loan guarantee, if there is a difference, after adjusting for 
any difference in guarantee fees, between the amount the recipient of the guarantee 
pays on the guaranteed loan and the amount the recipient would pay for a comparable 
commercial loan if there were no guarantee by the authority;194 and 
(4) in the case where goods or services are provided, if such goods or services 
are provided for less than adequate remuneration, and in the case where goods are 
purchased, if such goods are purchased for more than adequate remuneration.195 
Consistent with the Subsidies Agreement, the U.S. countervailing duty law 
defines a “benefit” as something better than the recipient could otherwise obtain in the 
market. For instance, a government equity infusion confers a benefit “if the investment 
decision is inconsistent with the usual investment practice of private investors … in the 
country in which the equity infusion is made.”196 Similarly, a government loan provides 
a benefit “if there is a difference between the amount the recipient pays” on the 
government loan “and the amount the recipient would pay on a comparable commercial 
loan that the recipient could actually obtain on the market.”197 Accordingly, “less than 
adequate remuneration” means a government price for goods or services that is better 
 
192 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(E)(i). 
193 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(E)(ii). 
194 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(E)(iii). 
195 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(E)(iv). 
196 Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada (Lumber IV), 67 FR 15545 (April 2, 2002). 
197 Id. 
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than the purchaser could otherwise obtain in the market place.198 These concepts are 
described in more detail in the sections that follow. 
 
3.2.1.2.1. Equity Infusions 
 
Equity infusions can present very complicated problems in a CVD 
investigation. In cases where the government purchases equity or newly issued shares 
(i.e., equity infusion) in a company, that investment may be considered as a 
countervailable subsidy if it is inconsistent with “the usual investment practice of 
private investors.”199 According to Commerce’s interpretation based on its practice, an 
equity infusion is considered inconsistent if the price paid by the government for newly 
issued shares is greater than the price paid by private investors for the same (or similar 
form of) newly issued shares.200  
In order to determine whether the government’s investment as an equity 
infusion is consistent with usual investment practice, the equity infusion is compared 
to actual purchases by private investors of similar newly issued shares.201 In selecting 
a private investor price to make comparison, Commerce will rely on sales of newly 
issued shares made reasonably concurrently with the newly issued shares purchased by 
the government.202 Commerce does not use private investor prices if the private 
investor purchases of newly issued shares are not significant.203 If the actual private 
investor prices do not exist, Commerce will determine whether the company funded by 
the government-provided equity was “equityworthy”204 or “unequityworthy” at the 
 
198 Id. 
199 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(E)(i). 
200 19 C.F.R. § 351.507(a)(2)(i). 
201 GREGORY W. BOWMAN, NICK COVELLI, DAVID A. GANTZ, AND IHN HO UHM, TRADE REMEDIES IN 
NORTH AMERICA 122 (Global Trade Law Series, Volume 27, Kluwer Law International 2010). 
202 19 C.F.R. § 351.507(a)(2)(ii). 
203 19 C.F.R. § 351.507(a)(2)(iii). 
204 19 C.F.R. § 351.507(a)(4)(i) (The company is considered to be “equityworthy” if, from the 
perspective of a reasonable private investor examining the firm at the time the government-provided 
equity infusion was made, the firm showed an ability to generate a reasonable rate of return within a 
reasonable period of time. The Commerce will examine factors such as an objective analysis of future 
financial prospects, current and past indicators of the recipient’s firm’s financial health calculated from 
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time of the equity infusion.205 For the purposes of making an equityworthiness 
determination, Commerce will request that the respondents provide information and 
analysis completed prior to the infusion, upon which the government bases its decision 
to provide the equity infusion.206 Absent the existence or provision of an objective 
analysis, containing information typically examined by potential private investors 
considering an equity investment, Commerce will normally determine that the equity 
infusion received provides a countervailable benefit.207 In other words, if the company 
is determined to be unequityworthy, a benefit to the company exists in the amount of 
the equity infusion.208 On the other hand, if the company is concluded to be 
equityworthy, there are two possible outcomes. Commerce will examine the terms and 
the nature of the equity purchased to determine whether the investment practice is 
consistent with the usual business practice of private sectors. If it is consistent, there is 
no benefit conferred and as a result that equity infusion is not countervailable. If it is 
inconsistent, Commerce will determine the amount of the benefit conferred on a case-
by-case basis.209 
In Stainless Steel Plate in Coils from Belgium,210 Commerce examined three 
government equity infusions of the companies under review. The respondent, ALZ, 
and the government of Belgium (GOB) argued that Commerce did not properly address 
the issue of whether a benefit was conferred on the recipients of the GOB equity 
infusions.211 ALZ and GOB contended that, according to U.S. law and the Subsidies 
Agreement, a benefit exists when a recipient is better off than it would have been in the 
commercial marketplace.212 Thus, ALZ and GOB argued that in order to determine 
 
the firm’s statements and accounts, rates of return on equity in the three years prior to the government 
equity infusion, and equity investment in the firm by private investors). 
205 19 C.F.R. § 351.507(a)(3)(i). 
206 19 C.F.R. § 351.507(a)(4)(ii). 
207 Id. 
208 19 C.F.R. § 351.507(a)(6). 
209 19 C.F.R. § 351.507(a)(5). 
210 Stainless Steel Plate in Coils from Belgium: Final Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative 
Review, 66 FR 45007 (August 27, 2001). 
211 Id. at Comment 1. 
212 Id. 
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whether a benefit exists, a comparison must be made to the marketplace to determine 
if the recipient is better off financially than it would have been absent the government 
financial contribution.213 ALZ and GOB also contended that Commerce did not 
conduct such a comparison in its analysis.214 
In response to ALZ and the GOB, Commerce disagreed and relied on regulation 
that provides, “Absent the existence . . . of an objective analysis, containing information 
typically examined by potential private investors considering an equity investment, the 
Secretary will normally determine that the equity infusion received provides a 
countervailable benefit within the meaning of paragraph (a)(1) of this section.”215 Thus, 
in the absence of such an objective analysis, Commerce will determine that the 
company receiving the government’s equity infusion is receiving a benefit in the 
amount of the infusion.216 According to Commerce, where a reasonable private investor 
is purchasing equity, the investor would seek information about expected returns and 
evaluate that information before making the decision to invest.217 Therefore, where 
there was no evidence that a government had sought such information prior to deciding 
to invest, Commerce concluded that the government was not acting in accordance with 
“the usual investment practice of private investors.”218 
 
3.2.1.2.2. Grants, Loans, and Loan Guarantees 
 
“Financial contribution” is first defined as the direct transfer of funds, such as 
grants, loans, and equity infusions, or the potential direct transfer of funds or liabilities, 








219 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(D)(i). 
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The term “grant” has been used interchangeably with “bounty” as a form of 
benefit or subsidy. Typically, grants are considered provide a benefit per se.220 In the 
case of a grant, Commerce normally considers a benefit as having been received on the 
date on which the company received the grant.221 
With respect to “loans,” in determining whether a benefit is conferred from a 
loan, the statute provides that a benefit exists “if there is a difference between the 
amount the recipient of the loan pays on the loan and the amount the recipient would 
pay on a comparable commercial loan that the recipient could actually obtain on the 
market.”222 
Thus, the benefit is typically the difference between the amount of a 
government-provided loan that the company received and the amount of a “comparable 
commercial loan” that the company “could actually obtain on the market”.223  
In selecting a loan that is “comparable” to the government-provided loan, 
Commerce will normally place primary emphasis on similarities between the structure 
of the loans (e.g., fixed interest rate versus variable interest rate), the maturity of the 
loans (e.g., short-term versus long-term), and the currency in which the loans are 
denominated.224 Further, in selecting a “commercial” loan, Commerce will use a loan 
taken out by the company from a commercial lending institution or a debt instrument 
issued by the company in a commercial market.225  
Also, Commerce will treat a loan from a government-owned bank as a 
commercial loan, unless there is evidence that the loan from a government-owned bank 
was provided on noncommercial terms or at the direction of the government.226 
However, Commerce will not consider a loan provided under a government program, 
 
220 19 C.F.R. § 351.504(a). See also BOWMAN et al. (2010), supra note 201, at 121. 
221 19 C.F.R. § 351.504(b). 
222 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(E)(ii). 
223 19 C.F.R. § 351.505(a)(1). 
224 19 C.F.R. § 351.505(a)(2)(i). 
225 19 C.F.R. § 351.505(a)(2)(ii). 
226 Id. 
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or a loan provided by a government-owned special purpose bank, to be a commercial 
loan for purposes of selecting a loan to compare with a government-provided loan.227 
A key component of identifying a benefit received from a loan is the 
creditworthiness determination. Commerce initiates an investigation into a company’s 
creditworthiness  only when there is a specific allegation by the petitioner, supported 
by information establishing a reasonable basis to believe or suspect that the company 
is uncreditworthy.228 In its investigation, Commerce will consider a firm to be 
uncreditworthy if, based on information available at the time of the government-
provided loan, the company could not have obtained long-term loans from conventional 
commercial sources.229 In the event that Commerce finds that a company that received 
a government-provided long-term loan was uncreditworthy, Commerce will use a 
“benchmark” interest rate in its benefit calculation formula.230 
In summary, Commerce will follow three steps in identifying and calculating a 
loan benefit. Step 1 is to select a comparable commercial loan that the recipient “could 
actually obtain on the market,” that is a commercial loan with market-based interest. 
When it is difficult to access the banking systems and private companies in the country 
under investigation, Commerce has to rely on the “actual experience of the firm in 
question in obtaining comparable commercial loans.”231 Step 2 will be conducted if the 
 
227 Id. 
228 19 C.F.R. § 351.505(a)(6)(i). 
229 19 C.F.R. § 351.505(a)(4)(i) (In making a creditworthiness determination, Commerce may examine, 
among other factors, the following: 
“(A) The receipt by the firm of comparable commercial long-term loans; 
(B) The present and past financial health of the firm, as reflected in various financial indicators calculated 
from the firm’s financial statements and accounts; 
(C) The firm’s recent past and present ability to meet its costs and fixed financial obligations with its 
cash flow; and 
(D) Evidence of the firm’s future financial position, such as market studies, country and industry 
economic forecasts, and project and loan appraisals prepared prior to the agreement between the lender 
and the firm on the terms of the loan.”). 
230 19 C.F.R. § 351.505(a)(3)(iii). 
231 19 C.F.R. § 351.505(a)(3)(i) (In a CVD case, Commerce will issue questionnaires to both the 
government and the companies of the country in question to request the provision of information 
regarding all alleged programs and the policy, laws and regulations that administer the programs. With 
respect to the loans, Commerce will ask the companies to provide information on grant programs, loans 
and credit, etc.). 
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company does not have any comparable commercial loans. In such situation, 
Commerce will use a national average interest rate to make a comparison. Step 3 is to 
construct a benchmark interest rate for a long-term loan if the company is determined 
to be uncreditworthy or the lender of the loan is a government-controlled bank. This 
benchmark approach is also used for loan guarantees in the case of uncreditworthiness. 
For loan guarantees, the benefit is typically the difference, after adjusting for 
any difference in guarantee fees, between the amount the recipient of the guarantee 
pays on the guaranteed loan and the amount the recipient would pay for a comparable 
commercial loan if there were no guarantee by the authority.232 Under Commerce’s 
regulations, the benefit conferred is the difference between the amount of interest and 
any administrative fees paid and those that the company would have had to pay for a 
comparable loan without the guaranty.233 In the event that a company, owned by a 
government, receives a government loan guarantee, that guarantee does not confer a 
benefit if the respondent provides evidence demonstrating that it is normal commercial 
practice in the country in question for shareholders to provide guarantees to their firms 
under similar circumstances and on comparable terms.234 
 
3.2.1.2.3. Provision of Goods or Services at Less Than Adequate Remuneration 
 
A benefit exists in the case where goods or services are provided to the recipient 
for less than “adequate remuneration” (or, in the case of government procurement of 
goods, for more than adequate remuneration).235 What counts as “adequate 
remuneration” is not directly defined, but it is determined in relation to “prevailing 
market conditions”236 These prevailing market conditions include price, quality, 
availability, marketability, transportation, and other conditions of purchase or sale.237 
 
232 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(E)(iii). 
233 19 C.F.R. § 351.506(a)(1). 
234 19 C.F.R. § 351.506(a)(2). 
235 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(E)(iv). 
236 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(E). 
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This statutory provision is believed to have opened a new model for using a market 
benchmark in identifying and measuring subsidies in the provision of goods or 
services.238 
Therefore, the first factor (“adequate remuneration”) must be analyzed in 
relation to the second factor (“prevailing market conditions”). In its practice, 
Commerce has normally used a three-tiered hierarchy of market benchmarks to 
determine whether goods or services are provided less than adequate remuneration.239 
Specifically, Commerce’s regulations provide that the benchmarks for assessing 
whether goods or services have been provided by a government for “less than adequate 
remuneration” should be based on market prices (this is a so-called Tier-1 
Benchmark).240 When actual prices in the market of the country under investigation 
cannot be used, a world market price may be used “where it is reasonable to conclude 
that such price would be available to purchasers in the country in question.” (this is a 
so-called Tier-2 Benchmark).241 If there is no world market price available to 
purchasers in the country under investigation, Commerce will assess whether the 
government price is consistent with market principles (a Tier-3 Benchmark).242 In the 
cases of actual market-determined prices and the world market prices, if the company 
imported the product, Commerce will then adjust the comparison price to reflect the 
price that the company actually paid or would pay.243  
A notorious case that demonstrates how Commerce may exercise its discretion 
in looking to out-of-country (Tier-2) benchmarks in measuring the benefit received 
from a government’s provision of goods or services in a market economy is the 
Canadian softwood lumber case. In Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada 
 
238 See Wentong Zheng, The Pitfalls of the (Perfect) Market Benchmark: The Case of Countervailing 
Duty Law, 19(1) MINN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2010). 
239 Id. at 19. 
240 19 C.F.R. § 351.511(a)(2)(i). 
241 19 C.F.R. § 351.511(a)(2)(ii). 
242 19 C.F.R. § 351.511(a)(2)(iii). 
243 19 C.F.R. § 351.511(a)(2)(i-iii). The adjustment will include delivery charges and import duties. 
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(Lumber IV),244 the U.S. petitioners (the Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports Executive 
Committee, representing thirteen domestic producers (collectively, Petitioner)),245 filed 
a petition on April 2, 2001 and alleged that Canadian producers of softwood lumber 
products received countervailable subsidies and that such imports materially injured an 
industry in the United States.246 The major subsidy allegations in this case concerned 
the timber management systems maintained by the provinces of Canada. Specifically, 
the Petitioner alleged that, through the provincially administered stumpage systems, 
the provinces provided softwood lumber producers with wood fiber for less than 
adequate remuneration through the selling of rights to harvest timber on government-
owned (or Crown) forest lands.247 The Canadian respondents contended that stumpage 
was not a countervailable subsidy because it did not fall within a statutory definition of 
financial contribution.248  
Further, the Canadian respondents explained that stumpage does not constitute 
the provision of a good; rather, stumpage is simply a “conferral of a right of access to 
exploit an natural resource.”249 In other words, stumpage is similar to licensing of 
quotas to harvest fish, or leasing of the right to extract oil or minerals from public 
lands.250 In its final determination, Commerce did not agree with the Canadian 
respondents’ arguments and determined that the provincial governments of Canada 
 
244 Notice of Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Final Negative Critical 
Circumstances Determination: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada (Lumber IV), 67 FR 
15545 (Apr. 2, 2002). 
245 Four more companies participated and joined in the petition on April 20, 2001. See Notice of 
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Antidumping Duty Determination: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 66 FR 43186 (Aug. 
17, 2001) (Lumber IV Prelim). 
246 Notice of Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from 
Canada, 66 FR 21332 (Apr. 30, 2001). 
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Circumstances Determination: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada (Lumber IV), 67 FR 
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provided a good (timber) to lumber producers, constituting a countervailable 
subsidy.251 
In measuring the stumpage subsidies, surprisingly given that Canada is a market 
economy country, Commerce found that there were non market-based internal 
Canadian benchmarks due to the dominance of Canadian government timbers sales in 
the various provincial markets.252 In such a situation, Commerce concluded that “true 
market prices may not exist in the country, or it may be difficult to find a market price 
that is independent of the distortions caused by the government’s actions.”253 As a 
result, Commerce decided to use U.S. stumpage (i.e., the American selling price for 
standing timber) as a reasonable Tier-2 benchmark.254 For its benchmark selection, 
Commerce reasoned that U.S. stumpage is also available to Canadian producers, and 
that U.S. timber stands were comparable to Canadian timber stands.255 This concept 
will resurge in Chapter 5 in the discussion of the CVD cases against Vietnam; 
Commerce has exercised wide latitude in deciding when to apply Tier-2 or Tier-3 
benchmarks, and in choosing which countries to use as surrogates for the purpose of 
determining the amount of a countervailable benefit received by a Vietnamese exporter. 
 
3.2.1.3. Element 3: Specificity 
 
Element 3: A subsidy must be “specific.” 
The third element, which was originally developed in the U.S. administrative 
and statutory implementation of its countervailing duty law, is the concept of 
“specificity.” The specificity test is a critical step in CVD investigations in determining 
whether a benefit is a countervailable subsidy. The specificity test is used to check 
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253 Id. (citing Dr. Robert Stoner and Dr. Matthew Mercurio, “Economic Analysis of Price Distortions in 
a Dominant–Firm/Fringe Market” (January 4, 2002), Exhibit 4 of Letter from Dewey Ballantine to 




whether a subsidy is provided only to certain exporters or producers under 
investigation.  
Under U.S. law, the following are considered “specific” subsidies: (1) a subsidy 
contingent on export performance; (2) an import substitution subsidy contingent on the 
use of domestic goods rather than imported goods; and (3) a domestic subsidy that is 
limited to an enterprise or industry within the jurisdiction of the authority providing the 
subsidy.256 From a U.S. government agency’s perspective, the purpose of the 
specificity test is to “function as an initial screening mechanism to winnow out only 
those foreign subsidies which are truly broadly available and widely used throughout 
an economy.”257 Accordingly, to be a countervailable subsidy, a benefit must be 
granted to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or industries. 
Subsidy benefits generally available may or may not be countervailable. In fact, not 
every subsidy is or should be countervailable because governments have a legitimate 
interest in supporting certain activities, such as national defense, education, and 
infrastructure development.258 Further, for example, government assistance is not 
countervailable if that program is generally available and widely and evenly distributed 
throughout the jurisdiction of the subsidizing authority.259 Simply put, the specificity 
test exists is to ensure that subsidies distributed generally and widely throughout an 
economy are noncountervailable subsidies. For that reason, a subsidy is countervailed 
only if it is provided to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or 
industries.260 In particular, the entire Section 771(5A) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as 
amended, provides explicit guidelines for the specificity test. Section 771(5A) 
implements the provisions of Article 2 of the Subsidies Agreement dealing with 
specificity. 
 
256 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5A). 
257 SAA, supra note 159, at 929. 
258 BHALA RAJ, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: A COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK, VOLUME 3, REMEDIES 383 
(Fifth Edition, Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press 2019). 
259 Id. 
260 Section 771(5A), Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (5A)(D)(i)). 
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The first time that Commerce used the specificity test was in Certain Steel 
Products from Belgium261 in 1982. In this CVD case, Commerce used the specificity 
test to determine that several generally applicable subsidies were non-countervailable 
subsidies. Commerce viewed the word “specific” in the statutory definition as 
“necessarily modifying both ‘enterprise or industry’ and ‘enterprises or industries.’”262 
Commerce stated that “this criterion is necessary to distinguish between government 
programs designed to benefit a specific sector and programs designed to implement 
broader goals, such as a lower inflation rate or improved health care.”263  
 
3.2.1.3.1. Export Subsidies and Import Substitution Subsidies 
 
“Export subsidies” means the subsidies conditioned on export of the products 
or on export performance.264 In other words, subsidies used to pay for an industry only 
on products when they are exported are classified as export subsidies. Under the U.S. 
countervailing duty law, “export subsidies” are defined as those subsidies that are, in 
law or in fact, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, contingent upon 
export performance.265 This definition is more expansive than it was in the preceding 
law and practice.266 
 
261 Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determinations; Certain Steel Products from Belgium, 47 FR 
39304 (September 7, 1982). 
262 Id. at comment 1. 
263 Jay L. Panzarella, Is the Specificity Test Generally Applicable, 18 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 417, 422 
(1986). (citing U.S. Department of Commerce, Study of Foreign Government Targeting Practices and 
the Remedies Available under the Countervailing Duty and Anti-dumping Duty Laws 8 (July 1985) (on 
file at Commerce, Import Administration, Room 3716, Washington, D.C. 20230). 
264 Barceló III (1980), supra note 100. 
265 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5A),(B) and SAA, supra note 159, at 259. 
266 SAA, supra note 159, at 259. The Subsidies Code did not define “export subsidies”, but it 
incorporated an annex that listed all types of practices entitled “Illustrative List of Export Subsidies” into 
the statute; the new § 1677(5A) does not. However, the U.S. Congress intended that Commerce would 
continue to adhere to the “Illustrative List,” except where it may be inconsistent with the statute. See 
also Jackson (1997), supra note 41, at 1-398. 
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“Import institution subsidies” are defined as those subsidies that are contingent, 
whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon the use of domestic over 
imported goods.267  
The specificity test is not required in the case of export subsidies and import 
institution subsidies because these two forms of subsidies are “deemed to be specific” 
under both WTO legal framework and the U.S. law.268 These two subsidies are also 
classified as prohibited (or red light) subsidies under the Subsidies Agreement.269 
Commerce has set out specific rules to identify export subsidies from Section 
351.514 to 351.520, which incorporate the appropriate standards from the Illustrative 
List contained in the Subsidies Agreement.270 In particular, Commerce considers a 
subsidy to be contingent upon export performance if the provision of the subsidy is, in 
law or in fact, tied to actual or anticipated exportation or export earnings, alone or as 
one of two or more conditions.271 Exceptionally, a benefit does not exist in export 
promotion activities that consist of general informational activities that do not promote 
particular products over others.272 In its regulations, Commerce has regulated specific 
criteria for identification and calculation of benefits conferred from the following type 
of subsidies: (i) internal transport and freight charges for export shipments; (ii) price 
preferences for inputs used in the production of goods for export; (iii) exemption or 
remission upon export of indirect taxes (e.g., sales taxes and valued added taxes); (iv) 
exemption, remission, or deferral upon export of prior-stage cumulative indirect taxes; 
(v) remission or drawback of import charges upon export; and (vi) export insurance.273 
The category of import substitution subsidy is a new type of subsidy that did 
not exist in the preceding laws (i.e., the Subsidies Code and the 1979 TAA). Import 
substitution subsidies are added under the Subsidies Agreement and the URAA, and 
 
267 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5A)(C) and SAA, supra note 159, at 259. 
268 Subsidies Agreement, supra note 39, at Article 2.3; and 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5A)(A). 
269 Subsidies Agreement, supra note 39, at Article 3. 
270 19 C.F.R. Part 351. 
271 19 C.F.R. Part 351, § 351.514(a). 
272 19 C.F.R. Part 351, § 351.514(b). 
273 19 C.F.R. Part 351, § 351.515 for (i); § 351.516 for (ii); § 351.517 for (iii); § 351.518 for (iv); § 
351.519 for (v); and § 351.520 for (vi). 
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they are automatically considered to be specific. The purpose of the import substitution 
subsidies is generally to “protect domestic input producers by imposing requirements 
or providing incentives for companies to use these inputs”274. Since this type of subsidy 
is new, Commerce preserved its definition as exactly provided under the statute and 
did not issue additional related regulations due to its lack of experience in dealing with 
this new subsidy.275 However, Commerce promised that it will develop practice 
regarding this type of subsidy on a case-by-case basis.276 
In Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires from China,277 Commerce 
found that GITI Anhui Radial, a respondent, received export seller’s credits from the 
China Exim Bank that constituted a financial contribution, and the loans were specific 
because they were tied to actual or anticipated exportation or export earnings.278 In 
addition, the petitioner alleged that the tire producers also benefited from subsidized 
export credit insurance provided by China Export & Credit Insurance Corporation, a 
government-owned insurance company.279 Specifically, the petitioner claimed that 
export credit insurance for Chinese tire producers and exporters provided a 
countervailable subsidy under U.S. law where the premium rates charged by the 
programs were inadequate for covering the programs’ long-term costs and losses, and 
that these subsidies were specific because the provision of insurance was contingent 
upon export performance.280 However, during the Commerce’s verification, it was 
found that this program was actually a grant provided by the local government to 
reimburse the company for the cost of its export insurance premiums.281 Then, 
Commerce decided simply to countervail the benefit as a grant because it constituted a 
 
274 19 C.F.R. Part 351, § 521 (Nov. 25, 1998). 
275 Id. at preamble, at 65385. 
276 Id. 
277 Countervailing Duty Investigation of Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires from the 
People’s Republic of China: Final Affirmative Determination, and Final Affirmative Critical 
Circumstances Determination, in Part, 80 FR. 34888 (June 18, 2015). 
278 Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty 
Investigation of Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires from the People’s Republic of China 
(PVLT Tires IDM) (June 11, 2015), at comment 13. 
279 Id. at 23. 
280 Id. 
281 Id. at 24. 
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financial contribution in the form of a direct transfer of funds or a potential transfer of 
funds in accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(D)(i).282 
 
3.2.1.3.2. Specificity of Domestic Subsidies 
 
“Domestic subsidies” can be understood as those that are primarily granted to 
production without respect to output destination.283 In this situation, the subsidies are 
granted to a domestic industry on all of its production of a product, regardless of 
whether that production is exported or not.284 Like export subsidies, domestic subsidies 
are believed to have the ability to distort resource allocation by drawing resources into 
production of a product where production would be economically infeasible but for the 
subsidy.285 However, as to the degree of trade distortion to the importing market, 
domestic subsidies are viewed as less aggressive than the export subsidies that are 
prohibited under the WTO’s legal framework.286 
Under the U.S. countervailing duty law, domestic subsidies are all subsidies 
besides export subsidies and import subsidies.287 The specificity test is used to 
determine whether a domestic subsidy is a specific one, in law (de jure) or in fact (de 
facto), to an enterprise or industry within the jurisdiction of the authority providing the 
subsidy.288 This is a simple definition, but it creates a high volume of work and 
technical analysis for identifying a genuinely specific domestic subsidy. In fact, the 
specificity test for determining whether the domestic subsidy is specific is divided into 




283 Barceló III (1980), supra note 100, at 261. 
284 JACKSON et al. (2008), supra note 124, at 848. 
285 Id. 
286 Subsidies Agreement, supra note 39, at Article 3. Article 3 classifies export subsidies and import 
substitution subsidies under the title of prohibition. 
287 Bowman et al. (2010), supra note 201, at 120. 
288 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5A)(D). 
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3.2.1.3.2.1. De Jure Specificity 
 
Domestic subsidies are either specific or not, as determined based on an analysis 
of whether the subsidy is specific as a matter of law (de jure specific) or specific as a 
matter of fact (de facto specific).289 The test of de jure specificity is affirmative when 
the authority providing the subsidy, or the legislation pursuant to which the authority 
operates, “expressly limits access” to the subsidy to “an enterprise or industry.”290 In a 
contract, a subsidy is considered not to be de jure specific if the eligibility criteria or 
conditions for the subsidy are objective and transparent, if the eligibility rules are 
automatic, and if these eligibility rules are clearly stipulated in the existing laws capable 
of verification and strictly followed.291 The statute defines the term “objective or 
conditions” as criteria or conditions that are neutral and that do not favor one enterprise 
or industry over another.292 Further, the SAA directs that such criteria or conditions 
must be economic in nature and horizontal in application, such as stipulating the 
number of employees or the size of an enterprise.293  
De jure specificity also exists where a subsidy is limited to designated 
geographical regions within the jurisdiction of the granting authority.294 These 
subsidies are also considered to be regionally specific. 
Commerce has found de jure specific domestic subsidies in several cases. In 
Lightweight Thermal Paper (LTP) from China,295 Commerce found that the GOC has 
a policy in place to encourage and support the growth of the paper industry through 
 
289 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5A)(D) 
290 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5A)(D)(i). The SAA gives an authoritative interpretation of this provision as 
follows: 
“Although it has long been established that intent to target benefits is not a prerequisite for a 
countervailable subsidy, the de jure prong of the specificity test recognizes that where a foreign 
government expressly limits access to a subsidy to a sufficiently small number of enterprises, industries 
or groups thereof, further inquiry into the actual use of the subsidy is unnecessary.” 
291 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5A)(D)(ii) and SAA, supra note 159, at 260. See also Bowman et al. (2010), supra 
note 201, at 120. 
292 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5A)(D). 
293 SAA, supra note 159, at 260. 
294 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5A)(D)(iv). 
295 Lightweight Thermal Paper from the People’s Republic of China: Final Affirmative Countervailing 
Duty Determination, 73 FR 57323 (October 2, 2008). 
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preferential financing initiatives, as expressly reflected in the government plans and 
related documents. Through a de jure specificity test, Commerce concluded that the 
loans from such a program are de jure specific because of the GOC’s policy, as 
illustrated in its government plans, to encourage and support the growth and 
development of the paper industry.296  
In Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road (OTR) Tires from India,297 Commerce 
found a tax deduction to cover expenses related to in-house R&D for companies 
“engaged in the business of bio-technology or in any business of manufacture or 
production of any article or thing …. in the list of the Eleventh Schedule of the Income 
Tax Act of 1961” was a countervailable subsidy. As this type of subsidy was expressly 
limited to certain enterprises and industries, it was considered to be de jure specific.298 
 
3.2.1.3.2.2. De Facto Specificity 
 
In practice, Commerce may be suspicious that a subsidy program is apparently 
provided as generally available to all companies and industries, but that it actually 
targets only some companies that are in a position to take it; or perhaps, in fact, only a 
limited group of industries or some specialized companies can fulfill the conditions 
necessary to receive the subsidy. In such a situation, Commerce has a reason to believe 
that such a subsidy may be specific as a matter of fact (de facto specific). Therefore, 
Commerce will examine the actual distribution of benefits to determine whether it may 
be de facto specific. Commerce discerns de facto specificity from the presence of one 
or more factors. Factor 1: whether the actual number of recipients is limited; Factor 2: 
whether an enterprise or industry is a predominant user of the subsidy; Factor 3: 
whether an enterprise or industry receives a disproportionally large subsidy amount; 
 
296 Id. 
297 Countervailing Duty Investigation of Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from India: Final 
Affirmative Determination, and Final Affirmative Critical Circumstances Determination, in Part, 82 FR 
2946 (January 10, 2017). 
298 Id. 
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and Factor 4: whether the authority favored an enterprise or industry in its decision to 
grant a subsidy.299 
As a standard rule for examining these four factors, Commerce will examine 
each factor in sequential order of its appearance. If a single factor warrants a finding of 
specificity, Commerce will stop there and not undertake further analysis.300 In 
analyzing these four de facto specificity factors, Commerce is required to take into 
account (i) the extent of diversification of economic activities within the economy in 
question; and (ii) the length of time during which the subsidy program in question has 
been in operation.301 
In Pneumatic Off-The-Road (OTR) Tires from China,302 the provision of natural 
and synthetic rubber by state-owned rubber producers to OTR tire producers at less 
than adequate remuneration was found to be de facto specific because the industries 
are “limited in number.”303 During the preliminary investigation, the government of 
China provided a list of industries that use natural and synthetic rubbers: “tires, rubber 
bands and tubes, shoes, machinery components and commodity products.”304 Prior to 
the final determination, the petitioners argued that at the verification, an official from 
the Chinese Synthetic Rubber Industry Association (“SRIA”) stated that “tire industry 
is the largest consumer of natural and synthetic rubber in the country” and that the 
“main consumers of synthetic rubber are: shoemakers, rubber pipe producers, 
construction companies, and automobile producers.”305 Consequently, Commerce 
continued to find that industries that use natural and synthetic rubber are “limited in 
 
299 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5A)(D)(iii)(I-IV). 
300 19 C.F.R. Part 351, § 351.502(a). 
301 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5A)(D)(iii)(I-IV) and SAA, supra note 159, at 261. 
302 Certain New Pneumatic Off-The-Road Tires from the People’s Republic of China: Final Affirmative 
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Partial Affirmative Determination of Critical 
Circumstances, 73 FR 40485 (July 15, 2008) (“Final Determination”). 
303 Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People’s Republic of China: Preliminary 
Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, 72 FR 71360 (Dec. 17, 2007) (“Preliminary 
Determination”). 
304 Id. 
305 Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: 
Certain New Pneumatic Off-The-Road Tires (OTR Tires) from the People’s Republic of China, issued 
accompanying with the Final Determination (IDM). 
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number;” therefore, such benefit was de facto specific.306 In addition, Commerce noted 
that the tire industry is the largest consumer of natural and synthetic rubber in the 
country, and the figures collected from SRIA officials during verification indicated that 
the tire industry consumes over half of the total rubber consumed in the country during 
the period of investigation (“POI”), indicating that this program may also be de facto 
specific under the predominant and disproportionate analyses (i.e., Factor 2 and Factor 
3). In other previous cases in the past, among many others, for example, Circular 
Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe (CWP) from China307 and Certain Steel Products 
from Belgium,308 Commerce also found the subsidies were de facto specific due to the 
“limited in number” factor. 
 
3.2.2. Injury Determination 
 
Historically, the provisions of the injury test had their origin in the Antidumping 
Act of 1921.309 From 1921 to 1954, the injury determinations in antidumping cases 
were in the hands of the Department of Treasury. Then, in 1954, the responsibility for 
finding injury finding was transferred to the Tariff Commission, later renamed the 
International Trade Commission (“ITC”).310 The countervailing duty law, however, did 
not contain an injury test for many years, until one was implemented with the enactment 
 
306 Id. at 71. 
307 Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe from the People’s Republic of China: Final Affirmative 
Countervailing Duty Determination and Final Affirmative Determination of Critical Circumstances, 73 
FR 31966 (June 5, 2008). 
308 Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determinations: Certain Steel Products from Belgium, 58 FR 
37273, 37276 (July 9, 1993). 
309 The Antidumping Act of 1921 was enacted as part of the Emergency Tariff Act, 42 Stat. 11 § 201(a). 
Under the Act, the Secretary is responsible for investigating when imports are sold at less than fair value 
and for finding injury to American industry. 
310 Customs Simplification Act of 1954, ch. 12 & 13, § 302, 68 Stat. 1138 (repealed 1979). See generally 
Bruce A. Ortwine, Injury Determinations under United States Antidumping Laws before and after the 
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 1076, 1079 (1981). 
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of the Trade Act of 1974.311 At that time, a basic injury312 test was added to the 
countervailing duty law for imports of nondutiable goods only.313 It was, however, a 
landmark moment for the beginning of a bifurcated system in countervailing duty 
proceedings.314 In 1979, a completely new injury test315 was added for all imports from 
signatories to the 1979 Subsidies Code. Since the establishment of the WTO in 1995, 
the United States has extended the injury test to apply in all countervailing duty cases 
involving a WTO member.316 It should be noted that the legal requirements for injury 
test are fundamentally the same both for dumping and subsidies.317 
 
3.2.2.1. Statutory Criteria for the Injury Test 
 
Under Section 701(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (codified at 19 
U.S.C. § 1671(a)), a two-step system is stipulated, respectively, as follows: 
(a) General rule. If— 
(1) the administering authority318 determines that the government of a country 
or any public entity within the territory of a country is providing, directly or indirectly, 
a countervailable subsidy with respect to the manufacture, production, or export of a 
class or kind of merchandise imported, or sold (or likely to be sold) for importation, 
into the United States, and 
 
311 Trade Act of 1974, supra note 31. See generally Lloyd Granet, ITC Injury Determination in 
Countervailing Duty Investigations, 15 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 987, 995 (1983). See also Jackson 
(1997), supra note 41, at 267. Jackson explained that because these U.S. laws preceded the GATT, the 
U.S. benefited from grandfathered rights established in the Protocol of Provisional Application under 
GATT 1947, with respect to injury test matters. 
312 The law merely specified an “injury” test without the additional word “material.” See Jackson (1997), 
supra note 41, at 267. 
313 See Granet (1983), supra note 311, at 988 (footnote 8). Granet explained, “Because U.S. 
countervailing duty law prior to GATT did not impose a duty on nondutiable goods, the GATT 
grandfather clause exemption did not apply.” 
314 Id. 
315 The new injury test, with a full definition of “material injury,” added the three varieties of injury, 
namely material injury, threat of material injury, and material retardation of establishment of industry. 
See Section 701(a)(2), Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 93 Stat. 144. 
316 JACKSON et al. (2008), supra note 124, at 815. 
317 JACKSON (1997), supra note 41, at 266. 
318 The term “administering authority” means the Secretary of Commerce. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(1). 
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(2) in the case of merchandise imported from a Subsidies Agreement country, 
the Commission319 determines that— 
(A) an industry in the United States— 
(i) is materially injured, or 
(ii) is threatened with material injury, or 
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded, 
by reason of imports of that merchandise or by reason of sales (or the likelihood 
of sales) of that merchandise for importation, 
then there shall be imposed upon such merchandise a countervailing duty, in 
addition to any other duty imposed, equal to the amount of the net countervailable 
subsidy. 
From the language of the foregoing provisions, to impose a countervailing duty 
to a subsidized product from a WTO member country, one must satisfy three important 
elements. These include: (i) an existence of a countervailable subsidy benefiting the 
exported product; (ii) a material injury to the U.S. domestic industry; and (iii) a causal 
link between the material injury and the imports, as indicated by the language “by 
reasons of imports of that merchandise.” The last two elements, (ii) and (iii), comprise 
the two-step injury step, and both elements are necessary for the imposition of a 
countervailing duty. Therefore, the ITC’s injury determination is a decisive component 
of any countervailing duty investigation. In further detail, the first step of the ITC’s 
injury test provides three options: “material injury,” “threat of material injury” to U.S. 
industry, or “material retardation” of the establishment of U.S. industry. Then, in step 
two, whichever form of injury exists must be shown to have been caused “by reason 
of” imports of the products under the countervailing duty investigation.  
In addition, as is evident from section 701(a)(2), the ITC only conducts the 
injury test only when the exporting country of the product under investigation is a 
“Subsidies Agreement country.”320 Looking back to the legislative history when the 
 
319 “Commission” means the United States International Trade Commission. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(2). 
320 19 U.S.C. § 1671(b) defines “Subsidies Agreement country” as “a WTO member country, or a country 
which the President has determined has assumed obligations with respect to the U.S. which are 
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U.S. Congress amended the Tariff Act of 1930 in 1979 to add the injury test in 
conforming with international commitments to implement the Subsidies Code, Section 
303321 of the Act was still retained to cover those cases related to imports from the 
countries that are not “countries under the Agreement.”322 For instance, if such 
countries (e.g., non-WTO members) export the subsidized goods into the U.S. market, 
they are not entitled to an injury finding by the ITC.323 That means they are back to the 
one-step system and are more likely to be exposed to the imposition of a countervailing 
duty if Commerce finds the related subsidies are countervailable, with no findings of 
any sort required by the ITC. In essence, the bifurcated system is intended to ensure 
that CVD determinations are not concentrated in only one agency, and the relatively 
independent nature of the ITC could insulate it from political pressures in its injury 
determinations.324 Notably, determinations by both Commerce and the ITC can be 
subject to judicial reviews.325 That provides some protection against arbitrary 
imposition of high duties; notably however, there is no judicial review available for 
Commerce’s determination that a country has a nonmarket economy, and such 
determination is thus indefinitely binding until revocation or reconsideration by 
Commerce.326 
 
3.2.2.1.1. Material Injury 
 
 
substantially equivalent to the obligations under the Subsidies Agreement, or a country with respect to 
which the President determines that there is an agreement in effect between the U.S. and that country.” 
321 Section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 applied to the following countries: “… any country, dependency, 
colony, province, or other political subdivision of government, person, partnership, association, cartel, 
or corporation, shall pay or bestow, directly or indirectly, any bounty or grant upon the manufacture or 
production or export of any article or merchandise manufactured or produced in such country, 
dependency, colony, province, or other political subdivision of government.” 
322 Catherine DeFilippo, Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Handbook, 14th Edition, Pub. 4540, 
USITC, June 2015, at IV-6. Available online at 
https://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/documents/handbook.pdf, accessed on May 13, 2020. 
323 In Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Czechoslovakia (1984), because both Poland and Czechoslovakia 
were not signatories to the 1979 Subsidies Code, Commerce conducted the CVD investigation of the 
alleged subsidization of carbon wire steel rod in accordance with Section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930. 
324 BOWMAN et al. (2010), supra note 201, at 181. 
325 19 U.S.C. § 1516a. 
326 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(D). 
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The ITC’s focus in any antidumping or countervailing duty case is finding a 
“material injury” to the domestic industry. The term “material injury” is defined as 
“harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant.”327 Supporting this 
technical definition, the law provides the ITC with a list of economic factors to be 
reviewed; and the ITC is given substantial discretion in its analysis and weighing of 
such factors.328 The list includes: (1) the volume of imports of the subject merchandise, 
(2) the effect of imports of that merchandise on prices in the United States for domestic 
like products, and (3) the impact of imports of such merchandise on domestic producers 
of domestic like products in the context of production operations within the United 
States.329 In considering whether there is a material injury, the ITC is allowed to 
consider “such other economic factors as are relevant.”330 This provision has granted 
the ITC a very broad discretion, and there is some risk that the ITC may abuse its 
discretion by failing to consider an important factor that is not otherwise listed among 
the statutory criteria.331 
Technically, when evaluating the volume of imports, the ITC is directed by law 
to consider whether the volume of subject imports, or any increase in that volume, 
either in absolute terms or relative332 to production or consumption in the United States, 
is significant.333 Thus, the ITC has substantial discretion to conclude what constitutes 
a “significant” increase.334 
 
327 Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, Section 771(7) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)). This Section is also 
applied to antidumping investigations. This definition is exactly the same definition as appeared in the 
legislative history of Trade Acts 1979 and 1974 and it is believed to inherit the definition of injury 
standard under the Antidumping Act of 1921. See generally Ortwine (1982), supra note 310, (providing 
further explanation on the origin of the “material injury” definition). 
328 BOWMAN et al. (2010), supra note 201, at 57. 
329 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B)(i). 
330 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B)(ii). 
331 PATTISON (2016), supra note 141, at 105. (citing Mittal Steel Point Lisas Ltd. v. U.S., 542 F.3d 8667 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) and other cases). 
332 See BOWMAN et al. (2010), supra note 201, at 58 (An increase can be “significant” if it is either an 
increase in absolute terms (i.e., the actual volume of imports has increased) or if it is an increase in 
“relative” terms (meaning that the U.S. market share of the imported goods has increased)). 
333 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(i). 
334 BOWMAN et al. (2010), supra note 201, at 58. 
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In its review of the effect of imports on the subject merchandise on prices, the 
ITC is further instructed to consider two basic aspects of pricing: (1) whether there has 
been significant price underselling by the imported merchandise as compared with the 
price of domestic like products in the United States and (2) whether the effect of 
imports of such merchandise otherwise depresses prices to a significant degree or 
prevents price increases, which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant 
degree.335 
The third element that is the broadest one requires the ITC to examine the 
impact of imports on the affected domestic industry.336 Specifically, the ITC is required 
to evaluate all relevant economic factors that have a bearing on the state of the industry 
in the U.S., including, but not limited to [the following five factors]: 
(1) actual and potential decline in output, sales, market share, gross profits, 
operating profits, net profits, ability to service debt, productivity, return on investments, 
return on assets, and utilization of capacity; 
(2) factors affecting domestic prices; 
(3) actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, 
wages, growth, ability to raise capital, and investment; 
(4) actual and potential negative effects on the existing development and 
production efforts of the domestic industry, including efforts to develop a derivative or 
more advanced version of the domestic like product; and 
(5) in dumping proceedings, the magnitude of the margin of dumping.337 
The purpose of the law is to provide general guidance to the ITC in its material 
injury considerations, but the ITC still has its broad discretion by a statutory standard 
for making its determination as provided by the law. The law states that “the presence 
or absence of any factor which the Commission is required to evaluate shall not 
necessarily give decisive guidance with respect to the determination by the 
 
335 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(ii). 
336 PATTISON (2016), supra note 141, at 106. 
337 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iii). 
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Commission of material injury.”338 One of the most important factors in the ITC’s 
injury determination is causation, that is the causal link between the material injury to 
the domestic industry and the imports of the subsidized product.339  
 
3.2.2.1.2. Threat of Material Injury 
 
There is no specific definition or interpretation of a “threat of material injury” 
under the countervailing duty law. The concept of “threat of material injury” is more 
complicated to define than that of “material injury,” which is an existing or actual injury 
that has already occurred. In fact, to evaluate whether the “threat” exists, the ITC has 
even more leeway than in the case of an existing injury, because the ITC is expected to 
evaluate trends for the future, which in many cases are not clear.340 
Thus, in practice, the ITC has not infrequently found a threat of material injury, 
rather than an actual material injury, as the basis for an injury determination.341 As a 
matter of concept, a determination of a “threat of material injury” is similar to that of a 
“material injury”; however, the prospective nature of determination of a threat of 
material injury makes them more difficult.342 As explained by Congress, the purpose 
of the threat of material injury standard is “to permit import relief under the 
countervailing duty and antidumping laws before actual injury occurs.”343 
In evaluating the threat of material injury, the ITC is required to consider, 
among other relevant factors, the following specific criteria: 
“(1) if a countervailable subsidy is involved, such information as may be 
presented to it by the administering authority as to the nature of the subsidy 
(particularly as to whether the countervailable subsidy is a subsidy described in Article 
 
338 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(E)(ii). 
339 In the past, the laws did not include a causation standard because Congress was concerned that a relief 
for an American industry would be more difficult to obtain if the Commission’s discretion was limited 
in that respect. See also Ortwine (1981), supra note 310, at 1103. 
340 JACKSON (1997), supra note 41, at 270. 
341 PATTISON (2016), supra note 141, at 124. 
342 BOWMAN et al. (2010), supra note 201, at 58. 
343 PATTISON (2016), supra note 141, at 124 (citing S. Rep. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Ses. 89 (1979)). 
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3 or 6.1 of the Subsidies Agreement), and whether imports of the subject merchandise 
are likely to increase, 
(2) any existing unused production capacity or imminent, substantial increase 
in production capacity in the exporting country indicating the likelihood of 
substantially increased imports of the subject merchandise into the United States, 
considering the availability of other export markets to absorb any additional exports, 
(3) a significant rate of increase of the volume or market penetration of imports 
of the subject merchandise indicating the likelihood of substantially increased imports, 
(4) whether imports of the subject merchandise are entering at prices that are 
likely to have a significant depressing or suppressing effect on domestic prices, and are 
likely to increase demand for further imports, 
(5) inventories of the subject merchandise, 
(6) the potential for product‐shifting if production facilities in the foreign 
country, which can be used to produce the subject merchandise, are currently being 
used to produce other products, 
(7) in any investigation under this title which involves imports of both a raw 
agricultural product (within the meaning of paragraph (4)(E)(iv)) and any product 
processed from such raw agricultural product, the likelihood that there will be increased 
imports, by reason of product shifting, if there is an affirmative determination by the 
Commission under section 705(b)(1) or 735(b)(1) with respect to either the raw 
agricultural product or the processed agricultural product (but not both), 
(8) the actual and potential negative effects on the existing development and 
production efforts of the domestic industry, including efforts to develop a 
derivative or more advanced version of the domestic like product, and 
(9) any other demonstrable adverse trends that indicate the probability that there 
is likely to be material injury by reason of imports (or sale for importation) of the 
subject merchandise (whether or not it is actually being imported at the time).”344 
 
344 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F)(i). 
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In addition, as instructed by the law, the ITC’s determination of a threat of 
material injury “may not be made on the basis of mere conjecture or supposition;”345 
instead, it must be based on current and historical data that demonstrate that “dumped 
or subsidized imports are imminent and whether material injury by reason of imports 
would occur unless an order is issued or a suspension agreement is accepted.”346  
 
3.2.2.1.3. Material Retardation 
 
Congress does not define “material retardation” in the countervailing duty law. 
Material retardation is even more difficult to define than a threat of material injury. If 
a U.S. industry under the ITC’s review is not already well-established, there is typically 
insufficient data to demonstrate actual material retardation.347 In practice, the ITC 
rarely chooses to use the “material retardation of an industry” standard as provided in 
the statute when determining whether there is injury.348 
In reviewing this issue in past cases, the ITC has started by examining whether 
the U.S. industry is “established.”349 If American producers have started production 
and such operations have “stabilized,” the industry is considered to be established.350 
In its evaluation, the ITC examines the following factors: 
(1) when the U.S. industry began production;  
(2) whether the production has been steady or start‐and‐stop;  
(3) the size of domestic production compared to the size of the domestic market 
as a whole;  
(4) whether the U.S. industry has reached a reasonable “breakeven point;” and  
 
345 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F)(ii). 
346 Id. 
347 BOWMAN et al. (2010), supra note 201, at 59 (citing U.S. International Trade Commission, ‘Certain 
Gene Amplification Thermal Cyclers and Subassemblies Thereof from the United Kingdom’ 
(Investigation No. 731-TA-485, Pub. No. 2412), Federal Register 56 (28 Aug. 1991): 44101). 
348 PATTISON (2016), supra note 141, at 124. 
349 Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Handbook, 14th Edition, Publication 4540, USITC, June 
2015, at II-33. 
350 Id. 
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(5) whether the activities are truly a new industry or merely a new product line 
of an established firm.351 
If the industry is not established, the ITC considers whether the performance of 
the industry reflects normal start‐up difficulties or whether the imports of the subject 




One of the long-standing concerns in determining material injury is how to deal 
with the situation involving the same products that are imported from more than one 
country. In particular, the main concern in such proceedings is whether all imports from 
the countries in question should be aggregated or “cumulated” to assess their combined 
effect on injuries or whether each country’s imports should be separated to conduct a 
separate injury analysis.353 The cumulative approach may be unfair to the country of 
which the import volume is at the lowest level, but the cumulation of all imports from 
all countries in the same CVD proceeding may result to an affirmative injury 
determination. 
As required by U.S. law, cumulation is used in both countervailing duty and 
antidumping proceedings.354 When identifying a material injury, the ITC is directed to 
cumulate subject imports from all countries as to which petitions were filed and/or 
investigations self-initiated by Commerce on the same day, if such imports compete 
with each other and with domestic like products in the U.S. market.355 The law, 
however, provides exceptions to the application of cumulation in the following 
circumstances: (1) if Commerce has made a preliminary negative determination with 
respect to imports from a particular country and does not make a final affirmative 
 
351 Id. (citing Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway, Inv. No. 701‐TA‐302 (Preliminary) and 
Inv. No. 731TA‐454 (Preliminary), USITC Pub. 2272 (April 1990) at 15‐18). 
352 Id. (citing Benzyl Paraben from Japan, Inv. No. 731‐TA‐462 (Final), USITC Pub. 2355 (February 
1991) at 11‐12). 
353 PATTISON (2016), supra note 141, at 144. 
354 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(G). 
355 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(G)(i). 
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determination on those imports prior to the ITC’s final determination; (2) when the 
investigation has been terminated for a particular country; (3) for a country designated 
a beneficiary country under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (“CBERA”) 
(except that two or more CBERA beneficiaries must be cumulated with each other); 
and (4) for imports from Israel.356 
In practicable circumstances, at its discretion, the ITC may cumulatively assess 
the volume and effect of imports of the subject merchandise if such imports compete 
with each other and with domestic like products in the U.S. market.357  
 
3.2.2.3. De Minimis Countervailable Subsidies 
 
Commerce has applied a long-term practice that if the aggregate of net 
countervailable subsidies is below a certain de minimis level, it will be treated as zero 
and no countervailing duties will be imposed. Under the applicable CVD law, 
Commerce is directed to disregard any de minimis countervailable subsidy.358 The 
standard de minimis threshold is set based on a statutory rule that “a countervailable 
subsidy is de minimis if the administering authority determines that the aggregate of 
the net countervailable subsidies is less than 1 percent ad valorem or the equivalent 
specific rate for the subject merchandise.”359 However, there are exceptions for 
developing countries, including (i) not exceeding 2% for most developing countries360 
and (ii) not exceeding 3% for certain other developing countries.361 
 
356 Id. See also Lawrence J. Bogard, 1 Law and Practice of US Reg. of International Trade § 1:125, Law 
and Practice of United States Regulation of International Trade, Publisher’s Editorial Staff, Chapter 1. 
Antidumping and Countervailing Duties, III. Material Injury in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty 
Cases (Westlaw), accessed on October 20, 2020. 
357 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(H) (The provision on cumulation for determining a threat of material injury uses 
the phrasing “may cumulatively assess …” (emphasis added). 
358 19 U.S.C. §1671b(a)(4)(A). 
359 Id. 
360 Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. §1671b(a)(4)(B), the 2% de minimis rate is applied to country members of the 
Subsidies Agreement that are designated by USTR as developing countries. However, the 2% de minimis 
rate shall not apply after the date that is eight years after the date the WTO Agreement enters into force. 
See 19 U.S.C. §1671b(a)(4)(D)(i). 
361 Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. §1671b(a)(4)(C), there are two subjects eligible for the 3% de minimis 
threshold. The first subject includes country members of the Subsidies Agreement that are designated 
 70 
It should be noted that the standards of 1%, 2%, and 3% de minimis threshold 
can be applied only in the original CVD investigation to determine whether the 
imported goods from a country should be subject to a CVD order. In regular 
administrative reviews and other determinations other than preliminary or final CVD 
determination in an original investigation of CVD orders, Commerce uses the standard 
of less than 0.5 percent ad valorem upon the imported goods from all countries.362 
Under the U.S. AD and CVD laws, the Trade Representative (“USTR”) shall 
publish in the Federal Register, and update as necessary, a list of (i) developing 
countries that have eliminated their export subsidies on an expedited basis within the 
meaning of Article 27.11 of the Subsidies Agreement, and (ii) countries determined by 
the Trade Representative to be lease developed or developing countries.363 The first 
time that the USTR published such a list was on June 2, 1988.364 The USTR recently 
revised that list on February 10, 2020.365 For the purpose of the U.S. CVD law, the 
USTR considers countries with a share of 0.5 percent or more of world trade to be 
developed countries.366 As a result, Vietnam together with other countries such as 
Brazil, India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand are now ineligible for the 2% de 
minimis standard.367 The special meaning of this change for Vietnam is that it will no 
longer receive preferential treatment of the 2% de minimis threshold in CVD 
investigations. In other words, Vietnam will be subject to a lower threshold for 
 
by USTR as least developed countries. For these countries, the 3% de minimis threshold shall expire 
eight years from the date the WTO Agreement entered into force. The second subject includes 
developing countries with respect to which USTR has notified Commerce that the country has eliminated 
its export subsidies on an expedited basis within the meaning of Article 27.1 of the Subsidies Agreement. 
See 19 U.S.C §1671b(a)(4)(D). The purpose of applying the 3% de minimis threshold is to encourage 
such countries to speed up their process for eliminating subsidies. See H. Rpt. No. 103-826(1), at 117 
(1994); Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809. 
362 19 C.F.R. § 351.106(c). 
363 19 U.S.C. § 1677(C). 
364 USTR, Developing and Least-Developed Country Designations under the Countervailing Duty Law, 
63 FR 29945-02 (June 2, 1998). 
365 USTR, Designations of Developing and Least-Developed Countries Under the Countervailing Duty 
Law, 85 FR 7613-03 (February 10, 2020). 
366 Id. at 7615. 
367 Id. 
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triggering a CVD investigation into whether exports from Vietnam are unfairly 
subsidized by the government and cause injuries to U.S. industries. 
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Chapter 4. Application of U.S. Countervailing Duty Law to 
Nonmarket Economy Countries 
 
 
Thus far, in Chapters 2 and 3, this dissertation has traced the development of 
global and U.S. trade laws, with a focus on two features that have caused controversy 
in the context of U.S. countervailing duty investigations, namely the discretion 
allocated to the U.S. Department of Commerce in determining when a subsidy is 
countervailable, and the discretion allocated to the ITC in making an injury 
determination. This Chapter highlights another aspect is integral to understanding the 
cases to be studies in Chapter 5: the treatment of Vietnam as having a nonmarket 
economy, and the disfavored treatment afforded to nonmarket economies generally by 
the U.S. trade regime. First, in Section 4.1, this Chapter discusses the historical 
underpinnings of the disfavored treatment of nonmarket economies. Then, in Section 
4.2, this Chapter briefly discusses the U.S. trade laws’ treatment of nonmarket 
economies. Finally, Section 4.3 dives into U.S. countervailing duty investigations 
against nonmarket economies. Of particular importance are some of the alternative 
approaches to the traditional bright-line distinction between market and nonmarket 
economies: for instance, this Chapter highlights the “mix and match” (or “bubbles of 
capitalism”) and “market-oriented industry” theories, either of which could prove 
promising as nonmarket economies like Vietnam seek to gain more favorable 
international trade treatment as a response to their market-oriented reforms. 
 
4.1. The Origin of NMEs in the Multilateral Trading System 
 
This section discusses issues related to nonmarket economies under the 
multilateral trading system, mainly highlighting historical developments of GATT 
1947 to WTO regime in relation to nonmarket economies. 
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4.1.1. GATT 1947 
 
Looking back to the Cold War era after World War II, the world was divided 
into two spheres of influence: one side, the United States; the other, the Soviet Union 
(USSR).368 In this “bipolar world,” the Soviet bloc included so-called state-trading or 
planned-economy countries, then mainly in Central and Eastern Europe.369 On the other 
side, the United States emerged as a leader of market economy countries in initiating 
the success of the first General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), which is 
based mostly on market-oriented rules and principles. 
In late 1945, as supported by the U.K., the United States published the Proposals 
for Expansion of World Trade and Employment and called for multinational 
negotiations on tariff reductions.370 As stated by the U.S. Secretary of State in the 
Proposals, “it is urgently necessary that these policies should be agreed upon, in order 
that the world may not separate into economic blocs.”371 At about the same time the 
United Nations was beginning its work, and one of its principal organs, the Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC), was established.372 In December 1945, the United 
States invited a small “nuclear” group of fifteen countries (including the Soviet Union 
and China) to participate.373 In February 1946, at the first ECOSOC meeting, the United 
States introduced a resolution, which was adopted, calling for the convening of a 
“United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment” with the purpose of drafting 
 
368 Snyder (2001), supra note 60, at 378. 
369 Id. 
370 U.S. Department of State, Proposals for Expansion of World Trade and Employment, November 1945 
[hereinafter the Proposals]. (Available for access at 
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/historical/eccles/036_04_0003.pdf). See also Irwin, Douglas A., 
et al., The Genesis of the GATT, Feb. 13, 2008, available at 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265001187_The_genesis_of_the_GATT). 
371 The Proposals, supra note 370. 
372 JACKSON et al. (2008), supra note 124, at 218. 
373 Irwin (2008), supra note 370. Fourteen countries had been invited to join: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, 
Canada, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
South Africa, and the United Kingdom. The Soviet Union was invited but never responded. In August, 
at the request of the United Nations, Chile, Lebanon, and Norway received invitations as well. 
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a charter for an international trade organization374 (ITO). In the draft “Suggested 
Charter for an ITO,” which was based mainly on the Proposals, the United States 
proposed several principles and methods for dealing with state trading monopolies, 
including “Equality of treatment,” “State monopolies of individual products,” and 
“Complete state monopolies of foreign trade.”375  
With an expectation of bringing the Soviet Union countries into the multilateral 
organization, the U.S. had tried many times to invite the Soviet Union to join in the 
Preparatory Committee.376 However, the Soviet Union did not reply to the repeated 
invitations377 The Soviet Union also declined to participate in the subsequent 
conferences in London, Geneva, and Havana.378 It could be understood that the Soviet 
Union did not want to participate because the two economic blocs had different 
economic systems with different political and trade interests to achieve. Indeed, the 
United States had proposed provisions actually reflecting the principles of free trade, 
non-discrimination and multilateral negotiations, which were incompatible with the 
Soviet Union’s planned-economic system, economic policy of self-sufficiency, and its 
target of consolidating the linkage with the newly established socialist countries and 
control of bilateral trade arrangements with those countries.379 However, the proposed 
methodologies to deal with “complete state monopolies of foreign trade”380 is believed 
not to be new.381 The concept of “global purchase arrangement” had already existed in 
several bilateral trade agreements between the Soviet Union and some nations, for 
 
374 Id. (citing US State Dept. Press Release, Dec. 16, 1945, reproduced in 13 Dept. State Bull. 970 (1945); 
1 U.N. ECOSOC Res. 13, U.N. Doc. E/22 (1946)). 
375 ZHANG (2018), supra note 79, at 79-86. 
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378 HAROLD KARAN JACOBSON, THE SOVIET UNION, THE UN AND WORLD TRADE 673-688 (Volume 11, 
Issue 3, The Western Political Quarterly 1958). 
379 Id. at 86. 
380 The Proposals, supra note 370. Section E. State Trading (providing “3. Complete state monopolies 
of foreign trade. As the counterpart of tariff reductions and other actions to encourage an expansion of 
multilateral trade by other members, members having a complete state monopoly of foreign trade should 
undertake to purchase annually from members, on the nondiscriminatory basis referred to in paragraph 
1, above, products valued at not less than an aggregate amount to be agreed upon. This global purchase 
arrangement should be subject to periodic adjustment in consultation with the Organization”). 
381 Polouektov (2002), supra note 76, at 7. 
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example, an agreement with Latvia in 1927, with Finland during the 1930s, and in a 
bilateral trade agreement with the United States in 1935.382 Therefore, the “global 
purchase agreement” proposed by the United States was the recognition and 
multilateralization of this reciprocal trade arrangement between nonmarket economies 
and market economies.383 However, because the Soviet Union had shown no interest 
in participation into the multinational negotiations that led to the conclusion of the 
GATT in 1947, the provision of “complete state monopolies of foreign trade,” as a 
multilateral trade arrangement between nonmarket economies and market economies, 
was eventually excluded from the text of the GATT.384 The other provisions, proposed 
by the United States, including “Equality of treatment” and “State monopolies of 
individual products” were integrated into Article XVII, “State Trading Enterprises” of 
the GATT.385 
It should be noted that the GATT was drafted as an agreement to embody the 
results of the tariff negotiations at Geneva conferences from April to October 1947, 
concurrently with the work on the ITO charter.386 However, under the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreement Act extension of 1945, the U.S. President only had the authority to negotiate 
the tariff agreements (including the GATT), but no authority to accept international 
organization membership.387 Also, because the GATT itself was not self-executing 
without other nations’ parliamentary actions to implement many of the GATT’s general 
clauses, and in because while the U.S. President’s authority to enter into a trade 
 
382 Id. (The agreement provided that in exchange for MFN treatment, the Soviet Union would accept an 
obligation to place orders in the United States worth at least $30 million a year. (citing “The Prospect of 
Soviet-American Trade Relations,” Bulletin No. 39 of the Institute of International Finance of New York 
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agreement was going to expire in the middle of 1948, as a result, a Protocol of 
Provisional Application of the GATT was signed in late 1947, which then became 
effective on January 1, 1948. The ITO charter was finally dead because the U.S. 
Congress did not approve it.388  
 
4.1.2. The WTO Regime 
 
From the outset, the GATT was constructed as an international trading system 
operating on market-oriented rules and principles. Some commentators considered the 
GATT as having been designed by market economies for market economies, or as a 
rich nations’ club of the West’s market economy bloc vs. the East’s socialist or 
nonmarket economy bloc.389 Therefore, the GATT was not effective in dealing with 
many institutions and economies that do not operate under free-market principles, such 
as state trading agencies or monopolies, government-owned industries, centrally 
planned economies, and transition economies, and so on. These circumstances have 
raised some difficult conceptual problems for the GATT trading system.390 As an 
example, GATT’s Article XVII requires state trading enterprises to make transactions 
“solely in accordance with commercial considerations, including price, quality, 
availability, marketability, transportation….” Thus, theoretically, it does not take into 
account other motivations, which seems to contradict the “basic tenets of economic 
planning” in the socialist countries.391 Another issue is that the GATT is premised on 
a classical economic model (i.e., private enterprises are stimulated by profit motives 
and trade goods in response to market forces). On the contrary, nonmarket economies 
do not follow this classical model; for example, instead of responding to market forces, 
purchases and sales are largely based on central planning requirements and state trading 
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389 Polouektov (2002), supra note 76. See also Wilczynski, J., Dumping in Trade between Market and 
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decisions.392 Therefore, the most critical issue for the GATT was how to manage 
acceptance by major nonmarket sectors.393 
Prior to the official establishment of the WTO in 1995, many Eastern European 
countries desired to transform their economies into a market-oriented economies. The 
flow of their accession into the GATT has triggered a change of direction in how the 
multilateral trading system approached nonmarket economies.394 Instead of adapting 
GATT rules to integrate nonmarket economies, the main concern was promoting a 
more efficient transition of these economies.395 Yugoslavia is a typical example of a 
country adapting, by way of economic reforms, to the GATT’s market-oriented rules 
and principles.396 Other Eastern European countries acceded to the GATT during their 
centrally planned economy stages such as Poland (1967), Romania (1971), Hungary 
(1973).397 Hence, the tendency to move from nonmarket economies to market 
economies reflects the “natural, inevitable and progressive”398 features in the 
multilateral trading system under the GATT and WTO regime. 
The GATT shirt, however, seems to be unfit for a bigger body of more and more 
acceding economies. Therefore, at the Uruguay Round negotiations, which started in 
1986, there was a demand for creation of an institution with decision-making 
procedures to meet the needs of all members. After eight years of multinational 
 
392 William Butler et al., The Role of the Nonmarket Economies in the New Round of Trade Negotiations, 
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negotiations, the WTO was officially created in 1994 and began its life on January 1, 
1995.399  
China, as one of the largest nonmarket economy countries, has spent a 
complicated long run to be acceded to the WTO. Indeed, China was one of the founders 
of the GATT in 1947, but after the Communists came to power in 1949, the then-
Republic of China withdrew from the GATT in 1950.400 In 1968, China officially 
applied to the GATT for resumption of its status as a contracting party; however, the 
Working Party viewed this process as the same as an accession process.401 It took China 
for sixteen years to be officially accepted as the 143rd WTO member on December 11, 
2001.402 However, China has yet to be recognized by the United States as a market 
economy country since its accession to the WTO. 
The former leader of the socialist bloc during the Cold War, Russia, officially 
became the WTO’s 157th-member in 2012.403 Unlike China, Russia chose a completely 
cooperative strategy with large market economy countries at the early stage of its 
economic transition.404 The fact that Russia was recognized by the United States as a 
market economy country in 2002 was significant in “nudging Russia toward eventual 
accession into the World Trade Organization.”405 
 
4.2. The Origin of NMEs in Relation to the U.S. Trade Laws 
 
As a political reaction to the Cold War in the early 1950s, U.S. Congress 
enacted a law to direct the President, “as soon as practicable,” to withdraw concessions 
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402 WTO, China. Available at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_chine_e.htm. 
403 WTO, Russian Federation. Available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_russie_e.htm. 
404 ZHANG (2018), supra note 79, at 212. 
405 Neil Jr. King, U.S. Decides to Grant Russia Status of ‘Market Economy, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, 
June 7, 2002. 
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from Communist areas.406 Specifically, the law prohibited the United States from 
granting most-favored-nation (“MFN”) status to any nation or area dominated or 
controlled by a foreign government or foreign organization controlling the world’s 
Communist movement.407 That reaction was strengthened again in 1962 when 
Congress enacted another law to prevent Communist economic penetration.408 
Congress classified this measure as a national security one to prevent the imports from 
any country dominated or controlled by Communism.409 The United States took such 
actions as trade controls for political purposes rather than for ensuring production of 
goods essential for defense as required by national security purposes.410 Simply, during 
such tension that was emblematic of the Cold War period, a nation may have chosen to 
refrain from granting MFN status to other nations merely because those countries were 
viewed as unfriendly or because to grant such status would have been politically 
unpopular and therefore a risk to the survival of elected officials’ positions.411 
Consequently, trade between the Soviet Union and the United States prior to the 1970s 
was stagnant.412 
Remarkably, in 1974, Congress changed trade policies by enacting a law to deal 
with the trade relations between the United States and Communist countries having 
NME status.413 In particular, for an NME country to receive MFN benefits, that country 
must meet the requirements of freedom of emigration.414 In addition, the Act added a 
 
406 Trade Agreement Extension Act of 1951, Public Law No. 50, Chapter 141, H.R. 1612, 48 Stat. 943 
(June 16, 1951). 
407 Id. at Section 5. 
408 Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Public Law 87-794, H.R. 11970, 76 Stat. 872 (October 11, 1962). 
409 Id. at Chapter 4-National Security, Section 231. 
410 JACKSON et al. (2008), supra note 124, at 1080. 
411 Id. 
412 See Kevin M. Cowan, Cold War Trade Statutes: Is Jackson-Vanik Still Relevant?, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 
737 (1994) (citing ANDREW J. GOODPASTER ET AL., U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION 119 (eds. 
1988)). 
413 Trade Act of 1974, supra note 31. 
414 Id. at Section 402. The Act prohibited the President from entering into any commercial agreement 
with any NME country if that country: (i) denies its citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate; (ii) 
imposes more than a nominal tax on emigration or on the visas or other documents required for 
emigration, for any purpose or cause whatsoever; or (iii) imposes more than a nominal tax, levy, fine, 
fee, or other charge on any citizen as a consequence of the desire of such citizen to emigrate to the 
country of his choice. See also JACKSON (1997), supra note 41, at 333. (Jackson explained that a 
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new section on dealing with “market disruption,” which is a special escape-clause415 
channel that applies only to Communist countries.416 Specifically, the law provides a 
remedy against the imports of the merchandise from a Communist country that causes 
a “market disruption” for the merchandise produced by domestic industry.417 The term 
“Communist country” was simply defined as any country dominated or controlled by 
Communism.418 Congress thought that the provision regarding “market disruption” 
would cure the fear that Communist countries would engage in storing up goods and 
then suddenly flooding the American market for the purpose of destroying the 
market.419 To a certain extent, the “market disruption” remedy was based on a 
recognition of the difficulty of applying normal unfair trade laws, such as antidumping 
and countervailing duty laws, to NME countries.420 It should be noted that the Act also 
prohibited granting the GSP benefits to Communist countries unless they received 
MFN status from the United States and were members of the GATT and the IMF.421 
In addition to the “market disruption” provision, the Act added a new 
constructed-value methodology for calculating the dumped imports from a state-
controlled economy.422 However, there were no specific statutory provisions dealing 
 
[lobbying] movement in the Congress, generated by U.S. citizens interested in promoting the opportunity 
of emigration (particularly of Jewish persons) from the Soviet Union, led to the Jackson-Vanik 
Amendment. The enactment of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment as part of the Act was a direct political 
reaction to the severe restrictions that the Soviet Union had placed in late 1972 on the emigration of its 
citizens, but was expanded in its scope to apply to all NME countries. See also Pregelj, Vladimir N., The 
Jackson-Vanik Amendment: A Survey, CRS Report for Congress, Order Code 98-545, Aug. 1, 2005. 
Available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/98-545.pdf. 
415 The escape clause is a provision to allow temporary border barriers to imports when imports are 
increasing and can be shown to “injure” domestic competing industry. See generally Jackson (1997), 
supra note 41, at 179 (discussing the history of safeguards measures). 
416 Trade Act of 1974, supra note 31, at Section 406. See also Jackson (1997), supra note 41, at 333. 
417 Trade Act of 1974, supra note 31, at Section 406(a). The Act provided that a “market disruption” 
exists within a domestic industry whenever imports of an article, like or directly competitive with an 
article produced by such domestic industry, are increasing rapidly, either absolutely or relatively, so as 
to be a significant cause of material injury, or threat thereof, to such domestic industry. 
418 Id. at Section 406(e)(1). 
419 Horlick and Shuman (1984), supra note 59, at 838. 
420 JACKSON (1997), supra note 41, at 333-34. 
421 Section 502, Title V-Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). 
422 Section 205 (c) of the Antidumping Act of 1921 (as amended by the Trade Act of 1974). The law 
provides that “if available information indicates that the economy of the country from which the 
merchandise is exported is state-controlled to an extent that sales or offers of sales of such or similar 
merchandise in that country... do not permit a determination of foreign market value, the Secretary shall 
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with the NMEs’ subsidies under the CVD law. It was assumed that the United States 
would take any possible action against the subsidization from NME countries by the 
other alternative measures, such as with the antidumping law under the Antidumping 
Act of 1921, as amended by the Trade Act of 1974, or with the “market disruption” 
remedy under Section 406, or with import relief (i.e., the highest level of action) under 
Section 301, by providing import-restriction measures to tackle export subsidies from 
foreign countries that had the effect of substantially reducing sales of competitive 
American products. 
In 1988, Congress drastically changed the provisions pertaining to NME 
countries under the antidumping duty law by enacting the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988423. First, the Act added a completely new section entitled 
“Dumping by nonmarket economy countries.”424 The term “state-controlled economy” 
disappeared and was replaced by “nonmarket economy” throughout the section. It was 
the first time that a definition of “nonmarket economy” had been seen; it was defined 
as “any foreign country that the administering authority determines does not operate on 
market principles of cost or pricing structures, so that sales of merchandise in such 
country do not reflect the fair value of the merchandise.”425 The withdrawal of the term 
“state-controlled economy,” which was never defined in the previous laws, and which 
was replaced by the term “nonmarket economy,” implies that the two forms of 
economic systems are the same or similar and can reasonably be used interchangeably. 
It seems that the language used by the statute when defining the term “nonmarket 
economy” is technically applicable only to antidumping actions. 
 
determine the foreign market value of the merchandise on the basis of the normal costs, expenses, and 
profits as reflected by either (1) the prices at which such or similar merchandise of a non-state-controlled-
economy country is sold for consumption in the home market of that country or to other countries, 
including the U.S.; or (2) the constructed value of such or similar merchandise in a non-state-controlled-
economy country….” The concept of using a constructed value of the non-state-controlled-economy 
country was previously used since 1968 under the Treasury Department’s regulations to deal with the 
merchandise from controlled economy countries. 19 C.F.R. § 53.5(b) (1969). See also Cuneo, Donald 
L., and Charles B. Manuel, Roadblock to Trade: The State-Controlled Economy Issue in Antidumping 
Law Administration, 5 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 277 (1981). 
423 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, supra note 135. 
424 Id. at Section 1316. 
425 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(A). 
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Second, it is important to note that the Act also sets forth the six golden factors 
for Commerce to take into account when determining whether a country has a 
nonmarket economy.426 However, these six factors are not “weighted or ordered” and 
there is also “no formula” for NME determinations.427 Instead, such factors work as 
guidelines for application to each fact-specific NME determination.428 When such a 
determination is made, it remains in effect until it is revoked by Commerce.429 It should 
be noted that this NME determination is not subject to judicial review.430 For instance, 
when Commerce made an NME status determination of Vietnam in its first 
antidumping case in 2002, Vietnam was unable to make an appeal to the U.S. Court of 
International Trade or any other judicial body to challenge that decision. 
Third, with respect to antidumping investigations, the Act once again 
strengthened the dumping calculation methodologies. It provides a methodology of 
“factors of production” to determine the foreign market values for NME countries.431 
This new methodology has replaced the constructed value methodology as provided 
under the Trade Act of 1974. Again, NME countries are not mentioned in any statutory 
 
426 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(B). The six factors must be taken into consideration are as follows: 
(i) the extent to which the currency of the foreign country is convertible into the currency of other 
countries;  
(ii) the extent to which wage rates in the foreign country are determined by free bargaining between 
labor and management; 
(iii) the extent to which joint ventures or other investments by firms of other foreign countries are 
permitted in the foreign country;  
(iv) the extent of government ownership or control of the means of production; 
(v) the extent of government control over the allocation of resources and over the price and output 
decisions of enterprises; and  
(vi) such other factors as the administering authority considers appropriate. 
427 Bowman et al. (2010), supra note 201, at 107. 
428 Id. 
429 19 U.S.C § 1677(18)(C)(i). 
430 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(D). 
431 Id. Section 1316(c) provides: 
“The factors of production are the input factors used in manufacturing the product, including: (i) hours 
of labor, (ii) quantities of raw materials used, (iii) amounts of energy and other utilities consumed, and 
(i) representative capital cost, including depreciation. In valuing the factors of production, the Commerce 
shall utilize, to the extent possible, the prices or cost of factors of production in one or more market 
economy countries that are at a stage of economic development comparable to the nonmarket economy 
country and that are significant producers of comparable merchandise.” “The factors of production shall 
be based on the best available information regarding the values of such factors in a market economy 
country or countries considered to be appropriate by the Commerce.” 
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provisions under the sections regulating actionable subsidies and countervailing duty 
actions. 
Noticeably, the Act provides a separate section on “Accession of state trading 
regimes to the [GATT].”432 This section requires that, before any major country 
accedes to the GATT, the President must determine the following: (i) whether that 
country’s state-trading enterprises account for a significant share of that country’s 
exports or goods that compete with imported goods; and (ii) whether the state-trading 
enterprises of that country unduly burden and restrict, or adversely affect the foreign 
trade of the United States or the United States economy.433 If both determinations are 
affirmative, the President can choose to withhold extension of the application of the 
GATT between the United States and the acceding country until that country enters 
into an agreement with the United States undertaking that the state trading enterprises 
of that country will make purchases of goods and services that are not intended for 
governmental use, and sales in international trade in accordance with commercial 
considerations (including price, quality, availability, marketability, and transportation) 
and that the U.S. firms will have an adequate opportunity, in conformity with 
customary practice, to compete for such purchases or sales;434 alternatively, an 
extension of GATT rules may be approved by Congress under an expedited 
consideration, or so-called “fast-track” procedures.435 Section 1106 has been slightly 
amended by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994 by changing the “GATT” 
into “GATT 1947” and inserting the term “WTO Agreement” in order to apply to all 
acceding WTO members. 
In the case of China when it acceded to the WTO in 2001, President George W. 
Bush determined that the state trading enterprises accounted for a significant share of 
the exports of China and goods that compete with imports into China. Therefore, the 
President determined that such state trading enterprises unduly burden and restrict, or 
 
432 Id. at Section 1106. 
433 Id. at Section 1106(a). 
434 Id. at Section 1106(b). 
435 Id. at Section 1106(b)(2)(B). See also JACKSON (1997), supra note 41, at 334. 
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adversely affect, the foreign trade of the United States or the United States economy. 
Since China was seeking to become a WTO member, it was affirmed that China must 
make commitments that it will ensure that all state-owned and state-invested 
enterprises will make purchases and sales based solely on commercial considerations 
and the U.S. business firms will have an adequate opportunity to compete for sales to 
and purchases from these enterprises on nondiscriminatory terms and conditions. 
Furthermore, the President required that China not influence, directly or indirectly, 
commercial decisions on the part of state-owned or state-invested enterprises. As the 
obligations that China assumed under the WTO Agreement, including China’s protocol 
of accession, meet the requirements of section 1106(b)(2)(A), the President’s 
determination under section 1106(a) therefore does not require invocation of the 
nonapplication provisions of the WTO Agreement.436 
 
4.3. Application of CVD Law to Nonmarket Economies 
 
The issue of whether the CVD law should be applied to NME countries is 
perhaps the most notable and hotly debated topic in the history of U.S. trade remedy 
laws for many decades prior to 2012.437  
Before 2007, the longstanding position of Commerce was that the CVD law did 
not apply to NME countries. A series of cases such as Textiles and apparel from 
China,438 Carbon Steel Wire Rods (CSWR) from Czechoslovakia439 and Poland440 were 
typical cases that Commerce initiated against NMEs in 1983. Although the China 
 
436 The President Determinations Under Section 1106(a) of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act 
of 1988—People’s Republic of China, Memorandum of November 9, 2001, 66 FR 57357, Nov. 15, 
2001. 
437 In 2012, the U.S. Congress changed the CVD law to confirm its application to NMEs. See Nonmarket 
Economies Act of 2012, supra note 147. 
438 Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigations; Textiles, Apparel, and Related Products from the 
People’s Republic of China, 48 FR 46600-01 (October 13, 1983) [hereinafter China Textile Case 
Initiation]. 
439 Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Czechoslovakia; Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation, 48 FR 
56419 (December 21, 1983) [hereinafter Initiation of CSWR from Czechoslovakia]. 
440 Id. 
 85 
Textile Case was terminated before a preliminary determination,441 the CSWR cases 
from Czechoslovakia and Poland resulted in determinations by Commerce that the 
bounties or grants (or subsidies) could not be found in NME countries.442 Commerce’s 
rejection of the applicability of CVD law to NMEs was later appealed and resolved by 
two levels of courts. These cases have been noticed by many academic scholars, 
practitioners, administrators, and legislators. The impact of the cases has been one of 
the catalyst of the historic amendment of the CVD law in 2012 to apply it to NME 
countries. 
In 2007, Commerce, with its broad discretionary power for administering the 
CVD law, changed its longstanding position and accepted a petition, filed on October 
31, 2006, by NewPage Corporation, against the paper produced and exported from 
China (i.e., NME country), Indonesia and Korea (i.e., ME countries).443 This case was 
the first time that Commerce went through all steps from initiation to a final affirmative 
determination that the CVD law could be applied to NME countries, in the case of 
China.  
The complexity of the trade remedy laws, and especially the absence of clear 
statutory provisions on NMEs in the CVD law, had led to significant inconsistencies in 
Commerce’s application of the CVD law to NMEs.  
The sections that follow focus on analysis of the foregoing NME cases to 
unpack the inconsistencies and controversial features of the decision of Commerce and 
the competent judicial courts in determining the applicability of CVD law to NMEs. 
These cases are presented in a chronological order as the relevant legal proceedings 
transpired. 
 
441 Textiles, Apparel, and Related Products from the People’s Republic of China; Termination of 
Countervailing Duty Investigations, 48 FR 55492-03 (December 13, 1983) [hereinafter China Textile 
Case Termination]. 
442 Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Czechoslovakia: Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determination, 49 
FR 19370-01 (May 7, 1984); Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland; Final Negative Countervailing Duty 
Determination, 49 FR 19374-01 (May 7, 1984). 
443 Notice of Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigations: Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People’s 
Republic of China, Indonesia, and the Republic of Korea, 71 FR 68546-01 (November 27, 2006) 
[hereinafter CFS Paper Case Initiation]. 
 86 
 
4.3.1. Nonapplicability of CVD Law to Nonmarket Economies 
 
4.3.1.1. Theoretical Debates 
 
Initially, the CVD law was devised in the early 1890s when there was no clear 
division between the economic systems of the targeting countries. Throughout its 
historical evolution, the spirit of the law has been maintained as countervailing or 
offsetting the foreign government’s bounties or grants provided to the exported 
products. Such bounties or grants are, of course, considered as unfair trade competition 
to the American industry. In reality, it appears that the applicability of the CVD law to 
NME countries has been uncertain for a long time. Remarkably, U.S. legislators, as 
required by internal forces and international commitments, implemented several 
critical amendments to the trade laws such as the Tariff Act of 1930, the Trade Act of 
1974, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, and then the URAA of 1994. But they did 
not provide any specific statutory provisions or guidelines for dealing with NMEs 
under the CVD law. Perhaps they believed that issues related to NMEs could be 
resolved more effectively with the alternative tools of the antidumping law, the market 
disruption remedy, or safeguard measures. 
In 1981, the Comptroller General of General Accounting Office (GAO),444 a 
nonpartisan federal watchdog agency, released a report to the U.S. Congress to address 
the concerns on how to improve the trade remedy laws (including the CVD law) in a 
more effective way to protect the American industries.445 It should be noted that the 
GAO’s concerns came from its studies of East-West trade issues and the emergence of 
NME countries such as China, which had been increasingly expanding their exports to 
 
444 GAO is headed by the Comptroller General, who is appointed by the President of the United States 
for a term of 15 years. GAO supports Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and in 
helping to improve the performance and ensure the accountability of the federal government for the 
benefit of the American people. See Role of the Comptroller General, available at 
https://www.gao.gov/about/comptroller-general/, accessed on March 20, 2020. 
445 U.S. Laws and Regulations Applicable to Imports from Non-market Economies Could Be Improved, 
GAO Report to Congress, ID-81-35, September 3, 1981 [hereinafter GAO NME Report]. 
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the United States.446 From the beginning of its report, the GAO admitted the most 
perplexing aspect of import trade administration vis-a-vis the NME countries involves 
questions of subsidies and countervailing duties.447 In essence, in any CVD 
investigation, it is very difficult to identify and quantify the bounties or grants of the 
subsidized goods. When NMEs involved in such a proceeding, the difficulty is 
greater.448 For instance, in any CVD proceeding, it is required to identify the subsidies 
and then quantify the amount thereof. However, this work involves a lot of significant 
obstacles such as the complex intertwining of subsidies and taxes; access to information 
concerning the subsidies granted; and the nonexistence of a suitable exchange rate for 
converting subsidy amounts from NME currencies into the U.S. dollars.449 
Unfortunately, the GAO had no recommendations on how to apply the CVD law to 
NME countries, but it concluded that the practical effect of the problems is that 
“actually identifying and quantifying subsidies remains only remotely possible.”450 
In a response to the GAO, the Department of Justice was unsure whether CVD 
proceedings against NME countries were at all appropriate because it believed that the 
concept of subsidies may not have meaning in the NME context.451 The application of 
CVD law to NME countries should be permitted, it was thought, only if actual subsidies 
could be identified and quantified by the petitioner in the original countervailing duty 
petition.452 Therefore, according to the GAO, such a difficult job discouraged U.S. 
industries from making requests for CVD investigations of foreign subsidy practices.453  
It seems that the theoretical question on the applicability of the CVD law to 
NMEs left an unresolved debate for the legislative and executive branches. In a more 
academic sense, there appear to be two opposing “schools of thought” as to whether a 
 
446 GAO NME Report, supra note 445, at 9. 
447 Id. 
448 Id. at 31. 
449 Id. See also Gregory J.  Spak, Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States: Applying the Countervailing 
Duty Law to Imports from Nonmarket Economy Countries, 18 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 313, 328 (1986). 
450 Id. at 32-33. 
451 Id. Appendix VII, U.S. Department of Justice Letter to GAO, May 28, 1981. 
452 Id. 
453 GAO NME Report, supra note 445, at 27. 
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government having an NME system can disburse a bounty, grant, or subsidy.454 The 
first school of thought argues that no subsidy can exist in an NME because the entire 
economy is controlled by government intervention.455 The purpose of the CVD law is 
to correct market distortions caused by government interventions. However, when the 
public sector and private sector are essentially one in an NME setting, such correction 
seems to be impossible.456 To be sure, the supporters of this theory acknowledge that 
government action distorts the allocation of resources within NME settings.457 In 
addition, in order to calculate a CVD duty when a subsidy exists, it is necessary to rely 
on commercial benchmarks.458 Yet there are no available commercial benchmarks (or 
commercial standards) against which to measure the government distortion.459 
Consequently, lacking such a market-based norm, it is impossible to determine whether 
there is a subsidy and how to quantify it, if it actually exists.460 
On the other hand, the second school of thought defines a subsidy based on the 
concept of “preferentiality;” for example, if the government grants a special treatment 
to a group, a subsidy is conveyed and existing.461 Based on this “preferential treatment” 
approach, the government’s preference that one group or industry receives is already a 
countervailable subsidy. In order to apply this approach, the administrating authority is 
required to establish the normal or average price levels within a country, and then 
determine whether the group or industry under investigation received any preferential 
treatment.462 The proponents of this second school of thought concluded that this 
approach could be used to measure the degree of preferential treatment provided to one 
 
454 Horlick & Shuman (1984), supra note 59, at 829 (describing the two approaches to granting 
countervailing duties in NMEs). 
455 Id. 
456 Id. 
457 Robert H. Lantz, The Search for Consistency: Treatment of Nonmarket Economies in Transition 
under United States Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, 10 AM. U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 993 
(1995). 
458 Id. (A countervailable subsidy exists when a government behaves in a way that is more beneficial to 
the recipient than the same commercial action would be based upon unrestrained market forces.). 
459 Id. There are no commercial benchmarks because the government owns and controls the means of 
production. 
460 Id. 
461 Id. at 830. 
462 Id. at 1022. 
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group or industry in either an ME or NME.463 According to Robert H. Lantz, this 
approach seems to be difficult to employ in dealing with subsidies embedded in an 
NME’s normal or average price levels. A group or industry could be the beneficiary of 
government involvement in setting the economy’s normal or average price levels 
without incurring CVD liability. In order that the administering authority is able to 
identify a countervailable subsidy, it would have to find a second level of government 
preference for that group or industry beyond that normally found throughout the 
economy. As a result, under this approach, a great deal of government subsidies would 
not be countervailable.464 
The following sections shall unpack and apply the above theoretical views as 
well as the two schools of thought applied in practice by Commerce in CVD 
proceedings against China, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. From the studies of these 
cases and their subsequent appeals, these theoretical debates have revealed great 
practical consequences as reflected by both administrative and judicial decisions. 
 
4.3.1.2. Administrative Decisions by the Department of Commerce 
 
4.3.1.1.1. Textile and Apparel Case Against China 
 
Considering whether the CVD law could be utilized to deal with unfair trade 
competition from NME countries was a “novel issue” from Commerce’s perspective. 
The first time that Commerce confronted the issue of applying the CVD law to NMEs 
was in 1983, when the American Apparel Manufacturers Association representing the 
U.S. textile industry (“Petitioners”) filed a petition on September 12, 1983.465 The 




465 China Textile Case Initiation, supra note 438. It should be noted that since China was not a signatory 
to the Subsidies Code at that time, Section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended in 1974, was 
applicable in this investigation. 
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Republic of China (“China”) received bounties or grants within the meaning of the 
applicable law.466 
Prior to this petition, all countervailing duty cases involved imports from ME 
countries. Having recognized the importance of this new issue, Commerce held a 
“novel issue” public conference to seek for opinions from interested parties on whether 
bounties or grants may be found in an NME country.467 At the conference, there were 
different views presented by two groups of interests (i.e., the petitioners’ group and 
importers’ group). To certain extent, these views had useful contribution to 
Commerce’s determination in its preliminary results and other subsequent cases.468 The 
first group relied on the “plain language” of the CVD law to interpret that the law can 
be applied to imports from “any country, dependency, colony, province, or other 
political subdivision of government.”469 This group argued that the CVD law applies 
to all countries, regardless of the ME/NME distinction, and makes no exceptions based 
on economic preconditions or form of government.470 They also reiterated that the 
equal application of the CVD law to both NMEs and MEs is fully consistent with the 
intended purposes of the statute, i.e., to prevent domestic producers from being placed 
in “jeopardy” by the “unfair competitive advantages” that foreign governments use to 
subsidize their exporters.471 On the contrary, the second group, mainly importers, 
interpreted the “plain language” in a different way to fight against the first group. The 
second group argued that the phrase “any country” must be interpreted in dependency 
with the next phrase of the provision that “shall pay or bestow … any bounty or grant;” 
 
466 Id. 
467 Notice of conference on novel issues, 48 FR 46092 (October 11, 1983). Commerce’s notice of 
conference was announced two days prior to the notice of investigation initiation was released. 
468 Cichanowicz (1983), supra note 72, at 408-12. 
469 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(1) (1980). Id. (citing Submission on Behalf of the ACTWU, the ILGWU and the 
AAMA, Oct. 28, 1983, at 1-10. DOC DKT No. C570-005). 
470 Id. Section 303(a)(1) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(1)) applies: “[w]henever any country, 
dependency, colony, province, or other political subdivision of government, person, partnership, 
association, cartel, or corporation, shall pay or bestow, directly or indirectly, any bounty or grant upon 
the manufacture or production or export of any article or merchandise manufactured or produced in such 
country, dependency, colony, province, or other political subdivision of government.” 
471 Cichanowicz (1983), supra note 468. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 45-46 (1979)). 
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and the “grants” are actually not found in NME countries.472 In addition, the second 
group further argued that the grants are nonexistent and cannot be measured in NMEs 
because of the government intervention in determining the allocation of resources for 
manufacturers, producers or exporters, as compared to MEs, where such allocation is 
made based on market forces.473 With respect to legislative purpose, the second group 
argued that there is explicit methodology for dealing with NME countries set forth in 
the antidumping law and Section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974.474 Specifically, 
Congress’s concerns regarding lower priced NME exports flooding U.S. markets are 
addressed through antidumping and Section 406 procedures.475 Therefore, CVD law is 
simply “inappropriate” for use against imports from NME countries.476 Arguments by 
both sides at the conference did not come to any specific resolution on whether the 
CVD law should be applied to NMEs, but they did “break the ice” for the subsequent 
cases.477 
It is interesting that the China Textile Case was terminated at the due date of 
the preliminary determination on December 6, 1983, due to a withdrawal request by 
the petitioners.478 It seems to be a purely legal action, but the reason behind this 
termination is very interesting. The U.S. textile industry agreed to withdraw the petition 
as recommended by the Secretary of Department of Commerce in favor of tighter 
controls over textile imports to be announced by President Reagan in that same 





475 Id. (citing Post-Conference Brief on Behalf of Kmart Corporation, Nov. 3, 1983, DOC DKT No. 
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478 Textiles, Apparel, and Related Products from the People’s Republic of China; Termination of 
Countervailing Duty Investigations, 48 FR 55492 (December 13, 1983) [hereinafter China Textile Case, 
Termination]. See also Bello et al. (1992), supra note 477, at 708. 
479 See Cichanowicz (1983), supra note 72, 408-12. See also Bello et al. (1992), supra note 477 (cited at 
footnote 236: At approximately the same time, the Reagan administration announced measures that 
would effectively curb textile imports from China and other countries. (citing Stuart Auerbach & Juan 
Williams, Reagan Sets Import Rules on Textiles, Wash. Post, December 17, 1983, at E8; Clyde H. 
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to welcome the President’s decision as “a step forward in dealing with the problem of 
disruption of the American textile and apparel market by imports” and confirmed not 
to refile their petition against Chinese imports in the CVD case.480 The American textile 
makers were pleased with the President’s action because a stricter control of textile 
imports (e.g., import quotas) would definitely benefit them in the long run moreso than 
merely offsetting the bounties or grants provided to the exported textiles by an 
affirmative CVD decision. This shows that the American textile industry effectively 
used the CVD petition as a tool in its negotiations with its own government to “clamp 
down” on imports, especially those from China.481 
 
4.3.1.1.2. Carbon Steel Wire Rods Against Czechoslovakia and Poland 
 
Just a week after the termination of the China Textile Case, Commerce initiated 
two separate CVD investigations against the products of carbon steel wire rods 
imported from Czechoslovakia and Poland.482 The two petitions were separately filed 
by four American steel producers483 who alleged that manufacturers and exporters in 
Czechoslovakia and Poland received benefits conferring bounties or grants. These two 
cases raised the same issue that had yet to be determined: whether the CVD law could 
be applied to NME countries.  
 
Farnsworth, Reagan Decides to Tighten Controls on Textile Imports, N.Y. TIMES, December 17, 1983). 
Thus, the domestic textile industry succeeded in limiting imports by, among other things, wielding a 
countervailing duty petition.). 
480 Clyde H. Farnsworth, Reagan Decides to Tighten Controls on Textile Imports, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 
1983. 
481 Alan F. Holmer & Judith Hippler Bello, U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series #7: The Countervailing 
Duty Law’s Applicability to Nonmarket Economies, 20 INT’L LAW. 319, 322 (1986). (citing Pine, How 
President Came to Favor Concessions for U.S. Textile Makers, Wall St. J., January 6, 1984, at 1. col. 6; 
Madison, Chinese Textile Dispute Entangled in Sensitive National Security Issues, NAT’L J. December 
3, 1983, at 2526). 
482 Initiation of CSWR from Czechoslovakia, supra note 439. The CSWR petitions were filed two 
months after the petition filed on China Textile Case. 
483 Id. The petitioners were Atlantic Steel Company, Continental Steel Company, Georgetown Steel 
Corporation, and Raritan Steel Company. 
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In its preliminary decisions for both countries, Commerce stated that the 
Congress had not exempted NME countries from the CVD law.484 The reasoning was 
that section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended can be applied to “any country, 
dependency, colony, province, or other political subdivision of government.” This 
interpretation of the law by its literal terms was more or less influenced by the 
petitioners’ arguments voiced at the “novel issue” conference held in the China Textile 
Case. However, in this preliminary investigation, Commerce found no benefits that 
constituted bounties or grants to producers in either country.485  
Three months later, Commerce reversed its preliminary determination and ruled 
that bounties or grants could not be found in NMEs.486 In reaching this surprising 
determination, Commerce did shift its focus from a narrow reading of section 303 to 
include an additional jurisdictional question on whether government activities in an 
NME confer bounties or grants.487  
To come to the crucial conclusion that bounties or grants could not be found in 
NMEs, Commerce conducted comprehensive research and analysis on four aspects: (i) 
the subsidy concepts as applied and compared in both MEs and NMEs; (ii) 
reexamination of the legislative history of the countervailing duty laws from 1890s to 
1979 and following developments; (iii) consensus of opinion from academic literature 
delivered by prestige law professors and practitioners; and (iv) broad discretion in 
subsidy determination.  
First, Commerce defined a subsidy as any action that distorts or subverts the 
market process and results in a misallocation of resources, encouraging inefficient 
 
484 Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Czechoslovakia; Preliminary Negative Countervailing Duty 
Determination, 49 FR 6773, February 23, 1984 [Czechoslovakia Prelim Determination]; Carbon Steel 
Wire Rod from Poland; Preliminary Negative Countervailing Duty Determination, 49 FR 6768, February 
23, 1984 [Poland Prelim Determination]. 
485 Id. 
486 Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Czechoslovakia; Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determination, 49 
FR 19370, May 7, 1984 [Czechoslovakia Final Determination]; Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland; 
Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determination, 49 FR 19374, May 7, 1984 [Poland Final 
Determination]. 
487 Id. See also Karen A. O’Brien, The Applicability of the United States Countervailing Duty Law to 
Imports from Nonmarket Economy Countries, 9 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 596, 614 (1985). 
 94 
production and lessening world wealth.488 According to Commerce, in an ME, scarce 
resources are channeled to their most profitable and efficient uses by the market forces 
of supply and demand.489 In contrast, in NMEs there are no such market process to 
distort or subvert.490 In particular, the government’s central planning, rather than the 
market forces of supply and demand, determines the allocation of resources and 
therefore distorts the costs, prices and profits. It was also noted that because the notion 
of a subsidy is a market phenomenon, it does not apply in a nonmarket setting.491 That 
means if a subsidy is a distortion from a market norm, it can exist only in a market 
context. Hence, to impose that concept where it has no meaning would force Commerce 
to identify every government action as a subsidy.492 Then, Commerce confirmed that it 
was not prepared to do this job, i.e., it could not impose the market-based concept of a 
subsidy on a system where it had no meaning and could not be identified or fairly 
quantified.493  
Second, through the enactment of the first U.S. CVD law in 1890 and its 
subsequent amendments in 1974 and 1979, Congress chose two other vehicles for 
dealing with unfair trade practices from NME countries.494 For that reason, Congress 
has remained silent on the question of whether the CVD law applies to NME 
countries.495 When reviewing the development of the CVD law after 1979, Commerce 
 






494 Id. In the Trade Act of 1974, Congress amended section 205 of the Antidumping Act, 1921 to set 
forth rules for dealing with unfair competition from NME countries. In the same Act, Congress also 
enacted section 406 to protect U.S. industries from trade disruption caused by imports from Communist 
countries. Likewise, in the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (TAA), in which Congress thoroughly 
restructured the countervailing duty law, Congress did not enact any countervailing duty provision even 
referring to NMEs. Also, there is nothing in the legislative history of the TAA even suggesting that the 
countervailing duty law should apply to NMEs, nor is there any advice on how the administering 
authority should apply the market-oriented concept of “bounty or grant” to an NME. Instead, Congress 




took the view of the GAO NME Report in 1981 that it is only “remotely possible” to 
identify and quantify subsidies in NMEs.496  
Third, the consensus appeared to be that the CVD law simply cannot be applied 
to NME countries.497 For instance, according to Professor John H. Barceló, III: 
 
If an NME exporting country is involved, most of the analysis used thus far 
for both export and domestic subsidies, is entirely inapplicable. One cannot 
speak of market imperfections and nondistortive actions or even the 
distinction between export and domestic subsidies if an economy as a whole 
is not governed by the market principle. Theoretically, any given sale may 
be subsidized or not, but since there is no market reference point, it is idle 
to speak in such terms.498 
 
In addition, Professor Robert E. Hudec supported Commerce’s view that under 
both the 1974 and 1979 trade legislation, “state-controlled-economy” trade is treated 
as a problem under the antidumping laws, and nothing at all is said about this subject 
in the law pertaining to subsidies.499 
Fourth, by citing United States v. Zenith Radio Corp.,500 Commerce reasoned 
that it has broad discretion in determining the existence or nonexistence of “bounty or 




498 Id. See also John J. III. Barceló, Subsidies and Countervailing Duties - Analysis and a Proposal, 9 
LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 779, 850 (1977). 
499 Poland Final Determination, supra note 486. (citing D. WALLACE, JR. AND D.A. FLORES, INTERFACE 
TWO (eds. 1982), at 23). 
500 United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 562 F.2d 1209 (C.C.P.A. 1977), aff’d, 437 U.S. 443, 98 S. Ct. 
2441, 57 L. Ed. 2d 337 (1978). (The Chief Judge of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals opined 
that “Congressional intent to provide a wide latitude within which the Secretary of the Treasury may 
determine existence of a bounty or a grant authorizing levy of countervailing duties is clear from the 
statute itself and from congressional refusal to define the words ‘bounty,’ ‘grant,’ or ‘net amount,’ in the 
statute or anywhere else for almost 80 years.” 
501 Poland Final Determination, supra note 486. 
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Based on the above analyses and records in the investigations, Commerce 
finally ruled that both Poland and Czechoslovakia satisfied the test to be NME countries 
and for that reason it was impossible for Commerce to identify or determine subsidies 
in such economies.502 As a result, the manufacturers, producers, or exporters in both 
countries did not receive bounties or grants, and therefore, all allegations of the 
petitioners were denied. 
In the same year, there were two other petitions filed by American chemical 
companies against potassium chloride products imported from the German Democratic 
Republic and the Soviet Union, but Commerce dismissed all petitions and rescinded 
the initiations of the related CVD proceedings against these NME countries based on 
the same reasoning.503 
 
4.3.1.3. Judicial Decisions 
 
4.3.1.3.1. Continental Steel Corp. v. United States  
 
The inconsistency of Commerce between its preliminary and final decisions in 
determining the inapplicability of CVD law to NMEs has fed some entities’ hope to 
reverse the outcome by resort to the courts. Petitioners in both the CSWR and potash 
cases appealed to the Court of International Trade (“CIT”) for reversal of Commerce’s 
NME determination.504   
On July 30, 1985, the CIT reversed Commerce’s decisions and held that the 
CVD law covers countries with NMEs and that subsidies, which are target of the law, 
 
502 Czechoslovakia Final Determination and Poland Final Determination, supra note 486. 
503 Potassium Chloride from the German Democratic Republic; Rescission of Initiation of Countervailing 
Duty Investigation and Dismissal of Petition, 49 FR 23428 (June 6, 1984); Potassium Chloride from the 
Soviet Union; Rescission of Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation and Dismissal of Petition, 
49 FR 23428 (June 6, 1984) [hereinafter Potash cases]. 
504 Continental Steel Corp. v. United States, 614 F. Supp. 548 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1985) [hereinafter 
Continental Steel Case]. 
The plaintiffs, including American steel and chemical companies, brought the suits to CIT separately, 
but all the cases were consolidated by the court on the grounds they involved a common issue of law. 
For a summary of this case, see also Monroe Leigh, Countervailing Duty Law-Applicability to 
Nonmarket Economy Countries, 80 AM. J. INT’L. L. 359 (1986). 
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may be found in NMEs as well as in MEs.505 First, the CIT noted that the basic principle 
for determining the scope of a statute is to look first at its language.506 Then, based on 
its interpretation of section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, the CIT opined 
that the language of the law is “perfectly indifferent to forms of economy.”507 Indeed, 
it ruled, the law was written to apply to all countries, including both MEs and NMEs.508 
However, in its judicial interpretation of the law, Commerce was self-contradictory 
from its inception.509 Commerce preliminarily recognized that the law covers “any 
country” and did not allow per se exemptions from the law for any political entity.510 
Nevertheless, in its final determinations, Commerce looked at different criteria, called 
an “additional jurisdictional question,” i.e., whether government activities in an NME 
can confer a “bounty or grant” within the meaning of the law.511 According to the CIT, 
if this was truly a “jurisdictional” question, a failure to meet the jurisdictional criteria 
of the law would indeed deprive Commerce of its authority to enforce the law beyond 
the determination of that point. That would amount to a per se exemption from the law 
and would conflict with the plain statement that the law covers any country.512 
Second, the CIT ruled that it was a fundamental error to conclude that a subsidy 
can exist only in a market economy.513 The CIT also disagreed with Commerce’s 
definition of a subsidy as one “results in a misallocation of resources, encouraging 
inefficient production and lessening world wealth.”514 According to the CIT, a subsidy 
in its purest form is the encouragement of exportation by means of some type of special 
 
505 Continental Steel Case, supra note 504. 
506 Id. at 551 (citing North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 312, 103 S.Ct. 1095, 1102, 75 L.Ed.2d 
99 (1983)). 
507 Continental Steel Case, supra note 504, at 551. 
508 Id. at 552. 




513 Id. at 550 
514 Id. at 554. The CIT expressly stated: “There is not the slightest indication in the law or the legislative 
history to show that the allocation of resources, the efficiency of production or the diminution of world 
wealth is a concern of the countervailing duty law. Commerce’s definition sounds as if the CVD law is 
being viewed as a means for influencing the way the wealth of the world is developed or the way other 
countries choose to allocate resources or organize production. This would be totally improper and would 
be a dangerous distortion of the law. The countervailing duty law is not a tool of foreign policy.” 
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preference.515 The CIT concluded that subsidies can exist in NMEs, and that Commerce 
should find a method to identify and quantify them.516  
Third, the CIT also rejected Commerce’s reasoning that Congress aimed to use 
the antidumping law and section 406 as alternative trade remedies to deal with unfair 
imports from NME countries. The CIT observed that the potent specialized nature of 
the countervailing duty law is not affected by the existence of possible alternative 
remedies.517 
Finally, the CIT ruled that Commerce’s determinations were arbitrary and not 
in accordance with the law. Therefore, the final determinations in the CSWR cases 
were reversed and the matters were remanded for a determination consistent with CIT’s 
opinions.518 The CIT also ordered the resumption of the potassium investigations in the 
potash cases. 
The CIT’s decision was a big victory for the American steel industry in 
particular and for other domestic industries in general, which need a legal security in 
their competition against products imported from NME countries. In addition, this 
decision stood to stimulate a significant increase in CVD petitions filed against NME 
imports.519 However, one of the trade policy concerns was that if Commerce found 
significant subsidies, import trade with NMEs could be drastically reduced.520 Further, 
it was believed that the imposition of countervailing duties on NME imports could 
contravene the efforts of the United States to encourage East-West trade over the 
preceding several years.521 It also could have a certain impact on imports from China. 
Therefore, the CIT’s decision also left Commerce with a dilemma of how to reconcile 
U.S. trade interests and its efforts to identify and quantify the subsidies in NME 
 
515 Id. at 553. 
516 Id. at 554. (Commerce has the authority and ability to detect patterns of regularity and investigate 
beneficial deviations from those patterns - and it must do so regardless of the form of the economy). See 
also Robert Franklin Hoyt, Comment: Implementation and Policy: Problems in the Application of 
Countervailing Duty Laws to Nonmarket Economy Countries, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1647 (1988). 
517 Continental Steel Case, supra note 504, at 556. 
518 Id. at 557. 
519 Holmer & Bello (1986), supra note 481, at 324. 
520 Id. 
521 Leigh (1986), supra note 504, at 362. 
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countries, where all trading factors are distorted by government intervention and where 
all public market-based information and data such as costs and prices are hard to 
collect. That seemed to be an impossible mission to Commerce. On September 17, 
1985, the government filed its notice of appeal with the court522, which opened another 
chance for the NME issue to be reviewed by a higher court (i.e., the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for Federal Circuit). 
 
4.3.1.3.2. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States 
 
The appeal of Commerce at the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(“CAFC”) and its outcomes were landmark litigation on the applicability of CVD law 
to NME countries. On September 18, 1986, the CAFC reversed the CIT’s ruling and 
upheld Commerce’s position that the CVD law did not apply to NME countries.523  
Initially, based on procedural grounds, the CAFC determined that the CIT had 
no jurisdiction over the CSWR cases because Georgetown Steel Corporation, Raritan 
River Steel Company, and Atlantic Steel Company (collectively, “Georgetown Steel”) 
did not file the summons at the CIT on time.524 For that reason, the CAFC remanded 
those cases to the CIT to dismiss Georgetown Steel’s complaint for lack of 
jurisdiction.525 As a result, the CAFC reviewed the merits only of the CIT’s reversal of 
 
522 Holmer & Bello (1986), supra note 481, at 324. 
523 Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
524 Id. at 1311. Continental Steel did not appear as a party in the CIT’s litigation. With respect to the 
filing procedures, section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the Trade Agreements Act of 
1979, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(A), provides “Within thirty days after the date of publication in the 
Federal Register of notice of … a final negative determination by the Secretary, the administering 
authority …, an interested party who is a party to the proceeding in connection with the matter arises 
may commence an action in the court by filing a summons, and within thirty days thereafter a complaint.” 
Georgetown Steel timely filed the summons by mailing it to the clerk of the court on May 24, 1984, 
which was within 30 days of the publication in the Federal Register of the negative countervailing duty 
determination. Thereafter, Georgetown Steel mailed the complaint to the court’s clerk by certified mail 
on June 22, 1984, which was within 30 days of the filing of the summons. The Postal Service, however, 
returned the complaint on July 6, 1984, because of insufficient postage. That same day, Georgetown 
Steel remailed the complaint, accompanied by a motion for leave to file the complaint out of time. The 
government opposed that motion, but the CIT granted it. Id. However, the CAFC agreed with the 
government’s challenges and concluded that the complaint was not timely filed “with the proper postage 
affixed” until 43 days after the summons were filed on May 24, 1984. Id. at 1312. 
525 Id. at 1313. 
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Commerce’s determination in the potassium cases.526 This decision did not affect the 
analysis of NME applicability because Commerce had determined both the CSWR and 
the potassium cases based on virtually identical facts and on the same reasonings.527 
With respect to the application of CVD law to NME countries, the CAFC 
reversed the CIT’s ruling and supported the position of Commerce that the CVD law 
does not apply to NMEs. The CAFC’s ruling was based mainly on the following 
grounds: (i) the purpose of the CVD law is to prevent unfair competitive advantages, 
and such advantages do not result from the imports from NMEs;528 (ii) the nature of 
NMEs excludes the existence of subsidies provided by the governments since they 
would in effect be subsidizing themselves;529 and (iii) Congress’ choice of the 
antidumping duty law to deal with unfair trade practices from NMEs, while remaining 
silent on the NME issue in the CVD law.530  
First, the CAFC emphasized that the purpose of the CVD law was to “offset the 
unfair competitive advantage that foreign producers would otherwise enjoy from export 
subsidies paid by their governments.”531 The CAFC was also convinced by Commerce 
that “a subsidy (or bounty or grant) is definitionally any action that distorts or subverts 
the market process and results in a misallocation of resources, encouraging inefficient 
production and lessening world wealth.”532 Basically, the purpose of the CVD law was 
to protect American firms from such kind of unfair competition (or so-called trade 
distortion) resulting from subsidies to foreign producers that gave them a comparative 
advantage they otherwise would not have enjoyed.533  
 
526 Id. 
527 Richard N. Eid, The Effect of Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States on Nonmarket Economy 
Imports, 3 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 65, 73 (1988). 
528 Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States (1986), supra note 523, at 1315. 
529 Id. at 1316. 
530 Id. at 1317-18. See also Frank DeArmon Whitney, Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States: The 
Federal Circuit Addresses Countervailing Duties against Nonmarket Economy Imports, 12 N.C.J. INT’L 
L. & COM. REG. 303, 306 (1987). 
531 Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States (1986), supra note 523, at 1315 (citing Zenith Radio Corp. 
v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 455-56 1978)). 
532 Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States (1986), supra note 523, (citing Poland Final Determination, 
49 FR 19374, 19375 (1984)). 
533 Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States (1986), supra note 523, at 1315. 
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Second, the CAFC echoed Commerce’s view that in an NME, the government 
controls everything from the sales to the pricing determinations and even the terms.534 
The CAFC was also in accord with Commerce’s description of the nature of an NME 
with the following features: “an environment is riddled with distortions; prices are set 
by central planners; losses suffered by production and foreign trade enterprises are 
routinely covered by government transfer; investment decisions are controlled by the 
state; money and credit are allocated by the central planners; the wage bill is set by the 
government; access to foreign currency is restricted; and private ownership is limited 
to consumer goods.”535 Hence, the CAFC concluded that the NME government 
technically cannot subsidize an entity because this action is actually a “subsidy of 
itself.”536 In other words, the purpose of the countervailing duty law (i.e., 
countervailing the trade distortion in a market) is inconsistent with the nature of an 
NME (i.e., no market due to the state control of all market forces). The CAFC affirmed 
Commerce’s holding that a subsidy has a function of a trade distortion to the market 
and, therefore, if no market exists, no subsidy can exist.537  
Third, the CAFC observed that section 303, regarding countervailing duty 
actions, had remained unchanged since the time of its enactment in 1897.538 The CAFC 
observed that at the time of the enactment of the first general countervailing duty 
statute, there were no NMEs; therefore, Congress had no occasion to address the NME 
issue.539 Since 1897, Congress had reenacted section 303 six times, without making 
any significant changes to the NME issue.540 Further, the CAFC reasoned that 
Congress’s actions in dealing with the problem of NME imports were embodied in 
 
534 Id. 
535 Id. at 1316 
536 Id. 
537 Id. at 1318. See Eid (1988), supra note 527, at 75. 
538 Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States (1986), supra note 523, at 1314-15 
539 Id. 
540 Id. at 1314. The version of § 303 in existence at the time of ruling represents the sixth re-enactment 
of the 1897 provision without any changes that are relevant here. Tariff Act of 1909, § 6, 36 Stat. 85; 
Tariff Act of 1913, § IV(E), 38 Stat. 193; Tariff Act of 1922, § 303, 42 Stat. 935; Tariff Act of 1930, § 
303, 46 Stat. 687; Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 88 Stat. 2049; The Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 
103, 105(a), 93 Stat. 190, 193. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 448 (1978), at 
n.8. 
 102 
other statutory provisions. In particular, the CAFC noted that Congress amended the 
antidumping law by enactment of the Trade Act of 1974 to deal specifically with 
imports from NMEs541 and especially by approving for a special “surrogate country” 
method for determining whether NME imports were being “dumped” in the United 
States.542 Nevertheless, when amending the CVD law under section 331 of the Tariff 
Act of 1974, Congress did not change its scope to cover NME countries.543 Again, in 
the enactment of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (“1979 TAA”), Congress reenacted 
the special surrogate country method in antidumping investigations against state-
controlled economies, but Congress continued its silence on the NME applicability 
issue in the CVD law.544 In addition, the purpose of enactment of the 1979 TAA was 
to implement the GATT Subsidies Code,545 which permitted signatory countries to levy 
either antidumping duty or countervailing duty against an NME by using “surrogate 
country” pricing.546 While the CIT’s rationale was that Congress’s approval of the 
Subsidies Code evidenced an intent that the CVD law apply to state-controlled 
economies,547 the CAFC rejected such a conclusion, stating that it was a non 
 
541 Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States (1986), supra note 523, at 1316. Under the antidumping 
law, when “foreign merchandise [that] is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States at less than 
its fair value” threatens to cause or causes actual material injury to a domestic industry or to the 
establishment of a domestic industry, duties are imposed on that merchandise. See U.S.C. § 1673 (1982). 
542 Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States (1986), supra note 523 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1976) 
(repealed 1979)). Section 164(c) provides as follows: 
“(c) If available information indicates to the Secretary that the economy of the country from which the 
merchandise is exported is state-controlled to an extent that sales or offers of sales of such or similar 
merchandise in that country or to countries other than the United States do not permit a determination of 
foreign market value under subsection (a), the Secretary shall determine the foreign market value of the 
merchandise on the basis of the normal costs, expenses, and profits as reflected by either- 
(1) the prices, determined in accordance with subsection (a) and section 202, at which such or similar 
merchandise of a non-state-controlled-economy country or countries is sold either (A) for consumption 
in the home market of that country or countries, or (B) to other countries, including the United States: or  
(2) the constructed value of such or similar merchandise in a non-state-controlled-economy country or 
countries as determined under section 206.” 
543 Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States (1986), supra note 523, at 1316. 
544 Id. at 1317. 
545 Subsidies Code, supra note 125 
546 Id. Article 15 and Interpretative Note Ad Article VI from Annex I, paragraph 1 (1, 2); Georgetown 
Steel Case at 1317; See Whitney (1987), supra note 530, at 307-08. 
547 Continental Steel Case, supra note 504, at 557. 
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sequitur.548 The CAFC reasoned that the Subsidies Code merely provides the method 
for determining the existence of a subsidy, and leaves it to each country to determine 
the particular method it would use to deal with the NME problem through either 
antidumping duty or countervailing duty legislation. Therefore, the CAFC held that in 
the United States, Congress chose to deal with that problem under the antidumping law 
and not under the CVD law.549 Based on such reasoning, the CAFC found that the 
inaction and silence of Congress was clear evidence that the CVD law did not apply to 
state-controlled economies or nonmarket economies.550 
In addition to the above rationale, it is important to note that the CAFC followed 
the holding of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in United States v. Zenith 
Radio Corp.,551 which was that Commerce has broad discretion in determining the 
existence of a “bounty” or “grant” under the CVD law. The CAFC also reaffirmed that 
Commerce’s conclusion that the benefits the Soviet Union and the German Democratic 
Republic provided for the export of potash to the United States were not bounties or 
grants was reasonable, in accordance with the law, and not an abuse of discretion.552 
Another critical point should be noted from the CAFC’s opinion: Congress designed 
the antidumping law to protect the American industry from injury resulting from the 
sale in the United States of foreign merchandise that is priced below its fair value, and 
Congress provided the related remedy. However, if that remedy was inadequate to 
protect American industry from such foreign competition, then it is up to Congress to 
provide any additional remedies it deems appropriate.553 This comment reminded the 




548 “Non sequitur” means an inference or conclusion that does not logically follow from its premise. See 
Black’s Law Dictionary, (8th ed. 2004); Georgetown Steel Case, at 1318; see also Whitney (1987), supra 
note 530, at 308; Leigh (1987), supra note 504, at 214. 
549 Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States (1986), supra note 523 at 1318. 
550 See O’Brien (1985), supra note 487, at 620. 
551 562 F.2d 1209 (C.C.P.A. 1977), aff’d, 437 U.S. 443 (1978). 
552 Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States (1986), supra note 523, at 1318. 
553 Id. 
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4.3.2. Applicability of CVD Law to Nonmarket Economies 
 
4.3.2.1. Impact of the Georgetown Steel Case 
 
The 1986 decision of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed 
Commerce’s discretion not to apply CVD law to NME countries. That decision 
supports the first school of thought that subsidies cannot be found in NMEs due to the 
market distortions caused by the government control. It clearly upholds the theory that 
government intervention in an NME is so pervasive that meaningful comparisons 
between subsidized and market-determined prices are impossible. Technically, the 
outcome of Georgetown Steel Case did confirm that subsidies can be found and 
measured only in ME countries, where commercial standards exist for Commerce to 
rely on to calculate the countervailing duties. Nevertheless, these conceptual opinions 
are still controversial and completely contrary to the second school of thought that CVD 
actions can be taken against both ME and NME countries. Specifically, the CIT 
supported the American industries’ view that the difficulties of the CVD law are not 
those of meaning, but rather the problems of measurement, and it is the responsibility 
of Commerce to detect and calculate the subsidies regardless of the form of the 
economy.  
From the perspective of the American industry, the Georgetown Steel Case was 
not an end to their fight against unfair trade practices such as subsidies from NME 
countries. In the long run, it could not stop the American industries from seeking an 
effective methodology in the CVD law to mitigate against the subsidies implicit in the 
products entering the United States market. That is also the purpose of the CVD law, 
that such unfair benefits must be countervailed to level the playing field between the 
domestic and foreign producers. Congress had bolstered the antidumping law, which is 
equipped with special methodologies to protect American industries from sale below 
fair value of the goods imported from NME countries. The CAFC opinion signaled that 
if the American industries felt they were not fully protected by the antidumping law, 
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they needed to seek support in Congress to change the CVD law to apply it to NME 
countries.  
From the perspective of the administrative authorities or practitioners, the 
CAFC’s decision should be read in a narrower context. It was assumed that the CAFC 
did not clearly hold that countervailing duties are never applicable to NME products.554 
Instead, that decision may be read in the context of the particular subsidies that the 
CAFC analyzed in the potash cases.555 This assumption could also help the American 
industries and Commerce in distinguishing between the Georgetown Steel Case and 
other alleged subsidies on subsequent NME products entering the domestic market. 
Further, from the CAFC’s decision, it could be understood that the trade policy is a 
discretionary process. That process is subject to the intent of the legislators and the 
executive administration to structure it in an effective way to best protect the American 
industries. As a matter of fact, the Georgetown Steel Case sent an important message 
to the United States Congress that the trade laws applicable to NMEs should be 
modified or changed to adapt with the continuously changing realities. As a result, the 
CAFC’s decision triggered a lot of congressional actions to amend the CVD law to 
apply it to imports from NME countries. In 1987, several bills were introduced in 
Congress to invalidate Georgetown Steel Case and apply the CVD law against NME 
countries.556 One of the remarkable efforts in this year was section 157 of the 1987 
Trade Bill.557 Section 157 provided for the application of the CVD law to NME 
 
554 See Whitney (1987), supra note 530, at 313. 
555 Id. The CAFC held that: 
“There is no reason to believe that if the Soviet Union or the German Democratic Republic had sold the 
potash directly rather than through a government instrumentality, the product would have been sold in 
the United States at higher prices or on different terms. Unlike the situation in a competitive market 
economy, the economic incentives the state provided to the exporting entities did not enable those entities 
to make sales in the United States that they otherwise might not have made. Even if one were to label 
these incentives as a ‘subsidy,’ in the loosest sense of the term, the governments of those nonmarket 
economies would in effect be subsidizing themselves. Those governments are not providing the 
exporters of potash to the United States with the kind of ‘bounty’ or ‘grant’ for which Congress in section 
303 prescribed the imposition of countervailing duties.”; See Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States 
(1986), supra note 523, at 1316. 
556 Hoyt (1988), supra note 516, at 1665. 
557 Trade and International Economic Policy Reform Act of 1987, H.R. 3 § 157, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. 
(1987) [hereinafter 1987 Trade Bill]. 
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countries to the extent that a subsidy can reasonably be identified and measured by 
Commerce.558 Although this provision was passed by the House, it was not included in 
the Senate version in the final stages of the conference committee.559 In the same year, 
there were other efforts to apply CVD law to imports from state-controlled economies, 
but all were unsuccessful.560 Thereafter, there were many attempts to address the 
application of CVD law to NMEs since 1993 to 2005, but all proposed bills were again 
unsuccessful.561 
In 2007, there was a large number of bills that were introduced in the 110th 
Congress that sought to apply the CVD law to NME countries.562 Some of the bills 
were proposed to direct the administrative authorities to apply CVD laws to NMEs; 
some aggressively proposed a China-specific alternative methodology for determining 
the amount of subsidy if special difficulties were found.563 These law-making efforts 
were influenced not only by the Georgetown Steel Case, but also by a surge of imports 
from emerging NME countries such as China, as motivated by its global integration 
and economic reforms. Especially after its WTO accession in 2001, China had rapidly 
 
558 Id. 1987 Trade Bill. See also Hoyt (1988), supra note 516, at 1665. 
559 Hoyt (1988), supra note 516, (noting that the Senate, abandoning its own trade proposals, passed a 
bill laying out proposed amendments to H.R.3. The Senate version did not address the issue of applying 
the countervailing duty laws to NME countries, tacitly accepting the House proposal). See Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, supra note 135. 
560 Vivian C. Jones, Trade Remedy Legislation: Applying Countervailing Action to Nonmarket Economy 
Countries, CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33550, December 6, 2007 [hereinafter CRS Report 
2007], at CRS-12. 
561 Id. at CRS-13-14. 
562 Id. (The bills included S. 364 (Rockefeller, introduced January 23, 2007); H.R. 571 (Tancredo, 
introduced January 18, 2007); H.R. 708 (English, introduced January 29, 2007); H.R. 782 (Ryan/Hunter, 
introduced January 31, 2007), H.R. 2942 (Ryan/Hunter, introduced June 28, 2007), and related bill S. 
796 (Bunning/Stabenow, introduced March 7, 2007); H.R. 1229 (Davis/English, introduced February 
28, 2007) and related bill S. 974 (Collins/Bayh, introduced March 22, 2007); and S. 1919 (Baucus, 
introduced August 1, 2007)). 
563 Id. Pursuant to H.R. 1229 and S. 974, whether China is designated as a nonmarket economy country, 
administrative authorities would be directed to use “methodologies that take into account the possibility 
that terms and conditions prevailing in China may not be applicable as appropriate benchmarks.” In these 
situations, authorities would be directed to adjust the terms and conditions prevailing in China before 
using those prevailing outside of China. However, if authorities have determined that China is an NME 
country, they would be directed to “presume” that special difficulties do exist, that it is not practicable 
to consider and adjust for Chinese terms and conditions, and that “terms and conditions prevailing 
outside of China” (e.g., those from a surrogate market economy country or world market data) should 
be used to calculate the amount of subsidy. 
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boosted its trade relationship with the United States. Among other bills, H.R. 1229, the 
Nonmarket Economy Trade Remedy Act of 2007, was introduced by Artur Davis and 
Phil English on February 28, 2007, trying to change the CVD law to apply to NME 
countries, especially targeting China.564 According to the sponsors of H.R. 1229, China 
was the most commercially significant NME country.565 In 2006, the United States 
trade deficit with China was $232 billions, reflecting a 177% increase since 2000; 
meanwhile, the worldwide trade surplus of China also rapidly increased.566 According 
to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the United States and China’s total trade, 
which was only $5 billion in 1980, rose to $387 billion in 2007.567 The second reason 
that triggered the legislators’ alert on China was its long-overdue notification to the 
WTO of 70 subsidy programs, which it made in 2006 after much urging by the United 
States.568 Thus, the impact of the Georgetown Steel Case and the subsequent actions 
by congressmen greatly contributed to Commerce’s decision to change of its 
longstanding policy of not applying CVD rules to NME countries. In 2006, Commerce 
officially initiated a CVD case against China as an NME country and continued with 
other investigations in subsequent years. This change of direction was also influenced 
by Commerce’s awareness of the economic transformation in NME countries.  
Before analyzing these related countervailing duty cases against China, it is 
important to explore the nature of transition economies and their impact upon 
Commerce’s recognition in applying the CVD law to these nations. 
 
564 H.R. 1229, the Nonmarket Economy Trade Remedy Act of 2007: Hearing before the Subcommittee 
on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth 
Congress, First Session, Serial No. 110-24, March 17, 2007 [hereinafter H.R. 1129]. 
565 Id. 
566 Id. at 4 (Opening Remarks by the Chairman). 
567 Wayne M. Morrison, China-U.S. Trade Issues, CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33536, 
March 7, 2008 [hereinafter CRS Report 2008]. 
568 H.R. 1129, at 3. China acceded to WTO in 2001, and, as part of its accession, China agreed to notify 
the WTO of its subsidies and agreed to terminate its prohibited subsidies upon accession. However, 
China notified the WTO of its subsidy programs in 2006, several years after the due date. According to 
USTR, China’s report is incomplete because it failed to notify the WTO about any subsidies provided 
by China’s state-owned banks or by provincial and local government authorities. In addition, while China 
gave notice of several subsidies that appear to be prohibited, it did so without making any commitment 
to withdraw them, and it failed to give notice about other subsidies that appear to be prohibited. See 
United States Trade Representative (USTR), 2006 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, 
December 11, 2006 [hereinafter USTR Report 2006], at 42. 
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4.3.2.2. Impact of Transition Economies 
 
The aspiration to grow and integrate into the global trading system has 
motivated nonmarket economy countries to transform their economic systems to 
become market economy countries or at least to operate on market principles. However, 
the transformation of an existing nonmarket economy to a market economy or a market-
oriented economy takes many years or even decades. Furthermore, the degree and 
feasibility of economic reform in each country is also subject to the political system it 
is pursuing. Such economic transformation was broadly implemented after the 
dissolution of the former Soviet Union in the late 1980s.569 The reunification of East 
and West Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 was also a 
fundamental motivation for a wave of economic reforms in Eastern Europe.570 During 
1989 and 1990, NME countries such as Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and 
Hungary started to accelerate their economic reform efforts.571 As a leading 
representative for NME countries in Asia, China initiated a comprehensive reshaping 
of its economy beginning in 1978.572 However, it was not until 1992 that China made 
it clear that it was to pursue a socialist market economy.573 Vietnam initiated its 
economic renovation in 1986 with the objective of transition to a socialist market-
oriented economy. Since then, transition to a market economy has been considered as 
a main target and basic feature for almost all centrally planned economies, including 
independent states from the former Soviet Union, Eastern European, and Asian 
socialist countries.574 
 
569 ZHANG (2018), supra note 79, at 5. 
570 Economic Report of the President, Transmitted to the Congress together with the Annual Report of 
the Council of Economic Advisors, February 1991 [Economic Report of the President 1991], at 195. 
571 Id. 




Although the United States has supported transitions to market economies,575 
one of the critical concerns of Congress and the administrative authorities is how to 
deal with imports from these transition economies effectively under the domestic trade 
laws such as antidumping and countervailing duty laws. As discussed in section 4.2 of 
this Chapter, Congress did amend the antidumping law to incorporate new provisions 
for NME countries within the 1988 OTCA.576 This Act defined the term “nonmarket 
economy” and set forth the standards to determine whether a country has a nonmarket 
economy for the application of the antidumping law.577 However, since this Act’s 
enactment, Commerce has encountered difficulties in dealing with the market reforms 
in NME countries. One of the difficulties is that each NME country, subject to its 
particular social, political, and economic situation, may pursue market reforms with 
varying degrees and toward various forms of market economies.578 Hence, it is a great 
challenge for Commerce to cope with NMEs in transition by application of the outdated 
NME provisions of the 1988 OTCA.579 On the other hand, the countervailing duty law 
could not help to resolve such challenges itself because it was determined not to be 
applicable to NME countries in the Georgetown Steel Case. As discussed in 
Georgetown Steel Case, the determination of the CVD law’s inapplicability to NMEs 
is based on the logic that subsidies have no meaning outside the context of market-
based economic systems. However, when a reforming NME begins to exhibit elements 
 
575 Id. Hearings before the Joint Economic Committee Congress of the United States, S.Hrg. 102-181, 
102nd Congress, 1st. Session, Jan. 4, Feb. 12, and March 6, 8, 13 and 14, 1991, at 85-86. (In Chapter 6: 
Economies in Transition Around the World, it is summarized that “[t]he report concludes with a 
discussion of the role the United States can best play in supporting transitions to democratic societies 
and free-market economies: how we can best help these countries help themselves. In both regions this 
role involves technical and financial support aimed at assisting reform, not providing an excuse to delay 
it, and reduction of barriers to trade and investment. In addition, the United States has encouraged and 
will continue to encourage multilateral institutions and other governments to support the transformation 
process.”). 
576 1988 OTCA, supra note 135. 
577 Id. 
578 Lantz (1995), supra note 457, at 1008. 
579 Id. 
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of both market and nonmarket economies, it becomes more difficult to justify that 
inapplicability policy.580 
 
4.3.2.3. U.S. Trade with Transition Economies 
 
In 1980, two significant commercial developments affected economic relations 
between the United States and the NME countries: the imposition of trade sanctions 
against the U.S.S.R. and the normalization of commercial relations with China.581 Both 
contributed greatly to changes in the pattern of U.S. trade with the NMEs. In that year, 
the level of trade between the United States and NME countries rose very slightly. 
Noticeably, China replaced the U.S.S.R. both as the most important NME buyer of U.S. 
exports and as the principal NME supplier of U.S. imports.582 However, trade between 
the United States and NMEs during that year slowed down because of the U.S.S.R. 
sanctions. In particular, U.S. exports to NMEs increased by only 2.5 percent, from $8.2 
billion in 1979 to $8.4 billion in 1980.583 On the other hand, U.S. imports from NMEs 
increased by only 2.8 percent.584 However, imports from China occupied over a third 
of total U.S. imports from NMEs.585  
In the following years, China continued to dominate trends in U.S. and NME 
trade. Specifically, in 1984, the two-way trade increased 43.3 percent, from $8.6 billion 
in 1983 to $12.4 billion in 1984.586 U.S. exports to NMEs increased by 41.8 percent, 
 
580 James A. Meszaros, Application of the United States’ Law of Countervailing Duties to Nonmarket 
Imports: Effects of the Recent Foreign Reforms, 2 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 463, 471 (1996). 
581 United States International Trade Commission, Publication 1136, 25th Quarterly Report to Congress 
and the Trade Policy Committee on Trade Between the United States and the Nonmarket Economy 
Countries During 1980, March 1981 [hereinafter 25th ITC Report], at 3. 
582 Id. In 1979, the United States and China signed a comprehensive trade agreement, which was effective 
in February 1980. The agreement included the extension of most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff treatment 
to imports from China. Since granting MFN status, two-way trade with China has more than doubled. 
583 Id. at 5. 
584 Id. 
585 Id. at 20. 
586 United States International Trade Commission, Publication 1662, 41st Quarterly Report to Congress 
and the Trade Policy Committee on Trade Between the United States and the Nonmarket Economy 
Countries During 1984, March 1985 [hereinafter 41st ITC Report], at 5. 
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from $5.1 billion in 1983 to $7.2 billion in 1984.587 U.S. imports from NMEs also 
increased by 45.4 percent from $3.6 billion in 1983 to $5.2 billion in 1984.588 
During the 1990s, the movement of market reforms in NME countries and their 
deeper integration with the world’s economy significantly boosted two-way trade. 
Remarkably, U.S. trade with NME countries more than doubled, setting a record level 
of $26.3 billion by 1990.589 However, the trade balance between the United States and 
NMEs reversed course. Although U.S. exports to NMEs declined by 18.6 percent, U.S. 
imports from these countries grew by 25.0 percent, marking their eighth consecutive 
year of expansion.590 As a result, the U.S. deficit in trade with NMEs nearly tripled 
from $2.8 billion during 1989, the previous annual record, to $8.3 billion during 
1990.591  
Based on the data, it was claimed that trade with China was largely responsible 
for the U.S. trade deficit with NMEs.592 In particular, U.S. imports from China 
expanded by 27.5 percent, from $11.9 billion during 1989 to $15.1 billion during 
1990.593 In contrast, U.S. exports to China decreased by 17.3 percent, from $5.8 billion 
during 1989 to $4.8 billion during 1990.594 As a result, the U.S. deficit in trade with 
China increased by 70 percent to $10.3 billion, reaching a new record level for the sixth 




589 United States International Trade Commission, Publication 2375, Trade Between the United States 
and the Nonmarket Economy During 1990, 65th Quarterly Report, April 1991 [hereinafter 65th ITC 
Report], at 2. The report focuses on U.S. trade with Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany 
(through September 1990), Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the U.S.S.R., whose current levels of trade 
with the United States have the potential to affect a domestic industry. Although U.S. trade with 
Afghanistan, Albania, Cambodia, Cuba, Laos, Mongolia, North Korea, and Vietnam was negligible, 
exports to and imports from each of these are shown and included in the totals for “All NMEs” in these 
reports. 
590 Id. 
591 Id. The U.S. trade balance with China turned from a surplus to a deficit in 1983, but the deficit 
declined slightly in 1984. It then increased from $51.9 million in 1984 to $67.2 million in l985, $1.6 
billion in 1986, $2.8 billion in 1987, $3.4 billion in 1988, and $6.1 billion in 1989. 
592 Bello et al. (1992), supra note 477, at 669. 
593 65th ITC Report, supra note 589, at 10. 
594 Id. at 8. 
595 Id. 
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following years, to $12.6 billion in 1991,596 $18.2 billion in 1992597, and $22.8 billion 
in 1993.598 More importantly, China’s share of total NME exports to the United States 
rapidly jumped from 87.2% in 1990599 to 95.3% in 1991, 96% in 1992, and 93.1% in 
1993.600 
The above analysis of the trade data shows the undeniable role of transition 
economies in trade development with the United States. Both sides need mutual trade 
cooperation to reach their own goals for economic development and global trade 
integration. In principle, promoting trade exports is essential, but the mission of 
protecting each side’s domestic industries must be always ensured. Needless to say, 
when the U.S. trade deficit with China started to rise rapidly from early 1990s, as 
reported by the ITC, imports from China were noticed more, and then U.S. trade laws 
were primed for two objectives: to protect the American industry and to balance the 
level of trade deficit between the two countries. 
The impact of Georgetown Steel Case, the economic transformation of NME 
countries, and their rapidly increasing imports into the United States market have 
forced Commerce to develop new approaches in antidumping investigations and to try 
to test such approaches in CVD proceedings applied to NMEs in transition. Since 
Congress did not provide any statutory guidance on dealing with transition economies 
during this timeline, Commerce has made use of its broad discretionary power to 
develop such approaches for administering the antidumping and countervailing duty 
laws in a series of cases involving dumped and subsidized imports from China.601 The 
next sections will examine several AD and CVD cases to elaborate on how Commerce 
 
596 United States International Trade Commission, Publication 2503, Trade Between the United States 
and China, the Former Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltic Nations, and Other Selected 
Countries During 1991, 69th Quarterly Report, April 1992 [hereinafter 69th ITC Report], at 3. 
597 United States International Trade Commission, Publication 2634, Trade Between the United States 
and China, the Former Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltic Nations, and Other Selected 
Countries During 1992, 73d Quarterly Report, May 1993 [hereinafter 73d ITC Report], at 5. 
598 United States International Trade Commission, Publication 2770, Trade Between the United States 
and China, the Successor States to the Former Soviet Union, and Other Title IV Countries During 1993, 
77th Quarterly Report, April 1994 [hereinafter 77th ITC Report], at 7. 
599 65th ITC Report, supra note 589, Table 3, at 7. 
600 77th ITC Report, supra note 598, Table 1.3, at 6. 
601 Lantz (1995), supra note 457, at 1031. 
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applies the antidumping and countervailing duty laws to cope with the challenges posed 
by China as an NME in transition. 
 
4.3.2.4. Changes to the Department of Commerce's Approach to NMEs 
 
4.3.2.4.1. Changes in Antidumping Investigations 
 
Like the CVD law, the antidumping duty law is a remedial measure that 
provides relief to American industries harmed by unfair trade practices (i.e., dumping 
and subsidization). The antidumping duties are imposed if the two following conditions 
are met: (1) Commerce determines that the foreign goods are sold in the United States 
at “less than fair value” (LTFV) and (2) the International Trade Commission concludes 
that American industries are either injured or threatened to be injured by reason of 
imports of such foreign goods.602 This bifurcated statutory process has been unchanged 
since the amendment of the Tariff Act of 1930 in 1974 up to now. In an antidumping 
investigation, to determine whether the foreign goods are sold at LTFV, Commerce is 
required to compare the U.S. price of the merchandise under investigation (or the 
subject merchandise) with its “foreign market value” (FMV). After such comparison, 
if the FMV exceeds the U.S. price (i.e., there is a positive dumping margin), Commerce 
will determine the antidumping duty to be an amount equal to that positive dumping 
margin. Otherwise, if the dumping margin is negative, it means there is no LTFV sale 
 
602 Section 731 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended in 1979 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673). Section 
731 provides: 
“If— 
(1) the administering authority determines that a class or kind of foreign merchandise is being, or is 
likely to be, sold in the United States at less than its fair value, and 
(2) the Commission determines that— 
(A) an industry in the United States— 
(i) is materially injured, or 
(ii) is threatened with material injury, or 
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded, 
by reason of imports of that merchandise, 
then there shall be imposed upon such merchandise an antidumping duty, in addition to any other duty 
imposed, in an amount equal to the amount by which the foreign market value exceeds the United States 
price for the merchandise.” 
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or no occurrence of dumping. However, it is complicated to determine the FMV of the 
subject merchandise in an NME country. The methodology used to calculate the FMV 
in a standard case (i.e., in a market economy) is different from that of an NME case. In 
an ME case, in order to calculate the FMV, Commerce simply uses the prices in the 
producer’s home market or in third countries (if there were no home-market sales) or 
uses constructed values (where there were no sales in the home market and no sales to 
third countries).603 However, if Commerce finds that the exporting country of the 
subject merchandise is a state-controlled economy (SCE)604 or NME, it will use a 
radically different methodology to calculate the FMV. This NME methodology would 
be used because the sales prices or costs in the home (exporting) market of an NME 
country are unreliable due to government controls. Alternatively, Commerce would use 
the prices or costs collected from producers in a non-SCE or ME to calculate the 
FMV.605 The reasons that Commerce does not trust the home-market prices or costs in 
an NME are understandable. At least in a pure state-controlled or command economy, 
inputs and outputs are centrally planned and prices are distorted and not determined by 
supply and demand.606 Basically, such prices do not support a comparison between the 
U.S. price and the NME’s sales price.607 Further, the NME’s nonconvertible currency 
makes it difficult for Commerce to calculate the dumping margin on a U.S. dollar 
basis.608 Therefore, to cope with such difficulties in an NME case, Commerce normally 
uses the NME methodologies including a surrogate ME country, constructed value, and 
factors of production to calculate the FMV.609 
 
603 Section 773(a)(1), Tariff Act of 1930, as amended in 1979 (codified at 19 U.S.C. 1677b(a)). 
604 The term “state-controlled economy” or SCE was used prior to the enactment of the 1988 OTCA. 
Since 1988, SCEs have been referred to as “nonmarket economies” or NMEs. 
605 Section 773(c), Tariff Act of 1930, as amended in 1979 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)). 
606 Jeffrey S. Neeley, Nonmarket Economy Import Regulation from Bad to Worse, 20 LAW & POL’Y 
INT’L BUS. 529, 532 (1989). 
607 Pearson (1989), supra note 137, at 721. 
608 Id. 
609 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c); Antidumping Investigation Procedures Under Antidumping Act, 1921, 43 Fed. 
Reg. 35262 (Final Rule, August 9, 1978) [hereinafter The Treasury Department’s 1978 Regulation] 
(codified at 19 C.F.R. § 153.7 (1979)). 
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In Electric Golf Cars from Poland610, imported golf cars manufactured in 
Poland were determined to be sold at LTFV. During this time period, Poland was 
regarded as an SCE, and the Treasury Department611 used the NME methodology to 
calculate the fair price of the Polish golf cars. Specifically, it was found that golf cars 
were manufactured in Poland solely for export to the United States market.612 During 
that time, there were neither home market sales nor sales to other foreign countries.613 
In its fair value investigation, the Treasury Department initially calculated the FMV of 
the Polish golf cars based on the home-market prices of an obscure Canadian producer 
which sold small quantities of similar factory-use cars.614 Later, the Canadian producer 
went out of business in 1975, leaving the United States as the only other major producer 
of golf cars.615 Given a lack of pricing data from any other foreign manufacturers, the 
Treasury Department announced its intention to use the domestic prices of United 
States manufacturers to calculate the FMV of the Polish golf cars.616 However, the 
unfairness of such an approach plus oppositions from both Polish trade representatives 
and from domestic industry “catalyzed a rethinking” within the Treasury 
Department.617 In late 1977, in order to avoid using the U.S. prices or costs for its fair-
value investigation, the Treasury Department developed a “constructed value” 
methodology to calculate the Polish cars’ FMV.618 This novel methodology constructed 
a fair value that was based on the Polish producers’ factors of production (inputs such 
as labor, raw materials, administrative and selling expenses, etc.) valued at prices found 
 
610 Electric Golf Cars from Poland; Antidumping: Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 40 
FR 25497 (June 16, 1975) [hereinafter Polish Golf Cars]. 
611 The Treasury Department was responsible for the administration of antidumping and countervailing 
duty statutes during this timeline until 1980 when such responsibilities were transferred to Commerce. 
See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979, 93 Stat. 1381, September 25, 1979. 
612 Horlick & Shuman (1984), supra note 59, at 811. 
613 Id. 
614 Polish Golf Cars, supra note 610. See Horlick & Shuman (1984), supra note 59; Michael Kabik, The 
Dilemma of Dumping from Nonmarket Economy Countries, 6 EMORY INT’L REV. 339, 361 (1992). 
615 Polish Golf Cars, supra note 610. See also Horlick & Shuman (1984), supra note 59; Comment, 
Dumping by State-Controlled-Economy Countries: The Polish Golf Cart Case and the New Treasury 
Regulations, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 217, 220 (1979) [hereinafter Comment]; Bello et al. (1992), supra note 
477, at 675. 
616 Comment, supra note 615, 220. 
617 Id. 
618 Horlick & Shuman (1984), supra note at 59, 812. 
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in Spain, which was a non-SCE country comparable to Poland in its level of economic 
development.619 The Treasury Department formally proposed this approach as a 
regulation in 1978.620 Despite critical comments and opposition from many interested 
parties, this proposed regulation was ultimately adopted in the Treasury Department’s 
Final Rule in 1978.621 It should be noted that the approach of “factors of production” 
was used to supplement, not supplant, the surrogate country methodology.622 It 
provided for a means to establish fair value in cases where the like product for the NME 
merchandise under investigation was not manufactured in a market economy other than 
the United States.623 However, because of congressional skepticism of the Treasury 
Department’s 1978 Regulation, when Congress enacted the Trade Agreements Act of 
1979, the newly adopted factors of production approach was not incorporated in the 
amended antidumping law.624 This NME approach was, however, utilized in the 
majority of antidumping investigations against NME countries after Commerce 
assumed responsibility from the Treasury Department in 1980.625 
In Natural Menthol from the People’s Republic of China in 1981, Commerce 
continued to use the above-mentioned NME methodology and, for the first time, 
declared that China was an SCE.626 The overriding issue in the preliminary stage of the 
case was that Commerce had to determine whether China was state-controlled “to an 
extent that sales or offers of sales of [menthol in PRC] or to countries other than the 
United States do not permit a determination of foreign market value”627 by normal 
standards. Since this case was investigated within the legal framework of the Tariff Act 
 
619 Bello et al. (1992), supra note 477, at 675. 
620 Antidumping: Proposed Amendments Pertaining to Merchandise from State-Controlled-Economy 
Countries, 43 FR 1356 (January 9, 1978). 
621 The Treasury Department’s 1978 Regulation, supra note 609. 
622 Bello et al. (1992), supra note 477, at 676. 
623 Id. 
624 The Trade Agreements Act of 1979, supra note 123; See Horlick & Shuman (1984), supra note at 59, 
at 813. 
625 Kabik (1992), supra note 614, at 362. 
626 Natural Menthol from the People’s Republic of China; Antidumping: Preliminary Determination of 
Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Suspension of Liquidation, 46 FR 3258 (January 14, 1981) [hereinafter 
Natural Menthol Prelim]. 
627 Section 773(c), Tariff Act of 1930, as amended in 1979 (codified at 19 U.S.C. 1677b(c)). 
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of 1930, as amended in 1979, Commerce had yet no statutory criteria to define a 
nonmarket economy. Commerce realized this case was “extraordinarily complicated 
because it presents the novel issue of the extent of state controls in PRC.”628 To come 
to its conclusion, Commerce examined the degree of control exercised by the state over 
China’s economy generally and the impact of state control on the production and sale 
of menthol.629 Commerce found considerable control by the Chinese government over 
the composition of inputs and the distribution of outputs.630 Further, it was found that 
the pervasiveness of state planning and control of major agricultural products 
substantially limited the autonomy of production units and distorted the incentives that 
would be developed by a freely operating market.631 Commerce came to such findings 
based on the operating principles of a market economy where there is free from 
government planning and the production and sale is directed by the supply and demand. 
In the final determination, Commerce sustained the preliminary conclusion that 
China’s economy is state-controlled both generally and in the agricultural sector.632 
Since China was determined to be an SCE, Commerce did not use the home market 
and export prices of menthol in China to calculate the FMV. Instead, Commerce 
selected Paraguay as a non-SCE surrogate country to calculate the FMV.633 In this case, 
it should be noted that Commerce started to pay attention to certain economic reforms 
in China. In particular, Commerce indicated that a number of reforms had been 
introduced to give greater play to market forces, but at the time of investigation 
believed that such reforms “seem[ed] to us as too new and too limited to have altered 
the fundamental nature of the PRC’s economy and its effects on the production of 
 
628 Natural Menthol Prelim, supra note 626. 
629 Id. 
630 Id. Commerce found that the State Planning Committee sets output targets and prices, allocates 
commodities and production, and establishes overall guidelines for the economy. 
631 Id. 
632 Natural Menthol from the People's Republic of China; Antidumping: Final Determination of Sales at 
Less Than Fair Value, 46 FR 24614 (May 1, 1981) [hereinafter Natural Menthol Final]. 
633 Id. Having considered country-wide and sectoral criteria, Commerce determined that the level of 
economic development of Paraguay is closer to that of the PRC than it is to that of other major producers 
of menthol. According to Commerce, Paraguay is the only major free market producer of natural menthol 
that also produces all of its own raw material (peppermint). 
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menthol.”634 This remark shows Commerce’s potential for reconsideration of the 
application of its NME approach to transitional economies. It also implies that if certain 
industries within an SCE or NME were able to operate on market forces or had 
autonomy in pricing and production making decisions, such industries might be entitled 
to a normal dumping methodology. This is particularly notable because countries that 
are currently plagued by the negative effects of an NME determination could consider 
proposing that Commerce adopt such a tailored approach in a countervailing duty case, 
assuming Commerce remained unwilling to revoke the NME determination entirely. 
 
4.3.2.4.1.1. “Mix and Match” or “Bubbles of Capitalism” Approach 
 
Following the Natural Menthol case, from 1982 to 1990, the Department of 
Commerce initiated 23 antidumping investigations against China.635 For most of the 
cases, in analyzing whether China’s economy was state-controlled, Commerce 
examined key factors such as government control over the ownership of the means of 
production, allocation of resources or inputs and outputs; government control over 
trade; and the foreign currency’s convertibility.636 Although significant economic 
reforms in China were noticed during this period, Commerce still viewed China as an 
SCE because of the fact that the Chinese government still controlled the business 
sectors’ prices and levels of production at both local and provincial levels, and because 
the Chinese government still owned most of the assets in the economy637. 
 
634 Natural Menthol Prelim, supra note 626. 
635 AD/CVD Investigations (Federal Register History), (01/01/1980 - 12/31/1999), Antidumping and 
Countervailing Duty Case Information, Enforcement and Compliance, available at 
https://enforcement.trade.gov/stats/iastats1.html, accessed on August 10, 2020. 
636 Petroleum Wax Candles from the People’s Republic of China; Final Determination of Sales at Less 
Than Fair Value, 51 FR 25085 (July 10, 1986) [hereinafter Candles case]; Certain Headwear from the 
People’s Republic of China; Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 54 FR 11983 (March 
23, 1989) [hereinafter Headwear case]. 
637 Tapered Roller Bearings from the People’s Republic of China; Final Determination of Sales at Less 
Than Fair Value, 52 FR 19748 (May 27, 1987); Id. Headwear case; Sparklers from the People’s Republic 
of China; Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 55 FR 51743 (December 17, 
1990) [hereinafter Sparklers Prelim]. 
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More notably, in a series of antidumping cases initiated in the 1990s, Commerce 
attempted to adopt new NME methodologies to cope with the reality of the economic 
reforms in China. 
First, in Sparklers from China, initiated in July 1990,638 Commerce used the 
“factors of production” (FOP) methodology, which was formally supplemented in the 
antidumping statute by the 1988 OTCA.639 The statute requires Commerce to determine 
the FMV based on the market valuation of the factors of production utilized in 
producing the subject merchandise (unless Commerce determines the available 
information on factor prices in market economies to be inadequate).640 Furthermore, 
Commerce was permitted to value the FOP in one or more ME countries that are at a 
level of economic development comparable to that of the NME and that are significant 
producers of comparable merchandise.641 In this investigation, China’s economy was 
continually regarded as a nonmarket economy. However, in its FMV calculation, 
Commerce accepted the value for one factor on the actual price paid by a Chinese 
producer for an input that was imported from a country with a market economy.642  
Second, in the other two landmark antidumping investigations initiated in the 
same year, Commerce showed progressive signs of flexibility in its adoption of NME 
methodologies by developing a new approach known as “mix and match” or “bubbles 
of capitalism.” Specifically, in Oscillating Fans and Ceiling Fans (Fans) from China, 
initiated in November 1990,643 a large number of Chinese producers raised a variety of 
novel methodological issues for Commerce to take into serious consideration. The 
 
638 Sparklers from the People’s Republic of China; Initiation of Antidumping Duty Investigation, 55 FR 
31088 (July 31, 1990). 
639 1988 OCTA, supra note 135, § 1316. Section 1316 amended section 773(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930 
(as amended in 1979) to add the factors of production methodology and to provide a definition of NME 
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b). 
640 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1) (1988). See Sparklers from the People’s Republic of China; Final 
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 56 FR 20588 (May 6, 1991) [hereinafter Sparklers 
Final]. 
641 Id. Sparklers Final. The Department of Commerce decided to select India, Pakistan and the 
Philippines as ME surrogate countries to value Chinese producers’ factors of production. 
642 Id. at 20589. 
643 Oscillating Fans and Ceiling Fans from the People’s Republic of China; Initiation of Antidumping 
Duty Investigations, 55 FR 49320 (November 27, 1990). 
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respondents in this case asserted that although the Fans sector was operating within an 
NME country, it was sufficiently free of state control to allow calculation of FMV 
based on ME methodologies.644 In Chrome-plated Lug Nuts (Lug Nuts) from China,645 
initiated two days after the Fans case, the Chinese manufacturers similarly claimed that 
the chrome-plated nut industry was sufficiently market-oriented to permit Commerce 
to determine FMV based on ME methodologies.646 In both cases, the Chinese producers 
did not challenge the designation of China’s economy as an NME from a 
macroeconomic perspective, but they requested use of the ME methodologies to 
calculate the FMV of the subject merchandise. Such assertions caused Commerce to 
seriously consider changing its NME methodologies. However, the applicable 
antidumping law at the time did not give Commerce any clear interpretation or 
guidance in applying the law to NMEs in transition. In fact, when enacting the 1988 
OTCA, Congress gave no specific statutory instructions on how to determine when the 
exporting country’s prices were market oriented and sufficiently free from the value 
distortions caused by central planning.647 To overcome this obstacle, according to 
Commerce, its task was to determine dispositive congressional intent by projecting (as 
well as it could) how Congress would have dealt with this particular situation if 
Congress had spoken.648 Consequently, in the Prelim Fans, Commerce developed a 
“mix and match” methodology that was more flexible than the antidumping law 
required.  
In the preliminary investigation stage, in consideration of the Chinese 
producers’ claims, Commerce started to examine how any industrial sector or 
commercial entity in an NME could be said to be operating on market principles such 
 
644 Oscillating Fans and Ceiling Fans from the People’s Republic of China; Preliminary Determinations 
of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 56 FR 25664 (June 5, 1991) [hereinafter Fans AD Prelim] (The Chinese 
producers asked Commerce to use their own prices or costs of production to calculate the FMV). 
645 Chrome-Plated Lug Nuts from the People’s Republic of China; Initiation of Antidumping Duty 
Investigation, 55 FR 49548 (November 29, 1990). 
646 Chrome-plated Lug Nuts from the People’s Republic of China; Preliminary Determination of Sales 
at Less Than Fair Value, 56 FR 15857 (April 18, 1991) [hereinafter Lug Nuts AD Prelim]. 
647 See Meszaros (1996), supra note 580, at 463-473. 
648 Id. (citing Georgetown Steel Corporation v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
 121 
that costs and prices were acceptable, reliable measures of FMV.649 After its 
examination, Commerce concluded that absent a showing that all costs and prices were 
market-oriented, FMV in an NME must be based on the FOP methodology, using 
appropriate surrogate values to provide prices for factor input costs that were not 
market-determined.650 That means in order to be eligible for the complete ME 
methodology (i.e., using market values instead of surrogate values for factors of 
production in FMV calculations), it is required that 100 percent of the producers’ costs 
and prices for all inputs be purchased at market-determined prices.651 Nevertheless, 
Commerce provided that if a company in an NME is able to establish that inputs are 
purchased at market-oriented prices or from market economies, such prices are 
accepted for the purpose of an FOP analysis.652 In addition, Commerce promised that 
if the cost of inputs sourced in China, including materials, labor, water, electricity, and 
rent, are valued on the basis of market principles, Commerce may substitute those 
market values for surrogate country values in individual firm calculations.653  
In Lug Nuts AD Prelim, which was issued before Fans AD Prelim, in response 
to the Chinese producers’ request to use the ME methodologies to calculate the FMV, 
Commerce stated that it did not have sufficient information to determine whether the 
steel and chemical producers operated in a market environment.654 Thus, Commerce 
did not base the FMV on input prices in China, but based on the surrogate values from 
Pakistan as n surrogate ME country.655 Consequently, the dumping margin was 
preliminarily calculated at 66.49%.656 Thereafter, based on analysis drawn from the 
Fans AD Prelim, Commerce dropped the dumping margin from 66.49% to 4.24%.657 
This huge drop is resulted from Commerce’s flexibility in adoption of the “mix and 
 





654 Lug Nuts AD Prelim, supra note 647, at 15859. 
655 Id. at 15859-60. 
656 Id. 
657 Chrome-Plated Lug Nuts from the People’s Republic of China; Final Determination of Sales at Less 
Than Fair Value, 56 FR 46153 (September 10, 1991) [hereinafter Lug Nuts AD Final]. 
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match” or “bubbles of capitalism” approach.658 Initially, Commerce acknowledged the 
existence of a “bubble of capitalism” in an otherwise NME country, but it expressed 
skepticism whether such a “bubble of capitalism” actually does or is likely to exist.659 
Commerce explained that to find a “bubble of capitalism” and to treat the NME 
producer as if it were an ME producer despite the fact that the economy in which it 
operates is nonmarket, it must be persuaded that all prices and costs faced by the 
individual producer are market determined.660 This means the “bubbles of capitalism” 
test is passed only where the prices or costs of 100% inputs into the production of the 
subject merchandise are market-driven. In such a situation, Commerce is willing to use 
the reported NME input prices rather than surrogate ME values in determining the FMV 
of the subject merchandise.661 However, this test does not work in practice because 
even if almost all of the factors of production were found to be market driven, it is 
impossible to find an industry completely insulated from nonmarket influences.662 
Although Commerce could not find that all input costs were market-driven, it 
recognized that “for certain inputs into the production process, market forces may be 
at work.”663 In those situations where inputs are imported from ME suppliers and where 
locally sourced goods are based on market forces, the prices of such inputs are actually 
market-driven prices and they reflect the producer’s actual experience.664 Therefore, 
Commerce believed that “it is appropriate to use those prices in lieu of values of a 
surrogate, market-economy producer.”665 Eventually, although Commerce declined to 
 
658 Commerce used the term “bubbles of capitalism” in its study of China’s new market orientation in 
1989. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Study of China’s New Market Orientation and U.S. Trade 
Laws (1989) (cited by Bello and Holmer (1992), at 693 n.143). 
659 Lug Nuts AD Final, supra note 658. See Wang (1996), supra note 47, at 644 (1996). 
660 Lug Nuts AD Final, supra note 658, at 46154-55. 
661 See Meszaros (1996), supra note 580, at 474 (citing David W. Richardson & Robert E. Nielsen, 
Recent Developments in the Treatment of Nonmarket Economies Under the AD/CVD Laws, in THE 
COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS 1995, PLI CORP. L. & PROC. Course Handbook Series No. B-
789). 
662 Luke P. Bellocchi, The Effects of and Trends in Executive Policy and Court of International Trade 
(CIT) Decisions Concerning Antidumping and the Nonmarket Economy (NME) of the People’s Republic 
of China, 10 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 177, 208 (1997). 




find that the entire industry was 100% market oriented for using the complete ME 
methodology, it started to realize that this “all-or-nothing” test was not appropriate for 
evaluating the market orientations for reforming NME producers.666 Then, it added a 
second “mini-bubble” test (also known as a “mix and match” approach), under which 
the factor inputs sourced within an NME were considered market-driven if they were 
shown to be free of direct or overt central government influence.667 Using this new 
methodology, Commerce found that the prices paid for steel and chemicals used as 
factor inputs in the production of chrome-plated lug nuts were market-driven.668 
Consequently, Commerce decided to include the actual prices of these market-based 
inputs in the FOP analysis.669 The intent of Commerce was to enhance “accuracy, 
fairness, and predictability” in the circumstances where an NME producer’s factor 
input prices are market determined.670 At the time of this landmark decision, Lug Nuts 
appeared to be the only case where the factor inputs sourced within an NME country 
could be used to calculate the FMV under the FOP approach.671  
Following the Lug Nuts AD Final, a month later Commerce made its final 
determination on the Fans case.672 However, the respondents in this case did not 
provide sufficient information to prove that the prices of locally sourced inputs were 
market-driven.673 Therefore, in its FMV calculation of such factor inputs, Commerce 
valued each individual producer’s reported FOP using surrogate values from Pakistan 
(as the most comparable surrogate) and India (as an acceptable alternative).674 With 
respect to the factor inputs that were purchased from ME countries such as Japan, the 
United States, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, Commerce used these actual market-based 
 
666 See Meszaros (1996), supra note 580, at 476. 
667 Id. 
668 Lug Nuts AD Final, supra note 658, at 46155. 
669 Id. 
670 Id. 
671 Lantz (1995), supra note 457, at 1040; Bello et al. (1992), supra note 477, at 697. 
672 Oscillating Fans and Ceiling Fans from the People’s Republic of China; Final Determinations of Sales 
at Less Than Fair Value, 56 FR 55271 (October 25, 1991) [hereinafter Fans AD Final]. 
673 Id. 
674 Id. at 55273 
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prices to calculate the FMV.675 Accordingly, instead of relying solely on surrogate 
country values from Pakistan and India, by using the “mix and match” methodology, 
Commerce also based its calculations on prices paid by Chinese manufacturers for 
those raw materials imported from ME countries.676 As a result, the final dumping 
margins were calculated at zero to 0.79 percent for oscillating fans and zero to 2.47 
percent for ceiling fans.677 
Not long after the release of Lug Nuts AD Final, the Lug Nuts petitioner, 
Consolidated International Automotive, Inc. (Consolidated), initiated a civil action 
challenging Commerce’s “bubbles of capitalism” methodology.678 The Fans petitioner, 
Lasko Metal Products, Inc. (Lasko), also appealed the “mix and match” methodology 
to the CIT.679 On the other hand, having recognized the possibility of treating an 
industry as a “bubbles of capitalism,” both petitioners also filed countervailing duty 
petitions.680 In fact, once Commerce opened the door to determining that the industries 
of fans and lug nuts are market-oriented industries, the petitioners shifted their position 
taken in the antidumping proceedings to argue that these industries were market-
oriented, and therefore, should be investigated under the CVD law.681 Unexpectedly, 
Commerce’s initial good faith in adding “accuracy, fairness, and predictability” to the 
 
675 Id. at 55275. 
676 Id. at 55273. 
677 Antidumping Duty Orders and Amendments to Final Determinations of Sales at Less Than Fair 
Value: Oscillating Fans and Ceiling Fans from the People’s Republic of China, 56 FR 64240 (December 
9, 1991). 
678 Consol. Int'l Auto., Inc. v. United States, 797 F. Supp. 1007, 1009 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1992 [hereinafter 
Consolidated v. United States]. 
679 Lasko Metal Prod., Inc. v. United States, 810 F. Supp. 314 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1992), aff’d, 43 F.3d 1442 
(Fed. Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Lasko v. United States]. 
680 Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigations: Oscillating Fans and Ceiling Fans from the People’s 
Republic of China (“PRC”), 56 FR 57616 (November 13, 1991) [hereinafter Fans CVD Initiation]; 
Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation: Chrome-Plated Lug Nuts and Wheel Locks from the 
People’s Republic of China (“PRC”), 57 FR 877 (January 9, 1992) [hereinafter Lug Nuts CVD 
Initiation]. The petitioners argued that regardless of the nature of the PRC economy, the PRC fans and 
lug nuts sectors operated on the market principles, so the CVD law is now applicable. 
681 Jeffrey P. Bialos, Randolph W. Tritell, and Martin S. Applebaum, Trading with Central and Eastern 
Europe: The Application of the U.S. Unfair Trade Laws to Economies in Transition, 7-AUT INT’L L. 
PRACTICUM 69, 73 (1994). 
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NME methodologies created unintended outcomes that the market-driven industries in 
an NME in transition are now “potentially vulnerable to attack” under the CVD law.682  
Facing such a dilemma, on January 4, 1992, the government filed a motion to 
remand the civil action by Consolidated so that Commerce could reconsider its new 
methodologies in Final Lug Nuts.683 In its reexamination of the “bubbles of capitalism” 
and “mix and match” methodologies, Commerce admitted that its prior “scope of 
inquiry was too narrow” and that “the absence of explicit government involvement in 
these transactions is not sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the prices for these 
inputs are market-driven.”684 Instead of focusing on individual transaction prices, 
Commerce turned to a broader examination of economic conditions in each industry 
that supplied raw materials as inputs into the production of lug nuts.685 This method of 
analysis was called “market-oriented industry” (MOI) test, which had been developed 
during the antidumping proceeding of the Sulfanilic Acid case.686 
Two days after the publication of Prelim Sulfanilic Acid, on March 20, 1992, 
Commerce filed the remand determination with the CIT.687 By using the new MOI test, 
Commerce reversed its position and declined to apply the “mix and match” 
methodology for raw materials locally sourced within an NME in the Lug Nuts AD 
Final. Accordingly, Commerce found that the prices paid for a significant input (i.e., 
steel) were not market-determined prices because of the extent of state-required 
production of that input.688 Consequently, Commerce revalued the steel and chemical 
inputs used in the production of the subject merchandise based on surrogate values in 
 
682 Id. 
683 Consolidated v. United States, supra note 679, at 1009. 
684 Amendment to Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Amendment to Antidumping 
Duty Order: Chrome-Plated Lug Nuts from the People’s Republic of China; 57 FR 15052 (April 24, 
1992) [hereinafter Amended Lug Nuts AD Final]. 
685 Id. 
686 Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Sulfanilic Acid from the People’s 
Republic of China, 57 FR 9409 (March 18, 1992) [hereinafter Sulfanilic Acid Prelim]. 
687 Consolidated v. United States, supra note 679, at 1009. 
688 Amended Lug Nuts AD Final, supra note 685, at 15054. Commerce stated that since steel prices in 
China are not market-driven, it was not necessary to reach a similar determination with respect to any 
other significant inputs. 
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Pakistan.689 With this method of analysis, the antidumping duty rate was substantially 
increased from 4.24% in the Lug Nuts AD Final to 42.42%.690 
 
4.3.2.4.1.2. “Market-Oriented Industry” Approach 
 
The “mix and match” approach had been tested for a couple of months and then 
it was abandoned and replaced by the “market-oriented industry” (“MOI”) approach. 
In Sulfanilic Acid, despite the fact that China was still treated as an NME, the Chinese 
respondents claimed that certain inputs in the production of sulfanilic acid were market 
driven.691 This case was a chance for Commerce to reconsider the appropriateness of 
the specific approach established in Lug Nuts and Fans antidumping cases. As a result 
of this reconsideration, Commerce developed stricter criteria for determining whether 
an NME producer operates within an MOI in the NME. Specifically, to be qualified as 
an MOI, the following three criteria must be met: 
(1) There must be virtually no government involvement in setting prices. 
(2) The industry should be characterized by private or collective ownership and 
a lack of substantial state ownership. 
(3) Market-determined prices must be paid for all significant inputs (whether 
material or non-material).692 
Under this strict MOI test, if any of the above criteria are not met, the producers 
of the subject merchandise will be treated as NME producers, and then the FMV will 
be calculated by using prices and costs from a surrogate country.693 In other words, if 
this MOI test is failed, Commerce does not accept to evaluate whether individual inputs 
used by the producer were sourced from within the NME based on the market 
 
689 Id. 
690 Id. at 15058. Before the publication of the Amended Lug Nuts AD Final, since the Department of 
Commerce had submitted its remand determination describing the MOI test and its revised calculation, 
the CIT dismissed Consolidated’s appeal on April 8, 1992. See Consolidated v. United States, supra note 
679, at 1009. 
691 Sulfanilic Acid Prelim, supra note 687. 
692 Id. at 9411. 
693 Id. 
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principles. In essence, it is unlikely that 100% of the inputs sourced in an NME are 
entirely driven by the market principles, unless all inputs used for the production of the 
subject merchandise are imported from ME countries.694 In Sulfanilic Acid Prelim, 
Commerce determined that there was insufficient “documentary evidence” to 
overcome the presumption that the inputs used by the sulfanilic acid producers that 
were sourced in China had not been purchased at market prices.695 Therefore, 
Commerce determined the FMV on the basis of factors of production utilized in 
producing sulfanilic acid, as valued in a surrogate country.696 However, the Chinese 
producers in this investigation claimed that all of the manufacturers’ material and non-
material inputs used to produce sulfanilic acid were purchased at market-driven 
prices.697 In Sulfanilic Acid Final, Commerce found that aniline, which is a significant 
material input used to produce sulfanilic acid, is subject to state-required production.698 
At the verification stage, Commerce requested but did not receive quantifiable data 
from the Chinese government to evaluate the extent of state-required production of the 
aniline input.699 Therefore, Commerce did not have sufficient information to evaluate 
whether or not aniline prices were market-determined in China.700 Consequently, 
applying the strict MOI test, Commerce concluded that once a significant material input 
may not be purchased at market-determined prices, it does not need to consider (1) 
whether the prices of other material or non-material inputs are market-determined; (2) 
whether there is state-required production of the subject merchandise; or (3) whether 
there is substantial state ownership in the sulfanilic acid industry.701 When Commerce 
used this “all-or-nothing” approach to replace the “mix and match” approach 
 
694 Wang (1996), supra note 47, at 645. 
695 Sulfanilic Acid Prelim, supra note 687. 
696 Id. at 9412. 
697 Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Sulfanilic Acid from the People’s Republic of 
China, 57 FR 29705 (July 6, 1992) [hereinafter Sulfanilic Acid Final]. 





previously used in the Fans and Lug Nut cases, it was unlikely that any producers 
within an NME would pass the 100% MOI test. 
This new MOIT test has been also used as a basis for determining whether it 
could apply CVD law to the Chinese producers in Fans CVD case. This CVD case will 
be discussed in detail in the next section. 
 
4.3.2.4.2. Testing of MOI Approach in the Fans CVD Case 
 
As discussed above, the likely existence of a “bubble of capitalism” within the 
NME had seeded a glimmer of hope in the United States industries to overturn 
Commerce’s longstanding position of not applying the CVD law to NME countries 
following the Georgetown Steel case. In the CVD petition filed by the United States 
industry producing oscillating fans and ceiling fans (collectively, “Fans”) on October 
17, 1991, the Petitioner alleged that manufacturers, producers or exporters 
(collectively, “Respondents”) in China received bounties or grants within the meaning 
of section 303 of the CVD law.702 The Petitioner further alleged that regardless of 
China’s NME status, the Fans industry operated substantially pursuant to market 
principles and that the CVD law should apply.703 Therefore, Commerce was required 
to determine (1) whether the Fans industry does, in fact, operate in a market setting; 
and (2) if so, whether the CVD law could be applied to that industry.704 
It was the first time since the Georgetown Steel case in 1986 that the 
applicability of the CVD law was raised in a proceeding. At this time, however, the 
issue in consideration was to determine whether the CVD law could be applied to 
market-oriented industries within an NME country. In other words, Commerce needed 
to decide whether an individual industry could actually operate in the marketplace free 
from government control and whether all of the producers’ prices and costs of 
production in that industry were based purely on principles of supply and demand 
 




determined by the market. That mission required Commerce to adopt the MOI test that 
was developed in the Sulfanilic Acid antidumping case. In its CVD preliminary 
investigation, Commerce reaffirmed that, by adopting the MOI test, if the Fans industry 
in China was found to be an MOI, the prices and costs to the Chinese producers would 
be considered accurate measures of value.705 In particular, Commerce stated that the 
concerns of Georgetown Steel case did not arise if NME prices and costs were market-
determined and not significantly influenced or distorted by central government 
planning.706 In such a situation, Commerce is free to apply the CVD law to an MOI 
located within an NME.707 
After using the MOI test, Commerce preliminarily concluded that (1) the price 
of at least one significant input (i.e., steel) was not market-determined, (2) the record 
did not support a finding that the prices of other significant inputs were market-
determined, and (3) the record did not support a finding that market-determined prices 
were paid for all but an insignificant proportion of all the inputs accounting for the total 
value of the subject merchandise.708 Therefore, Commerce preliminarily determined 
that the CVD law could not be applied to the Chinese Fans producers.709 Finally, after 
verification of the data and records submitted by the Respondents, Commerce 
determined that the Fans industry in China does not meet the third criterion of the MOI 
test710 (i.e., market-determined prices must be paid for all significant material and non-
material inputs).711 Since the Respondents failed this “all-or-nothing” test, it was 
concluded that the Fans industry was not an MOI; as a result, the CVD law could not 
be applied to the Fans industry.712 In a similar Lug Nuts CVD case, when using the 
MOI test to examine the lug nuts industry in China, Commerce also found that a 
 
705 Preliminary Negative Countervailing Duty Determinations: Oscillating and Ceiling Fans from the 
People’s Republic of China, 57 FR 10011 (March 23, 1992) [hereinafter Fans CVD Prelim]. 
706 Id. at 10012. 
707 Id. 
708 Id. at 10013. 
709 Id. 
710 Prelim Sulfanilic Acid, supra note 687, at 9411 (listing the three-criteria in the MOIT test). 
711 Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determinations: Oscillating and Ceiling Fans from the People’s 
Republic of China, 57 FR 24018 (June 5, 1992) [hereinafter Fans CVD Final]. 
712 Id. at 24019. 
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significant input (i.e., steel) was not purchased at a market-determined price because 
of the extent of state-required production of that input.713 In that case, the third of the 
MOI criteria was also not satisfied; and consequently, consistent with its 
redetermination in the Amended Lug Nuts AD Final, Commerce rescinded the Lug 
Nuts CVD Initiation without further investigations.714 
The MOI approach, which is much more restrictive than the “bubbles of 
capitalism” approach, has been criticized by many commentators. Some commentators 
opposed the MOI approach because under this strict test, especially the third criterion, 
almost no MOI could be found within an NME country.715 Some others criticized that 
the requirement that “significantly all” inputs must be purchased in market-determined 
prices is ambiguous and would lead to arbitrary results.716 Indeed, the term 
“significant,” which is not clearly defined, has caused considerable uncertainty in the 
application of the MOI test.717 More importantly, this MOI approach could allow many 
industries that are partly market-oriented in NME countries to avoid potential CVD 
investigations, while retaining the benefits of injury determinations under the United 
States antidumping law.718 Therefore, accepting the MOI approach has been a double-
edged sword for manufacturers and exporters from NME countries.719 However, the 
MOI approach was used for testing only a few CVD and AD cases in the early 1990s. 
Since then, there has been no designation of an MOI within the NME under this strict 
approach. 
 
713 Rescission of Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation and Dismissal of Petition: Chrome-
Plated Lug Nuts and Wheel Locks from the People’s Republic of China, 57 FR 10459 (March 26, 1992). 
714 Id. 
715 Lantz (1995), supra note 457, at 1045 (1995) (citing Lawrence J. Bogard & Linda C. Menghetti, The 
Treatment of Non-Market Economies Under U.S. Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Law: A 
Petitioner’s Perspective, in Commerce Speaks 1992: Developments in Import Administration; Export 
and Investment Abroad, at 6-7 (PLI Corp. Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 789, 1992); 
James K. Kearney & Jim Wang, Commerce’s Market-Oriented Industry Methodology for Nonmarket 
Economies in Antidumping Investigations: The Responding Party’s Perspective, in The Commerce 
Department Speaks 1992: Developments in Import Administration; Export and Investment Abroad, at 
255, 266-67 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Handbook Series No. 789, 1992)). 
716 Id. 
717 Bialos et al. (1994), supra note 682, at 73. 
718 Lantz (1995), supra note 457, at 1045. 
719 Bialos et al. (1994), supra note 682, at 74. 
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4.3.2.4.3. Application of CVD Law to Nonmarket Economies 
 
For over twenty years, Commerce has held its belief from 1984,720 later 
supported by the ruling of Georgetown Steel in 1986,721 that the CVD law could not be 
applied to NME countries because it could not identify and measure the effects of 
government subsidies within an NME. Although Commerce had attempted to apply the 
CVD law to market-oriented industries within an NME in 1991, the NME countries 
were still untouched under the CVD law until 2006. It was a landmark moment when, 
on November 20, 2006, Commerce decided to initiate a CVD investigation on imports 
of coated free sheet paper from China (“CFS Paper CVD”).722 This CVD investigation 
was initiated in parallel to an initiation of AD investigation against the same CFS paper 
product on the same day.723 To understand Commerce’s change of policy in application 
of the CVD law, this section focuses on analyzing the CVD case only. In its CVD 
petition, NewPage Corporation (“Petitioner”) argued that there was no statutory 
restriction to applying countervailing duties to imports from China or any other NME 
country.724 The Petitioner asserted that the court of Georgetown Steel deferred to 
Commerce’s discretion that it did not have the authority to conduct a CVD 
investigation, but the court’s ruling did not affirm the notion that the statute prohibits 
Commerce from applying countervailing duties to NME countries.725 More 
importantly, the Petitioner argued that the modern economy of China was entirely 
 
720 See Czechoslovakia Final Determination and Poland Final Determination, supra note 486. 
721 Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States (1986), supra note 523. 
722 Notice of Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigations: Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People’s 
Republic of China, Indonesia, and the Republic of Korea, 71 FR 68546 (November 27, 2006) [hereinafter 
CFS Paper CVD Initiation]. 
723 Initiation of Antidumping Duty Investigations: Coated Free Sheet Paper from Indonesia, the People’s 
Republic of China, and the Republic of Korea, 71 FR 68537 (November 27, 2006) [hereinafter CFS 
Paper AD Initiation]. 
724 CFS Paper CVD Initiation, supra note 723. 
725 Id. The Petitioner also argued that the Georgetown Steel case was not applicable because the CVD 
law (section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930) involved in the CAFC’s decision has since been repealed and 
the statute has been amended to provide an explicit definition of a subsidy. (See 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (5)(B) 
for definition of subsidy.) 
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different from the Soviet-era economies investigated in Georgetown Steel, and 
therefore, Commerce should be able to identify and measure the subsidies provided by 
Chinese government.726 
Having recognized the complex legal and policy issues involved in this CFS 
Paper CVD case, Commerce requested public comment on the issue of whether the 
CVD law should be applied to NMEs.727 It could be understood that Commerce took a 
cautious course of action in this proceeding because, if Commerce decided that the 
CVD law could be applied to NMEs, and if the courts later upheld that decision, this 
case would serve as an important precedent for more and more CVD petitions filed 
against China and other NME countries. Commerce was careful because it also realized 
the significant economic transformations in China. In fact, upon accession to the WTO 
in late 2001, China made a lot of progress in its economic reforms, and its economy in 
the 2000s was quite distinguished from those economies involved in the context of 
Georgetown Steel case. However, from Commerce’s point of view, China’s economic 
reforms were insufficient to be completely recognized as a market economy under the 
United States trade remedy framework. Specifically, in the most recent determination 
prior to the CFS Paper CVD case, in response to the Chinese respondents’ request for 
reevaluation of China’s NME status, Commerce conducted a thorough review of 
China’s economy as a whole to determine whether China was an NME country.728 
Initially, Commerce noted that although China had implemented economic reforms, 
generally recognized, fundamental reforms in certain areas were still incomplete.729 In 
particular, Commerce found the level of government intervention in certain key sectors 
of China’s economy remained significant, as did deeply rooted institutional problems, 
 
726 Id. 
727 Application of the Countervailing Duty Law to Imports from the People’s Republic of China: Request 
for Comment, 71 FR 75507 (December 15, 2006). 
728 Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, and Affirmative Critical 
Circumstances, in Part: Certain Lined Paper Products from the People’s Republic of China, 71 FR 53079 
(September 8, 2006). 
729 Shauna Lee-Alaia, et al., Import Administration, Antidumping Investigation No. A-570-901, The 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) Status as a Non-Market Economy (ME) (May 15, 2006); 
https://enforcement.trade.gov/download/prc-nme-status/prc-nme-status-memo.pdf. [hereinafter May 
15th Memorandum]. 
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e.g., with respect to the banking sector, land ownership and property rights, and the 
rule of law.730 To consolidate its initial analysis, Commerce conducted a more 
comprehensive analysis of the six statutory factors that govern NME country 
designation.731 Then, Commerce finally affirmed that while China had enacted 
significant and sustained economic reforms, market forces in China were not yet 
sufficiently developed to permit the use of prices and costs in China for purposes of the 
dumping calculation.732 Therefore, Commerce continued to treat China as an NME in 
antidumping investigations.  
Back to the CFS Paper CVD case, after receiving comments from all interested 
parties and assessment of the distinguishing features between the Georgetown Steel 
opinion and China’s present-day economy, on March 29, 2007, Commerce released an 
important memorandum of analysis (known as the Georgetown Memo), providing its 
legal justification for applying the CVD law to China.733 On the same day, the United 
States Court of International Trade also decided to dismiss a lawsuit brought by the 
Government of China and Chinese paper producers that had sought to enjoin 
Commerce from conducting its CVD investigation.734 The CIT held that it could not 
exercise jurisdiction prior to conclusion of investigation and final CVD 
determination.735 In its decision, the CIT stated that: 
“Although Plaintiffs allege that ‘the CAFC has definitively ruled that the CVD 
law was not intended to be applied against NMEs,’ the Georgetown Steel court did not 
 
730 Id. 
731 Shauna Lee-Alaia et al., Import Administration, Antidumping Investigation No. A-570-901, 
Antidumping Duty Investigation of Certain Lined Paper Products from the People’s Republic of China 
(“China”)- China’s status as a non-market economy (“NME”) (August 30, 2006); 
https://enforcement.trade.gov/download/prc-nme-status/prc-lined-paper-memo-08302006.pdf. 
[hereinafter August 30th Memorandum]. The six statutory factors are stipulated under section 
771(18)(B) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the 1988 OTCA (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 
1677(18)(B). See Section 4.2 herein, supra note 426 (discussing on the six golden factors for determining 
whether a country is an NME country). 
732 Id. 
733 Shauna Lee-Alaia and Lawrence Norton, Import Administration, Investigation No. C-570-907, 
Countervailing Duty Investigation of Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People’s Republic of China - 
Whether the Analytical Elements of the Georgetown Steel Opinion are Applicable to China’s Present-
Day Economy (March 29, 2007) [hereinafter Georgetown Memo]. 
734 Gov’t of People’s Republic of China v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 2d. 1274 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2007). 
735 Id. 
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go as far as Plaintiffs claim and find that the countervailing duty law is not applicable 
to NMEs. Rather, the Georgetown Steel court only affirmed Commerce’s decision not 
to apply countervailing duty law to the NMEs in question in that particular case and 
recognized the continuing ‘broad discretion’ of the agency to determine whether to 
apply countervailing duty law to NMEs.” 
It appeared that the CIT also supported the authority of Commerce to change 
its policy in administering the CVD law. Such broad discretion is reflected in 
Commerce’s comparative analysis of China’s economy at the time and the ‘Soviet-
style economies of 1980s’ illustrated in the Georgetown Steel case. Specifically, 
Commerce noted that China’s economy presented a significantly different picture than 
the traditional communist economic system of the early 1980s, i.e., the so-called 
“Soviet-style economies” such as the economies at issue in Georgetown Steel.736 
Commerce stated that the traditional communist economies during the time of 
Georgetown Steel had no market forces, in which: 
 
(p)rices are set by central planners. ‘Losses’ suffered by 
production and foreign trade enterprises are routinely covered by 
government transfers. Investment decisions are controlled by the 
state. Money and credit are allocated by the central planners. The 
wage bill is set by the government. Access to foreign currency is 
restricted. Private ownership is limited to consumer goods.737 
 
According to Commerce, the then-traditional communist economies were 
significantly different from China’s non-market economy of today.738 Although 
China’s economy was still riddled with the distortions attendant to the extensive 
intervention of the government, it was more flexible than the Soviet-style economies 
 
736 Georgetown Memo, supra note 734, at 4. 
737 Id. (citing Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d at 1315 (quoting Carbon Steel Wire 
Rod from Poland; Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determination, 49 Fed. Reg. 19375, 19376 (May 
7, 1984))). 
738 Georgetown Memo, supra note 734, at 4. 
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of the period of Georgetown Steel.739 For instance, regarding wages and prices, Chinese 
enterprises were free to set wages, and the majority of prices were market-based.740 
Although currency convertibility remains limited to a certain extent, enterprises and 
citizens in China generally have access to foreign currency for trade purposes (in 
contrast with the Soviet-style economies).741 With respect to the obstacles of 
identifying and measuring “bounties or grants” in Soviet-style economies, the current 
nature of China’s economy does not create such obstacles to applying the CVD law 
due to significant developments in privatization, foreign trading rights, and diminution 
of the role of central planners.742 
By recognition of China’s economic developments, Commerce concluded that 
“it is possible to determine whether the PRC Government has bestowed a benefit upon 
a Chinese producer and whether any such benefit is specific.”743 In other words, 
Commerce believed that China’s economy had developed to the extent that the effects 
of its government subsidies could be identified and measured. Hence, based on the 
conclusion of the Georgetown Memo, Commerce continued its CVD investigation and 
preliminarily determined that the CVD law could be applied to imports from China.744 
It is important to note that the Georgetown Memo and the CFS Paper Prelim’s analysis 
inquired into the possibility of applying the CVD law to China as an NME, but not into 
trying to change China’s NME status as it had previously been designated for the 
purposes of the antidumping law. At the final stage of the investigation, Commerce 
affirmed the application of CVD law to China.745 Commerce determined that 







744 Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People’s Republic of China: Amended Preliminary Affirmative 
Countervailing Duty Determination, 72 FR 17484 (April 9, 2007) [hereinafter CFS Paper Prelim]. 
745 Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People’s Republic of China: Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty 
Determination, 72 FR 60645 (October 25, 2007) [hereinafter CFS Paper Final]. 
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from China, and then calculated CVD rates ranging from 7.40% to 44.25%.746 
However, the International Trade Commission ultimately concluded that there was no 
material injury to the United States domestic industry, thus meaning there was no CVD 
order imposed upon Chinese producers and exporters of CFS paper.747 Although this 
case was not successful imposing a CVD order upon the Chinese CFS paper producers 
and exporters thanks to the ITC’s negative determination, it triggered a lot of CVD 
petitions filed by the United States industries in the following years. 
One may observe that Commerce’s trade remedy policy toward NMEs such as 
China is, to some extent, internally contradictory. While Commerce considered the 
market forces in China exist to the point that subsidies could be identified and 
measured, it conversely viewed the market forces are insufficient for the prices or costs 
in China to be used as the basis for dumping margin calculations under the ME 
methodologies.748 Commerce, however, has rejected such criticism. It explained that 
the analysis underlying the question of “whether prices and costs in China can be used 
for purposes of antidumping law” and the question of “whether it is possible to 
determine that the government of China has bestowed a countervailable subsidy upon 
a Chinese producer” are fundamentally different.749 Regardless of which side is correct, 
by a parallel using of both antidumping duty and countervailing duty laws against 
NMEs such as China, it seems that Commerce has attempted to employ all of the 
strictest possible trade measures to protect United States domestic industries. For that 
 
746 Id. The countervailable subsidies which were found by Commerce include: a government policy 
lending program; a “two free/three half” program; reduced income tax rates for FIEs based on location; 
a loan income tax exemption and reduction program for “productive” FIEs; VAT rebates on purchases 
of domestically produced equipment; VAT and tariff exemptions on imported equipment; and 
domestic VAT refunds. See Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the 
Countervailing Duty Investigation of Coated Free Sheet from the People’s Republic of China, Import 
Administration, Investigation No. C-570-907 (October 17, 2007) [hereinafter CFS Paper Final IDM]; 
available at https://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/prc/E7-21046-1.pdf. 
747 Notices of International Trade Commission, Investigation Nos. 701-TA-444-446 (Final) and 731-TA-
1107-1109 (Final), Coated Free Sheet Paper from China, Indonesia, and Korea, 72 FR 70892 (December 
13, 2007). (The ITC determined that no industry in the United States was materially injured or threatened 
with material injury, and the establishment of an industry in the United States was not materially retarded 
by reason of imports from China, Indonesia, and Korea of coated free sheet paper.) 
748 Wentong Zheng, Trade Law’s Responses to the Rise of China, 34 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 109, 133 
(2016). 
749 CFS Paper Final IDM, supra note 747. 
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reason, it is likely that Commerce may continue to use its “broad discretion” in 
developing new methodologies or even changing its longstanding policy to adapt with 
the radical changes of economic settings in NME countries. It should be noted that at 
the time of this policy shift, only eleven countries still had NME status.750 And the list 
is unchanged today.751 Among these NME countries, China has been emerging as the 
largest trading partner with the United States; Vietnam has gradually increased its 
significance as a U.S. trading partner. Therefore, it could be argued that Commerce’s 
change of CVD policy was to target China as the largest NME exporter; and, seemingly 
inevitably, Vietnam then became the second target after China for simultaneous 
application of antidumping and countervailing duty laws. 
 
4.3.2.5. The Problem of Double Remedies 
 
Since 2007, when Commerce reversed its two-decade interpretation of the U.S. 
CVD law to apply it to China, more and more CVD petitions have been filed in 
conjunction with AD petitions against China. It is as if “the floodgates had opened” 
with Commerce’s new policy, to a wave of numerous CVD petitions filed by the U.S. 
domestic industries.752 In fact, in the four years 2008 through 2011, there were 23 CVD 
orders imposed upon goods from China and one CVD order upon Vietnam.753 In nearly 
 
750 These countries are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. See Vivian C. Jones, Trade Remedy Legislation: Applying 
Countervailing Action to Nonmarket Economy Countries, CRS Report for Congress, updated April 19, 
2007. Many former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries were classified as market economy 
countries such as Latvia (2001), Kazakhstan (2002), Russia (2002), Lithuania (2003), Estonia (2003), 
Poland (1993), Slovakia (1999), Czech Republic (2000), Hungary (2000), Romania (2003), and Ukraine 
(2006). See GAO, Report to Congressional Committees, U.S.-CHINA TRADE: Commerce Faces 
Practical and Legal Challenges in Applying Countervailing Duties, June 2005 [hereinafter 2015 GAO 
Report]. See ITA, Department of Commerce’s Notices: Final Results of Inquiry into Ukraine’s Status as 
a Non-Market Economy Country., 71 FR 9520 (February 24, 2006). 
751 U.S. Antidumping & Countervailing Duties, Information and Resources for U.S. Trade Remedy Laws 
and Ongoing Proceedings, COUNTRIES CURRENTLY DESIGNATED BY COMMERCE AS NON-
MARKET ECONOMY COUNTRIES, available at https://www.trade.gov/nme-countries-list. 
752 James P. Durling, Encountering Rocky Shoals: Application of the CVD Law to China, 2010 WL 
956090, *4 (2010). 
753 Jeanne J. Grimmett, U.S. Trade Remedy Laws and Nonmarket Economies: A Legal Overview, 
Congressional Research Service (March 9, 2012), at 12 (citing U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, Antidumping 
and Countervailing Duty Orders in Place as of October 11, 2011, by Date of Order, at 
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all of these cases, the U.S. petitioners simultaneously filed AD and CVD petitions, 
seeking orders to impose both antidumping duties and countervailing duties on the 
same imports. Thus, in these cases Commerce regularly initiated parallel AD and CVD 
investigations; consequently, in every case, a CVD order was usually issued in 
conjunction with an AD order on the same alleged product.754 Such actions have 
marked a dramatic change in the U.S. policy to applying double trade remedies to China 
and Vietnam. 
In reality, the concurrent imposition of antidumping duties (ADDs) and 
countervailing duties (CVDs) over the same alleged product from an NME country 
inevitably causes a problem of duplicative remedy or “double remedies” (sometimes 
referred to as “double counting”). “Double remedy” refers to a circumstance where the 
simultaneous imposition of ADDs and CVDs results in the same instance of 
subsidization being offset twice.755 In theory, the same injury or harm should be subject 
to one remedy; however, the use of double remedies to compensate for the same injury 
caused to the U.S. domestic industry is likely unfair. This unfair policy that is used to 
recover injuries from unfair trade practice seems to be a “tit for tat” to combat the 
dumping and subsidization from NME countries.  
Needless to say, Commerce’s double-remedy practice has been controversial 
and has been claimed to be potentially inconsistent with WTO rules.756 Indeed, in 
Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People’s Republic of China 
(“OTR Tires”),757 the Government of China (“GOC”) fiercely opposed and challenged 
Commerce’s simultaneous application of CVD law and the NME methodology in its 
 
http://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/731_ad_701_cvd/investigations/active/index.htm (click on 
“AD/CVD Orders”) [hereinafter, List of Current U.S. AD/CVD Orders]; Multilayered Wood Flooring 
From the People’s Republic of China: Countervailing Duty Order, 76 Federal Register 76693 
(December 8, 2011)). 
754 Id. 
755 Thomas J. Prusa, NMEs and the Double Remedy Problem, 16 WORLD TRADE REVIEW 619, 622 
(2017). 
756 Id. 
757 Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People’s Republic of China: Final Affirmative 
Countervailing Duty Determination and Final Negative Determination of Critical Circumstances, 73 FR 
40480 (July 15, 2008) [hereinafter OTR Tires CVD Final]. 
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parallel antidumping investigation against the Chinese producers. In this case, the GOC 
argued that Commerce’s reliance on normal values sourced from subsidy-free surrogate 
values to calculate NME dumping margins produces an unjust antidumping price 
comparison that penalizes Chinese producers twice for the same allegedly unfair trade 
practice (i.e., the first time when the CVDs are applied to compensate for the alleged 
subsidy, and then the second time when the allegedly subsidized export price is 
compared with the non-subsidized constructed normal value).758 The GOC and Chinese 
respondents further argued that the double counting occurs when ADDs and CVDs are 
concurrently applied to NME producers because Commerce simultaneously measures 
the alleged subsidy benefit (relying on ME benchmarks) and dumping (using its FOP 
analysis based on surrogate prices) for many of the same inputs (e.g., interest expenses, 
rubber, electricity, water).759 Then, the GOC urged Commerce to take measures to 
prevent double remedies for a single alleged unfair trade practice, either by ending its 
CVD investigation or by adjusting its AD calculations in the parallel AD investigation 
to account for both the amount of any export subsidies and any domestic subsidies.760 
In response to such arguments, Commerce stated that there was no statutory authority 
to allow it to terminate the CVD investigation to avoid double counting, and that, if 
Commerce finds any possible adjustment to avoid a double remedy, it would do so in 
the context of an antidumping investigation.761 In the parallel OTR Tires AD case,762 
the GOC and other respondents argued that Commerce must adjust any calculated AD 
rate by the amount of both export and domestic subsidies determined in the companion 
CVD investigation.763 In particular, all respondents argued that the NME AD 
 
758 Stephen J. Claeys, Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty 
Determination: Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires (OTR Tires) from the People’s Republic of 
China (July 7, 2008); available at https://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/prc/E8-16154-1.pdf. 




762 Certain New Pneumatic Off-The-Road Tires from the People’s Republic of China: Final Affirmative 
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Partial Affirmative Determination of Critical 
Circumstances, 73 FR 40485 (July 15, 2008) [hereinafter OTR Tires AD Final]. 
763 Stephen J. Claeys, Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Antidumping Investigation of Certain 
New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People’s Republic of China (July 7, 2008); available at 
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methodology does not use actual prices or costs from the NME country, but rather uses 
subsidy-free data from a surrogate ME country that corrects the market-distorting 
behavior.764 Accordingly, the respondents concluded that when subsidy allegations are 
addressed in corresponding CVD investigations, the result is correction of the market-
distorting behavior in both trade remedies (i.e., double remedies).765 For example, the 
Chinese respondents showed the existence of double remedies as to the rubber input in 
these AD and CVD investigations.766 The Chinese producers argued that the same 
unfair advantage (the ability to purchase rubber at low prices) is directly addressed in 
both the AD (as a raw material cost) and the CVD investigations (through application 
of a world benchmark price).767 Then, the respondents further argued that by 
countervailing the subsidies in the CVD investigation (where Commerce found that 
rubber was subsidized) but by also using a surrogate value for rubber (thereby 
eliminating the effect of subsidization) in the AD investigation, Commerce is unfairly 
penalizing the Chinese producers in NME investigations twice.768 More importantly, 
the Chinese respondents also argued that U.S. law and the WTO rules prohibit the 
imposition of two duties for the same unfair trade practice.769 Actually, both WTO rules 
and U.S. laws require adjustments in combined duty rates to avoid double counting of 
export subsidies. Article VI:5 of the GATT 1947 provides that “[n]o product of the 
territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting 
party shall be subject to both AD and CVD duties to compensate for the same situation 
of dumping or export subsidization.”770 This provision, however, is not clear as to 
 
https://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/prc/E8-16156-1.pdf. [hereinafter OTR Tires AD Final 







770 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter 
GATT 1947]. 
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whether a domestic subsidy can be double counted.771 The U.S. law echoes Article VI:5 
by requiring adjustments in ADDs in the event that CVDs are applied simultaneously 
to countervail export subsidies on the same products.772 The reason for this adjustment 
is that export subsidies are presumed to lower the export price of the subject 
merchandise, pro rata, increasing dumping margins correspondingly. This 
requirement, however, is limited to offsetting export subsidies rather than domestic 
subsidies. Hence, Commerce found that silence in the provision “about the plainly 
related issue of CVDs to offset domestic subsidies, is not complete silence - it implies 
that no adjustment is appropriate.”773 In response to the Chinese respondents’ legality 
claims, Commerce concluded that, “absent a statutory directive for an adjustment and 
underlying assumption similar to that regarding CVDs imposed to offset export 
subsidies, or evidence that domestic subsidies have lowered U.S. prices in a given case, 
any adjustment for an assumed or undetermined effect would be inappropriate.”774 As 
a result, Commerce declined to make any adjustments to avoid the double counting as 
claimed by the Chinese producers in the OTR Tires AD case. Consequently, Starbright, 
who was the main respondent in OTR Tires, was subject to an AD rate of 29.93%775 
and a CVD rate of 14%.776 With a combined cash deposit rate of 44%, it is unlikely 
that Starbright could continue to export to the U.S. market. Undoubtedly, Commerce’s 
 
771 Longyue Zhao & Yan Wangr, Trade Remedies and Non-Market Economies: Economic Implications 
of the First U.S. Countervailing Duty Case on China 12 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 
No. 4560, 2008), at 34. 
772 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(1)(C). This provision requires an increase in the export price in the amount of 
any CVD when calculating ADDs, the resulting effect being a decrease in ADDs, with the intention of 
offsetting any export subsidy, though there is no mention of an intention to offset domestic subsidies. 
See Christopher Blake McDaniel, Sailing the Seas of Protectionism: The Simultaneous Application of 
Antidumping and Countervailing Duties to Nonmarket Economies - An Affront to Domestic and 
International Laws, 38 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 741, 764 (2010); See also GAO Report on U.S.-China 
Trade: Commerce Faces Practical and Legal Challenges in Applying Countervailing Duties (2005), at 
27. 
773 OTR Tires AD Final IDM, supra note 764, at 14. 
774 Id. at 15-16. 
775 Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People’s Republic of China: Notice of Amended 
Final Affirmative Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Antidumping Duty Order, 73 FR 
51624 (September 4, 2008). Starbright’s rate, which was previously calculated at 19.15%, was amended 
and increased to 29.93% due to correction for ministerial errors. See OTR Tires AD Final, supra note 
763. 
776 OTR Tires CVD Final, supra note 758. 
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rejection of the double counting argument has opened a series of battles between China 
and the United States at the legal battlefields of the U.S. courts and at WTO’s dispute 
settlement body. 
 
4.3.2.6. First Round of Legal Battles at U.S. Courts and WTO’s Dispute 
Settlement Body 
 
4.3.2.6.1. Legal Battles at U.S. Courts 
 
GPX I: On September 9, 2008, GPX International Tire Corporation (“GPX”), 
a domestic importer of OTR tires that wholly owns Chinese producer Starbright, filed 
an action in the U.S. Court of International Trade (“CIT”) to contest Commerce’s 
affirmative AD and CVD determinations and ITC’s injury determination.777 GPX also 
sought for immediate relief from the 44% cash deposit rate, but this motion was denied, 
on grounds of lack of irreparable harm attributable to the CVD determination.778 Then, 
GPX moved for reconsideration or rehearing by the CIT for a temporary restraining 
order and preliminary injunction, alleging that collection of full AD and CVD deposits 
would cause irreparable harm, but unfortunately this second attempt was again denied 
on December 30, 2008.779 On January 13, 2009, the Government of China moved to 
intervene in the litigation, but its motion was denied due to untimely submission 
without any good cause.780 On January 20, 2009, the CIT consolidated all actions 
challenging the final AD and CVD determinations and moved forward for judgment.781 
This consolidated decision is hereinafter referred to as GPX I. In GPX I, the two main 
issues which were challenged by GPX were (i) the applicability of CVD law to China 
as an NME and (ii) the double counting issue. First, GPX argued that throughout the 
legislative history of the U.S. trade laws, Congress did not allow application of the 
 
777 GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, 587 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 32 C.I.T. 1183 (November 12, 2008). 
778 Id. 
779 GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1389, 32 C.I.T. 1516 (December 30, 2008). 
780 GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, 2009 WL 362136, 33 C.I.T. 114 (February 12, 2009). 
781 GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, 645 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 33 C.I.T. 1368 (September 18, 2009) 
[hereinafter GPX I]. 
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CVD law to NMEs because of its ambiguity; on the other hand, Congress intended that 
the AD law would be the sole remedy to combat unfair trade practices by NMEs.782 
Second, with respect to the double counting, GPX argued that the concurrent 
imposition of CVDs and ADDs using the NME methodology results in a double 
counting of duties, as it “punishes Chinese companies twice for the same allegedly 
‘unfair’ trading practices.”783 The CIT reasoned that Commerce has been granted broad 
discretion in determining the existence of a subsidy under the CVD law.784 Therefore, 
the CIT ruled that Commerce had the authority to apply the CVD law to products from 
an NME-designated country.785 The CIT, however, noted that the CVD and NME AD 
laws are unclear as to how Commerce is to account for the overlap between the statutes 
when imposing both CVD and AD duties on goods from an NME country.786 Then, the 
CIT provided the important insight that “if there is a substantial potential for double 
counting, and it is too difficult for Commerce to determine whether, and to what degree 
double counting is occurring, Commerce should refrain from imposing CVDs on NME 
goods until it is prepared to address this problem through improved methodologies or 
new statutory tools.”787 Therefore, the CIT remanded the case for Commerce to either 
forego the imposition of CVDs on the goods at issue; or if Commerce “is to apply CVD 
remedies where it also utilizes NME AD methodology,” it must “adopt additional 
policies and procedures for its NME AD and CVD methodologies to account for the 
imposition of the CVD law to products from an NME country and avoid to the extent 
possible double counting of duties.”788 
On April 26, 2010, in response to the CIT’s remand order, Commerce 
determined to continue to impose CVD remedies on imports of OTR tires, but it 
 
782 Id. at 1374. 
783 Id. at 1376. 
784 Id. at 1374. 
785 Id. 
786 Id. at 1375. 
787 Id. at 1379. 
788 Id. at 1369. 
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proposed to deduct the amount of the CVD cash deposit rate applied on OTR tires from 
the AD cash deposit amount in order to avoid the double counting of duties.789  
To come to this conclusion, Commerce explained that it had evaluated three 
procedural options to avoid the potential double remedy that the CIT found to exist: (1) 
do not apply the CVD law to GPX/Starbright’s exports; (2) treat either Starbright, in 
particular, or China, in general, under the ME AD methodology; or (3) offset 
GPX/Starbright’s CVDs against GPX’s AD cash deposit rate.790 In the first two 
options, according to Commerce, the potential for a double remedy would be 
eliminated because it would not be concurrently applying the NME AD methodology 
and the CVD law.791 In the third option, offsetting the two remedies would prevent the 
two remedies from overlapping in the slightest degree.792 Commerce finally selected 
the third option because it believed that this offset methodology is unobjectionable and 
would create less confusion than the first two options.793 Commerce stated that this 
option complies with the CIT’s order either “to forego the imposition of CVDs” or “to 
adapt its NME AD and CVD methodologies to account for the imposition of CVD 
remedies,” because offsetting the CVDs against ADDs had the same effect as not 
applying CVD law to Chinese producers’ exports.794 
 
GPX II: On review of Commerce’s Remand Results, which is, hereinafter 
referred to as, GPX II, the CIT noted that by using the offset methodology, the 
combination of the CVD margin and the NME AD cash deposit rate would always 
equal the unaltered NME AD margin.795 The CIT pointed out that it would be 
unnecessary to conduct both CVD and AD investigations when Commerce could 
 
789 Department of Commerce, Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Remand, GPX Int’l Tire 
Corp. v. United States, Consol. Court No. 08-00285 Slip Op. 09-103 (September 18, 2009), available at 
https://enforcement.trade.gov/remands/09-103.pdf [hereinafter Remand Results]. 




794 Id. at 9-10. 
795 GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, 34 C.I.T. 945, 951 (Aug. 4, 2010) [hereinafter GPX II]. 
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obtain the same result by merely conducting an AD investigation.796 The CIT also noted 
that the offset methodology used by Commerce was inconsistent with 19 U.S.C. § 
1677a, which lists the specific offsets to export price and constructed export price that 
are permissible.797 In summary, the CIT held that the offset methodology does not 
comply with the statute and is also unreasonable due to the expense associated with 
conducting an additional investigation that is essentially useless.798 As a result, the CIT 
ruled that Commerce failed to comply with the first remand instructions; therefore, 
Commerce had to forego the imposition of CVD law on the NME products.799 The CIT 
came to this decision because it believed that Commerce’s actions on remand “clearly 
demonstrate its inability, at this time, to use improved methodologies to determine 
whether, and to what degree double counting occurs when NME antidumping remedies 
are imposed on the same good.”800 Although Commerce disagreed with this second 
remand, it complied under protest and made it clear that it would appeal the CIT’s 
decision.801 
 
GPX III: The U.S. government and domestic manufacturers favoring the 
imposition of CVDs appealed the CIT’s decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit (“CAFC”).802 This dispute is referred to as GPX III. According to the 
CAFC, the CIT’s decision to bar the imposition of CVDs due to the high likelihood of 
double counting was problematic because of the two reasons: (i) the extent to which 
the statute may prohibit double counting was unclear and (ii) Commerce had 
determined that it was far from clear that double counting had in fact occurred.803 As a 
matter of law, the CAFC concluded that Commerce is barred by the statute from 
 
796 Id. at 951. 
797 Id. 
798 Id. 
799 Id. at 946. 
800 Id. 
801 GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, 34 C.I.T. 1307 (Oct. 1, 2010). 
802 GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, 666 F.3d 732 (Dec. 19, 2011) [hereinafter GPX III]. 
803 Id. at 738. 
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imposing CVDs on NME goods.804 The key reasoning of the CAFC is that the 
legislative history of the CVD law, and particularly Congress’s repeated reenactment 
of CVD law while approving the Georgetown Steel holding, demonstrates that 
Congress adopted the then-prevailing position that CVDs cannot be imposed on NME 
exports.805 Specifically, the CAFC found that in amending and reenacting the trade 
laws in 1988 and 1994, Congress adopted the position that the CVD law does not apply 
to NME countries.806 In the CAFC’s view, although Commerce has broad discretion in 
administering CVD and AD laws, it cannot exercise this discretion contrary to the 
intent of Congress.807 Accordingly, the CAFC affirmed the CIT’s holding, but on a 
different and broader ground, that CVDs could not be applied to goods from NME 
countries.808 Notably, referring to Georgetown Steel, the CAFC stated that if 
Commerce believes that the CVD law should be changed, the appropriate approach is 
to seek legislative change.809 However, it should be noted that the CAFC had not yet 
issued the mandate in GPX III, which, when it issued, would have the effect of 
invalidating Commerce’s CVD orders previously issued. The CAFC’s 
recommendation was based on the same opinion in Georgetown Steel in 1986, but at 
this time it would have a more extensive impact upon Commerce. The CAFC’s ruling 
put Commerce in a situation where, when the mandate issued (as it would by operation 
of rule once the appellate proceedings had come to a final end), Commerce may then 
have to revoke the 24 CVD orders against goods from NME countries (i.e., 23 orders 
against China and one order against Vietnam).810 According to Commerce, those 24 




806 Id. at 745. 
807 Id. 
808 Id. (The CIT’s ruling focused on the narrow ground that CVDs could not be applied to NME goods 
because of the double-counting problem.) 
809 Id. 
810 Id. 
811 Claire Rickard Palmer (Miller & Chevalier Chartered), What Next for Countervailing Duties on 
Imports from Non-Market Economies in the United States?, North American Free Trade & Investment 
Report, Vol. 22, No. 2, Thomson Reuters/World Trade Executive (January 31, 2012). 
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position where it could not step back to comply immediately with the CAFC’s decision. 
In order to retain these CVD orders, Commerce could have appealed that decision by 
seeking a rehearing by the CAFC (which would have had the effect of staying the 
mandate), or seeking reexamination (certiorari) by the Supreme Court. Or, otherwise, 
Commerce could ask Congress to change the CVD legislation to abrogate the CAFC’s 
decision and to allow Commerce to impose CVDs on imports from NME countries.  
In addition to the pressure from the CAFC’s decision in GPX III, the legal 
battles at the WTO against the concurrent application of AD and CVD laws to China 
also had significant impact on Commerce’s efforts to seek a congressional change to 
the CVD law. The next section shall focus on the legal battles between China and the 
United States at the WTO regarding the legality of CVD application to China and the 
issue of double remedies that arose from certain investigations initiated by Commerce. 
 
4.3.2.6.2. Legal Battles at WTO: United States - Definitive Antidumping and 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China (WT/DS379) 
 
In strong support of the Chinese producers and exporters, the Government of 
China (“GOC”) started another legal battle relying on the multilateral trading 
mechanism of the WTO. Parallel with the litigation of GPX I in the CIT battle, on 
September 19, 2008, the GOC concurrently initiated the first step in a dispute 
settlement proceeding at WTO by requesting an official consultation with the 
Government of the United States to challenge the imposition of ADDs and CVDs upon 
several products exported by Chinese producers.812 While GPX and other Chinese 
producers and exporters opened a legal battle at the U.S. CIT, the GOC made an effort 
to fight against the United States by taking advantage of the WTO dispute resolution 
mechanism. The same issue of double counting was raised in these parallel 
proceedings. Specifically, the GOC challenged the imposition of concurrent ADDs and 
 
812 Request for Consultation by China, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/1 (September 22, 2008) [hereinafter Consultations 
Request]. 
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CVDs in the following four cases: (1) circular welded carbon-quality steel (“CWP”) 
(July 2008); (2) new pneumatic off-the-road tires (“OTR Tires”) (Sept. 2008); (3) light-
walled rectangular pipe and tube (“LWRP”) (Aug. 2008); and (4) laminated woven 
sacks (“LWS”) (Aug. 2008).813 GOC claimed that the measures used in these four cases 
were inconsistent with the obligations of the United States under a series of articles 
including Articles I and VI of the GATT 1994, Articles 1, 2, 10, 12, 13, 14, 19, and 32 
of the Subsidies Agreement, Articles 1, 2, 6, 9, and 18 of the AD Agreement, and 
Article 15 of the Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China (the 
Protocol of Accession).814 These claims were considered as “as applied” challenges; 
the GOC neglected to include “as such” challenges in its Consultations Request.815  
On November 14, 2008, consultations between China and the United States 
were held, but both sides failed to resolve the dispute.816 Therefore, on December 9, 
2008, the GOC requested the establishment of a panel to resolve the dispute.817 This 
time, the GOC added the following “as such” challenges: 
“In certain of the investigations specified above, the U.S. Department of 
Commerce stated that U.S. law provides no basis to make any adjustment to either the 
anti-dumping or countervailing duty calculations to avoid the imposition of a double 
remedy for the same unfair trade practice, where such a double remedy arises from the 
use of the U.S. non-market economy (NME) methodology to impose anti-dumping 
duties simultaneously with the imposition of countervailing duties on the same product. 
The measures therefore include, as an omission, the failure of the United States to 
 
813 Id. More details on both AD and CVD final determinations and orders of these cases are available at 
https://enforcement.trade.gov/stats/inv-initiations-2000-current.html. 
814 Id. Consultations Request, at 3. 
815 The terms “as applied” and “as such” are usually used in the WTO dispute resolution mechanism. A 
challenge prior to the application of a measure in violation of the WTO’s treaty is termed “as such” 
challenge and a challenge only after the measure is applied in a manner that purportedly breaches a treaty 
obligation is termed as an “as applied” challenge. See also Alan Skypes, Alan O. Sykes, An Economic 
Perspective on As Such/facial Versus as Applied Challenges in the WTO and U.S. Constitutional 
Systems, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 1 (2014). 
816 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by China, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and 




provide legal authority for the U.S. Department of Commerce to avoid the imposition 
of a double remedy when it imposes anti-dumping duties determined pursuant to the 
U.S. NME methodology simultaneously with the imposition of countervailing duties 
on the same product.”818 
Generally, in its Panel Request, the GOC claimed that the imposition of double 
remedies was, both “as such” and “as applied,”819 inconsistent with Articles 10, 12.1, 
12.8, 19.3, 19.4, and 32.1 of the Subsidies Agreement and with Articles I:1 and VI of 
the GATT 1994.820 
At its meeting on January 20, 2009, the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body 
(“DSB”) agreed to establish a panel to resolve the dispute.821 However, due to the 
substantive complexity of the dispute, up until October 22, 2010, the Panel could not 
issue its Panel Report, which was ultimately in favor of the United States.822 Most of 
the “as such” and “as applied” claims of the GOC were rejected by the Panel. 
Specifically, the Panel found that the “omission”823 challenged by the GOC as part of 
its “as such” claims fell outside the Panel’s terms of reference, because the GOC had 
not identified this “as such” challenge in its Consultations Request.824 Hence, the Panel 
found that China’s “as such” claims under Articles 10, 19.3, 19.4 and 32.1 of the 
Subsidies Agreement and Articles VI and I:1 of the GATT 1994 equally fell outside 
the Panel’s terms of reference.825 As a result, the Panel dismissed China’s “as applied” 
claims under Articles 10, 19.3, 19.4, and 32.1 of the Subsidies Agreement and Article 
 
818 Id. at 3. 
819 Panel Request, supra note 817, at 3-8. 
820 Id. 
821 WTO, Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting, Held in the Centre William Rappard on January 
29, 2009, WT/DSB/263 (March 25, 2009), at 14. 
822 WTO, Report of the Panel, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on 
Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/R (Oct. 22, 2010) [hereinafter DS379-Panel Report]. 
823 The GOC argued that the United States’ failure to provide sufficient legal authority for the U.S. 
Department of Commerce to avoid the imposition of double remedies for the same alleged acts of 
subsidization when it imposes anti-dumping duties determined pursuant to its NME methodology 
simultaneously with the imposition of countervailing duties on the same product means that U.S. law is, 
in all such instances, inconsistent “as such” with Articles 10, 19.3, 19.4, and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement 
and with Article VI of the GATT 1994. See DS379-Panel Report, id. at (x) on page 9. 
824 Id. at 14.42, page 219. 
825 Id. at 17.1(e)(i), page 282. 
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VI:3 of the GATT 1994.826 The Panel, however, reaffirmed the basic notion that the 
simultaneous imposition of ADDs and CVDs may result in double remedies, but it 
concurred with the United States’ assertion that the existence of double remedies in any 
given case depends on the facts, specifically whether the subsidy in question results in 
the reduction of the export price.827 Then, the Panel decided that none of the provisions 
of the Subsidies Agreement or the GATT 1994 cited by the GOC prohibited the 
imposition of both ADDs and CVDs with respect to the domestic subsidies.828 In 
addition, the Panel observed that China’s Protocol of Accession does not address the 
issue of “double remedies,” but does contemplate the use of CVDs while China remains 
an NME.829 
On December 1, 2010, the GOC appealed the Panel findings to the Appellate 
Body.830 On March 11, 2011, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel findings and ruled 
in favor of China.831 The Appellate Body mainly focused on Article 19.3 of the 
Subsidies Agreement, which requires that subsidies be levied “in the appropriate 
amounts in each case.”832 Article 19.3 of the Subsidies Agreement provides: 
“When a countervailing duty is imposed in respect of any product, such 
countervailing duty shall be levied, in the appropriate amounts in each case, on a non-
discriminatory basis on imports of such product from all sources found to be subsidized 
and causing injury, except as to imports from those sources which have renounced any 
 
826 Id. at 17.1(e)(ii), page 282. 
827 Id. at 14.70-14.72, page 227-228. See Stephanie E. Hartmann, Putting the Specter of Double Counting 
to Rest: How Public Law 112-99 Resolves the Issue of Double Counting in Concurrent Countervailing 
and Non-Market Economy Antidumping Investigations, 10 BYU INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 139, 151 (2014). 
828 Hartmann (2014), supra note 828, at 152 (citing Panel Report, at 14.112, 14.115, 14.117, 14.130, 
14.136, 14.138). 
829 DS379-Panel Report, supra note 823, at 14.120.21. See Pablo M. Bentes et al., International Trade 
Edited by: Joseph A. Laroski, Jr. and Valentin A. Povarchuk, 45 INT’L LAW. 79, 83 (2011). 
830 WTO, Annex I, Notification of an Appeal by China under Article 16.4 and Article 17 of the 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), and under Rule 
20(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R (March 11, 2011). 
831 WTO, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from 
China, WT/DS379/AB/R (March 11, 2011) [hereinafter DS379-AB Report]. 
832 Hartman (2014), supra note 828, at 154. See also Raj (2019), supra note 258, at 769. 
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subsidies in question or from which undertakings under the terms of this Agreement 
have been accepted.”833 
In its findings, the Panel found that “the imposition of ADDs calculated under 
an NME methodology has no impact on whether the amount of the concurrent 
countervailing duty collected is ‘appropriate’ or not,”834 and that Article 19.3 of the 
Subsidies Agreement does not address the issue of double remedies.835 However, the 
Appellate Body found that the Panel erred in its interpretation of Article 19.3 and failed 
to give meaning and effect to all the terms of that provision.836 According to the 
Appellate Body, the appropriateness of the amount of CVDs cannot be determined 
without having regard to ADDs imposed on the same product to offset the same 
subsidization.837 Hence, the amount of a CVD cannot be “appropriate” in situations 
where that duty represents the full amount of the subsidy and where ADDs, calculated 
at least to some extent on the basis of the same subsidization, are imposed concurrently 
to remove the same injury to the domestic industry.838 Accordingly, dumping margins 
established on an NME methodology are likely to include some component that is 
attributable to subsidization.839 Consequently, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s 
interpretation of Article 19.3 and the findings pursuant to that interpretation, ruling that 
the imposition of double remedies, that is, the offsetting of the same subsidization twice 
by the concurrent imposition of ADDs calculated on the basis of an NME methodology 
and CVDs, is inconsistent with Article 19.3 of the Subsidies Agreement.840 It should 
be noted that the Appellate Body was of the opinion that it was not convinced that 
double remedies necessarily result in every instance of a simultaneous application of 
 
833 Subsidies Agreement, supra note 39. 
834 DS379-Panel Report, supra note 823, at para. 14.128. 
835 Id. para. 14.129. 




840 DS379-AB Report, supra note 832, para. 583. See also Dukgeun Ahn, United States-Definitive Anti-
Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, AB Report, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 
761, 763 (2011). 
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ADDs and CVDs.841 This depends rather on whether and to what extent domestic 
subsidies have lowered the export price of a product, and on whether the investigating 
authority has taken the necessary corrective steps to adjust its methodology to take 
account of this factual situation.842 With respect to the four specific cases that the GOC 
claimed in this dispute, the Appellate Body found that the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, by declining to address China’s claims concerning double remedies arisen 
in these cases, failed to fulfill its obligation to determine the “appropriate” amount of 
CVDs within the meaning of Article 19.3 of the Subsidies Agreement.843 Therefore, 
the Appellate Body concluded that, in the circumstances of the four sets of AD and 
CVD investigations at issue, by virtue of Commerce’s imposition of ADDs calculated 
on the basis of an NME methodology, concurrently with the imposition of CVDs on 
the same products, without having assessed whether double remedies arose from such 
concurrent duties, the United States acted inconsistently with its obligations under 
Article 19.3 of the Subsidies Agreement.844 Finally, the Appellate Body recommended 
that the Dispute Settlement Body ask the United States to bring its measures into 
conformity with its obligations under the Subsidies Agreement.845  
China’s Ministry of Commerce described the WTO’s decision as a significant 
victory, stating that the U.S. Department of Commerce had long refused to correct the 
double counting problem despite pleas from Chinese trade officials and despite the CIT 
decisions in GPX I and GPX II.846 By contrast, the United States Trade Representative 
(“USTR”) Ron Kirk proclaimed that the WTO’s decision “appears to be a clear case of 
overreaching by the Appellate Body.”847 Despite disagreement, the USTR later directed 
 
841 DS379-AB Report, supra note 832, para. 599. 
842 Id. 
843 Id. para 605. 
844 Id. para. 606. 
845 Id. para. 612. 
846 See Melissa Lipman, WTO Rejects U.S. Duty Double-Counting in China Fight, Law360 (March 11, 
2011). 
847 USTR Statement Regarding WTO Appellate Body Report in Countervailing Duty Dispute with 
China, March 11, 2011, available at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-
releases/2011/march/ustr-statement-regarding-wto-appellate-body-report-c. See also Richard 
Lockridge, Doubling down in Non-Market Economies: The Inequitable Application of Trade Remedies 
against China and the Case for a New WTO Institution, 24 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 249, 271 (2014). 
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Commerce to implement its final determinations under section 129 of the URAA848 
regarding the concurrent AD and CVD investigations of the four cases including CWP, 
OTR Tires, LWRP, and LWS, in compliance with the WTO’s recommendations and 
rulings.849 To a certain extent, this WTO victory together with the CIT’s rulings in 
favor of the Chinese producers had significant impacts on Commerce’s efforts to 
impose simultaneous ADDs and CVDs against China. 
 
4.3.2.7. U.S. Congressional Action: Legitimization of CVD Application to NMEs 
 
The existence of double counting resulting from the simultaneous imposition 
of ADDs and CVDs to China as an NME country was supported by the WTO’s DSB 
in DS379 and by the U.S. CIT in the GPX I and GPX II cases. Furthermore, the decision 
of U.S. CAFC in GPX III, which was made after the WTO’s rulings, had a great 
influence on the U.S. Department of Commerce because the CAFC barred the 
applicability of the CVD law to China so long as it was still designated as an NME. In 
reality, the CAFC’s ruling had a broader and stronger impact than the rulings of WTO 
and U.S. CIT because the CAFC’s ruling sent a strong message that Commerce cannot 
apply the CVD law to China and other NME countries in future cases, unless Congress 
changes the applicable statute.850 More importantly, the CAFC’s ruling also set an 
expiration date for the previously imposed CVD orders and pending CVD 
investigations against China.851 Such critical pressures put Commerce in a position 
 
848 19 U.S.C. § 3538(b)(2). Section 129 of the URAA governs the nature and effect of determination 
issued by Commerce to implement findings by WTO dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body. 
Specifically, section 129(b)(2) of the URAA provides that “notwithstanding any provision of the Tariff 
Act of 1930,” upon a written request from the USTR, the Department shall issue a determination that 
would render its actions not inconsistent with an adverse finding of a WTO panel or the Appellate Body. 
See Department of Commerce, ITA, Implementation of Determinations Under Section 129 of the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act: Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires; Circular Welded Carbon 
Quality Steel Pipe; Laminated Woven Sacks; and Light-Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube from the 
People’s Republic of China, 77 FR. 52683 (August 30, 2012) [hereinafter Section 129 
Redeterminations]. 
849 Id. 77 FR 52683, at 4. 
850 Elliot J. Feldman & John J. Burke, Testing the Limits of Trade Law Rationality: The GPX Case and 
Subsidies in Non-Market Economies, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 787, 809 (2013). 
851 Id. at 811. See also Lockridge (2014), supra note 848, at 273 (2014). 
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consider both judicial and legislative options (i.e., appeal the CAFC’s ruling or seek a 
legislative change).852 In order to give the Congress more time to pass such a law, the 
United States government concurrently opted for a strategy to file a petition with the 
CAFC for a rehearing en banc in GPX III, which at least had the effect of keeping the 
mandate from issuing.853 While this case was pending at the CAFC, the United States 
government quickly pursued a legislative strategy by pushing Congress to change the 
CVD law. Therefore, Congress was put in a situation wherein it had no choice but to 
find a way to legitimize Commerce’s prior change of practice for using the CVD law 
against China; or otherwise, Commerce would have to revoke all existing CVD orders 
and terminate pending investigations854. As a result, the U.S. Congress, in a rare 
bipartisan effort, passed a bill amending both CVD and AD laws at a rapid pace.855 On 
March 13, 2012, President Obama officially signed the bill into law (coded as P.L 112-
99), namely “An Act to Apply the Countervailing Duty Provisions of the Tariff Act of 
1930 to Nonmarket Economy Countries, and for Other Purposes.”856 P.L 112-99, also 
known as “GPX Legislation,” abrogated (that is, legislatively overturned) the CAFC’s 
ruling in GPX III so as to apply the CVD law to NME countries.  
 
852 CRS Report, WTO Dispute Settlement: Status of U.S. Compliance in Pending Cases, (name redacted) 
Legislative Attorney (April 23, 2012), at 63. In a letter sent to the chairmen and ranking members of the 
House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee, USTR Ron Kirk and Commerce 
Secretary John Bryson said that the administration is still reviewing “all its options,” including a request 
for a rehearing by the full appellate court and concurrently proceeding the legislative change. See Kirk, 
Bryson Urge Congress to Fix GPX Decision in Parallel to Judicial Review, Inside U.S.-China Trade 
(January 25, 2012). 
853 Id. (The CAFC set a one-time March 5, 2012, deadline for the United States to file a petition for 
rehearing; the United States had asked the court for a 60-day extension of the original February 2, 2012, 
deadline). 
854 According to the sponsors of the bill, if the CAFC’s ruling were to stand, Commerce would be forced 
to terminate 23 existing countervailing duties on products from China and fellow NME country Vietnam, 
as well as five ongoing investigations, and it would possibly require a refund of duties already collected. 
See Megan Leonhardt, House Vote Sends Countervailing Duty Bill to Obama, Law360 (March 06, 2012). 
855 See Lockridge (2014), supra note 848 Bill H.R. 4105 was introduced in the House of Representatives 
Ways and Means Committee on February 29, 2012, and quickly passed by the House and Senate on 
March 6 and March 7, 2012, respectively without amendment. See H.R. 4105, a bill to apply the 
countervailing duty provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930 to nonmarket economy countries and for other 
purposes (March 5, 2012); available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-
bill/4105/actions. 
856 P.L. 112-99, supra note 147. 
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P.L. 112-99 has two sections: (1) Section 1, which directs Commerce to impose 
CVDs on goods from NME countries except where it is “unable to identify and measure 
subsidies provided by the government of the [NME] country or a public entity within 
the territory of the [NME] country because the economy of that country is essentially 
comprised of a single entity”;857 and (2) Section 2, which applies only to proceedings 
initiated following the enactment of P.L. 112-99, and which directs Commerce to 
“reduce” the ADD in all proceedings involving the concurrent imposition of ADDs and 
CVDs where it can “reasonably estimate the extent to which the countervailable 
subsidy … increased the weighted average dumping margin” for the subject 
merchandise.858 However, it was controversial that P.L. 112-99 extends the application 
of CVD law to NME countries retroactively, back to 2006. In essence, the first purpose 
of this law was to legitimize Commerce’s imposition of CVDs to NME goods from 
China and other NME countries such as Vietnam. The second purpose was to retain all 
existing CVD orders and pending CVD investigations by devising a controversial 
provision that the law could apply to “all proceedings initiated on or after November 
20, 2006.”859 This retroactive application clearly meant that Commerce had the lawful 
authority to apply the CVD law to China and any other NME country back to the 
initiation date of the CFS Paper case (i.e., November 20, 2006). This intentional action 
shows the Congress’s enormous efforts to save Commerce from revoking its CVD 
orders against China and Vietnam that had been already issued before the enactment of 
P.L. 112-99.860  
Another key component of P.L. 112-99 is the congressional attempt to avoid 
the potential problems of double remedies as claimed by the CIT in GPX cases and in 
 
857 Id. Section 1(a). 
858 Id. Section 2. 
859 Id. Section 1(b)(1). 
860 In a statement supporting the legislation, Rep. Bill Pascrell, Jr. (D-NJ) announced, “This legislation 
will once again allow the application of our countervailing duty laws in the enforcement of existing 
orders to nonmarket economies like China. Let’s not stop with the passage of this bill but continue to 
move forward on a fair-trade policy that places American workers and businesses first.” See Press 
Releases, Rep. Pascrell Backs Bipartisan Legislation That Protects American Manufacturing and Jobs 
(March 6, 2012), available at https://pascrell.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=3025. 
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the WTO’s AB Report in DS379. Specifically, the law allows Commerce to adjust the 
ADDs in the proceedings involving concurrent application of ADDs and CVDs against 
NME imports.861 In order to satisfy the ADD adjustment, Commerce must find the 
following three conditions: (i) a countervailable subsidy (other than an export subsidy) 
has been provided; (ii) such countervailable subsidy has reduced the average export 
price of the subject merchandise; and (iii) Commerce can “reasonably estimate” the 
extent to which the countervailable subsidy has increased the dumping margin of the 
subject merchandise.862 If these criteria are met, Commerce is required to reduce the 
ADD by the estimated amount of the increase in the dumping margin inflated by the 
countervailable subsidy on the export price.863 The law also sets a maximum limit for 
the ADD reduction which is not more than the portion of the CVD rate attributable to 
a countervailable subsidy.864 It should be noted that this adjustment methodology is 
limited to the extent that the export price has been affected by the domestic subsidy 
only. Ironically, the legal authority to adjust the ADDs, however, does not apply 
retroactively back to 2006, but it only applies to the investigations and reviews initiated 
on or after March 13, 2012 (i.e., P.L 112-99’s enactment date).865  
It appears that the U.S. Congress has attempted to implement the findings and 
recommendations by both WTO and U.S. CIT to resolve the problems of double 
counting by adopting the methodology of ADD adjustment. In fact, it does so by 
requiring Commerce to avoid double remedies by offsetting the dumping margin in a 
situation where a countervailable domestic subsidy is passed through to lower export 
prices.866 However, Commerce remains the right to reject the adjustments if it cannot 
“reasonably estimate” the effects of the domestic subsidies on the dumping margins. In 
this situation, it is not clear from the law how Commerce can effectively avoid double 
counting problems. In fact, while the law provides Commerce a legal ground for its 
 
861 P.L. 112-99, supra note 147. Section 2. Adjustment of Antidumping Duty in Certain Proceedings 
Relating to Imports from Nonmarket Economy Countries. 
862 Id. Section 2(a). (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(f)(1)(A)(B)(C)). 
863 Id. 
864 Id. Section 2(a)(f)(2). 
865 Id. Section 2(b)(1). 
866 Hartmann (2014), supra note 828, at 158. 
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estimate, this law does not provide any specific guidelines on how to make a 
“reasonable estimate” or how to avoid occurrence of double counting if such 
“reasonable estimate” is unable to make. 
Since this new law came into force, Commerce has applied and developed the 
methodology of ADD adjustments for the first time in the proceeding of Section 129 
Determinations, revising the determinations in the four sets of AD and CVD 
investigations examined in the WTO DS379 dispute.867 In each of the four 
determinations, Commerce used the same methodology to estimate the extent that the 
subsidies reduced the average export price of the respective subject merchandise.868 
For instance, in OTR Tires Section 129 Final Determinations, Commerce conducted its 
analysis at the industry level (rather than requesting information from individual 
respondent parties).869 Based on the industry-level information provided by the GOC, 
Commerce identified a correlation between changes in input costs and changes in 
output prices.870 It also found that certain types of subsidies had reduced input costs in 
an industry.871 Accordingly, Commerce concluded that the variable cost-price link, as 
measured by its RCT test,872 was a reasonable estimate of the extent to which subsidies 
 
867 See Section 129 Redeterminations, supra note 849. Commerce issued four respective memoranda for 
the four different orders. See Memoranda from Christian Marsh, Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Operations to Paul Piquado, Assistant Secretary for Import 
Administration, dated July 31, 2012, regarding: (1) Final Determinations: Section 129 Proceedings 
Pursuant to the WTO Appellate Body’s Findings in WTO DS 379 Regarding the Antidumping and 
Countervailing Duty Investigations of Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People’s 
Republic of China (“OTR Tires Section 129 Final Determinations”); (2) Final Determinations: Section 
129 Proceedings Pursuant to the WTO Appellate Body’s Findings in WTO DS 379 Regarding the 
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe 
from the People’s Republic of China (“CWP Section 129 Final Determinations”); (3) Final 
Determinations: Section 129 Proceedings Pursuant to the WTO Appellate Body’s Findings in WTO DS 
379 Regarding the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations of Laminated Woven Sacks 
from the People’s Republic of China (“Sacks Section 129 Final Determinations”); and (4) Final 
Determinations: Section 129 Proceedings Pursuant to the WTO Appellate Body’s Findings in WTO DS 
379 Regarding the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations of Light-Walled Rectangular 
Pipe and Tube from the People’s Republic of China (“LWRPT Section 129 Final Determinations”). 
868 Hartmann (2014), supra note 828, at 159. 
869 OTR Tires Section 129 Final Determinations, supra note 868, at 36. 
870 Id. at 20. 
871 Id. 
872 Id. at 43. RCT is an abbreviation for Ratio Change Test - the ratio between changes to an index of 
Chinese producer prices (Bloomberg’s monthly CHEFTYOY producer price index) and changes to an 
index of producer input costs (Bloomberg’s monthly CNPPIY index). Specifically, Commerce took the 
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that impacted variable cost passed through to prices.873 As a result, Commerce 
determined that those input-price subsidies demonstratably reduced the OTR Tires 
industry’s export prices and made pass-through estimates.874 However, by using a 
methodology limited to variable cost-price link, the adjustments of the ADDs for 
respective Chinese respondents were insignificant or even unchanged.875 In this case, 
it is also important to note that Commerce believes the concurrent application of NME 
ADDs and CVDs does not necessarily and automatically results in “overlapping 
remedies.”876 According to Commerce, this notion was upheld by the WTO’s AB 
Report in DS379.877 Hence, Commerce insisted that a finding that there is an overlap 
in remedies, and any resulting adjustment, must be part of a fact-based inquiry.878 
Furthermore, Commerce also believed that the burden of proof would be on the 
respondent parties to demonstrate its entitlement to a particular ADD adjustment.879 
 
4.3.2.8. Second Round of Legal Battles at Both US Courts and WTO’s Dispute 
Settlement Body 
 
4.3.2.8.1. Legal Challenges at U.S. Courts 
 
 
producer price index in China (Bloomberg symbol CHEFTYOY) and divided it by the purchasing price 
index in China (Bloomberg symbol CNPPIY). Both of these ratios are determined monthly, comparing 
the value from the same month in the prior year. Commerce noted that this method of comparing a 
finished-good price index with an intermediate-good price index is a typical approach for studying how 
input costs pass through to finished-goods prices over time. 
873 Id. at 25-26. 
874 Id. at 38. 
875 Id. at 39. For GPX: its original ADD rate of 29.93% was unchanged; Guizhou Tyre Co., Ltd.: 5.25% 
was reduced to 5.1%; Tianjin United Tire & Rubber International Co., Ltd.: 8.44% was reduced to 
8.39%; Xuzhou Xugong Tyres Co., Ltd.: 10.01% was reduced to 9.92%; and all other companies: 
12.91% was reduced to 12.83%. 
876 OTR Tires Section 129 Final Determinations, supra note 868, at 16. In its arguments in this case and 
in most of the cases, it seems that Commerce has tried to avoid using the term “double remedies” or 
“double counting.” Instead, it often uses the term “overlapping remedies,” or “overlap of remedies,” or 
“overlap in remedies”. 
877 AB Report, supra note 832, at para 599. The AB Report found that “double remedies would likely 
result from the concurrent application of anti-dumping duties calculated on the basis of an NME 
methodology and countervailing duties” and also stated that it was “not convinced that double remedies 
necessarily result in every instance of such concurrent application of duties.” 
878 Id. at 17. 
879 Id. at 18. 
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As it was noted in the preceding section, before the enactment of the GPX 
Legislation to apply the CVD law to NME countries, the United States government 
embarked upon a judicial strategy by requesting for a rehearing en banc by the CAFC, 
essentially in order to give Congress more time to change the CVD law before the 
CAFC issued its mandate. That litigation strategy did help Congress to meet the judicial 
deadline, but it consequently initiated the CAFC’s rehearing en banc. 
 
GPX IV: The rehearing en banc requested by the United States government 
was subsequently granted, and, following the enactment of the GPX Legislation, the 
CAFC requested additional briefing on the impact of the new legislation.880 In this 
resumed litigation, GPX argued that the GPX Legislation was unconstitutional because 
(i) it attempted to prescribe a rule of decision for this case after the CAFC’s decision 
in GPX III was rendered; and (ii) it properly creates a special rule applicable only to 
this specific case due to the different effective dates in the two provisions; it thus creates 
a situation in which both ADDs and CVDs may be imposed, without providing a 
mechanism to account for potential double counting.881 In its decision, the CAFC 
observed that this case was still pending on appeal when Congress enacted the GPX 
Legislation, as the court’s mandate had not yet issued precisely because the United 
States government had petitioned for a rehearing en banc in GPX III.882 As a result, 
according to the CAFC, no issue was raised by the fact that the GPX III decision was 
issued prior to enactment of the GPX Legislation, because this case remained pending 
on appeal.883 With respect to GPX’s argument on the constitutionality of the new 
legislation, the CAFC sided with the United States government in concluding that 
 
880 GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, 678 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2012) [hereinafter GPX IV]. 
881 Id. at 1312. 
882 Id. at 1313. (citing Fed. R.App. P. 41(b)-(c); see also Beardslee v. Brown, 393 F.3d 899, 901 (9th 
Cir.2004) (“An appellate court's decision is not final until its mandate issues.”)). Rule 41(b) of the 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides: “The court’s mandate must issue 7 days after the time 
to file a petition for rehearing expires, or 7 days after entry of an order denying a timely petition for 
panel rehearing, petition for rehearing en banc, or motion for stay of mandate, whichever is later. The 
court may shorten or extend the time by order.” See Rule 41. Mandate: Contents; Issuance and Effective 
Date; Stay, available at https://www.federalrulesofappellateprocedure.org/title-vii/rule-41/. 
883 Id. 
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because this issue was raised for the first time in the rehearing petition, it should be 
“considered by the Trade Court in the first instance.”884 As a result, the CAFC 
remanded the case to the CIT for a determination on the constitutionality of the GPX 
Legislation and for other appropriate proceedings.885 
 
GPX V: On remand from the CAFC, GPX argued that the GPX Legislation 
was unconstitutional for three reasons.886 GPX claimed that the GPX Legislation 
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution,887 as well as the due process and 
equal protection rights of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.888 The CIT 
disagreed with all of GPX’s arguments and finally concluded that the GPX Legislation 
(also referred to as the “New Law” in this case) was constitutional.889 
In more detail, GPX’s first argument was that the New Law violated the Ex 
Post Facto Clause of the Constitution because it effectively penalized certain importers 
for past conduct.890 The United States government, however, argued that the New Law 
was remedial in nature and therefore not subject to the proscriptions of the Ex Post 
Facto Clause.891 The CIT concluded that the Ex Post Facto Clause “does not prohibit 
the imposition of all retrospective laws.”892 Instead, the clause only “prohibits the 




886 GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, 893 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 37 C.I.T. 19 (January 7, 2013) 
[hereinafter GPX V], at 1306. 
887 Id. Ex post facto means “from a thing done afterward” in Latin. Ex post facto is most typically used 
to refer to a criminal statute that punishes actions retroactively, thereby criminalizing conduct that was 
legal when originally performed. See Ex Post Facto, Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School, 
available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/ex_post_facto. Article I, Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution 
provides that “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.” That means this Clause 
prohibits Congress from passing any laws which apply ex post facto. See U.S. Const. Art. I § 9, cl. 3. 
888 The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall be… deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” The equal protection right is understood as follows: 
“Economic legislation or an administrative classification that neither targets a suspect class nor 
implicates a fundamental right will be upheld under the Equal Protection Clause, so long as it bears a 
rational relation to some legitimate end.” U.S. Const. amend. V. 
889 Id. at 1334. 




form of criminal law.”893 Further, the CIT agreed that retroactive remedial laws are not 
prohibited by the Ex Post Facto clause.894  
Secondly, GPX claimed that the New Law violated the Fifth Amendment’s due 
process clause by retrospectively altering legitimate expectations of the level of duties 
that would be imposed on their imports.895 Specifically, GPX argued that the New Law 
is a new tax being applied retroactively without notice to the affected importers and 
with harsh and oppressive effects deprived it of property without due process of law. 
The United States government rejected the GPX’s claims, arguing that 
Congress sought to correct an unexpected judicial decision with the New Law, and that 
GPX did not have a settled expectation that trade-remedy duties would not have to be 
paid on the covered imports.896 The CIT found that the retrospective nature of the New 
Law does not violate the due process because customs duties and trade remedies are 
part of a uniquely “retrospective assessment scheme.”897 That means that GPX could 
not have reasonably relied on any predicted duty rate prior to the enactment of the New 
Law. Consequently, the CIT concluded that because the New Law was general 
economic legislation, “it is subject to a rational basis review,” and that GPX failed to 
meet its burden to prove that Congress did not have a rational basis for passing the New 
Law or that GPX had a vested interest in not having the CVD law applied to its 
imports.898 
The third argument made by GPX was that the New Law violated the right to 
equal protection under the law by applying a different law to respondents whose 




895 Id. at 1311. 
896 Id. 
897 Id. at 1314. (The court also noted that “because, as to trade remedies, neither exporters nor importers 
have any real certainty as to the final rate on the imported product at the time of entry, they cannot 
demonstrate that a property right in a particular duty rate has vested, with which Congress may not 
interfere.” In addition, the court noted that “GPX and the other importers were aware that their 
importation of goods from China could give rise to duty liability in the form of traditional customs duties 
as well as trade remedy duties, and therefore, a modification to the boundaries of those laws does not 
constitute a “wholly new tax.”. Id. at 1316. 
898 Id. at 1312. 
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13, 2012, as compared to other companies whose products would be investigated for 
unfair trade practices after the New Law was enacted.899 GPX pointed out that there 
was a gap between the New Law’s effective dates for Section 1, November 20, 2006, 
and Section 2, March 13, 2012. During this interim period, goods from NMEs may be 
subject to the concurrent imposition of duties under the CVD and AD laws without any 
possible offset for overlapping remedies.900 The United States government contended 
that Congress had a rational reason to make only Section 1 expressly retroactive. 
Specifically, because approximately 24 CVD investigations were conducted on goods 
from NMEs during the interim period, Congress feared that without retroactive 
application of Section 1, the results of these investigations could be overturned.901 
Similarly, retroactive application of Section 2 of the law would have subjected those 
investigations to reopening based on the New Law, requiring Commerce to recalculate 
the AD or CVD rates in those investigations.902 Therefore, to preserve the finality of 
the investigations and to avoid additional recalculation by Commerce, the United States 
government argued that this interim period was needed.903 Furthermore, the United 
States government explained that Section 2 was the result of an attempt to conform to 
the WTO’s ruling in DS379. This action is normally taken under section 129 of the 
URAA, with prospective application only.904 For such reasons, the United States 
government argued that this feature of the legislation was rationally related to the 
government’s interests in conserving limited resources and also consistent with the 
general statutory approach of prospective implementation of changes based on an 
adverse ruling in a WTO dispute.905 The CIT upheld all arguments made by the United 
States government and concluded that the New Law was rationally related to legitimate 
 
899 Id. at 1316. 







government interests and therefore did not violate the equal protection guarantees of 
the Constitution.906 
 
GPX VI: GPX appealed the CIT’s determinations under the Ex Post Facto and 
Due Process Clause to the CAFC.907 It should be noted that while this appellate process 
was pending, the CAFC made a decision in another case challenging the ex post facto 
nature of the GPX Legislation as well.908 In Wireking, the court held that the GPX 
Legislation, while retroactive, did not violate the ex post facto clause because it was 
remedial in nature rather than punitive.909 Therefore, in GPX VI, the court did not 
deviate from its ex post factor analysis in Wireking and instead adopted the same 
reasoning to dismiss GPX’s challenge on the ex post facto issue. Then, the court 
focused on analysis of GPX’s arguments related to the Due Process Clause to resolve 
the dispute. GPX continued to argue that the New Law violated the Due Process Clause 
because it operates retroactively. However, the United States government argued that 
“legislation cannot implicate the due process clause unless it disturbs a vested right,” 
and that GPX’s due process challenge was therefore foreclosed at the outset by its 
failure to establish a vested right in this case.910 In analyzing the claimed due process 
violation, the court did not agree with the United States government that “the outcome 
of the due process analysis depends upon a determination that a vested right exists” 
(that is, even if there was a vested right, the outcome might still have been against 
GPX); however, the Court noted that “the strong deference accorded legislation in the 
field of national economic policy is no less applicable when that legislation is applied 
 
906 Id. at 1334. 
907 GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, 780 F.3d 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2015) [hereinafter GPX VI]. 
908 Guangdong Wireking Housewares & Hardware Co. v. United States, 745 F.3d 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
[hereinafter Wireking]. 
909 Id. at 1207. The court explained that “Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 of the Constitution states “[n]o 
Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.” A law only violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if 
it (1) applies retroactively and (2) imposes a punishment for an act that was not punishable at the time it 
was committed or increases the punishment for an act that was committed before the new law was 
enacted.” Id. at 1200 (citing U.S. CONST. Art. I, §9, cl. 3). 
910 GPX VI, supra note 908, at 1141. 
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retroactively.”911 According to the CAFC, due process was satisfied “simply by 
showing that the retroactive application of the legislation is itself justified by a rational 
legislative purpose.”912 Specifically, the court assessed five factors utilized by the 
Supreme Court in precedential cases to determine whether the retroactive application 
of the New Law satisfied rational-basis scrutiny.913 The court found that each of the 
five factors weighed in favor of a conclusion that the New Law was not 
unconstitutional; and thus, holding that the retroactive impositions of ADDs and CVDs 
in cases involving China and other NME countries, after Congress passed legislation 
allowing it to do so, did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution.914  
From this case, it can be understood that an importer does not have 
constitutional rights to maintain an existing duty rate in the fact of new legislation or 
quasi-legislative executive actions.915 This CAFC decision is the most recent case in a 
series of cases regarding the application of CVD duties to NME countries. This case 
apparently ended China’s judicial efforts to challenge to the retroactive application, on 
constitutional grounds, of the imposition of CVD duties to China at the U.S federal 
courts. This case also reflects a judicial assertion from the appellate court to clear away 
the uncertainties of the legality of imposing CVDs upon NME imports in trade remedy 
investigations. In short, all three branches of powers—judicial, legislative and 
executive—of the U.S. government confirmed the application of the CVD law to NME 
 
911 Id. at 1142 (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729, 104 S.Ct. 
2709, 81 L.Ed.2d 601 (1984) [hereinafter Pension Corp. Case). 
912 Id. (citing Pension Corp. Case, at 730, 104 S.Ct. 2709). 
913 Id. at 1142. (The court noted that “the Supreme Court has articulated five considerations that are 
relevant to the rational basis analysis under the Due Process Clause: (1) whether the retroactive provision 
is ‘wholly new,’ United States v. Hemme, 476 U.S. 558, 568, 106 S.Ct. 2071, 90 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); 
(2) whether the retroactive action resolves uncertainty in the law, see Romein, 503 U.S. at 184–85, 191–
92, 112 S.Ct. 1105; (3) the length of the period of retroactivity, see Carlton, 512 U.S. at 32–33, 114 S.Ct. 
2018; (4) whether the affected party had notice of the potential change prior to the conduct that was 
retroactively regulated, see Pension Benefit, 467 U.S. at 731–32, 104 S.Ct. 2709; and (5) whether the 
retroactive provisions are remedial in nature, see Romein, 503 U.S. at 191, 112 S.Ct. 1105. In this case, 
at least four of these considerations (excluding the length of the retroactive effect) weigh heavily against 
finding a due process violation.”). 
914 Id. at 1145. 
915 Reed, Patrick C., Access to Judicial Review of Customs Duties: The Overlooked Constitutional Rights, 
29 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 18 (2019). 
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countries such as China and Vietnam. It is unlikely that China or any other NME 
country could seek to overturn the application of the CVD law to NMEs by pursuing 
new legal battles at the U.S. federal courts (e.g., an appellate battle aimed at seeking 
ultimate relief in the U.S. Supreme Court would be unsuccessful, even if the Supreme 
Court decided to hear the case). The next section discusses China’s legal challenges 
against the retroactive application of the CVD law at the WTO. 
 
4.3.2.8.2. WTO Challenges: United States - Countervailing and Anti-dumping 
Measures on Certain Products from China (WT/DS449) 
 
The claimed irrationality of the retroactive application of the GPX Legislation, 
together with Commerce’s continued failure to completely examine the double 
counting occurring in the existing CVD orders and pending investigations, were the 
main reasons that China initiated yet another WTO case. On September 17, 2012, about 
three months after GPX had started its challenge to the GPX Legislation’s 
constitutionality at the U.S. CIT, China started the first step in the WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings by requesting formal consultations with the United States.916 
Two months later, the GOC officially requested the WTO’s DSB to establish a panel 
to resolve the dispute.917 The Chinese government focused on the two main challenges: 
(1) Section 1 of the GPX Legislation was inconsistent with the transparency 
 
916 WTO, United States - Countervailing and Anti-dumping Measures on Certain Products from China - 
Request for consultations by China, WT/DS449/1, Sept. 20, 2012. 
917 WTO, United States - Countervailing and Anti-dumping Measures on Certain Products from China, 
WT/DS449/2, Nov. 20, 2012 [hereinafter DS449-Panel Request]. 
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requirements under Articles X:1,918 X:2919 and X:3(b)920 of the GATT 1994; and (2) 
the United States failed to investigate and avoid double remedies in certain 
investigations and reviews initiated between November 20, 2006, and March 13, 2012, 
and the resulting CVD measures therefore violate the Subsidies Agreement.921  
For the first challenge, the GOC first argued that the GPX Legislation does not 
meet the requirement of prompt publication under Article X:1 because, even though it 
was enacted on March 13, 2012, the legislation was actually “made effective” as of 
November 20, 2006.922 In fact, Section 1(b) of the GPX Legislation refers to November 
20, 2006, as the “effective date.” According to the GOC, the term “made effective” 
refers to when the measure became “operative,” that is, when it could have an actual 
effect “in practice,” not the date on which it was formally promulgated or formally 
entered into force.923 Therefore, the GOC claimed that the United States violated 
Article X:1 because the latter did not promptly publish the legislation that was actually 
effective as of November 20, 2006. Specifically, the GOC contended that the United 
States backdated the legal authority of Commerce to conduct CVD investigations 
against NME countries and did not provide public notice of this authority until more 
than five years after it became effective.924 Second, based on such legal arguments, the 
 
918 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, April 15, 1994 (GATT 1994). 
Article X:1 requires the prompt publication of certain measures of general application, providing that: 
“Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application, made effective 
by any Member, pertaining to the classification or the valuation of products for customs purposes, or to 
rates of duty, taxes or other charges, or to requirements, restrictions or prohibitions on imports or exports 
… shall be published promptly in such a manner as to enable governments and traders to become 
acquainted to them.” 
919 Id., Article X:2 prohibits the enforcement of certain measures of general application before their 
official publication, providing that: “No measure of general application taken by any contracting party 
effecting an advance in a rate of duty or other charge on imports under an established and uniform 
practice, or imposing a new or more burdensome requirement, restriction or prohibition on imports, or 
on the transfer of payments therefor, shall be enforced before such measure has been officially 
published.” 
920 Id. Article X:3(b) requires a contracting party to maintain or institute judicial, arbitral or 
administrative tribunals for the purpose of the prompt review and correction of administrative action 
relating to customs matters. 
921 WTO, United States - Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Products from China, 
Report of the Panel, WT/DS449/R (March 27, 2014) [hereinafter DS449-Panel Report], at para. 7.8. 
922 Id. at para. 7.59. 
923 Id. (citing Panel Reports, EC – IT Products, paras. 7.1045-7.1046 and 7.1048). 
924 Id. at para. 7.60. 
 167 
GOC further claimed that under Article X:2, the United States was prohibited from 
enforcing the CVD law prior to its official publication on March 13, 2012.925 In 
particular, the GOC argued that the United States enforced the measure of general 
application in Section 1(b) of the GPX Legislation by having the measure provide 
retroactive legal authority for the imposition and continued maintenance of CVD 
measures on Chinese products resulting from investigations initiated between 
November 20, 2006, and  March 13, 2012.926 Therefore, according to the GOC, such 
retroactive enforcement was inconsistent with the prohibition in Article X:2 against the 
enforcement of a measure “before such measure has been officially published.”927 
Third, the GOC claimed that Section 1 of the GPX Legislation was also inconsistent 
with the obligation of Article X:3(b) because it amended the U.S. CVD law 
retroactively and made it applicable to judicial proceedings concerning administrative 
actions taken prior to its enactment.928 Accordingly, the GOC argued that the 
intervention in a pending judicial proceeding by the legislative branch of the U.S. 
government was incompatible with the obligations of the United States under Article 
X:3(b).929 
For the second challenge, pertaining to the double remedies, the GOC claimed 
that the United States failed to investigate and avoid double remedies in 26 CVD 
investigations and administrative reviews initiated over the period 2008-2012.930 The 
GOC referred to the DS379-AB Report to argue that Article 19.3 of the Subsidies 
Agreement obligates an investigating authority to investigate and determine, on the 
basis of “positive evidence,” whether double remedies arise in situations when an 
investigating authority concurrently imposes CVDs and ADDs calculated under a NME 
methodology.931 Based on this interpretation, the GOC alleged that the U.S. 
 
925 Id. at para. 7.91. 
926 Id. 
927 Id. 
928 Id. at para. 7.244. 
929 Id. 
930 Id. para. 7.300. 
931 Id. 
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Department of Commerce had failed to take any steps to investigate and avoid double 
remedies in the investigations and reviews at issue. 
In response to China’s first challenge, the United States rejected and argued that 
the GPX Legislation was “made effective” on the enactment date, i.e., on March 13, 
2012.932 The United States submitted that the ordinary meaning of the “made effective” 
clause confirms that it is aimed at limiting Article X:1’s application to measures that 
have been adopted or brought into operation.933 On this basis, the United States 
contended that the GPX Legislation came into existence and was made effective on 
March 13, 2012.934 With respect to China’s Article X:2 claim, the United States 
contended that Section 1 is not of general application and neither effects an advance in 
a rate of duty nor imposes a new or more burdensome requirement or restriction on 
imports.935 Further, the United States argued that Section 1 was not enforced until its 
publication on March 13, 2012.936 In response to China’s Article X:3(b) claim, the 
United States asserted that the claim fails for two reasons: (1) Article X:3(b) does not 
impose any limitations on the ability of a national legislature to enact legislation or how 
that legislation may be applied; and (2) Article X:3(b), instead, contains a “structural” 
obligation on members to establish tribunals whose final decisions should be 
implemented by agencies.937 Beside these two arguments, according to the United 
States, China’s claim also failed because the litigation in question never produced a 
final decision with legal effect prior to the time that the GPX Legislation was 
enacted.938 
 
932 Id. para. 7.61. 
933 Id. (citing, The United States refers to Panel Reports, EC – IT Products, para. 7.1045; and Appellate 
Body Reports, China – Raw Materials, para. 356). 
934 Id. 
935 Id. at para. 7.92. 
936 Id. 
937 Id. at para. 7.246. 
938 Id. See also Mostafa Beshkar & Adam S. Chilton, Revisiting Procedure and Precedent in the WTO: 
An Analysis of U.S. - Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), 15 WORLD TRADE REV. 375, 
381 (2016). 
 169 
China’s second challenge was also rejected by the United States, which argued 
that China’s claims were baseless both legally and factually.939 Regarding the legal 
basis, the United States submitted that China’s claim was “founded on an erroneous 
interpretation” of Article 19.3, and claimed that the Appellate Body’s reasoning in 
DS379 was “not persuasive.”940 Such allegations demonstrated the continued 
unwillingness of the United States to comply fully with the WTO decision. Regarding 
the factual basis, the United States claimed that China failed to substantiate its 
assertions regarding Commerce’s failure to investigate to avoid double remedies.941 
In a mixed decision, the Panel rejected all of China’s Article X-related claims 
and upheld the GPX Legislation that allows the United States to apply the CVD law to 
NME countries; however, the Panel sided with China in ruling that the United States 
failed to examine whether a double remedy had resulted from applying ADDs and 
CVDs at the same time. Specifically, the Panel agreed with the United States that 
Section 1 of the GPX Legislation was “made effective” on March 13, 2012 (and not on 
November 20, 2006), and published on the same day.942 The Panel’s holding is 
generally based on the Panel’s interpretation of Article X:1 that this provision does not 
prohibit the United States from “making effective” CVD measures to events or 
circumstances that occurred before their entry into force, provided such measures are 
promptly published.943 With respect to Article X:2 arguments, the Panel concluded that 
although Section 1 of the GPX Legislation was enforced before the law has been 
officially published, the United States does not violate Article X:2 because Section 1 
does not “effect an advance in rate of duty or other charge on imports under an 
established and uniform practice,” or “impose a new or more burdensome requirement, 
restriction, or prohibition on imports.”944 Regarding the arguments of Article X:3(b), 
the Panel ruled that the provision, which requires that the administrative agencies 
 
939 Id. at para. 7.301. 
940 Id. 
941 Id. 
942 Id. at para. 7.78. 
943 Id. at para. 7.73. 
944 Id. at para. 8.1.(b)(ii). 
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implement and be governed by decisions of the tribunals maintained to review their 
administrative action relating to customs matters, does not prohibit the United States 
from taking legislative action in the nature of Section 1 of the GPX Legislation.945 
China did not appeal the Panel’s rulings related to the provisions of Article X:1 and 
X:3(b), but it did appeal the Panel’s finding and interpretation of Article X:2 to the 
Appellate Body.946 China, however, won on the issue of double remedies. The Panel 
sided with China and concluded that in 25947 parallel CVD and AD investigations and 
reviews initiated between November 20, 2006, and March 13, 2012, the United States 
acted inconsistently with its obligation under Article 19.3 of the Subsidies Agreement 
in order to investigate whether, on the basis of positive evidence, double remedies arose 
from the imposition of concurrent duties.948 The United States did not directly appeal 
this double-remedy ruling to the Appellate Body, but it focused the appeal on accusing 
China of a procedural violation, rather than arguing on the substance of the legal 
questions at issue. Surprisingly, the United States claimed on appeal that China’s 
claims listed in Part D of its panel request949 were in violation of Article 6.2 of the 
 
945 Id. at para. 7.291. 
946 WTO, United States - Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Products from China, 
AB-2014-4, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS449/AB/R (July 7, 2014) [hereinafter DS449-AB 
Report]. 
947 China identified 26 cases in Appendix A of Exhibit CHI-24 to its panel request. The Panel, however, 
found one case, namely Drawn Stainless Steel Sinks, that was initiated after the enactment of the GPX 
Legislation. Therefore, the Panel excluded this particular case because it fell outside of the scope of 
China’s claim. Id. at para. 7.367, 7.369, and 7.372. 
948 Id. at para. 7.392. 
949 Part D of China’s panel request read: 
“D. Failure to Investigate and Avoid Double Remedies in Certain Investigations and Reviews Initiated 
Between 20 November 2006 and 13 March 2012 
Between 20 November 2006 and 13 March 2012, the U.S. authorities initiated a series of anti-dumping 
and countervailing duty investigations and reviews that resulted in the imposition of anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties in respect of the same imported products from China, either on a preliminary or 
final basis. In none of these investigations and reviews did the U.S. authorities take steps to investigate 
and avoid double remedies. 
In light of the failure of the U.S. authorities to investigate and avoid double remedies in the identified 
investigations and reviews, China considers that the resulting countervailing duty measures, including 
any countervailing duties collected pursuant to their authority, are inconsistent with Articles 10, 15, 19, 
21, and 32 of the SCM Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994. China further considers that the 
associated anti-dumping measures in each such instance, including any anti-dumping duties collected 
pursuant to their authority, are inconsistent with Articles 9 and 11 of the AD Agreement and Article VI 
of the GATT 1994.” See DS449-Panel Request, supra note 918, at pp.4. 
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Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
(DSU)950, which required China to “provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the 
complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly.” According to the United States, 
China merely listed general articles of the applicable laws (including the Subsidies 
Agreement, AD Agreement, and GATT 1994) instead of pointing out specific sub-
articles (e.g., Article 19.3 in lieu of merely reference to Article 19), in violation of this 
procedural rule.951 
As for the appeals from both sides, the key issues focused on Article X:2 and 
Article 6.2 of the DSU. In its ruling, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s 
interpretation of Article X:2 as requiring a comparison between the measure of general 
application and an established and uniform practice.952 Although the Appellate Body 
partly sided with China on the interpretation of Article X:2, it concluded that it was 
unable to complete the analysis under Article X:2 and determine whether the GPX 
Legislation violated the WTO requirement because the Panel’s report did not provide 
sufficient factual findings to examine this claim.953 Consequently, this claim was 
declared moot and had no legal effect to the United States. That means that 
Commerce’s actual application of CVD law to China between 2006 and 2012 was 
deemed to be lawful under the U.S. law. Therefore, the United States succeeded in 
continuing its application of the CVD law to China and other NME countries. 
 
950 DS449-AB Report, supra note 947, at para. 2.68.  Article 6.2 of the DSU provides in relevant part: 
“The request for the establishment of a panel shall be made in writing. It shall indicate whether 
consultations were held, identify the specific measures at issue and provide a brief summary of the legal 
basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly.” In defining the scope of the dispute, 
Article 6.2 serves the function of establishing and delimiting the panel’s jurisdiction. See DS449-AB 
Report, at para. 4.5. 
951 Id. 
952 Id. at para. 4.120. Specifically, the Appellate Body found that the Panel erred in finding that the phrase 
“under an established and uniform practice … serves to define the relevant prior rate that is to be used 
to establish whether or not an advance in a rate [of duty] has been effected” and that the relevant 
comparison contemplated by Article X:2 is “between the new rate effected by the measure at issue and 
the rate that was previously applicable under an established and uniform practice.” ⁠ Furthermore, the 
Appellate Body found that the Panel erred in finding that, in order to determine whether a measure of 
general application imposes a new or more burdensome requirement or restriction, a comparison should 
be made with “a requirement or restriction that results from, and reflects, an interpretation of … a 
measure adopted and publicly communicated by an administering agency.” ⁠ Id. at para. 4.93. 
953 Id. at para. 5.1.g. 
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With respect to the United States’ claim that China’s panel request was 
inconsistent with Article 6.2 of the DSU, the Appellate Body noted that in order for a 
panel request to meet this provision’s requirements to “present the problem clearly,” it 
must “plainly connect the challenged measure(s) with the provision(s) of the covered 
agreements claimed to have been infringed.”954 Further, the narrative of a panel request 
functions to “explain succinctly how or why the measure at issue is considered by the 
complaining Member to be violating the WTO obligation in question.”955 After a 
thorough examination of the narrative explanation of China’s panel request, the 
Appellate Body addressed that, even without a specification of the relevant paragraphs 
of Article 19 of the Subsidies Agreement, Article 19.3 was nonetheless capable of being 
identified as the pertinent provision.956 The reference to “double remedies” in China’s 
panel request helps present the problem clearly by creating a plain connection between 
the measure at issue and the legal claims.957 As a result, the Appellate Body concluded 
that it was clear that the general reference to Article 19 of the Subsidies Agreement, 
when read in conjunction with the narrative, could be considered to meet the 
requirement of Article 6.2 of the DSU to “provide a brief summary of the legal basis 
of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly.”958 Therefore, the Appellate 
Body upheld the Panel’s finding that claims under Articles 10, 19.3, and 32.1 of the 
Subsidies Agreement were identified in China’s panel request consistently with Article 
6.2 of the DSU, and were therefore within the Panel’s terms of reference.959 That meant 
that the United States, as recommended by the Panel, was required to bring 25 
investigations and reviews initiated between November 20, 2006 and March 13, 2012, 
into conformity with the WTO obligations. 
 
954 Id. at para. 4.26. (citing Appellate Body Report, U.S. - Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, 
para. 162). 
955 Id. (citing Appellate Body Reports, China - Raw Materials, para. 226 (quoting Appellate Body 
Report, EC - Selected Customs Matters, para. 130 (emphasis original))). 
956 Id. at para. 4.30. 
957 Id. 
958 Id. 
959 Id. at para. 4.52. 
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China and the United States separately claimed victory in this dispute. China 
won the legal battles of double remedies in both DS379 and DS449 cases, while the 
United States defeated China in its repeated attempts to challenge the United States’ 
enactment and application of the CVD law to China and other NME countries. As will 
be discussed in Chapter 5, the case discussed in Chapter 4 paved the way for the series 
of trade battles that have transpired between Vietnam and the United States, many of 
which have given rise to some of the same issues as those that arose in the Chinese 
cases—but with even greater complexity as Commerce continues to pursue its policy 
of aggressive AD and CVD investigations against countries that have been categorized 
as having nonmarket economies. 
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Following the end of the war between the United States and Vietnam was ended 
on April 30, 1975, the South of Vietnam was reunified with the North (“Reunification 
Day”), and, on July 2, 1976, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was officially 
proclaimed on July 2, 1976.960 In contrast, the loss of the Vietnam war was difficult to 
accept for the United States government at the time; as a result, the United States 
isolated the entire country of Vietnam by extending the trade and investment embargo 
that had been previously imposed only against the North of Vietnam since 1964 (a 
decade after the French defeat).961 From an American perspective, the Vietnam war 
remained “a source of deep emotional conflict,” and there was actually a “fierce antiwar 
sentiment both at home and abroad” under the then-President Nixon administration.962  
After the Reunification Day, Vietnam faced formidable development 
challenges.963 For example, essential infrastructures had been destroyed during the war, 
societal wounds from internal conflicts between the North and the South were yet to 
heal, food and other basic commodities were in short supply, and millions of people 
 
960 On July 2, 1976, the National Assembly for reunification of Vietnam has decided to change the 
country’s name to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. See, Nghi Quyet Ve Ten Nuoc, Quoc Ky, Quoc 
Huy, Thu Do, Quoc Ca (Resolution on the Country’s Name, National Flag, National Emblem, Capital, 
National Anthem), promulgated by the National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, July 2, 
1976. 
961 End of U.S. Embargo on Vietnam Will Boost Asia Trade, Stability, Associated Press Worldstream, 
February 04, 1994. See also St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri), U.S. Embargo on Vietnam Assailed, 
FIVE STAR Edition, February 11, 1993. 
962 Stauch, Thomas R., The United States and Vietnam: Overcoming the Past and Investing in the Future, 
28 INT’L LAW. 995 (1994). 
963 World Bank and Ministry of Planning and Investment of Vietnam. 2016. Vietnam 2035: Toward 
Prosperity, Creativity, Equity, and Democracy. Washington, DC: World Bank. doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-
0824-1. License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0 IGO, Box 1.1 A chronology of major 
market-oriented Doi Moi reforms [hereinafter Vietnam 2035 Report], at 78. 
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were dead, wounded or displaced.964 However, after a decade of struggling with the 
stagnant economy under the centrally planned economy model, in 1986, Vietnam 
started the most comprehensive economic reform package in its history, known as “Doi 
Moi” (“renovation” in English). This was a significant economic transformation from 
a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented economy where the state plays a key 
leading role. The 1986 Doi Moi policy was historically viewed as a strong move from 
bureaucratic centralized management based on state subsidies to a multisector, market-
oriented economy, one that would be open to world markets.965 These large-scale 
economic reforms focused on the key areas such as price reforms, agriculture sector 
reforms, economic integration, macroeconomic stabilization, enterprise reforms, 
decentralization, and social equity.966 In pursuit of the objectives of the Doi Moi policy, 
prioritizing the economic integration and enterprise reforms, the National Assembly of 
Vietnam for the first time enacted a Foreign Investment Law in 1987967 (providing a 
basic legal framework for foreign investors to invest and do business in Vietnam), and, 
in 1990, it enacted two sets of enterprise laws including the Company Law (providing 
the legal framework for the registration of limited liability companies and joint-stock 
companies) and the Private Enterprise Law (providing a legal basis for the 
establishment of private enterprises).968  
Reforms of the banking system in Vietnam have been also implemented since 
the 1990s by the enactment of several laws and regulations that have expanded and 
opened the banking system to both domestic and foreign investors. Specifically, in 
 
964 Id. see also Martin Rama, based on conversations with H.E. Vo Van Kiet with Professor Dang Phong 
and Doan Hong Quang, Making Difficult Choices: Vietnam in Transition, Commission on Growth and 
Development, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, Working 
Paper 40 (2008), at 9. 
965 Vietnam 2035 Report, supra note 964, at 81. 
966 Id., at 82-85. 
967 Law No. 04-HDNN8 of December 29, 1987, on Foreign Investment in Vietnam (repealed). 
968 Law No. 47-LCT/HDNN8 of December 21, 1990, on Company; and Law No. 48-LCT/HDNN8 of 
December 21, 1990, on Private Enterprise. These two sets of laws were amended in 1994 and later 
replaced and incorporated into the Law on Enterprises in 1999. See Enterprise Law No. 13/1999/QH10, 
enacted by the National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on June 12, 1999 (repealed). 
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1990, private commercial banks (including branches of foreign banks and joint-venture 
banks) were permitted to open and operate in Vietnam.969 
The Doi Moi reforms boosted Vietnam’s underperforming economy 
remarkably during the 1990s; in particular, the economic reforms focused on building 
a market-oriented economy and creating opportunities for private-sector competition 
sent a message to the world that Vietnam was willing to integrate into the global 
economy. In fact, the impressive changes in Vietnam’s foreign and domestic policies 
have been positively recognized by the international community. The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to resume lending to Vietnam in 1993. That action was 
a motivation for the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to 
recommence their lending to Vietnam shortly thereafter.970 These funds were integral 
to Vietnam’s post-war reconstruction of its infrastructure. 
The most successful outcome of Vietnam’s efforts at economic reforms was the 
lifting of the U.S. trade embargo. On February 3, 1994, then-President Clinton ordered 
an end to the 19-year embargo that had banned all trade between the United States and 
Vietnam.971 From President Clinton’s perspective, he lifted the trade ban because 
Vietnam had made improvements in assisting the United States to search for American 
prisoners of war (POWs) and those missing-in-action (MIAs).972 In addition, this action 
was viewed as “casting away a central remnant of one of America’s most divisive wars” 
 
969 Ordinance No. 37-LCT/HDNN8, on the State Bank of Vietnam promulgated by the Council of State 
on May 23, 1990 (repealed); Ordinance No. 38-LCT/HDNN8, on banking, credit cooperatives and 
finance companies promulgated by the Council of State on May 23, 1990 (repealed); and Decree No. 
189-HDBT, making regulations for operations of branches of foreign banks, joint-venture banks 
operated in Vietnam issued by the Council of Ministers on June 15, 1991 (repealed). 
970 Viet D. Dinh, Financial Reform and Economic Development in Vietnam, 28 LAW & POL’Y INT’L 
BUS. 857, 867 (1997). 
971 Douglas Jehl, Opening to Vietnam; Clinton Drops 19-Year Ban on U.S. Trade with Vietnam; Cites 
Hanoi’s Help on M.I.A.’s, The New York Times, Washington, Feb. 3, 1994. 
972 Robert S. Greenberger, Clinton Lifts Ban on Trade with Vietnam --- Full Ties Await Accounting for 
Missing Soldiers; U.S. Firms Ready to Go, the Wall Street Journal, Feb. 4, 1994. The lifting of trade 
embargo against Vietnam opened the door to reconciliation with [Vietnam]. President Clinton said that 
“the ending of 19-year embargo was the best way to ensure cooperation from Vietnam and to continue 
getting the information Americans want on POWs and MIAs (prisoners of war and military personnel 
missing in action). See, John Maher, Vietnam Markets Open to U.S. Dropping Trade Ban, Austin 
American-Statesman (Texas), Feb. 4, 1994. 
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and “opened a potentially lucrative market to American goods.”973 However, it should 
be noted that the lifting of the trade embargo was only the first step toward establishing 
ties with Vietnam; it did not “constitute a normalization” of diplomatic relations. 
Rather, the Clinton administration admonished that further progress for bilateral ties 
would depend on Vietnam’s continued cooperation in helping in POW/MIA 
searches.974  
From the perspective of Vietnam, the end to the trade ban was a remarkable 
stepping stone for Vietnam to promote its integration into the region and the world 
economy. In fact, in the subsequent year, Vietnam became a full member of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1995975, and Vietnam also entered 
into a cooperation agreement with the European Union (EU) in the same year.976 1995 
was indeed a historic year for Vietnam’s foreign relations, for it also achieved a second 
remarkable step in rebuilding its relationship with the United States: specifically, in 
July 1995, twenty years after Vietnam’s Reunification Day, the United States moved 
forward to establish the formal diplomatic relations with Vietnam.977 This important 
event supplemented Vietnam’s accomplishments in establishing its foreign relations 
with the three economic spheres including ASEAN (a regional relation), EU (a 
multilateral relation) and the United States (a bilateral relation). In addition, the historic 
1995 accomplishments paved the way for Vietnam to join into the global economy in 
the following years. 
Since 1995, Vietnam and the United States have implemented several 
significant steps toward bilateral trade normalization and cooperation. In July 2000, 
both nations entered into an unprecedented bilateral trade agreement (“BTA”), marking 
 
973 Id. 
974 U.S. Lift Trade Embargo Against Vietnam; Clinton Cites Progress in MIA Search, International 
Affairs Section, Facts on File World News Digest, Feb. 3, 1994. 
975 ASEAN Economic Community, Vietnam in ASEAN: Toward Cooperation for Mutual Benefits, 
available at https://asean.org/?static_post=vietnam-in-asean-toward-cooperation-for-mutual-benefits. 
976 Ky Tran-Trong, A Would-Be Tiger: Assessing Vietnam’s Prospects for Gaining Most Favored Nation 
Status from the United States, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1583, 1584 (1997). 
977 Washington Dateline, Chronology of Events in U.S. Relations with Vietnam, The Associated Press, 
July 11, 1995; Clinton normalizes ties with Vietnam, Agence France Presse - - English, July 12, 1995. 
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a key step in the historic reconciliation between the United States and Vietnam.978 The 
BTA includes five major sections: (1) market access for industrial and agricultural 
goods; (2) intellectual property rights; (3) market access for services; (4) investment 
provisions; and (5) transparency provisions.979 The BTA was a major step for Vietnam 
to fulfill a condition necessary to have Normal Trade Relations (“NTR”) status, also 
known as Most-Favored-Nation (“MFN”) status, granted by the United States.980 In 
June 2001, then-President Bush submitted the BTA to Congress for approval; it was 
passed by both the House and the Senate in September 2001 and October 2001, 
respectively.981 Thereafter, the BTA was signed into law on October 16, 2001.982 The 
National Assembly of Vietnam ratified the BTA on November 28, 2001983, and the 
Vietnamese President Tran Duc Luong signed the agreement into law on December 4 
of the same year.984 The BTA came into force on December 10, 2001, when the United 
States and Vietnam formally exchanged notices of acceptance.985 The successful 
conclusion of the BTA was a further key stepping stone along Vietnam’s path to joining 
the WTO. Indeed, the BTA is regarded as an important step in securing the United 
States’ support for Vietnam’s accession to the WTO. In addition, the processes of 
negotiating and implementing the BTA were useful for upgrading Vietnam’s legal, 
 
978 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet on Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement 
07/13/00, 2000 WL 967020, July 13, 2000. 
979 Agreement Between the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on Trade 
Relations, available at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/US-VietNam-BilateralTradeAgreement.pdf. 
[hereinafter BTA]. Id. 
980 White House Press Releases, Fact Sheet: Background on the U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade 
Agreement, June 8, 2001. (“Under the U.S. law, two conditions must be met in order for Vietnam to 
receive the NTR status: (1) a bilateral trade agreement must be completed and approved by Congress, 
and (2) the President must waive the ‘Jackson-Vanik’ provision, indicating that such a waiver would 
substantially promote freedom of emigration from Vietnam. Since 1998, the President has granted the 
annual Jackson-Vanik waiver for Vietnam. Thus, completion of this agreement, and its subsequent 
approval by Congress, would clear the way for Vietnam to receive NTR treatment on an annual basis. 
This in turn would bring Vietnam's trade commitments into force.”) 
981 CRS Report for Congress, The Vietnam-U.S. Bilateral Trade Agreement, updated September 9, 2002 
[hereinafter CRS Report 2002]. 
982 Id. 
983 Resolution No. 48/2001/QH10 of the National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, on 
approval of the U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement, November 28, 2001. 
984 Order No. 14/2001/L-CTN of the President of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, on announcement 
of the National Assembly’s Resolution, December 4, 2001. 
985 CRS Report 2002, supra note 982. 
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regulatory, and economic systems to WTO standards.986 It should be noted that as part 
of the BTA, Vietnam was granted only a conditional or temporary NTR or MFN status; 
that status requires annual Presidential extensions, which must be approved by the U.S. 
Congress. Following the BTA, the next step toward normalizing U.S.-Vietnam trade 
relations was restoring permanent NTR or MFN status for Vietnam. 
On May 31, 2006, U.S. and Vietnamese negotiators signed a bilateral 
agreement on the conditions for Vietnam’s accession to the WTO.987 However, the 
WTO requires its members to extend unconditional MFN or permanent NTR (PNTR) 
status in order to receive the benefits of WTO membership in their bilateral trade 
relations. Thus, in order for the United States to get the benefits of the trade concessions 
that Vietnam grants to all WTO members, the United States has to grant PNTR status 
to Vietnam. With recognition of the important economic and trade relations between 
the two countries, the United States granted PNTR status to Vietnam on December 29, 
2006.988 This important event marked a full economic normalization between the two 
countries. Thereafter, Vietnam formally became a member of WTO in January 2007.989  
In June 2007, the United States and Vietnam signed a Trade and Investment 
Framework Agreement (TIFA) and set up a platform to discuss issues related to 
Vietnam’s WTO commitments and additional investment and trade liberalization.990 
Thereafter, then-President Barack Obama’s administration supported a free trade 
 
986 Id. at CRS-10. 
987 This agreement with the United States is just the last, but the most difficult of the bilateral agreements 
that Vietnam has had to negotiate with 28 WTO Members (including the EU). See CRS Report for 
Congress, Vietnam PNTR Status and WTO Accession: Issues and Implications for the United States by 
Mark E. Manyin and William H. Cooper, Bernard A. Gelb (August 2., 2006) [hereinafter CRS Report 
2006]. 
988 CRS Report for Congress, U.S.-Vietnam Relations: Background and Issues for Congress by Mark E. 
Manyin (January 3, 2008) [hereinafter CRS Report 2008]. 
989 Vietnam’s WTO Working Party was established on 31 January 1995. The negotiations gained 
momentum after Vietnam signed the BTA with the U.S. in July 2001, they accelerated in the period 
2004-2005, and they were completed in October 2006. The WTO General Council approved Vietnam's 
accession package on November 7, 2006. On January 13, 2007, Vietnam officially became the 150th 
member of the WTO. See Tu-Anh Vu-Thanh, Does WTO Accession Help Domestic Reform? The 
Political Economy of SOE Reform Backsliding in Vietnam, 16 WORLD TRADE REV. 85, 86 (2017). 
990 CRS Report for Congress, U.S.-Vietnam Economic and Trade Relations: Key Issues in 2018, R45172 
(April 16, 2018) [hereinafter CRS Report 2018]. See also Eleanor Albert, The Evolution of U.S.-Vietnam 
Ties, Council on Foreign Relations (March 20, 2019). 
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agreement, namely the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), that would have consisted of 
a dozen countries in the Asia-Pacific region, including Vietnam, as a “lynchpin of a 
U.S. strategic pivot to the region.”991 However, based on the allegation that the TPP 
would undermine the U.S. manufacturing base, President Trump withdrew the United 
States from the TPP shortly after he took office in 2017.992 
Although the United States declined to join the TPP, U.S.-Vietnam bilateral 
trade has increased remarkably during the past decades. According to U.S. trade 
statistics, trade flows between the two nations grew quickly from $1.5 billion in 2001 
to $77.6 billion in 2019, transforming Vietnam into the seventh-largest source of U.S. 
imports and 27th-largest destination for U.S. exports.993 That rapid trade growth 
inevitably caused the U.S. trade deficit with Vietnam to rise from $592 million in 2001 
to more than $39 billion in 2018.994 Overall, from 2009 to 2019, imports of goods into 
the U.S. from Vietnam increased 442.2%.995  
Needless to say, the rapid increase in bilateral trade has created trade friction 
over specific products in the two countries. Fierce competition has with regard to such 
products as catfish, shrimp, plastic bags, steel pipes, and so forth. The rapid growth in 
Vietnam’s exports of catfish (also known as basa, tra, or pangasius) since 2002 has 
generated especially high trade tensions between the two nations. There is now a long 
and bitter war between the Catfish Farmers of America (“CFA”), representing U.S. 
catfish processors, and the Vietnamese producers and exporters of catfish in the 
Mekong Delta region of Vietnam. Indeed, a catfish antidumping investigation was the 
first trade remedy case that the United States government initiated against Vietnamese 
producers, following the CFA’s petition in 2002996, and an antidumping (AD) order 
 
991 Albert (2019), supra note 991. 
992 Id. 
993 Michael F. Martin, Specialist in Asian Affairs, CRS Report for Congress, U.S.-Vietnam Economic 
and Trade Relations: Issues in 2020, IN FOCUS, February 13, 2020 [hereinafter CRS Report 2020]. 
994 Id. 
995 Office of the United States Trade Representative, Southeast Asia & Pacific, Vietnam; available at 
https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/southeast-asia-pacific/vietnam, accessed on March 20, 2020. 
996 Initiation of Antidumping Duty Investigation: Certain Frozen Fish Fillets from the Socialist Republic 
of Vietnam, 67 FR 48437 (July 24, 2002). 
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was finally imposed against Vietnamese catfish producers and exporters in 2003.997 
The catfish AD order has now remained in place for more than 17 years, and it remains 
in effect today. Following the initiation of the catfish war, several other antidumping 
(AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) cases have been initiated against Vietnam. From 
2003 to 2019, there were 15 AD and CVD orders imposed against Vietnamese 
exporters and producers of frozen fish fillets (AD), shrimp (AD), uncovered 
innerspring units (AD), polyethylene retail carrier bags (AD/CVD), steel wire garment 
hangers (AD/CVD), utility scale wind towers (AD), welded stainless pressure pipe 
(AD), oil country tubular goods (AD), steel nails (AD/CVD), tool chests and cabinets 
(AD), and laminated woven sacks (AD/CVD).998 For these currently imposed AD and 
CVD orders, in every investigation, the U.S. Department of Commerce has persistently 
considered Vietnam a non-market economy (NME) country; therefore, it regularly uses 
the NME methodology to calculate the AD and CVD rates imposed against the 
Vietnamese exporters and producers. Pursuant to ITC statistical data, most of the 
Vietnamese products investigated are similar to Chinese products for which the 
Department of Commerce has also imposed AD or CVD orders.999 That is because the 
same U.S. petitioners have attempted to prevent unfair trade competition with regard 
to similar products imported from both China and Vietnam. In addition, in order to 
restrict a bypass or circumvention of an AD or CVD order, U.S. petitioners have a 
tendency to file an AD or CVD petition against Vietnam after a similar AD or CVD 
order has been imposed upon China, or the U.S. petitioners may file a new AD or CVD 
petition against both countries at the same time. 
This chapter presents a series of case studies, focusing on countervailing duty 
cases that the U.S. Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) has lodged against 
Vietnam as an NME country. In Section 5.2, the author will examine why Vietnam has 
 
997 Notice of Antidumping Duty Order: Certain Frozen Fish Fillets from the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam, 68 FR 47909 (August 12, 2003). 
998 ITC, Import Injury Investigations, Research Tools, AD/CVD Orders, Antidumping and 




been treated as an NME (by the U.S trade laws and under Vietnam’s WTO 
commitments). In Section 5.3, through analysis of specific CVD cases, the author seeks 
to identify the subsidy programs provided by the. Government of Vietnam (“GOV”) 
that Commerce most frequently determines to be countervailable. Then, in Chapter 6, 
the author will recommend strategies for the GOV and Vietnamese companies to adopt 
in order to mitigate the challenges of U.S. countervailing duty investigations. 
 
5.2. Vietnam’s Nonmarket Economy Status 
 
5.2.1. Vietnam’s WTO Commitments on NME Status 
 
To integrate into the WTO as a world trading system, Vietnam (as an acceding 
member) spent years negotiating the terms of its accession with all WTO members.1000 
This accession process took Vietnam for 12 years, from January 1995 to December 
2006. In late 2006, at the final meeting of the Working Party, Vietnam successfully 
concluded its negotiations on the terms of accession and later became an official WTO 
member after ratification of the Protocol on the Accession of Vietnam.1001 
Similar to China, Vietnam also agreed to be treated as an NME in antidumping 
and countervailing duty proceedings. Specifically, Vietnam made commitments under 
 
1000 Negotiations on terms of accession take place in four main parts: (1) multilateral negotiations in the 
Working Party on the rules to be accepted; (2) plurilateral negotiations among interested parties on 
agricultural domestic support and export subsidies; (3) bilateral negotiations between interested parties 
on concessions on goods; and (4) bilateral negotiations between interested parties on specific 
commitments on services. See Handbook on Accession to the WTO: Chapter 4, The accession process - 
the procedures and how they have been applied, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/cbt_course_e/c4s6p1_e.htm#:~:text=Negotiations%20on
%20terms%20of%20accession,and%20TBT)%3B%20bilateral%20negotiations, accessed on January 
11, 2020. 
1001 WTO, Working Party on the Accession of Vietnam, Report of the Working Party on the Accession 
of Vietnam, WT/ACC/VNM/48 (October 27, 2006). Note: Protocol of Accession is the formal document 
by which a new member joins the WTO and agrees to be bound by its multilateral agreements. All 
commitments made in the Working Party are incorporated into the Protocol of Accession; Protocol on 
the Accession of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization Done at Geneva on 7 November 2006, Notification of Acceptance and Entry into 
Force, WLI/100, December 19, 2006. 
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its WTO Accession Protocol Agreement that an importing WTO Member, when 
determining price comparability in an antidumping proceeding, may use either 
Vietnamese prices or costs (i.e., the ME methodology) or a methodology that is not 
based on a strict comparison with domestic prices or costs in Vietnam (i.e., the NME 
methodology).1002 The ME methodology may be used if the producers under 
investigation can clearly show that ME conditions prevail in the industry producing the 
product with regard to the manufacture, production, and sale of that product. In such 
circumstances, the importing WTO Member can use Vietnamese prices or costs for the 
industry under investigation in determining price comparability.1003 On the other hand, 
the NME methodology may be used if the producers under investigation cannot clearly 
show that ME conditions prevail in the industry producing the like product with regard 
to manufacture, production and sale of that product.1004 This NME methodology - or 
the so-called surrogate country approach - has consistently been used by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce in all antidumping investigations against Vietnam.  
As for its WTO’s commitments on countervailing duty proceedings, Vietnam 
agreed that if there are special difficulties in the application of a methodology for 
identifying a countervailable subsidy, an importing WTO member may use alternative 
methodologies for identifying and measuring the subsidy benefit that take into account 
the possibility that prevailing terms and conditions in Vietnam may not be available to 
serve as appropriate benchmarks.1005 This means that Vietnam agreed under its WTO 
 
1002 Id. para. 255(a). Paragraph 255(a) provides “In determining price comparability under Article VI of 
the GATT 1994 and the Antidumping Agreement, the importing WTO Member shall use either 
Vietnamese prices or costs for the industry under investigation or a methodology that is not based on a 
strict comparison with domestic prices or costs in Viet Nam based on the [rules as set forth in (i) or (ii)].” 
1003 Id. para 255(a)(i). This paragraph provides “If the producers under investigation can clearly show 
that market economy conditions prevail in the industry producing the like product with regard to the 
manufacture, production and sale of that product, the importing WTO Member shall use Vietnamese 
prices or costs for the industry under investigation in determining price comparability.” 
1004 Id. para 255(a)(ii). This paragraph provides “The importing WTO Member may use a methodology 
that is not based on a strict comparison with domestic prices or costs in Viet Nam if the producers under 
investigation cannot clearly show that market economy conditions prevail in the industry producing the 
like product with regard to manufacture, production and sale of that product.” 
1005 Id. para. 255(b). Paragraph 255(b) provides “In proceedings under Parts II, III and V of the SCM 
Agreement, when addressing subsidies, the relevant provisions of the SCM Agreement shall apply; 
however, if there are special difficulties in that application, the importing WTO Member may then use 
alternative methodologies for identifying and measuring the subsidy benefit which take into account the 
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obligations that the investigating authority of an importing WTO member can select 
external benchmarks in CVD investigations for determining the benefits granted to 
Vietnamese producers. For example, when loans are extended at “preferential” interest 
rates and are challenged through CVD actions, the investigating authority can look to 
a surrogate country (that is, a reasonably similar country with a market economy) to 
identify what a market interest rate would have been, in order to then identify the 
amount of the subsidy implied by the preferential interest rates available in the NME 
country.1006 
According to the Vietnam’s WTO commitments, the application of the NME 
methodology in antidumping proceedings was to endure until at least December 31, 
2018.1007 After that date, if Vietnam had established that it has a market economy 
satisfying the market economy criteria in accordance with the national law of the 
importing WTO member, the NME methodology should no longer be used in 
antidumping proceedings.1008 Or, if Vietnam could establish that a particular industry 
or sector within Vietnam had prevailing market economy conditions, the NME 
methodology should no longer be applied to that industry or sector.1009 Surprisingly, 
there was no commitment as to the expiration of non-Vietnamese benchmarks in CVD 
actions.1010 In general, under Vietnam’s terms of accession to the WTO, Vietnam was 
to remain in NME status until December 31, 2018 (i.e., 12 years from the date of 
accession), or until it can satisfy the conditions of market economy treatment set forth 
under U.S. law. In other words, the United States was not obligated to designate 
Vietnam as a market economy country automatically as of December 31, 2018; rather, 
 
possibility that prevailing terms and conditions in Viet Nam may not be available as appropriate 
benchmarks.” 
1006 David A. Gantz, Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags: Non-Market Economy Status and U.S. Unfair 
Trade Actions Against Vietnam, 36 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 85, 96-97 (2010). 
1007 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Vietnam, supra note 1002, para. 255(d). 
1008 Id. 
1009 Id. 
1010 Id. Paragraph 255(d) states that “in any event …subparagraph (a)(ii) shall expire on 31 December 
2018.” That means this expiry date applies to the NME methodology (i.e., surrogate country 
methodology) used in AD actions only, i.e., “a methodology that is not based on a strict comparison with 
domestic prices or costs in Viet Nam”. See para. 255(a)(ii), supra note 1005. 
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the NME status of Vietnam must affirmatively be revoked by the United States in 
accordance with its current trade laws. In reality, as of today, Vietnam is still regarded 
as an NME country in all AD and CVD actions by the United States. 
 
5.2.2. Vietnam’s NME Treatment by the United States 
 
Shortly after the historic U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement (“BTA”) 
entered into force in 2001, catfish products imported from Vietnam started to appear 
more and more in U.S. supermarkets and restaurants, and, with their cheaper prices, the 
rapidly became preferred by many American buyers and consumers. In fact, in 2001, a 
large quantity of Vietnamese catfish fillets (about 17 million pounds) was imported 
into the U.S. market and sold at a retail price of $1.60 per pound, compared with $2.40 
for U.S. catfish.1011 The rapid increase in the sale of Vietnamese catfish fillets caused 
a threat to the American catfish farmers and processors concentrated in the regions of 
Mississippi, Arkansas, and Louisiana, who feared losing their domestic market shares. 
Consequently, on June 28, 2002, American catfish farmers and processors filed an 
antidumping petition against Vietnamese catfish producers and exporters.1012 This 
landmark case over the control of America’s catfish market was known as the first U.S.-
Vietnam trade war since trade normalization in 1995. 
In this catfish antidumping case, Vietnam was for the first time treated as a non-
market economy country. The subject merchandise in this investigation was referred to 
as frozen “basa” and “tra” fillets, as they are commonly called by the Vietnamese 
producers and exporters. The U.S. petitioners claimed that the subject merchandise 
imported into the U.S. market was sold at less than the normal value and that such 
imports caused material injuries or threatened material injuries to the U.S. industry. In 
addition, the petitioners alleged that Vietnam was a non-market economy country for 
 
1011 Jeffrey Gettleman, Times Staff Writer, The Nation; U.S. Catfish Is in Troubled Water as Asian Catch 
Seizes the Market; Food: Vietnamese basa and tra look and taste like the fish along the Mississippi 
Delta. Farmers contend they are sold below cost, Los Angeles Times (July 16, 2002). 
1012 Initiation of Antidumping Duty Investigation: Certain Frozen Fish Fillets from the Socialist Republic 
of Vietnam, 67 FR 48437 (July 24, 2002) [hereinafter Catfish Initiation Notice]. 
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purposes of the U.S. antidumping law, and, therefore, Vietnam could not provide 
specific and reliable information on the production factors of the subject merchandise 
in Vietnam.1013 
For the purpose of its investigation, Commerce conducted an analysis of 
Vietnam’s economic reforms in order to make a decision on the market/non-market 
economy status of Vietnam. As required by 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(B), Commerce had 
to conduct an extensive analysis of all six factors when making its NME status 
determination.1014 Commerce also invited public comment on Vietnam’s economy in 
regard to the six factors as set out by the Act.1015 After nearly three months of analyzing 
all the comments received from Vietnam and all other interested parties, Commerce 
determined that Vietnam had a non-market economy for the purposes of antidumping 
and countervailing duty proceedings, effective July 1, 2001.1016 Specifically, in 
applying the six factors established by the Act, although Commerce recognized 
Vietnam’s positive economic reforms during the period of Doi Moi, Commerce 
concluded that Vietnam’s economy remained in transition and, therefore, Vietnam had 
not yet become a market economy country.1017  
First, in its assessment of Factor 1, the extent to which the currency of the 
foreign country is convertible into the currency of other countries, Commerce observed 
that Vietnam’s currency (i.e., Vietnam dong, or VND) is not fully convertible for 
current account purposes and is practically inconvertible for capital account purposes, 
and the exchange rate remains effectively set by the government.1018  
 
1013 Id. at 3. 
1014 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(B). See supra, Section 4.2 (discussing the six-factor analysis). 
1015 Investigation of Certain Frozen Fish Fillets from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Opportunity to 
Comment on Petitioner’s Allegation That Vietnam Has a Non-Market Economy, 67 FR 52942 (August 
14, 2002) [hereinafter “VN NME Notice of Request for Comment”]. 
1016 Notice of Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, Affirmative Preliminary 
Determination of Critical Circumstances and Postponement of Final Determination: Certain Frozen Fish 
Fillets from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 68 FR 4986 (January 31, 2003) [hereinafter Catfish 
Prelim Notice]. 
1017 Shauna Lee-Alaia et al, Office of Policy, Import Administration, Memorandum for Faryar Shirzad, 
Assistant Secretary, Import Administration, Antidumping Duty Investigation of Certain Frozen Fish 
Fillets from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam - Determination of Market Economy Status [hereinafter 
Market Status Memo], at 44. 
1018 Id. at 11. 
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Second, in its analysis of Factor 2, the extent to which wage rates in the foreign 
country are determined by free bargaining between labor and management, Commerce 
stated that the government of Vietnam retains de jure control over some wage levels, 
which could affect free bargaining between employers and employees; consequently, 
such control causes an ultimate effect on price formation.1019  
Third, in assessment of Factor 3, the extent to which joint ventures or other 
investments by firms of other foreign countries are permitted in the foreign country, 
Commerce recognized that Vietnam had attracted foreign direct investments (“FDI”) 
for the purpose of economic development; however, Vietnam did not show a 
willingness to allow FDI to participate in all economic sectors.1020 In addition, the 
government of Vietnam used licensing and registration procedures and limitations on 
choice of corporate form as the means to direct FDI and implement the government’s 
economic development plan.1021  
Fourth, in assessment of Factor 4, the extent of government ownership or 
control of the means of production, Commerce claimed that the government of Vietnam 
(“GOV” preserved an active leading role for state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) and that 
competition between the private sectors and public sectors remained limited.1022 
Further, it was noted that there was no private land ownership in Vietnam.1023 In other 
words, the land is owned by “all the people” and unitedly managed by the state. Thus, 
Commerce concluded that the ownership right over private property and private sector 
involvement in Vietnam’s economy was greatly limited due to government 
intervention.1024  
Fifth, in assessment of Factor 5, the extent of government control over the 
allocation of resources and over the price and output decisions of enterprises, although 
Vietnam has made impressive progress in the development of its private sector, such 
 
1019 Id. at 16. 
1020 Id. at 22. 
1021 Id. 
1022 Id., at 29. 
1023 Id. In practice, the government leases land and grants limited land-use rights (or LURs) to individuals 
and entities while the transfer and conversion of LURs are subject to government review and approval. 
1024 Id. 
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as with the growth of small-and medium-sized businesses, Commerce stated that the 
GOV still had considerable control over interest rates and lending policies; and 
consequently, the private sector was constrained from access to essential credit for its 
business development according to the principles of a market economy.1025 In addition, 
Commerce noted that Vietnam still maintained a control over prices in key sectors in 
relation to state monopolies (e.g., not only in traditional state monopolies such as 
electricity, postal service, and telephone services, but also in cement, steel, iron, other 
industrial products and pharmaceuticals, etc.).1026  
Sixth, in its broad and flexible assessment of Factor 6, such other factors as the 
administering authority considers appropriate, Commerce was free to evaluate 
additional issues that it considered relevant to its consideration of market economy 
status for Vietnam. Commerce focused on issues such as trade liberalization, rule of 
law, and corruption. Specifically, Commerce acknowledged Vietnam’s significant 
efforts toward trade liberalization by entering the BTA with the U.S. in 2001, joining 
the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (“AFTA”) by 2006, and preparing for accession to 
the world trading system (i.e., the WTO).1027 Regarding the other issues, Commerce 
stated that the rule of law in Vietnam was still weak and that the levels of corruption in 
Vietnam were high, although the GOV was taking steps to address this problem.1028 
Commerce admitted, however, that corruption is a major problem in many other 
transition economies and even some market economies.1029 
By a detailed application of the six factors, Commerce concluded that the 
market forces in Vietnam were not yet sufficiently developed to permit the use of prices 
and costs to calculate the normal values in its antidumping investigation. Beyond this 
conclusion, Commerce also recommended that Vietnam be treated as an NME country 
in countervailing duty investigations as well. This NME determination has been 
applicable to both antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings and is effective 
 
1025 Id. at 39. 
1026 Id. at 30-31. 
1027 Id. at 40-41. 
1028 Id. at 42. 
1029 Id. 
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from July 1, 2001 to present day. For the purpose of application of the U.S. antidumping 
and countervailing duty laws to NME countries, Commerce has published a list of 
eleven countries currently designated as nonmarket economy countries, including 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Georgia, Kyrgyz, Moldova, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.1030  
In order for an NME country to change its status and be treated as a market 
economy country, either it must make a formal request for review, or a respondent from 
that country in an antidumping proceeding must claim that its country has market 
economy status.1031 Over the years, several NME countries have successfully 
“graduated” to become market economy countries, such as Poland in 1993, Russia in 
2002, and Ukraine in 2006.1032 Section 5.3 will discuss Commerce’s revocation of its 
NME designations for Poland, Russia, and Ukraine, and it will also analyze China’s 
failed efforts to change its NME status. 
 
5.3. Other Countries’ Attempts to Escape NME Status 
 
Poland came to be recognized by the United States as a market economy 
country as early as 1993. During an antidumping investigation against imports of steel 
plates from Poland in 1993, Commerce agreed to revoke Poland’s status as an NME 
country (retroactively effective from January 1, 1992) for purposes of applying the U.S. 
antidumping law.1033 Commerce’s revocation was based on the finding that Poland’s 
economic reforms satisfied the statutory six factors established in 19 U.S.C. § 
1677(18)(B) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended. In particular, Commerce found that 
Poland’s domestic markets, unlike those of a traditional NME, were open to trade and 
 
1030 Commerce Department, ITA, Countries Currently Designated as Non-Market Economy Countries. 
Available at https://www.trade.gov/nme-countries-list. 
1031 Tariff Act of 1930 (as amended), sections 751(b) and 771(18)(C)(ii) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1675(b) 
and § 1877(18)(B)). 
1032 2019 Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report, China’s Status as a Nonmarket Economy 
(NME), January 10, 2019. 
1033 Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate 
from Poland, 58 FR 37205 (July 9, 1993) [hereinafter Poland’s ME Status Determination]. 
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foreign investment and were not insulated or protected from external market 
influences.1034 In addition, Commerce found that Poland’s economy operated on the 
basis of market principles to such an extent that its domestic prices could reasonably 
be used as a basis for determining fair market value under the U.S. antidumping law.1035 
For these reasons, Commerce determined that, by 1992, Poland’s major economic 
reforms , which had begun in 1990, had progressed to the point that 1992 Polish 
domestic prices could be considered market-driven.1036 
As to the case of Russia, following several formal requests by Russian steel 
companies in an AD proceeding on hot-rolled steel products from Russia, Commerce 
initiated an inquiry into the status of Russia as an NME country under the AD and CVD 
laws in October 2001.1037 As in the case of Poland, Commerce’s overall conclusion 
was also based on its analysis of the six factors. Commerce stated that Russia had 
generally made the transition to a market economy. Focusing its reasoning on Factor 
11038, Commerce opined that the Russian ruble was convertible for investment 
purposes, it was fully convertible for trade purposes, and the exchange rate was market-
based.1039 With respect to the internal pricing mechanism in Russia, Commerce found 
that prices for the vast majority of goods and services were not subject to price controls 
and were based on market forces of supply and demand. Commerce also remarked that 
Russian privatization had been comprehensive and had placed the great majority of 
industry, property, and assets in the hands of the private sector.1040 Although Commerce 





1037 Notice of Initiation of Inquiry into the Status of the Russian Federation as a Non-Market Economy 
Country Under the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, 66 FR 54197 (October 26, 2001). 
1038 Factor 1, supra note 426 (19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(B)(i) or Factor 1, provides that Commerce must take 
into consideration “the extent to which the currency of the foreign country is convertible into the 
currency of other countries.” 
1039 Memorandum for Faryar Shirzad, Assistant Secretary, Import Administration, Inquiry into the Status 
of the Russian Federation as a Non-Market Economy Country Under the U.S. Antidumping Law, Case 




system and its business registration and licensing requirements, which still kept 
investment relatively low, and although Russian workers on the whole were paid 
relatively low wages, Commerce ultimately accepted that foreign investment was 
permitted and encouraged in Russia, and that Russian wages were market-based.1041 
Furthermore, Commerce noted that Russian’s banking reforms had lagged, its pace of 
industrial restructuring has been slow, and regulated energy prices remained a 
significant concern in the economy.1042 Despite those difficulties, Commerce finally 
concluded that Russia’s economy overall had become market-based.1043 Based on these 
reasons, Commerce revoked Russia’s NME status, effective as of April 1, 2002.1044 
In the case of Ukraine, in April 2005, the Government of Ukraine (“GOU”) 
formally asked Commerce to conduct a review of Ukraine’s NME status within the 
context of a changed circumstances review of the AD order on carbon and certain steel 
wire rod from Ukraine.1045 Based on its assessment of the statutory six factors, 
Commerce found that Ukraine’s currency (i.e., the hryvnia) was freely convertible and 
was subject to market forces.1046 Ukraine’s employees and management could freely 
negotiate wages, and workers had trade union rights.1047 Further, Commerce found that 
foreign direct investment was encouraged in almost all sectors of Ukraine’s economy, 
and foreign-invested enterprises could have an equal treatment as with domestic 
enterprises.1048 It is worth noting that Ukraine was able to show its privatization efforts, 
as a result of which at least 65% of Ukraine’s GDP was held by the private sector, 
whereas there were relatively few large state-owned enterprises remaining.1049 In 
addition, Commerce found that land in Ukraine (including land for agricultural use) 






1045 Final Results of Inquiry into Ukraine's Status as a Non-Market Economy Country, 71 FR 9520 






investments are located.1050 With respect to the banking sector and price controls in 
Ukraine, Commerce stated that the GOU had withdrawn its previous position as a 
primary resource allocator in the economy by privatizing virtually the entire banking 
sector and eliminating most price controls.1051 Despite such substantial economic 
progress, Commerce recommended that Ukraine continue to enhance such privatization 
mechanisms for trade in land, particularly for agricultural land.1052 Based on this 
reasoning, Commerce finally concluded that Ukraine’s significant economic reforms 
warranted treatment as a market economy country, effective as of February 1, 2006.1053 
As for the case of China, pursuing an ME status has been its long-term strategic 
target. In 2017, China asked Commerce to revoke China’s NME status, but Commerce 
declined that revocation request.1054 In its decision, after an extensive analysis of the 
six factors, Commerce concluded that China was still an NME country because “the 
state’s role in the economy and its relationship with markets and the private sector 
results in fundamental distortions in the Chinese economy.”1055 Specifically, some of 
the key findings in Commerce’s six-factor analysis included persistent problems related 
to China’s currency convertibility, where Commerce found that the Government of 
China (“GOC”) “still maintains significant restrictions on capital account transactions 
and intervenes considerably in onshore and offshore foreign exchange market.”1056 
With respect to the wages, Commerce found that there remained “significant 
institutional constraints on the extent to which wage rates were determined through free 






1054 U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Memorandum from Leah Wils-
Owens, Office of Policy, Enforcement & Compliance, to Gary Taverman, Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Antidumping and Countervailing Operations, China’s Status as a Non-Maret Economy, Investigation 
No. A-570-053 (October 26, 2017) [hereinafter China’s NME Status Memo], available at 
https://enforcement.trade.gov/download/prc-nme-status/prc-nme-review-final-103017.pdf, accessed on 
August 18, 2021. 
1055 Id. at 7. 
1056 Id. at 4. 
1057 Id. at 5. 
 193 
the formation of independent trade unions to represent labor was still prohibited, and 
workers did not have the right to strike.1058 Regarding China’s foreign investment 
regime, Commerce found that there still existed “significant barriers to foreign 
investment, including equity limits and local partner requirements, opaque approval 
and regulatory procedures, and technology transfer and localization requirements.”1059 
With respect to China’s control over production, Commerce found that the GOC 
continued to “exert significant ownership and control over the means of production,” 
through (1) “the role and prevalence of state-invested enterprises (SIEs)” and (2) “the 
system of land ownership and land-use rights.”1060 Firstly, the SIEs overwhelmed other 
major economies, and due to the SIEs’ priority in allocation of resources, SIEs were 
“not strictly disciplined by market principles of supply and demand.”1061 Secondly, the 
GOC owned and controlled all land in China (including both rural and urban land), 
which is another key means of production.1062 Regarding China’s control over the 
allocation of resources, prices, and the banking sector, Commerce found that the GOC 
continued to maintain state planning in its industrial policies to influence economic 
outcomes, a high degree of control over essential or strategic prices (e.g., in provision 
of electricity), and state ownership and control over the largest commercial banks.1063 
Lastly, Commerce found that the legal system in China was used by the GOC and the 
CCP to “secure discrete economic outcomes, channel broader economic policy, and 
pursue industrial policy goals.” From these key findings, Commerce concluded that 
China was not qualified to be deemed a market economy country. 
In parallel with China’s efforts to challenge its NME designation directly with 
the U.S. Department of Commerce in 2017, China requested consultations with both 






1062 Id. at 6. 
1063 Id. 
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2016.1064 In each dispute, China claimed that according to certain provisions of its 
WTO’s Accession Protocol in 2001, China must be recognized as a market economy 
after 15 years had elapsed from its accession to the WTO.1065 According to China, the 
provisions of Section 15(a)(ii) and Section 15(d) of its Accession Protocol, which had 
allowed other WTO members to treat China as an NME in AD investigations, expired 
on December 11, 2016 (“Expiry Date”).1066 Section 15 generally allows a WTO 
member to disregard Chinese domestic prices and use surrogate prices from a third 
country instead, under the NME methodology. Section 15(d) provides that the NME 
provision as set forth under Section 15(a)(ii) “shall expire 15 years after the date of 
accession.”1067 Thus, based on its simple understanding of Section 15(d), China 
interpreted the expiry provision of Section 15(a)(ii) as creating a legal obligation for 
 
1064 See Request for Consultations by China, United States--Measures Related to Price Comparison 
Methodologies, WTO Doc. WT/DS515/1 (Dec. 15, 2016) [hereinafter US - Price Comparison 
Methodologies (DS515)], available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds516_e.htm, accessed on October 25, 2021; 
Request for Consultations by China, European Union - Measures Related to Price Comparison 
Methodologies, WTO Doc. WT/DS516/1 (December 15, 2016) [hereinafter EU - Price Comparison 
Methodologies (DS516)], available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds515_e.htm, accessed on October 25, 2021. 
1065 See WTO, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432 (November 10, 
2001) (incorporating the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, P150, 
WT/ACC/CHN/49 (October 1, 2001)) [hereinafter China’s Accession Protocol]. 
1066 Id. Subparagraphs 15(a)(ii) and 15(d) provide as follows: 
“15. Price Comparability in Determining Subsidies and Dumping 
…. 
(a) In determining price comparability under Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement, the importing WTO Member shall use either Chinese prices or costs for the industry under 
investigation or a methodology that is not based on a strict comparison with domestic prices or costs in 
China based on the following rules: 
(i) …. 
(ii) The importing WTO Member may use a methodology that is not based on a strict comparison with 
domestic prices or costs in China if the producers under investigation cannot clearly show that market 
economy conditions prevail in the industry producing the like product with regard to manufacture, 
production and sale of that product.  
…. 
(d) Once China has established, under the national law of the importing WTO Member, that it is a market 
economy, the provisions of subparagraph (a) shall be terminated provided that the importing Member's 
national law contains market economy criteria as of the date of accession. In any event, the provisions 
of subparagraph (a)(ii) shall expire 15 years after the date of accession. In addition, should China 
establish, pursuant to the national law of the importing WTO Member, that market economy conditions 
prevail in a particular industry or sector, the non-market economy provisions of subparagraph (a) shall 
no longer apply to that industry or sector.” 
1067 Id. Section 15(d). 
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other WTO members to grant China ME status automatically. If China’s interpretation 
were commonly accepted, it would benefit Vietnam, because Vietnam had similar 
provisions in its WTO Accession Protocol: the provisions regarding the application of 
the NME methodology in AD actions against Vietnam was supposed to expire on 
December 31, 2018.1068 Accordingly, because of the legal importance of the China 
dispute as well as its implications for Vietnam’s related interest, Vietnam also 
requested to join the consultations in both cases DS515 and DS516 in December 
2016.1069 Notably, at the request of China, a WTO panel was established in the EU case 
(DS516) only, but not in the U.S. case (DS515), simply because China did not request 
establishment of a panel in that case.1070 The matters that China raised in the EU 
consultation were closely related to the ones in the U.S. consultation. The United States, 
as a third party in DS516, disagreed with China’s interpretation and stated that 
following the expiry of Section 15(a)(ii), China must have “an adequate evidentiary 
basis” for a determination to use a methodology that is not based on a strict comparison 
with domestic prices or costs in China in determining price comparability in AD 
proceedings involving Chinese products that are imported into a WTO member after 
December 11, 2016.1071 The United States agreed with the EU that the expiry of Section 
15(a)(ii) meant that the particular standard of evidence introduced in that paragraph 
was no longer applicable, and that after December 11, 2016, an importing Member 
must “fall back” on the standard of evidence generally applicable in AD proceedings—
which does not necessarily mean treatment as an ME country.1072 In May 2019, China 
requested the Panel to suspend the proceedings in DS516.1073 That meant that China 
 
1068 See Vietnam’s Accession Protocol, paragraph 255(d), supra note 1011. 
1069 See DS516 and DS515, supra note 1065. 
1070 Id. 
1071 EU - Price Comparison Methodologies (DS516), Responses of the United States to the European 
Union’s Questions Following the First Substantive Meeting of the Panel with the Parties (January 29, 
2018), at para. 41, available at 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/DS/US.3d.Pty.As.EU.Qs.fin.%28public%29.pdf, 
accessed on October 25, 2021. 
1072 Id. at para. 42. 
1073 WT/DS516/13, EU - Price Comparison Methodologies, Communication from the Panel (June 17, 
2019), available at https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/DS/516-
13.pdf&Open=True, accessed on October 25, 2021. 
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decided temporarily to end its efforts at the WTO battlefield for recognition as a market 
economy. One may infer that China withdrew from the WTO dispute to avoid showing 
to the world its potential defeat.1074 Another possible explanation for China’s 
withdrawal is that the Panel supported the EU’s position that the Expiry Date merely 
shifts the burden of proof and does not terminate a member’s substantive right to apply 
the NME methodology to China.1075 
In sum, the successful examples of Poland, Russia, and Ukraine, as well as 
China’s unsuccessful efforts in applying for ME graduation with the United States and 
the EU, provide important lessons for Vietnam. So far Vietnam, has not formally asked 
Commerce to reconsider Vietnam’s NME label that was attached in 2002. However, 
the fact that Poland, Russia, and Ukraine have been recognized by Commerce as market 
economies does not depend only on their significant economic reforms, but above all, 
upon the diplomatic relations and political factors that also contributed to their success. 
For example, in the case of Ukraine, prior to Commerce’s decision on the 
reclassification of Ukraine’s NME status, during an official visit to Ukraine, the former 
U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, voiced her hope that “the United States 
would grant market economy status to Ukraine soon,” and she also said that the United 
States “highly values the friendship and its cooperation with Ukraine, a large strategic 
partner, and a country of great importance in Europe.”1076 It can be said that this 
strategic partnership between Ukraine and the United States substantially helped 
Ukraine to succeed in acquiring recognition as a market economy country. 
 
5.4. Case Studies of U.S. CVD Actions Against Vietnam 
 
 
1074 Henry Gao, SMU, and Weihuan Zhou, UNSW, The end of the WTO and the last case?, East Asia 
Forum, available at https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/07/10/the-end-of-the-wto-and-the-last-case/, 
accessed on October 26, 2021. 
1075 Id. 
1076 Ukraine Business Daily, US will grant market Economy Status to Ukraine soon, Rice hopes, 2005 
Interfax News Agency, December 7, 2005, accessed on Lexis on October 20, 2021. 
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This section will discuss and analyze several CVD actions initiated by the 
United States against Vietnam. Section 5.3.1 presents the case of polyethylene retail 
carrier bags. Section 5.3.2 presents the case of certain welded steel pipe. Section 5.3.3 
presents the case of steel wire garment hangers. Section 5.3.4 presents the case of 
certain frozen warmwater shrimp. Section 5.3.5 presents the case of steel nails, 
laminated woven sacks, and utility scale wind towers. And, finally, Section 5.3.6 
present the most recent case, concerning tires for passenger vehicles and light trucks. 
Together, these cases span the twelve-year period 2009-2021. As the author will 
discuss, the cases show that Vietnamese producers suffer less-favorable outcomes in 
these CVD actions because of the application of the NME methodology. Moreover, 
despite the presence of market forces in many sectors in Vietnam, Commerce has 
consistently found that prices in Vietnam do not reflect market values, with the result 
that Vietnamese producers are treated as having received countervailable subsidies in 
a wide array of circumstances, such as by obtaining land, credit, or raw materials at 
lower prices than, according to Commerce, they could have done in a true market 
economy. 
 




The analysis of the first CVD investigation involving Vietnam is very important 
in understanding the series of Commerce’s CVD cases against Vietnam. This first CVD 
case operated as a foundation for Commerce to implement and apply its new CVD 
practice in subsequent investigations against Vietnam. In addition, this first CVD case 
provides a good lesson for Vietnamese exporters and producers (especially for those 
who are exporting to the U.S. market) in understanding Commerce’s investigation 
process and its requirements, as well as for preparing to deal with similar cases in the 
future. 
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Therefore, in this section, the author will focus on analyzing the legal grounds 
and reasoning employed by Commerce in applying the CVD law to Vietnam as a 
nonmarket economy country. The author will also examine Vietnamese government 
programs that Commerce determined for the first time constituted countervailable 
subsidies. In addition, this section will clarify how Commerce selected benchmarks to 
calculate the benefits that Vietnamese exporters and producers received under each 
subsidy program. 
 
5.4.1.2. Case Summary 
 
On April 20, 2009, in a dual antidumping and countervailing duty action 
petitioned by U.S. industry, Commerce initiated the first ever CVD investigation 
against Vietnamese producers of polyethylene retail carrier bags (“PRCBs”).1077 
PRCBs are better known by American consumers as plastic grocery and shopping bags. 
In its petition, the U.S. domestic producers of PRCBs including Hilex Poly Co., LLC 
and Superbag Corporation (collectively, the “Petitioners”) alleged that the Vietnamese 
producers of PRCBs received subsidies from the Government of Vietnam (“GOV”) 
and that such imports caused or threatened to cause material injury to domestic U.S. 
industry.1078 According to the USITC’s import statistics, in terms of volume, between 
2006 and 2008, imports of PRCBs from Vietnam by the U.S. increased by 134.9 
percent.1079 In terms of value, subject imports from Vietnam were valued at an 
estimated US$79.4 million in 2008, showing a significant increase from US$65.4 
million in 2007 and from US$17.5 million in 2006.1080 Therefore, the rapid increase in 
 
1077 Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Initiation of 
Countervailing Duty Investigation and Request for Public Comment on the Application of the 
Countervailing Duty Law to Imports from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 74 FR 19064 (April 27, 
2009) [hereinafter PRCBs CVD Initiation]. 
1078 Id. 
1079 Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from Indonesia, Taiwan, & Vietnam, USITC Inv. No. 701-TA-462 
(Apr. 2010) (Citing Memorandum INV-HH-037 (Apr. 14, 2010)/PR at Table C-4). 
1080 US Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Fact Sheet, “Commerce Initiates 
Antidumping Duty Investigations on Imports of Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam, Indonesia, and Taiwan” (Citing Source: U.S. International Trade Commission, 
Dataweb (HTSUS 3923.21.0085), available at 
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quantity and value of PRCBs imported into the U.S. market is likely the main reason 
that the Petitioners initiated this dual trade remedy action. 
In its preliminary determination issued on August 28, 2009, Commerce 
determined that under U.S. trade law, there was no legal impediment to the application 
of the CVD law to imports from Vietnam, which was considered as a nonmarket 
economy country. Notably, Vietnam was designated as an NME country in the catfish 
antidumping case in 2003. Since that time, the United States has not modified 
Vietnam’s status as a nonmarket economy. In this CVD investigation, although 
Vietnam had a nonmarket economy, Commerce said that, because Vietnam had 
recently undergone many economic reforms, at the time of this proceeding, Commerce 
believed that it had the ability to identify and calculate any benefits that the GOV 
granted to Vietnamese exporters and producers. Regarding the existence of a subsidy, 
Commerce preliminarily found that a number of countervailable subsidies were 
provided to Vietnam’s exporters and producers of PRCBs. In March 2010, Commerce 
reaffirmed its preliminary determination. Accordingly, based on the benchmarking 
methodologies developed by Commerce in previous CVD cases against China, 
Commerce calculated the net subsidy rate for the three mandatory respondents that 
were individually examined in this CVD proceeding. In particular, Advance Polybag 
Co., Ltd. (API), Chin Sheng Company Ltd. (Chin Sheng), and Fotai Vietnam Enterprise 
Corp. (Fotai Vietnam) and Fotai Enterprise Corporation (collectively, Fotai) received 
final subsidy rates of 52.56 percent, 0.44 percent (de minimis), and 5.28 percent, 
respectively.1081 All other producers and exporters from Vietnam (which were not 
individually examined) received a final CVD rate of 5.28 percent.1082 
Commerce’s determination on the existence of countervailable subsidies was 
subsequently affirmed by the USITC. In its final voting, the USITC ruled that U.S. 
 
https://enforcement.trade.gov/download/factsheets/factsheet-prcb-ad-init-042109.pdf; accessed on July 
5, 2020. 
1081 U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Import Administration, 
Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Final Affirmative 
Countervailing Duty Determination, 75 FR 16428 (Thursday, April 1, 2010) [hereinafter referred to as 
PRCBs Final CVD Determination]. 
1082 Id. 
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industry is threatened with material injury by reason of imports of PRCBs from 
Vietnam.1083 As a result, Commerce issued a CVD order on PRCBs imported from 
Vietnam, effective as of May 4, 2010.1084  
In the simultaneous antidumping investigation against PRCBs from Vietnam, 
Commerce assigned to both mandatory respondents API and Fotai the Vietnam-wide 
entity rate of 76.11% due to their withdrawal from the AD investigation prior to 
Commerce’s preliminary determination.1085 Normally, if a mandatory respondent 
withdraws from participation, it is regarded as non-cooperative, and, therefore, it will 
be subjected to a total adverse-facts-available (“AFA”) rate, which is the highest 
dumping margin alleged by the petitioner. As for Chin Sheng (a mandatory respondent 
in the CVD case), because it was not a mandatory respondent in the AD investigation, 
it was assigned a separate rate of 52.30%.1086 
In sum, as a result of the concurrent AD and CVD investigations, API, Fotai 
and Chin Sheng received the combined AD and CVD rates of 128.67%, 81.39%, and 
52.74% respectively. From this case study, it is notable that the respondents (either 
mandatory or non-mandatory) involved in parallel AD and CVD investigations must 
ensure that they are able to succeed in both cases to be allowed to continue their exports 
to the U.S. market with a relatively low duty rate or even a zero duty rate. Otherwise, 
if they will not be able to withstand hight duty rates, they may have to close their 
 
1083 U.S. International Trade Commission, Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from Indonesia, Taiwan and 
Vietnam, USITC Publication 4144, Investigation Nos. 701–TA–462 and 731–TA–1156–1158, 75 FR 
22842 (Friday, April 30, 2010). 
1084 Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Countervailing Duty 
Order, 75 FR 23670 (May 4, 2010). 
1085 Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Preliminary Determination 
of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Postponement of Final Determination, 74 FR 56813 (November 3, 
2009), Westlaw, accessed on July 10, 2021. 
1086 Id. Normally a separate rate is determined based on the estimated weighted-average dumping 
margins established for exporters and producers individually investigated, excluding de minimis margins 
or margins based entirely on AFA. However, if the estimated weighted-average margins for all 
individually investigated respondents are de minimis or based entirely on AFA, Commerce may use any 
reasonable method. In the AD case, because the rate for all individually investigated respondents was 
based on AFA, Commerce relied on information from the Petition to determine a rate to be applied to 
respondents that have demonstrated entitlement to a separate rate. Specifically, Commerce assigned a 
simple average of the margins contained in the Petition, as adjusted by Commerce for purposes of 
initiation, i.e., 52.30 percent, as the separate rate for its determination. Id. 
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manufacturing plants or target other export markets. As in the case of Chin Sheng, 
although it achieved a de minimis rate (i.e., zero percent) in the CVD case, it was 
subjected to an AD duty rate of 52.30%. Chin Sheng was excluded from a CVD order 
on the basis of a de minimis subsidy rate, but its AD rate was no insignificant. 
 
5.4.1.3. Application of the CVD Law to Vietnam 
 
5.4.1.3.1. A Precedent Case from China 
 
As discussed above in Chapter 4, Commerce formerly pursued a long-standing 
policy of not applying the CVD law to NME countries. In 1986, in its ruling in 
Georgetown Steel, the CAFC affirmed Commerce’s determination that the CVD law 
could not apply to NME countries.1087 However, in a controversial action, on November 
20, 2006, Commerce still made the decision to initiate a CVD investigation on imports 
of coated free sheet paper (“CFS Paper”) from China.1088 This was the first 
countervailing duty investigation against China since 1991, when Commerce initiated 
investigations against lugnuts and ceiling fans, which had to be terminated before going 
to an order.1089 The investigation into CFS Paper from China required Commerce to 
review its long-standing policy of not applying the CVD law to NME countries like 
China. In that case, Commerce compared China’s economic situation during the period 
of investigation in 2006 with the economies that had been at issue in Georgetown Steel. 
Through its comparison, Commerce noticed that there was a substantial difference 
between the modern economy in China and the 1980s Soviet-style economy in 
 
1087 See Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States (1986), supra note 523. 
1088 U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Import Administration, Notice 
of Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigations: Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People's Republic 
of China, Indonesia, and the Republic of Korea, 71 FR 68546 (November 27, 2006). 
1089 U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Import Administration, 
Rescission of Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation and Dismissal of Petition: Chrome-Plated 
Lug Nuts and Wheel Locks from the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”), 57 FR 10459 (March 26, 
1992); and Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determinations: Oscillating and Ceiling Fans from the 
People’s Republic of China, 57 FR 24018 (June 5, 1992). 
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Georgetown Steel.1090 As a result, Commerce concluded that its policy that gave rise to 
Georgetown Steel’s litigation was inapposite to the investigation of CFS Paper from 
China, and therefore, did not bar the application of the CVD law to imports from 
China.1091 With this reasoning, on October 17, 2007, Commerce confirmed its 
preliminary determination to apply the CVD law to China.1092 
 
5.4.1.3.2. Application of the CVD Law to Vietnam 
 
Just as with China, when the CVD action against PRCBs from Vietnam was 
initiated in 2009, because Commerce had never investigated the imposition of any 
countervailing duty against Vietnam, Commerce was required to determine whether 
the CVD law was applicable to Vietnam. In the petition against PRCBs from Vietnam, 
the Petitioners argued that there was no statutory bar to the application of the CVD law 
to imports from NME countries like Vietnam.1093 Referring to Georgetown Steel, the 
Petitioners pointed out that the CAFC affirmed Commerce’s decision regarding the 
application of the CVD law to NME countries.1094 Furthermore, the Petitioners claimed 
that the Vietnamese economy, like China’s economy, is significantly different from the 
Soviet-style economy analyzed in Georgetown Steel. And for that reason, Commerce 
should not have any particular difficulty in determining and calculating NME-related 
subsidies.1095 In addition, the Petitioners contended that Vietnam’s economy (at the 
 
1090 U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Import Administration, 
Memorandum for David M. Spooner, CVD Investigation of Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People's 
Republic of China - Whether the Analytical Elements of the Georgetown Steel Opinion are Applicable 




1092 U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Import Administration, Issues 
and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation of 
Coated Free Sheet from the People’s Republic of China, 75 FR 16428 (Thursday, April 01, 2010). 
1093 PRCBs CVD Initiation, supra note 1078. 
1094 Id. 
1095 Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Preliminary Affirmative 
Countervailing Duty Determination and Alignment of Final Countervailing Duty Determination with 
Final Antidumping Duty Determination, 74 FR 45811 (September 4, 2009) [PRCBs Preliminary CVD 
Determination]. 
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time of this investigation) significantly mirrored China’s present-day economy and is 
at least as different from the Soviet-style economy at issue in Georgetown Steel, as 
China’s economy was found to be in 2007.1096 The Petitioners also argued that 
Vietnam’s integration into the WTO allowed Commerce to apply the CVD law to 
imports from Vietnam.1097 The WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
Agreement (“SCM Agreement”), similar to U.S. law, permits the imposition of CVDs 
on subsidized imports from member countries and nowhere exempts NME imports 
from being subject to the provisions of the SCM Agreement.1098 The Petitioners argued 
that because Vietnam had agreed to be bound under the SCM Agreement and other 
WTO provisions related to the use of subsidies, Vietnam must be subject to the same 
rules as other members.1099 
On May 27, 2009, when Vietnam submitted its comments to Commerce 
regarding whether the CVD law should be applied to imports from Vietnam, the GOV 
argued that Commerce should comprehensively examine whether Vietnam’s economy 
is fully market oriented to allow Commerce to conduct a CVD action as it did with 
China.1100 In addition, the GOV also contended that Commerce’s countervailing duty 
initiation was inconsistent with the U.S. law and its WTO obligations. Specifically, the 
GOV argued that CAFC’s decision, followed by the U.S. Congress’s failure to overturn 
that decision and by Commerce’s policy of not applying the CVD law against NMEs 
for 20 years, clearly established that the application of CVD law to NMEs was 
inconsistent with U.S. law.1101 
To assess whether the CVD law was applicable to Vietnam, Commerce took a 
quick review of Vietnam’s economy. Specifically, Commerce looked at recognizable 






1100 Official Letter dated May 27, 2009 of the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOIT) on behalf of the 
Government of Vietnam, regarding the Application of Countervailing Duty Law to Imports from 
Vietnam: Request for Comments (copy on file with author). 
1101 Id. 
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enterprise sector, land administration, and trade and investment mechanisms.1102 Based 
on its “snap-shot” examination, Commerce determined that “Vietnam is no longer a 
classic style, centrally planned economy as described in Georgetown Steel.”1103 
Commerce noted that “the economic space of Vietnam is a mixed landscape of public, 
private and foreign ownership,”1104 and that the non-State sector had grown rapidly and 
has accounted for an increasing share of production, investment, employment and 
trade, although SOEs continued to play a significant role in the economy.1105 However, 
Commerce noted that economic reforms in Vietnam were incomplete and that structural 
and institutional legacy problems still remained.1106 Although private enterprises 
shared the economic space, they did not share it equally or on the same terms and 
conditions with the State sector, especially in the important areas of access to credit 
and land.1107 Finally, Commerce concluded that, as a result of such developments, it 
was possible to determine whether the GOV had bestowed a benefit upon a Vietnamese 
producer (i.e., the subsidy could be identified and measured) and whether any such 
benefit was specific.1108 Commerce’s rationale was that because it was capable of 
applying the necessary criteria set forth in the CVD law, Commerce’s policy that gave 
rise to the Georgetown Steel litigation did not prevent it from concluding that the GOV 
had bestowed a countervailable subsidy upon a Vietnamese producer.1109  
In making its determination on the date of applicability of the CVD law to 
Vietnam, Commerce determined that the date from which it is appropriate and 
administratively feasible to identify and measure subsidies in Vietnam for the purposes 
of CVD actions was January 11, 2007 (i.e., the effective date of Vietnam’s WTO 
 
1102 U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Import Administration, 
Memorandum for Ronald K, Lorentzen, Countervailing Duty Investigation of Polyethylene Retail 
Carrier Bags from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam - Whether the Countervailing Duty Law is 
Applicable to Vietnam’s Present Day Economy (copy on file with author) [hereinafter referred to as 









accession).1110 The practice of choosing a cut-off date for a CVD investigation was 
similarly adopted in China’s CVD final determinations involving imports of welded 
pipe, woven sacks, OTR tires, and thermal paper from China, wherein Commerce held 
in each case that December 11, 2011 (i.e., the effective date of China’s WTO 
accession), was the most appropriate starting date for identifying and measuring 
subsidies in China. 
 
5.4.1.4. Use of Benchmarks 
 
Commerce normally uses benchmarks other than actual prices or interest rates 
available in Vietnam, and it does so based on Commerce’s findings that the GOV has 
taken a predominant role in land ownership and in the provision of loans in Vietnam. 
Further, the GOV’s direct intervention in the markets for lending and land-use rights is 
claimed to impact prices, rendering those prices inappropriate for determining the 
amount of the benefit conferred by a subsidy. Thus, Commerce usually resorts to out-
of-country benchmarks to measure the benefit of a subsidy in most of its countervailing 
duty investigations against Vietnam. 
 
5.4.1.4.1. Interest-Rate Benchmarks 
 
Before choosing benchmarks, Commerce conducted a review of Vietnam’s 
banking sector. Based on its findings that “loans provided by Vietnamese banks reflect 
significant government intervention in the banking sector and do not reflect interest 
rates that would be found in a functioning market,” Commerce determined that it 
should use an out-of-country, market-based interest-rate benchmark for the purposes 
of determining the benefits provided by the GOV’s preferential lending programs.1111  
 
1110 U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Import Administration, Issues 
and Decision Memorandum for Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam: Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, at 2 (March 25, 2010) [hereinafter 
referred to as PCRBs Final CVD Decision Memo], available at 
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/summary/VIETNAM/2010-7395-1.pdf. 
1111 PRCBs Prelim CVD Determination, supra note 1096. 
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For VND-denominated loans, Commerce calculated the external benchmark 
based on regression analysis that was previously developed by Commerce in CFS Paper 
from China and updated in other subsequent Chinese CVD cases.1112 Technically, 
Commerce’s regression analysis bases the benchmark interest rate on the inflation-
adjusted interest rates of countries with per capita gross national incomes (GNIs) 
similar to Vietnam’s, taking into account a key factor involved in interest formation, 
that of the quality of a country’s institutions, which is not directly tied to state-imposed 
distortions in the banking sector.1113 For USD-dominated loans, Commerce uses 
LIBOR rates with some adjustments.1114 
In this CVD case, in the preliminary determination, Commerce determined that 
the loans provided by the Vietnam Development Bank (VDB) and state-owned 
commercial banks (SOCBs) were considered government financial contributions and 
conferred a specific benefit because such preferential loans targeted the plastics 
industry under the GOV’s Plastic Plan.1115 However, in the final determination, 
Commerce concluded that the preferential lending under the Plastics Plan was not used 
by PRCBs exporters and producers in Vietnam.1116 
For Fotai, unfortunately, it was still assigned an AFA subsidy rate of 2.17% for 
the program of preferential lending for exporters.1117 The reason for this was that during 
Commerce’s verification of Fotai’s submitted information and data, Commerce was 
unable to verify the accuracy and completeness of Fotai’s reported short-term loan 
information.1118 In particular, during the verification, Commerce found that the actual 
figures in Fotai’s books and records were different numbers than reported on Fotai’s 
 
1112 Id. at 45815. 
1113 Id. 
1114 Id. see also Gantz (2010), supra note 1007, at 120. 
1115 PRCBs Prelim CVD Determination, supra note 1096, at 45817. 
1116 PCRBs Final CVD Decision Memo, supra note 1111, at 19. 
1117 Id. at 15. 
1118 Id. 
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initial responses.1119 Thus, Commerce concluded that Fotai failed to cooperate to the 
best of its ability and that the AFA was applicable to Fotai.1120 
 
5.4.1.4.2. Land Benchmarks 
 
Commerce’s regulations set forth the basis for identifying comparative 
benchmarks to assess whether a government good or service is provided for “less than 
adequate remuneration” (LTAR).1121 In other words, Commerce employs the three-
tiered benchmark approach to determine whether the government provides land rent 
for LTAR. Specifically, Commerce may use market prices from actual transactions 
within Vietnam (a Tier-1 Benchmark). When actual prices in Vietnam cannot be used 
due to government intervention, Commerce resorts to world market prices that would 
be available to purchasers in Vietnam (a Tier-2 Benchmark). In cases where there are 
no world market prices available to purchasers in Vietnam, Commerce goes forward to 
assess whether the government prices are consistent with market principles (a Tier-3 
Benchmark).1122  
Based on its separate research and analysis of the land markets in Vietnam, 
Commerce concluded that “the purchase of land-use rights in Vietnam is not conducted 
in accordance with market principles.”1123 In fact, Commerce stated that the GOV’s 
dominance of the land market in Vietnam distorted the market for provision of land 
rent; consequently, no non-distorted benchmarks could be selected.1124 Commerce’s 
conclusion was based on the facts that the GOV was involved in the allocation, access, 
and pricing of land.1125 Such involvement, according to Commerce, restricted the 




1121 19 C.F.R. § 351.511(a)(2). 
1122 19 C.F.R. § 351.511(a)(2)(iii). 
1123 PRCBs Prelim CVD Determination, supra note 1096, at 45815. 
1124 PRCBs Final CVD Decision Memo, supra note 1111, at 26. (citing Land Market Analysis 
Memorandum). 
1125 Id. at 28. 
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predominant role in Vietnam’s land market.1126 Commerce acknowledged that there 
may be land transactions via sub-leasing of land-use rights between private parties; 
however, access to these rights and the parameters within which these transactions were 
permitted to operate were also set by the GOV.1127 Accordingly, Commerce determined 
that it could not use in-country transactions as a benchmark because land prices in 
Vietnam were distorted. 
In evaluating which source was appropriate to use for an external land 
benchmark to apply to the case of Vietnam, following the precedential cases involving 
China, Commerce focused on the factors of per capita GNI and population density.1128 
Based on that methodology, Commerce chose to use average rental rates for industrial 
property in the cities of Pune and Bangalore in India as surrogate rates because these 
two cities were determined by Commerce to have the closest match in terms of per 
capita GNI and population density, noting that the per capita GNI for India is $1,070, 
compared to $890 for Vietnam, even though the Philippines was found to be a closer 
match in terms of population density to Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam than the two Indian 
cities.1129 
In this CVD investigation, Fotai was found to have received a countervailable subsidy 
from the program of land rent exemption for exporters. Specifically, Fotai was exempt 
from land rent because its project was in “the list of special encouragement” and Fotai’s 
value of exported products reached the rate of 90%.1130 For these reasons, Commerce 
determined that the portion of land use rights provided to Fotai exempted from land 
rental fees was specific as an export subsidy.1131 In addition, Commerce determined 
that there was a financial contribution because the rented land use rights constituted the 
provision of a good or service.1132 As a result, Commerce determined that there existed 




1128 PRCBs Prelim CVD Determination, supra note 1096, at 45816. 
1129 Id. 
1130 PRCBs Final CVD Decision Memo, supra note 1111, at 7. 
1131 Id. at 8. 
1132 Id. 
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adequate remuneration (LTAR).1133 In calculating the benefit that Fotai received, 
Commerce multiplied the Indian benchmark land rental rate by the area of Fotai’s 
exempted portion of land use rights.1134 Then, Commerce divided that amount by 
Fotai’s export sales to calculate a countervailable subsidy rate of 0.71%% ad valorem 
for Fotai.1135 
 
5.4.1.5. Analysis of Other Countervailable Subsidies 
 
5.4.1.5.1. Income Tax Preferences for Encouraged Industries 
 
The Petitioners further alleged that the foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) operating in 
industries and business sectors that are either “encouraged” or “specially encouraged” 
by the State are eligible for income tax preferences.1136 The Petitioners gave an example 
that the FIEs are eligible for preferential rates of 10 or 15 percent, for up to 15 years, if 
they satisfy one or more criteria including operating a project identified in the GOV’s 
list of encouraged projects.1137 During its investigation, Commerce found that one of 
the mandatory respondents, Chin Sheng Company, Ltd., benefited from a corporate 
income tax rate reduction for the tax return filed during the POI.1138 
Specifically, Commerce noted that Chin Sheng qualified for its tax preferences because 
of its investment in an encouraged industry (i.e., a new investment project in plastic 





1136 Petition for the Imposition of Antidumping Duties Against Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from 
Indonesia, Taiwan, and Vietnam and Countervailing Duties Against Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags 
from Vietnam, Volume I: General Information and Injury, Antidumping, and Countervailing Duty 
Allegations, at 88-89 [a copy filed by the Petitioners on March 31, 2009, Investigation Number: 701-
TA-462 [Hereinafter referred to as PRCBs Petition]. 
1137 Id. (citing Decree No. 24/2000/ND-CP of July 31, 2000, Detailing the Implementation of the Law 
on Foreign Investment in Vietnam, at Article 46). 
1138 PRCBs Final CVD Decision Memo, supra note 1111, at 6. The period for which Commerce 
measured subsidies in this CVD case, i.e., the period of investigation (POI), was January 1, 2008, through 
December 31, 2008 (See PRCBs Final CVD Determination, supra note 1082, at 16429). 
1139 PCRBs Final CVD Decision Memo, supra note 1111, at 6. 
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subsidy (i.e., income tax reduction and exemption) satisfies the conditions of (i) 
specificity to a group of industries and (ii) being a financial contributions in the form 
of revenue foregone by the government, and (iii) providing a benefit to Chin Sheng 
Company, Ltd., in the amount of the tax savings.1140 Thus, Commerce concluded that 
this subsidy program was countervailable. 
 
5.4.1.5.2. Income Tax Preferences for FIEs 
 
The Petitioners further claimed that the GOV treated FIEs differently from other 
similarly situated enterprises during the period of investigation (“POI”).1141 For this 
allegation, Commerce found that Fotai received countervailable income tax preferences 
under the Income Tax Preferences for FIEs program.1142 Specifically, Fotai benefited 
from a reduction in the standard corporate income tax rate for the tax return filed during 
the POI because of its FIE status.1143 Such preferences were found by Commerce to be 
specific (as a matter of law) to a group of enterprises, FIEs; they were found to be a 
financial contribution in the form of revenue foregone by the government; and 
provision of a benefit to Fotai in the amount of tax savings.1144 Thus, this subsidy 
program was determined as a countervailable subsidy. 
 
5.4.1.5.3. Import Duty Exemptions for Imported Raw Materials for Exported 
Goods 
 
In its initial Petition and in new subsidy allegations lodged on June 25, 2009, the 
Petitioners claimed that companies in Vietnam were entitled to exemptions from import 
duties on raw materials if they were FIEs or located in industrial zones.1145 While both 
API and Fotai were in fact exempt from paying duties on imported raw materials, their 
 
1140 Id., at 6-7. 
1141 Id. 
1142 Id., at 7. 
1143 Id. 
1144 Id. 
1145 See PRCBs Preliminary CVD Determination, supra note 1096, at 45818. 
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exemptions stem from Article 16 of the Law on Import Tax and Export Tax, Law No. 
45/2005/QH-11, June 14, 2005, included as Exhibit 43 of the GOV’s July 8, 2009 
questionnaire response.1146 Article 16 states that “Goods imported for processing for a 
foreign party which are then exported” are exempt from import duties.1147 According 
to the GOV, the FIE exemption program was part of a terminated law and there was no 
exemption program for industrial zones.1148  
At the preliminary stage of investigation, Commerce determined that API received 
countervailable benefits under this program to the extent that it imported materials not 
consumed in exported products.1149 Commerce clarified that these exemptions are 
specific as export subsidies because they are contingent upon export performance.1150 
As to Fotai, Commerce noted that Fotai also had imports of materials under this 
program, but it was unclear to Commerce whether all of these materials were consumed 
in the exported products.1151 Chin Sheng reported that its imports were subject to a zero 
rate under the normal tariff schedule, and therefore, it did not benefit from the 
program.1152 In making its final determination, Commerce gathered more information 
regarding how the GOV established and verified which goods were consumed in the 
production of exported products and how it reconciled imports and exports under these 
exemptions.1153 
During the final stage of investigation, since API dropped out of the investigation,1154 




1148 See Footnote 10 as cited in PRCBs Preliminary CVD Determination, supra note 1096, at 45818. 
1149 See PRCBs Preliminary CVD Determination, supra note 1096, at 45818. 
1150 Id. 
1151 Id., at 45819. 
1152 Id. 
1153 Id. 
1154 See PCRBs Final CVD Decision Memo, supra note 1111, at 4. On October 21, 2009, API informed 
Commerce it would no longer participate in the investigation and withdrew its business-proprietary 
information from the record. As noted by Commerce, given API’s complete withdrawal from the 
proceeding as a mandatory respondent, in an action clearly within the scope of section 776(a)(2), the 
Commerce based API’s CVD rate on facts otherwise available. Because API chose not to participate and 
thus did not cooperate to the best of its ability in the investigation, in selecting from among the facts 
available, an adverse inference was warranted (i.e., AFA). 
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and other materials used in production of the exported product on which the company 
received import duty exemption.1155 Chin Sheng reported that it had not received any 
import duty exemption on any of its raw materials or other materials; Fotai reported 
that it had received such exemptions on both raw materials and other materials.1156 
Commerce carried out verification at the final stage of investigation and found that the 
GOV did not have in place a system to confirm which inputs were consumed in the 
production of exported products and in what amounts, including a normal allowance 
for waste.1157 Finally, Commerce determined that the duty exemptions on raw materials 
imported under this program during the POI provided countervailable benefits.1158 
Commerce further explained that in order to find import duty exemptions on raw 
materials non-countervailable, the government in question must have a system in place 
to confirm which inputs are consumed in the production of the exported product, 
including a normal allowance for waste; however, the GOV did not have such a system 
and companies were, in fact, allowed to choose their own yield rates within a range 
established by the GOV.1159 Thus, the duty exemptions on raw materials for exports 
were found to be fully countervailable.1160 
 
5.4.1.5.4. Exemption of Import Duties on Imports of Spare Parts and Accessories 
for Industrial Zone Enterprises 
 
Commerce found that Fotai received import duty exemptions during the POI on 
imported spare parts and accessories and that Fotai qualified for such exemptions 
because one of its plants was located in an industrial zone.1161 Commerce stated that 
exemptions from import duties are normally treated as a recurring subsidy.1162 In 
addition, spare parts and accessories are imported on a regular basis and, presumably, 
 
1155 Id. at 8. 
1156 Id. 




1161 See PCRBs Final CVD Decision Memo, supra note 1111, at 10, citing 19 C.F.R. § 351.524(c)(1). 
1162 Id. 
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Fotai could expect exemptions on such imports on an ongoing basis from year to 
year.1163 Commerce then determined that benefits under this program were specific 
because the exemptions were limited to enterprises located within a designated 
geographical region (i.e., industrial zones) within the jurisdiction of the authority 
providing the subsidy.1164 Further, Commerce determined that a financial contribution 




Commerce’s findings regarding the subsidized programs granted to the 
Vietnamese exporters and producers of PRCBs was the first-ever affirmative CVD 
determination against imports from Vietnam. It marked a turning point from the outset 
that Commerce found Vietnam had undergone certain economic reforms to the extent 
that, at the time of this CVD initiation, Commerce was able to identify and measure 
Vietnam’s subsidy benefits. Although Commerce acknowledged that Vietnam had 
taken steps toward economic reforms, but Commerce still noted that such “economic 
reforms are incomplete and structural and institutional legacy problems remain.” Those 
are the main reasons cited by Commerce to apply the CVD law to Vietnam. 
 
In this CVD case, Commerce used external benchmarks to calculate the amount 
of the benefits received from government loans and preferential land rents. First, 
Commerce rejected Vietnam’s local bank interest rates because these rates were 
claimed to be controlled by the GOV. Instead, Commerce relied on the average 
commercial bank lending rates in the World Bank’s pool of “lower middle income 
countries” (excluding nonmarket-oriented countries). Second, Commerce went over 
the border of Vietnam to use surrogate data of land rents in India to calculate the land 






controlled all land prices in Vietnam; and as a result, the land prices in Vietnam were 
not reliable enough to be selected as a market-based benchmark for calculating the 
benefits received from the land rent program. 
In addition to the preferential lending program (which Commerce ultimately 
concluded to be inapplicable to PRCB exporters and producers in Vietnam) and the 
land rent reduction/exemption program, the program of import duty exemptions for 
imported raw materials for exported goods was also of equal importance. Fotai was 
determined to have received a countervailable subsidy from an import duty exemption 
for imported raw materials with a CVD rate of 2.17%, accounting for 41% of its total 
CVD rate (5.28%). In order for Commerce to find that this program was not 
countervailable, Commerce cautioned that the GOV “must have a system in place to 
confirm which inputs are consumed in the production of the exported product, 
including a normal allowance for waste.” At the time of this conclusion, the GOV did 
not have such a system in place. 
 




The PRCBs CVD case became a precedent that other U.S. petitioners could rely 
on to initiate other CVD investigations against Vietnamese exporters and producers. 
Normally, after the final affirmative determination of a CVD case, the government 
under investigation has not had enough time to change its policies and regulations in 
response to Commerce’s adverse findings. If the CVD investigations quickly continue 
case after case, however, the government under investigation will face even more 
challenges in adjusting its policies and subsidy programs to avoid having them 
determined to be countervailable subsidies. 
The second CVD action against Vietnamese steel pipes was an example of a 
U.S. petitioner that quickly took the opportunity to attack steel pipes imported from 
Vietnam. However, in this second CVD case, both of the mandatory respondents 
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successfully overturned Commerce’s preliminary determination and obtained a final 
determination by Commerce that they had not in fact received countervailable 
subsidies. This provides insight into arguments that Vietnamese producers may wish 
to make in future cases in order to avoid a CVD affirmative determination. 
 
5.4.2.2. Case Summary 
 
The U.S. domestic producers of circular welded carbon-quality steel pipe 
(“Steel Pipe”) filed a CVD petition against imports of the same product from India, 
Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam on October 26, 2011.1166 The U.S. 
domestic producers of Steel Pipe are comprised of Allied Tube and Conduit, JMC Steel 
Group, Wheatland Tube, and United States Steel Corporation (collectively, 
“Petitioners”).1167 
On December 15, 2011, Commerce selected SeAH Steel VINA Corp. (‘‘SeAH 
VINA’’) and Vietnam Haiphong Hongyuan Machinery Manufactory Co., Ltd. 
(‘‘Haiphong Hongyuan’’) as mandatory respondents.1168 
In this CVD proceeding, Commerce reaffirmed that the CVD law was 
applicable to Vietnam as an NME because on March 13, 2012, Public Law 112-99 (or 
the NME Act) was enacted, making clear that Commerce was officially permitted to 
apply it.1169 As with the PRCBs case, Commerce used the date of January 11, 2007, the 
date on which Vietnam became an official WTO Member, as the date from which 
Commerce would identify and measure subsidies in Vietnam for purposes of CVD 
investigations.1170  
 
1166 Circular Welded Carbon-Quality Steel Pipe from India, the Sultanate of Oman, the United Arab 
Emirates, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigations, 76 FR 
72173 (November 22, 2011) [hereinafter Steel Pipe CVD Initiation]. 
1167 Id. 
1168 Circular Welded Carbon-Quality Steel Pipe from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Preliminary 
Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Alignment of Final Countervailing Duty 
Determination with Final Antidumping Duty Determination, 77 FR 19211 (March 30, 2012) [hereinafter 
Steel Pipe CVD Prelim Affirmative Determination]. 
1169 Public Law 112-99 applies to this CVD case because it can apply retroactively to all proceedings 
initiated on or after November 20, 2006. 
1170 Steel Pipe CVD Prelim Affirmative Determination, supra note 1169, at 19214. 
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In the preliminary determination, Commerce concluded that Haiphong 
Hongyuan and SeAH VINA received countervailable subsidies from the following 
subsidized programs: (i) Import Duty Exemptions for Imported Raw Materials for 
Exported Goods; (ii) Import Duty Exemptions for Imported Fixed Assets, Spare Parts, 
and Accessories for Export Processing Enterprises or Export Processing Zones; and 
(iii) Import Duty Exemptions for Imported Fixed Assets, Spare Parts, and Accessories 
for Encouraged Projects.1171 Haiphong Hongyuan was determined to have received 
benefits from programs (i) and (ii) with respective calculated CVD rates of 8.04% and 
0.02%.1172 SeAH VINA was determined to have received a countervailable subsidy of 
0.04% under program (iii).1173 
At the on-site verification, both mandatory respondents succeeded in 
persuading Commerce that they did not receive countervailable subsidies under the 
preliminary determination. As a result, Commerce determined that the Petitioners’ 
alleged countervailable subsidies were not provided to Vietnamese producers and 
exporters of Steel Pipe.1174 Therefore, the CVD investigation against Steel Pipe 
imported from Vietnam was terminated because Commerce had reached a final 
negative determination.  
 
5.4.2.3. Use of benchmarks 
 
Commerce have reviewed all evidence on record and determined that neither 
respondent received preferential financing in the steel industry.1175 With respect to 
SeAH VINA’s land, Commerce found that SeAH VINA obtained its land-use rights 
prior to the cut-off date (January 11, 2007). Thus, Commerce concluded that SeAH 
 
1171 Id. at 19215-16. 
1172 Id. 
1173 Id. at 19216. 
1174 Circular Welded Carbon-Quality Steel Pipe from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Final Negative 
Countervailing Duty Determination, 77 FR 64471, 64472 (October 22, 2012) [hereinafter Steel Pipe 
CVD Final Negative Determination]. 
1175 Memorandum to Paul Piquado, Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the 
Countervailing Duty Investigation of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe from the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam (October 15, 2012) [hereinafter Steel Pipe CVD Final Decision Memo], at 31. 
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VINA did not receive countervailable benefits. With respect to Haiphong Hongyuan’s 
land, in the preliminary determination, Commerce found that Haiphong Hongyuan’s 
land price and terms of its lease were established through negotiations between 
Haiphong Hongyuan and an industrial development company (Hai Phong Do Son 
Industrial Joint Venture Company).1176 At the verification stage, Commerce further 
affirmed its finding that the authority to negotiate the price and enter into land use 
contracts in the Hai Phong Do Son Industrial Zone rests with the Hai Phong Do Son 
Industrial Zone Joint Venture Company.1177 As such, the provision of land-use rights 
within the industrial zone is not limited to an enterprise or industry located within a 
designated geographic zone.1178 Therefore, Commerce determined that Haiphong 
Hongyuan did not receive a benefit, and did not use this program.  
Because Commerce determined that both mandatory respondents did not 
benefit from policy lending and preferential land rent reduction/exemption programs, 
Commerce did not reach the issues of appropriate interest rate and land benchmarks. 
 
5.4.2.4. Analysis of Countervailable Subsidies 
 
5.4.2.4.1. Import Duty Exemptions on Imported Raw Materials for Export 
Processing Enterprises and Export Processing Zones 
 
Under this program, SeAH VINA verified that it paid the applicable import 
tariffs on its imported raw materials.1179 Therefore, SeAH VINA could prove that this 
program was not applicable to SeAH VINA. As for Haiphong Hongyuan, it reported to 
Commerce that it did not pay import duties on the imported raw materials used to 
produce exported goods because Haiphong Hongyuan was an export processing 
enterprise (i.e., a non-tariff area).1180 In fact, Haiphong Hongyuan is located in an 
 
1176 Steel Pipe CVD Prelim Affirmative Determination, supra note 1169, at 19217. 





export processing zone that is considered as a non-tariff area under the Vietnamese 
laws and regulations.1181 Pursuant to the GOV’s regulations, because Haiphong 
Hongyuan is an export processing enterprise, its imported goods from foreign countries 
into non-tariff zones for use only in non-tariff zones are not liable for import duties. 
Therefore, Haiphong Hongyuan did not pay any import duties on its imported raw 
materials in the first place and could not be said to have received an import duty 
exemption.1182 Accordingly, Commerce accepted that Haiphong Hongyuan did not 
receive a financial contribution from its duty-free imports of raw materials. 
For the above reasons, this program was non-countervailable as to both 
mandatory respondents. 
 
5.4.2.4.2. Import Duty Exemptions for Imported Fixed Assets, Spare Parts and 
Accessories for Export Processing Enterprises and Export Processing Zones 
 
This program was also determined not to be countervailable. Haiphong 
Hongyuan was an export processing enterprise and, as such, it qualified for the GOV’s 
regulations applicable to non-tariff areas.1183 Following the same principle that 
Haiphong Hongyuan’s imports of raw materials were not subject to duties, its imports 
of fixed assets, spare parts, and accessories were also not subject to duties.1184 Thus, 
Commerce determined that Haiphong Hongyuan did not receive a financial 
contribution from import duty exemption under this program. 
 
5.4.2.4.3. Import Duty Exemptions for Imported Fixed Assets, Spare Parts and 
Accessories for Encouraged Projects 
 
During the on-site verification, Commerce found that SeAH VINA did not 
receive any import duty exemptions under this program, although its investment 
 





certificate made it eligible to import these items duty free.1185 Instead, Commerce 
verified that SeAH VINA had paid the applicable duties for its imports of fixed assets, 
spare parts, and accessories.1186 Therefore, Commerce determined that SeAH VINA 




Among all CVD investigations against Vietnam up to this present time, this is 
the only CVD case where Commerce found that neither of the two Vietnamese 
mandatory respondents received countervailable subsidies. In this CVD case, both 
mandatory respondents were 100% foreign-owned enterprises. SeAH VINA is a 
wholly owned subsidiary of SeAH Steel Corp., based in South Korea. And Haiphong 
Hongyuan is wholly owned by MAT Holdings, Inc., which is located in the United 
States. Being foreign-owned enterprises was a positive factor for them in this CVD 
investigation. One of the reasons for their success in this case is that both of these 
companies maintained clear and transparent accounting bookkeeping and data related 
their sales and production. This was demonstrated by the fact that both companies could 
successfully meet on-site verifications by Commerce. Both respondents and the GOV 
worked closely in responding Commerce’s questions, and all actively participated up 
to the final stage of the investigation. 
The fact that SeAH VINA and Haiphong Hongyuan both did not receive 
benefits from the government loans and land rent exemption/reduction program was 
also a great advantage leading to their success. Accordingly, they could eliminate the 
risk of using external benchmarks that most of respondents in other CVD investigations 
cannot control due to the uncertainty and unpredictability of surrogate benchmarks. 
Vietnamese producers can derive lessons from this case. First, maintaining clear 
and transparent accounting will help to avoid an AFA determination during an 
investigation. Second, a respondent should, if possible, try to demonstrate that benefits 
 
1185 Id. at 25. 
1186 Id. 
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such as land-use rights were received prior to the cut-off date for applying the CVD 
law. Third, a respondent should consider declining government benefits where 
accepting them could result in the imposition of external benchmarks in a potential 
CVD investigation. 
 




Steel wire garment hangers were not among the key export products of Vietnam 
until 2008. After steel wire garment hangers from China were subject to Commerce’s 
AD order in 2008,1187 Vietnam’s export of steel wire garment hangers to the U.S. 
market began to increase. Unfortunately, in May 2010, M&B Metal Products Co., Inc. 
(“Petitioner”), asked Commerce to initiate and conduct an anti-circumvention inquiry 
into two Vietnamese companies to determine whether certain hangers, which were 
allegedly products of China exported from Vietnam, were circumventing the China AD 
order.1188 Commerce accepted the Petitioner and initiated an anti-circumvention 
inquiry in July 2010. Following its inquiry, Commerce finally affirmed that there was 
circumvention of the China AD order as a result of Angang’s assembly of China-origin, 
semi-finished hangers into finished garment hangers in Vietnam for export to the 
United States.1189 
Because of arrangements like this, it is inevitable that Vietnam will be the next 
target for the Petitioner’s request to initiate a concurrent antidumping and 
countervailing duty investigation against steel wire garment hangers from Vietnam. 
 
1187 Notice of Antidumping Duty Order: Steel Wire Garment Hangers from the People’s Republic of 
China, 73 FR 58111 (October 6, 2008). In this AD case, the two mandatory respondents Shanghai Wells 
Hanger Co., Ltd. and Shaoxing Gangyuan Metal Manufactured Co., Ltd., received AD duty rates of 
15.83% and 94.78% respectively. All other non-mandatory respondents received a rate of 55.31%, and 
the PRC-Wide rate is 187.25%. 
1188 Steel Wire Garment Hangers from the People’s Republic of China: Initiation of Anti-Circumvention 
Inquiry, 75 FR 42685 (July 22, 2010). 
1189 Steel Wire Garment Hangers from the People’s Republic of China: Affirmative Final Determination 
of Circumvention of the Antidumping Duty Order, 76 FR 66895 (October 28, 2011). 
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5.4.3.2. Case Summary 
 
In January 2012, Commerce officially initiated a parallel investigation for 
antidumping and countervailing duties against steel wire garment hangers fabricated 
from carbon steel wire (“Garment Hangers”) from Vietnam.1190 For the CVD case, 
Commerce continued to confirm that the CVD law is applicable to Vietnam as an NME 
country.1191 
The Petitioner alleged that the imports of Garment Hangers from Vietnam were 
benefiting from countervailable subsidies and that such imports caused, or threatened 
to cause, material injury to the U.S. industry.1192 The following programs were alleged 
as countervailable subsidies: preferential lending to exporters; the provision of goods 
or services for LTAR such as land rent reduction/exemption for FIEs, land rent 
reduction/exemption for an exporter, and land preferences for enterprises in 
encouraged industries or industrial zones; grants under the export promotion program; 
and tax programs such as income tax preferences for FIEs and enterprises in industrial 
zones, an income tax refund for reinvestment by FIEs, and import duty exemptions on 
imports of goods for encouraged projects and for raw materials for exported goods.1193 
In its final affirmative determination, Commerce concluded that 
countervailable subsidies were provided to the exporters and producers of Garment 
Hangers from Vietnam.1194 As a result, the CVD rate of 31.58% was assigned to 
Hamico Companies (including South East Asia Hamico Export Joint Stock Company 
(SEA Hamico), Nam A Hamico Export Joint Stock Company (Nam A), and Linh Sa 
 
1190 Steel Wire Garment Hangers from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Initiation of Countervailing 
Duty Investigation, 77 FR 3737 (January 25, 2012) [hereinafter Garment Hangers CVD Initiation]. 
1191 Certain Steel Wire Garment Hangers from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Preliminary 
Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Alignment of Final Countervailing Duty 
Determination with Final Antidumping Duty Determination, 77 FR 32930 (June 4, 2012). 
1192 Garment Hangers CVD Initiation, supra note 1191. 
1193 Id. 
1194 Certain Steel Wire Garment Hangers from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Final Affirmative 
Countervailing Duty Determination and Final Affirmative Critical Circumstances Determination, 77 FR 
75973 (December 26, 2012) [hereinafter Garment Hangers CVD Final Determination]. 
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Hamico Company Limited (Linh Sa)); the highest CVD rate of 90.42% was assigned 
to the Infinite Companies (including Infinite Industrial Hanger Limited (Infinite) and 
Supreme Hanger Company Limited (Supreme)) due to the use of adverse facts 
available (“AFA”).1195 Infinite Companies received an AFA rate due to its non-
cooperation during Commerce’s verification of information provided. Just before the 
verification, Infinite Companies withdrew and explained that “the level of the 
antidumping preliminary determination (i.e., 135.81%) and the reasons for that 
determination made [it] impossible to continue shipment and it is economically 
impossible to continue to participate in these investigations.”1196 For that reason, 
Infinite Companies received the highest CVD rate in this case. 
 
5.4.3.3. Analysis of Countervailable Subsidies 
 
Commerce finally found the following programs were countervailable: (i) 
preferential lending to exporters (or loan subsidies); (ii) land preferences from 
enterprises in encouraged industries or industrial zones (or land subsidies); and (iii) 
other tax programs such as corporate income tax reductions for newly established 
investment projects and import duty exemptions or reimbursements for raw 
materials.1197  
 
5.4.3.3.1. Loan Subsidies 
 
One of the lending institutions in Vietnam, Vietnam Joint Stock Commercial 
Bank for Industry and Trade (VietinBank), was found to have provided loans under an 
 
1195 Id. 
1196 Letter of Withdrawal from Proceeding filed on August 03, 2012, by Barnes, Richardson & Colburn, 
the law firm that represents Infinite, Case No. C-552-813. See also Steel Wire Garment Hangers from 
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and 
Postponement of Final Determination, 77 FR 46044 (August 2, 2012). 
1197 ITA, CVD Investigation: Certain Steel Wire Garment Hangers from the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam: Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination, Investigation C-552-813 
(December 17, 2012) [hereinafter Garment Hangers CVD Final Determination Memo]. 
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“export loan program” to SEA Hamico and Linh SA.1198 Under this export loan 
program, these two companies received preferential interest rates from VietinBank for 
their exporting activities.1199 VietinBank was regarded as a state-owned commercial 
bank (“SOCB”) because at the time of investigation VietinBank was 80% owned by 
the GOV.1200 Therefore, as in the preceding CVD cases, Commerce determined that the 
GOV provided a specific financial contribution to these companies through this 
preferential lending program. In order to calculate the benefit granted by this program, 
Commerce was required to calculate the difference between what the companies paid 
on the loans provided by VietinBank and the amount the companies would have paid 
on comparable, commercial loans.1201 This methodology is called adoption of an 
interest-rate benchmark. Pursuant to the CVD law, Commerce normally uses 
comparable commercial loans reported by the companies in question as a benchmark. 
If there are no comparable commercial loans during the period of investigation, 
Commerce would use “a national average interest rate for comparable commercial 
loans.” The benchmark to be used should be a market-based rate.1202 However, in the 
Garment Hangers case, Commerce chose to use an external, market-based benchmark 
interest rate to calculate the loan subsidies because it believed that the loans provided 
by VietinBank were distorted by a significant government intervention and, therefore, 
did not reflect the market interest rates. In other words, Commerce rejected the use of 
in-country loan benchmarks but used an external, market-based out-of-country 
benchmark interest rate. Specifically, Commerce used the same methodology that it 
had developed in its previous CVD investigations against China (e.g., in the CFS Paper 
and Thermal Paper cases) to calculate external benchmark interest rates based on the 
interest rates of those countries that were classified by the World Bank as lower-middle 
 
1198 Id. at 16. 
1199 Id. 
1200 Id. 
1201 Id. Section 771(5)(E)(ii) of the Act provides that the benefit for loans is the “difference between the 
amount the recipient of the loan pays on the loan and the amount the recipient would pay on a comparable 
commercial loan that the recipient could actually obtain on the market.” 
1202 Section 771(5)(E)(ii). 
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income countries having a gross national income similar to Vietnam.1203 As a result, 
Commerce used external benchmark interest rates to calculate the benefit from each 
loan that each company received from VietinBank. 
 
5.4.3.3.2. Land Subsidies 
 
In its subsidy analysis, Commerce found that the exemption of annual land rent 
applied to those companies which are located in “encouraged” industrial zones is a 
specific land subsidy.1204 This type of subsidy is provided under the form of a provision 
of a good that confers a benefit under the U.S. CVD law. Since Commerce believed 
that the land prices in Vietnam were not based on market principles, it used an external, 
market-based land rent benchmark to calculate the benefit conferred by this program. 
Specifically, Commerce analyzed “comparable market-based prices in another country 
at a comparable level of economic development within the geographic vicinity of 
Vietnam.”1205 By this analysis, Commerce selected the cities of Pune and Bangalore in 
India and then used “a simple average of all rental rates for industrial property in both 
cities” to use as the appropriate land benchmark for Vietnam.1206 This land benchmark 
methodology was previously used in PRCBs case. By using this methodology, 
Commerce calculated a net CVD rate of 25.41% for Hamico Companies, which 
occupies more than 80% of its total CVD rate.1207 
 
5.4.3.3.3. Other countervailable subsidies 
 
Commerce found that SEA Hamico received a 50% reduction in its income 
taxes payable in 2010.1208 Export performance was a condition to receive these 
incentives. Thus, Commerce determined that the income tax reduction and exemption 
 




1207 Id. see also Garment Hangers CVD Final Determination, supra note 1195. 
1208 Garment Hangers CVD Final Determination Memo, supra note 1196. 
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were financial contributions in the form of revenue foregone by the government, and 
they provide a benefit to SEA Hamico in the amount of tax savings.1209 
Commerce also found that SEA Hamico and Linh Sa received duty exemptions 
on imported raw materials.1210 Under the Vietnamese law, import duty exemptions or 
reimbursements for imported raw materials are granted to the following cases of 
import: “raw materials and supplies used for manufacture of equipment and 
machinery,” “raw materials, supplies and accessories imported for production activities 
of investment projects on the list of domains where investment is particularly 
encouraged or the list of geographical areas meeting with exceptional socio-economic 
difficulties,” “goods imported for processing for foreign partners then exported or 
goods exported to foreign countries for processing for Vietnam then re-imported under 
processing contracts”, and “raw materials or supplies imported for the production of 
export goods.”1211 In particular, SEA Hamico and Linh Sa received duty exemptions 
on raw materials for exported goods. In this case, Commerce repeated its finding in 
PRCBs case that “the GOV does not have in place a system to confirm which inputs 
are consumed in the production of the exported products and in what amounts, 
including a normal allowance for waste.”1212 As a result, Commerce determined that 
the import duty exemptions on raw materials conferred a benefit equal to the total 
amount of the duties exempted.1213 Based on that analysis, Commerce calculated a 




It is surprising that from the beginning of the investigation, Vietnam did not 




1211 Id. at 15. (citing the GOV’s March 30, 2012, questionnaire response at Exhibits 60). 




Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOIT), on behalf of the GOV, directly participated, 
prepared, and responded to all questionnaires and supplemental questionnaires issued 
by Commerce during this CVD investigation.1215 Undoubtedly, VCA had to do a lot of 
work in this case. For example, for only for the original questionnaire response, VCA’s 
submission consisted of nearly 4,000 pages, including 103 exhibits.1216 One of the 
selected mandatory respondents, Hamico Companies, also did not hire any counsel to 
help them. Right at the beginning of the investigation, Barnes, Richardson & Colburn 
filed a letter to Commerce to withdraw its representation for Hamico Companies and 
asked Commerce to send all future correspondence to Hamico Companies directly.1217 
What is even more surprising is that Hamico Companies decided to fight alone without 
hiring a counsel in the parallel antidumping investigation.1218 In the AD investigation, 
Hamico Companies was finally assigned a duty rate of 220.68% as a Vietnam-Wide 
entity due to its non-cooperation.1219 When combined with the CVD rate, Hamico 
Companies received the worst total rate of any case against Vietnam: 252.26% for both 
AD and CVD. 
In sum, the strategies that the mandatory respondents and VCA pursued for this 
CVD proceeding should be reconsidered. This case was an expensive lesson for 
Vietnamese exporters as well as management authorities in terms of the importance of 
coordination and cooperation with Commerce. 
 
 
1215 See GOV’s CVD Response: Steel Wire Garment Hangers from Vietnam, March 30, 2012, Public 
Version, Case No. C-552-813. 
1216 Id. 
1217 Barnes/Richardson, Steel Wire Hangers from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Withdrawal as 
Counsel, Public Document, Case No. C-552-813, February 24, 2012. 
1218 Barnes/Richardson, Steel Wire Hangers from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Withdrawal as 
Counsel, Public Document, Case No. A-552-812, February 24, 2012. 
1219 Steel Wire Garment Hangers from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Final Determination of Sales 
at Less Than Fair Value and Final Affirmative Determination of Critical Circumstances, 77 FR 75980 
(December 26, 2012). Hamico failed to provide the information requested by Commerce in a timely 
manner and in the form required, which significantly impeded the Commerce’s ability to calculate an 
accurate margin. Commerce was unable to calculate a margin without the necessary information, 
requiring the application of facts otherwise available to Hamico. Id. 
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Shrimp imports from Vietnam into the U.S. market have increased significantly 
since 2009.1220 According to U.S. import statistics, the value of Vietnam’s frozen 
warmwater shrimp imports into the United States increased from US$369 million in 
2009 to US$493 million in 2011.1221 Besides Vietnam, the United States has also 
imported shrimp from many other countries such as China, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, 
Thailand, and Malaysia.1222 These countries are also large shrimp exporters to the U.S. 
market. In 2011 alone, Indonesia’s shrimp exports to the U.S. market were valued 
nearly US$667.7 million.1223 Ecuador and India also exported at significant values to 
the U.S., reaching US$523.6 million and US$511.7 million, respectively.1224 
Among the above exporting countries, China, India, Thailand, and Vietnam 
have been subject to antidumping duty orders since 2005.1225 Normally, the continued 
increase in shrimp imports into the U.S. market is a threat to American domestic shrimp 
processors. However, although those exporting countries with large quantities of 
shrimp imported to the U.S. market have been subject to AD orders (except for 
Indonesia and Malaysia), their AD duty rates are not high enough to reduce or stop 
their continued exports to the U.S. market. This, of course, has not satisfied the 
 
1220 U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Fact Sheet, Commerce Initiates 
Countervailing Duty Investigations of Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the People’s Republic 
of China, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. 
Available at https://enforcement.trade.gov/download/factsheets/factsheet_multiple-shrimp-cvd-init-





1225 Notice of Amended Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Antidumping Duty 
Order: Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the People’s Republic of China, 70 FR 5149 (February 
1, 2005); Notice of Amended Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Antidumping 
Duty Order: Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from India, 70 FR 5147 (February 1, 2005); Notice of 
Amended Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Antidumping Duty Order: Certain 
Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from Thailand, 70 FR 5145 (February 1, 2005); Notice of Amended Final 
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Antidumping Duty Order: Certain Frozen 
Warmwater Shrimp from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 70 FR 5152-01 (February 1, 2005). 
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competing domestic shrimp processors. For example, in 2011, Vietnamese shrimp 
exporters, under Commerce’s administrative review for the period of 2009-2010, 
received very low cash deposit rates (effective as of September 12, 2011) in the range 
of 0.83 percent to 1.15 percent.1226 Similarly, Chinese exporters received the dumping 
margins of 0.04 percent and 0.00 percent from their own administrative review by 
Commerce.1227 Indian shrimp exporters similarly received a very low dumping margin 
of 1.69 percent for the same period of review.1228 
As a result of the increase of shrimp imports from other countries into the U.S. 
market, along with the very low antidumping duty rates that some export countries have 
enjoyed, American shrimp producers unsurprisingly decided to initiate another trade 
remedy fight. 
 
5.4.4.2. Case Summary 
 
On December 28, 2012, the Coalition of Gulf Shrimp Industries (“Petitioner”), 
an American business association representing its members who are producers and 
wholesalers of shrimps, filed a CVD petition to allege that China, Ecuador, India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam provided subsidies to their exporters and 
producers of frozen warmwater shrimps.1229  
In its petition, the Petitioner accused Vietnam of maintaining 20 subsidy 
programs.1230 In addition to the GOV’s mandatory participating role, Minh Qui 
Seafood Co., Ltd. (Minh Qui), and Nha Trang Seaproduct Company (Nha Trang) were 
selected as two mandatory respondents because, in terms of quantity and value 
 
1226 Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Final Results and Final 
Partial Rescission of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 76 FR 56158 (September 12, 2011). 
1227 Administrative Review of Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the People’s Republic of China: 
Final Results and Partial Rescission of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 76 FR 51940 (August 
19, 2011). 
1228 Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from India: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative 
Review, Partial Rescission, and Final No Shipment Determination, 76 FR 41203 (July 13, 2011). 
1229 Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the People’s Republic of China, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Thailand, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Initiation of Countervailing Duty 
Investigations, 78 FR 5416 (January 25, 2013) [hereinafter VN Shrimp CVD Initiation]. 
1230 Id. 
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imported into the U.S. market, they were the two largest exporters and producers of 
shrimp in Vietnam during the period of investigation.1231  
In its final determination, Commerce determined that both Minh Qui and Nha 
Trang had received several countervailable subsidies from government programs. In 
particular, Minh Qui was subjected to a CVD rate of 7.88%, up from 5.08% in the 
preliminary determination,1232 and Nha Trang received a CVD rate of 1.15%,1233 which 
was significantly reduced from 7.05%.1234 All other companies finally received the “all 
others” rate of 4.52%, which is an average based on the final rates of Minh Qui and 
Nha Trang.1235 
In its separate investigations, Commerce determined that Indonesia and 
Thailand’s producers received no countervailable subsidies.1236 On the other hand, 
Vietnam and the other four countries including China, Malaysia, India, and Ecuador all 
received final affirmative determinations. However, at the final stage of USITC 
proceeding, all five countries successfully persuaded USITC to make a negative injury 
determination. Specifically, USITC determined that no industry in the United States 
was materially injured or threatened with material injury, and the establishment of the 
shrimp industry in the United States was not materially impaired by reason of frozen 
warmwater shrimp imports from China, Ecuador, India, Malaysia, and Vietnam.1237 As 
a result of the USITC’s final ruling, Commerce did not issue CVD orders. 
 
 
1231 Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Final Affirmative 
Countervailing Duty Determination, 78 FR 50387 (August 19, 2013) [hereinafter VN Shrimp CVD Final 
Determination]. 
1232 Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Preliminary 
Countervailing Duty Determination, 78 FR 33342 (June 4, 2013) [hereinafter VN Shrimp CVD Prelim 
Determination]. 
1233 VN Shrimp CVD Final Determination, supra note 1232. 
1234 VN Shrimp CVD Prelim Determination, supra note 1233. 
1235 VN Shrimp CVD Final Determination, supra note 1232. 
1236 Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the Republic of Indonesia: Final Negative Countervailing 
Duty Determination, 78 FR 50383 (August 19, 2013); Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from 
Thailand: Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determination, 78 FR 50379 (August 19, 2013). 
1237 U.S. ITC, Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from China, Ecuador, India, Malaysia, and Vietnam, 
Investigation Nos. 701-TA-491-493, 495, and 497 (Final), Publication 4429 (October 2013). 
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5.4.4.3. Use of Benchmarks 
 
5.4.4.3.1. Interest Rate Benchmarks 
 
Based on an analysis of Vietnam’s banking sector, Commerce believed that 
Vietnam’s domestic interest rates were not market-determined but rather were distorted 
by the GOV’s predominant role in the banking sector.1238 Commerce pointed out that 
Vietnam’s predominant role was manifested through indirect and direct ownership of 
commercial banks, and also through other means such as interest rate control, policy, 
plans and administrative guidance.1239 From this analysis, Commerce determined that 
Tier-1 benchmarks were not appropriate, and, therefore, Commerce went on to select 
an external, market-based benchmark interest rate.1240 
Counsel for the GOV and mandatory respondents (“VN Counsel”) objected to 
Commerce’s determination, arguing that Commerce’s analysis did not compare the 
GOV’s interventions in the banking system in Vietnam with interventions conducted 
by other central banks.1241 Further, VN Counsel stated that absent an objective standard, 
Commerce could not make a judgment on whether Vietnam’s banking sector or that of 
a country used for an external benchmark was market based.1242 Therefore, VN Counsel 
claimed that Commerce’s analysis was not a proper analysis because it ignored the 
assessment of central bank interventions in other countries.1243 Interestingly, VN 
Counsel raised the questions of whether there was an interest rate market in the United 
States when “the Federal Reserve has manipulated interest rates to low single digits” 
and “held them at that level for nearly five years,” or in India, “a country which has a 
 
1238 Decision Memorandum for the Preliminary Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation 
of Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 78 ITADOC 33342 (May 
28, 2013) [hereinafter VN Shrimp CVD Prelim Memo], at 13. 
1239 Id. 
1240 Id. 
1241 Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle LLP, Case Brief on Behalf of the GOV, MPG, and NTSF: 
Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from Vietnam, Investigation Case No.: C-552-815, Public Version 




history both of controlling interest rates and of state ownership of a majority of the 
banking sector.”1244 
In response to VN Counsel’s arguments, Commerce stated that neither the CVD 
law nor Commerce’s regulations require it to compare the interventions of the SBV in 
its financial market to the actions of the central banks of other countries.1245 Commerce 
further explained that it deals only with the issues in this case and only for the parties 
involved in this investigation.1246 Finally, Commerce was silent on VN Counsel’s 
questions about whether there was an interest rate market in the United States or India.  
 
5.4.4.3.2. Land Benchmarks 
 
Commerce referred to the PRCBs case for the proposition that it could not rely 
on a Tier-1 Benchmark to determine whether the GOV was receiving adequate 
remuneration for land.1247 In this case, Commerce reiterated that the GOV retained 
ultimate ownership of all land in Vietnam and that all land prices in Vietnam were 
determined by the government through decrees and regulations.1248 Although 
Commerce was aware of some sub-leasing transactions between private parties, it 
found that the GOV had placed restrictions on those leasing rights.1249 Also, Commerce 
found that the GOV had significant control over the supply of land in the market 
through conversions and that the GOV (not the market) decided the allocation of land 
in Vietnam.1250 
From the above analysis, Commerce continued to adopt the same methodology 
of external benchmarking that it used in PRCBs case to measure the benefit from 
 
1244 Id. 
1245 Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty 
Investigation of Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp From Vietnam, 78 ITADOC 50387 (August 19, 
2013) [hereinafter VN Shrimp CVD Final Memo], at Comment 5. 
1246 Id. 





industrial land leased from the GOV.1251 In particular, Commerce selected Hyderabad 
in India as a surrogate source for choosing rental rates for industrial property.1252 
Commerce explained that it selected Hyderabad because it had the closest population 
density to the areas in which the respondents under this investigation are located.1253 
With respect to aquacultural land leased from the GOV, since Commerce could not 
find any related Indian rate, it relied on “ranged publicly available data on agricultural 
land prices” in Ecuador.1254  
VN Counsel of course objected to the use of external benchmarking for land in 
Vietnam. VN Counsel proposed that Commerce use a Tier-1 Benchmark for the 
following reasons: (i) record evidence established that land-use rights in Vietnam were 
sold based on market principles, and (ii) land rents charged by the GOV were based on 
market prices for comparable transactions involving only private parties.1255 
Notwithstanding VN Counsel’s arguments, Commerce has consistently affirmed its 
Preliminary Determination that Tier-3 Benchmarks should be used to measure the 
benefit from the provision of land rents in Vietnam. 
 
5.4.4.4. Analysis of Countervailable Subsidies 
 
Commerce found the GOV had targeted its aquaculture and seafood processing 
industries for development.1256 To achieve this development goal, the state-run 
commercial banks under the GOV’s control provided loans to companies operating in 
these industries.1257 According to Commerce, such loans confer benefits on the 
companies and are, thus, countervailable subsidies. Accordingly, Commerce used 
external benchmark interest rates to calculate the subsidies that the respondents had 






1255 VN Case Brief, supra note 1242, at 34-35. 
1256 VN Shrimp CVD Final Memo, supra note 1246. 
1257 Id. 
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at 0.26%.1258 In addition, Minh Phu Group was found to have participated in an export 
lending program provided by VietinBank.1259 This program is regarded as an export 
loan that confers a specific benefit to Minh Phu Group. By comparing the interest rate 
benchmark to this export loan, Minh Phu Group was calculated to have received a net 
subsidy of 1.17%.1260  
Besides the above lending programs, such programs as income tax preferences, 
import duty exemptions/reimbursements for imported raw materials for exported 
goods, and farmer subsidies were found to be countervailable subsidies. Among these 
subsidy programs, only Minh Phu Group received the highest CVD rate at 8.34% for 
the program of import duty reimbursement for imported raw materials for exported 
goods. This subsidy program has often appeared in previous cases. In previous 
investigations, Commerce always concluded that the GOV does not have in place a 
system to confirm which inputs are consumed in the production of the exported 
products and in what amounts, including a normal allowance for waste.1261 In this case, 
Commerce continued to find that the GOV’s system does not account for resalable 
waste, because such waste is exempt from duties.1262 As a result, Commerce continued 




The negative determination by the USITC marked a great victory for the shrimp 
industry in Vietnam after nearly a year pursuing the proceeding before both Commerce 
and the USITC. This was also the second success following the Steel Pipe case, wherein 
the USITC has also issued a negative determination of injury or threat to the U.S. 
domestic steel pipe industry. The success of Vietnam and other countries in the ITC’s 
final decision proves that the U.S. domestic shrimp industry has not suffered any 
 
1258 Id. at 13. 
1259 Id. at 14. 
1260 Id. at 15. 
1261 Id. at 20. 
1262 Id. 
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adverse effects from imported shrimp into the U.S. market. Moreover, the case shows 
that continued participation in the investigation by the producers and the GOV, coupled 
with capable counsel litigating the question of injury, is instrumental to a favorable 
outcome in a CVD proceeding. 
 




Following the final determination in the Frozen Warmwater Shrimp CVD case, 
from 2014 to 2019, Commerce initiated three other CVD investigations against 
Vietnamese exporters and producers in the industries of steel nails (“Steel Nails”), 
laminated woven sacks (“LWS”), and utility scale wind towers (“USWT”).1263 These 
three CVD investigations were all accompanied by parallel antidumping investigations 
concerning the same products.1264 Like previous CVD investigations, the exporters and 
producers of steel nails, laminated woven sacks, and utility scale wind towers were 
found to have received benefits from a range of government subsidies such as income 
tax preferences; preferential lending policies; import duty exemptions; and 
reimbursements for imported raw materials for exported goods, land rent exemptions, 
and provision of utilities for LTAR in industrial zones.1265 
 
1263 Certain Steel Nails from India, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Sultanate of Oman, Taiwan, the 
Republic of Turkey, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Initiation of Countervailing Duty 
Investigations, 79 FR 36014 (June 25, 2014); Laminated Woven Sacks from the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam: Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation, 83 FR 14253 (April 3, 2018); Utility Scale 
Wind Towers from Canada, Indonesia, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Initiation of 
Countervailing Duty Investigations, 84 FR 38216 (August 6, 2019). 
1264 Certain Steel Nails from India, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Sultanate of Oman, Taiwan, the 
Republic of Turkey, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Initiation of Less-Than-FairValue 
Investigations, 79 FR 36019 (June 25, 2014); Laminated Woven Sacks from the Socialist Republic of  
Vietnam: Initiation of Less-Than-Fair-Value Investigation, 83 FR  
14257 (April 3, 2018); Utility Scale Wind Towers from Canada, Indonesia, the  
Republic of Korea, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Initiation  
of Less-Than-Fair-Value Investigations, 84 FR 37992 (August 5, 2019). 
1265 See ITA, Decision Memorandum for the Preliminary Determination in the Countervailing Duty 
Investigation of Certain Steel Nails from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (October 27, 2014); ITA, 
Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation 
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5.4.5.2. Steel Nails 
 
In the Steel Nails case, Commerce preliminarily found that certain government 
subsidies benefited the two subject producers and exporters in Vietnam, namely Region 
Industries Co., Ltd. (“Region”), and United Nail Products Co., Ltd. (“United Nail”). 
The CVD rates were preliminarily calculated at very low rates of 8.35% and 0.17% for 
Region and United Nail, respectively.1266 Region was subjected to a higher rate than 
United Nail because Region received the benefits from the program of import duty 
exemptions and reimbursements for imported raw materials for exported goods. For 
this specific subsidy program of exemptions and reimbursements, Region received a 
CVD rate of 8.34% (the remaining 0.01% came from rent exemptions, discussed 
below). This program of import duty exemptions and reimbursements had also been 
determined to be a countervailable subsidy in other previous cases. It is important to 
understand why this particular program has repeatedly been regarded as a government 
subsidy. Under Commerce’s regulations, an import duty exemption on raw materials 
for exported goods cannot exceed the amount of duty levied; otherwise, the excess 
amount exempted confers a countervailable benefit.1267 Further, Commerce instructed 
that the foreign government under investigation must have a system or procedure to 
confirm which inputs are consumed in production and in what amounts, and such 
system or procedure must be reasonable, effective for the purposes intended and based 
on generally accepted commercial practices in the country of export; otherwise, the 
exemptions confer a benefit equal to the total amount of duties exempted.1268 After 
reviewing the responses and supporting documents submitted by the mandatory 
 
of Laminated Woven Sacks from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (April 4, 2019) [LWS Final IDM]; 
ITA, Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty 
Investigation of Utility Scale Wind Towers from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (June 29, 2020) 
[Wind Towers Final IDM]. 
1266 Certain Steel Nails from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing 
Duty Determination and Alignment of Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Final Antidumping 
Duty Determination, 79 FR 65184 (November 3, 2014). 
1267 See 19 CFR 351.519(a)(1)(i); Decision Memorandum for the Preliminary Determination in the 
Countervailing Duty Investigation of Certain Steel Nails from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 79 
ITADOC 65184 (October 27, 2014) [hereinafter Steel Nails CVD Prelim Memo], at 18. 
1268 See 19 CFR 351.519(a)(4); Steel Nails CVD Prelim Memo, supra note 1269. 
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respondents and the GOV, Commerce concluded that the GOV does not have in place 
an adequate system to confirm which inputs are consumed in production of the exported 
products and in what amounts, including a normal allowance for waste.1269 In addition, 
Commerce stated that the government of Vietnam does not account for resalable waste 
because such waste is exempt from duties.1270 Therefore, firstly, the program of import 
duty exemptions on raw materials was deemed to confer a benefit equal to the total 
amount of the duties exempted. Secondly, because the import duty exemptions on raw 
materials are contingent upon export performance, such exemptions were concluded to 
be specific and constituted a financial contribution in the form of forgone revenue.1271 
With respect to the land rent exemption, Region was found to have received a specific 
benefit under this program. The reason Region received a very low CVD rate (0.01%) 
for this subsidy is that, under the land contract, Region was not required to pay lump-
sum payments at the time the land contract was signed.1272 Instead, the land contract 
called for annual rent payments, which the GOV exempted for Region.1273 Because 
such an annual rent exemption constitutes a recurring subsidy, Commerce allocates the 
benefit accruing from the rent exemption only to the year in which the exemption was 
received.1274 
As for United Nail, Commerce determined that United Nail received certain 
benefits from income tax reductions and preferential lending from the Bank for 
Investment and Development of Vietnam (or BIDV).1275 With respect to the 
preferential lending program, like in previous cases, Commerce maintained the position 
it took in Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from Vietnam that the domestic interest rate in 
Vietnam is distorted due to GOV’s continued control of the banking sector through 
direct and indirect ownership and through other means such as control of interest rate, 
 
1269 Steel Nails CVD Prelim Memo, supra note 1269. 
1270 Id. at 20. 
1271 Id. 
1272 Id. at 22. 
1273 Id. 
1274 Id. 
1275 Id. at 13-18. 
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policy, plans and administrative guidance.1276 Therefore, Commerce continued to use 
an external, market-based benchmark interest rate in calculating the benefit received 
by United Nail under the preferential lending program. As a result, United Nail’s VND 
loans from BIDV was determined to be a countervailable subsidy, resulting in a CVD 
rate of 0.10%.1277 
In general, the total CVD rate of 0.17% was a successful outcome for United 
Nail because this de minimis rate will be treated as zero.1278 However, because this 
CVD investigation was accompanied by a parallel antidumping investigation for the 
same steel nails products manufactured and exported by United Nail, the antidumping 
results also impacted whether Steel Nail could avoid a trade remedy altogether. In the 
parallel AD investigation, on December 29, 2014, Commerce preliminarily decided 
that the dumping margins for Region and United Nail were 103.88% and 93.42%, 
respectively.1279 The other Vietnamese companies that were not selected as mandatory 
respondents received the rate that was applicable to a Vietnam-Wide Entity: 
323.99%.1280 Needless to say, Region and United Nail were extremely disappointed 
with such high AD margins. As a result, on January 5, 2015 and January 8, 2015, United 
Nail and Region respectively informed Commerce that they wanted to withdraw from 
the CVD investigation.1281 In the withdrawal letters, the two companies did not explain 
why they withdrew. However, the reasonable inference is that they did not want to 
expend more financial resources when they foresaw high antidumping duty rates that 
would effectively preclude future exports to the United States. Because both mandatory 
respondents withdrew their participation during the post-preliminary stage, Commerce 
 
1276 Id. at 10-11. 
1277 Id. at 15. 
1278 See supra, Section 3.2.2.3, De Minimis Countervailable Subsidies for more details on the de minimis 
standards. 
1279 Certain Steel Nails from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Preliminary Determination of Sales at 
Less Than Fair Value and Postponement of Final Determination and Extension of Provisional Measures, 
79 FR 78058-01 (December 29, 2014). 
1280 Id. 
1281 ITA Case No C-552-819, Kutak Rock LLP, Letter of Withdrawal from Proceeding, Certain Steel 
Nails from Vietnam; Upcoming Verification, submitted on behalf of United Nail, January 5, 2015; ITA 
Case No C-552-819, Kutak Rock LLP, Letter of Withdrawal from Proceeding, Certain Steel Nails from 
Vietnam; Upcoming Verification, submitted on behalf of Region, January 8, 2015. 
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applied adverse facts available to calculate the subsidy rates for them. In the final 
determination, Region received a subsidy rate of 288.56% and United Nail received a 
rate of 313.97%.1282 Their withdrawal from the CVD proceeding negatively influenced 
the results calculated for the other companies that were not selected as mandatory 
respondents. All other companies received an average rate of 301.27%.1283 
The CVD rates calculated for Region, United Nail and other companies in the 
preliminary and final stages are summarized in the table below. 
 
Table 1: Preliminary Calculation Data for Region1284 
Program Name Preliminary Rate 
Land Rent Exemption 0.01% 
Import Duty Reimbursement for Imported Raw Materials 




Table 2: Preliminary Calculation Data for United Nail1285 
Program Name Preliminary Rate 
Preferential Lending 0.10% 
Income Tax, Decree 24 0.02% 
Income Tax, Decree 60 0.01% 
Import Duty Exemption 0.04% 
Total 0.17% 
 
Table 3: Final Calculation Data for Region, United Nail and All-Others 
Rate1286 
 
1282 Certain Steel Nails from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty 
Determination, 80 FR 28962-01 (May 20, 2015). 
1283 Id. 
1284 Attachment List Excel File, Region Industries Co., Ltd.: Preliminary Calculation Memorandum, 
ITA, US Department of Commerce, Investigation No. C-552-819, AD/CVD OI: SB, PUBLIC 
VERSION, October 27, 2014. 
1285 Attachment 1, United Nail Products Co., Ltd. Preliminary Calculation Memorandum, ITA, US 
Department of Commerce, Investigation No. C-552-819, AD/CVD I: TES, PUBLIC VERSION, October 
27, 2014. 
1286 Final Calculation Memorandum for Region Industries Co., Ltd., United Nail Products Co., Ltd., and 
the All-Others Rate, ITA, US Department of Commerce, Investigation No. C-552-819, AD/CVD I: TES, 
Public Document, May 13, 2015. 
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Program Name AFA Rate Export Subsidies 
Preferential Lending to Exporters 1.17% 1.17% 
Income Tax Preferences  25.00%  
Import Duty Exemptions and Reimbursements for 
Imported Raw Materials for Exported Goods 4.46% 4.46% 
Import Duty Exemption on Equipment and Machinery 
Imported to Create Fixed Assets for Preferred Industries 0.03%  
Provision of Wire Rod for Less Than Adequate 
Remuneration (LTAR) 25.41%  
Land Rent Exemptions Under Decision 189 25.41%  
Export Factoring 1.17% 1.17% 
Financial Guarantees 1.17% 1.17% 
Export Credits from the Vietnam Development Bank 0.21% 0.21% 
Interest Rate Support Program under the State Bank of 
Vietnam (SBV) 0.05%  
Export Promotion Program 25.41% 25.41% 
Land Preferences for Enterprises in Encouraged Industries 
or Industrial Zones under Decree 142 25.41%  
Land Rent Reduction/Exemption for Exporters 25.41%  
Land Use Fees or Leases Exemptions/Reductions (Article 
26 of Decree 108) 25.41%  
Import Duty Exemption on Equipment and Machinery 
Imported to Create Fixed Assets in Designated Geographic 
Areas 0.03%  
Land-Use Levy Exemption/Reduction (Article 17 of 
Decree 51) 25.41%  
Land-Rent Exemption/Reduction (Article 18 of Decree 51) 25.41%  
Land Use Tax Exemptions/Reductions (Article 19 of 
Decree 51) 25.41%  
Investment Support (Article 30 of Decree 51) 1.17%  
Infrastructure Development Investment Support (Article 8 
of Decree 51) 25.41%  
Land Preferences for Enterprises in Encouraged Industries 
or Industrial Zones 25.41%  
United 313.97% 33.59% 
Region 288.56% 33.59% 
All Others 301.27% 33.59% 
 
From the above tables, at the preliminary stage, United Nail successfully 
received a de minimis rate of zero percent. The major subsidy programs that both 
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Region and United Nail received are related to import duty reimbursements or 
exemptions and the land rent exemptions. Region, however, received a higher CVD 
rate due to its receiving benefits from import duty reimbursements for imported raw 
materials for exported goods.  
 
5.4.5.3. Laminated Woven Sacks and Utility Scale Wind Towers Cases 
 
Due to the scope of this study, the author briefly lists below the subsidy 
programs and corresponding CVD rates as determined by Commerce in the Laminated 
Woven Sacks and Utility Scale Wind Towers cases. 
 
5.4.5.3.1. Laminated Woven Sacks from Vietnam 
 
The two mandatory respondents in the Laminated Woven Sacks case were 
Duong Vinh Hoa Packaging Company (“DVH”) and Xinsheng Plastic Industry 
Company (“Xinsheng”).  
 
Table 4: Preliminary and Final Calculation Data for DVH1287 





Preferential Lending to Exporters  1.60% 1.38% 
Income Tax Preferences to Companies in Special 
Zones  
0.51% 0.51% 
Import Duty Exemptions on Imports of Raw Materials 
for Exporting Goods 
1.13% 1.13% 
Total 3.24% 3.02% 
 
 
1287 Countervailing Duty Investigation of Laminated Woven Sacks from the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam: Preliminary Calculation Memorandum for Duong Vinh Hoa Packaging Company Limited, 
ITA, Department of Commerce, Investigation C-552-824, Public Version, E&C/OIV: AG, August 6, 
2018; Countervailing Duty Investigation of Laminated Woven Sacks from the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam: Final Calculation Memorandum for Duong Vinh Hoa Packaging Company Limited, ITA, 
Department of Commerce, Investigation C-552-824, Public Version, E&C/OIV: AG, April 4, 2019. 
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Table 5: Preliminary Calculation Data for Xinsheng1288 
Countervailable Subsidy Programs Ad Valorem Rate 
Preferential Lending to Exporters  0.00% 
Income Tax Preferences to Companies in Special Zones  0.08% 
Import Duty Exemptions on Imports of Raw Materials into 
"NonTariff Export Processing Zones" 
 
6.06% 
Import Duty Exemptions on Imports of Spare Parts and 










Preferential Lending and Export Credits 
from the Vietnam Development Bank 
1.38%  
 
DVH’s calculated rate Preferential lending to exporters 1.38% 
Interest rate support program  1.38% 
Export factoring  1.38% 
Financial guarantees for export activities 1.38% 
Land rent reductions or exemptions for 








Calculated for the Hamico 
Companies in Certain Steel Wire 
Garment Hangers from the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam: 
Final Affirmative Countervailing 
Duty Determination and Final 
Affirmative Critical 
Circumstances Determination, 77 
FR 75973 (December 26, 2012) 
(Hangers from Vietnam) for the 
“Land Preferences for Enterprises 
in Encouraged Industries or 
Industrial Zones” program 
 
Land rent exemptions for exporters  
Land rent exemptions for foreign-invested 
enterprises  
Land rent exemptions for enterprises 
located in special zones  
Provision of utilities for LTAR in 
industrial zones  






Vietnam Tax Rate - See 
Memorandum, “Countervailing 
Duty Investigation: Laminated 
Woven Sacks (LWS) from the 
Income tax preferences for companies in 
special zones 
Income tax preferences for small and 
medium sized enterprises 
 
1288 Countervailing Duty Investigation of Laminated Woven Sacks from the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam: Preliminary Calculation Memorandum for Xinsheng Plastic Industry Co., Ltd., ITA, 
Department of Commerce, Investigation C-552-824, Public Version, E&C/OIV: AG, August 6, 2018. 
1289 Attachment I, Countervailing Duty Investigation of Laminated Woven Sacks from the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam: Final Calculation Memorandum for Xinsheng Plastic Industry Co., Ltd., ITA, 
Department of Commerce, Investigation C-552-824, Public Document, E&C/OIV: TEM, April 4, 2019. 
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Income tax exemptions and reductions for 
business expansion and intensive 
investment 
25.00% Socialist Republic of Vietnam; 
Verification Report: The 
Government of the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam,” dated 
October 25, 2018 at 3. 
Preferential income tax programs for 
foreign invested entities 
Import duty exemptions on imports of raw 




DVH’s calculated rate 
Import duty exemption on imports of 
spare parts and accessories for companies 





Calculated for the Hamico 
Companies in Hangers from 
Vietnam for the “Import Duty 
Exemptions or Reimbursements 
for Raw Materials” program 
Import duty exemptions for foreign-
invested entities 
Import duty Exemptions on Imported Raw 
Materials for Export Processing 
Enterprises and Export Processin 
Export Promotion Program 25.41% Calculated for the Hamico 
Companies in Hangers from 
Vietnam for the “Land Preferences 
for Enterprises in Encouraged 
Industries or Industrial Zones” 
program 
Total  198.87%  
 
In this case, DVH received very low CVD rates at both the preliminary and 
final stages. The two subsidy programs that account for the highest proportion of the 
final CVD rate for DVH are (1) preferential lending to exporters and (2) import duty 
exemptions on imports of raw materials for exported goods. 
In the case of Xinsheng, at the preliminary stage, Xinsheng received a total 
CVD rate of 6.15%. The subsidy programs from which Xinsheng received the most 
benefits were import duty exemptions on imports of raw materials into “non-tariff 
export processing zones.” However, at the final stage of Commerce’s investigation, 
Xinsheng withdrew its participation from the CVD investigation. Consequently, 
Xinsheng was subject to an AFA rate of 198.87% because of its non-cooperation.  
 
5.4.5.3.2. Utility Scale Wind Towers from Vietnam 
 
In this CVD investigation, Commerce selected only one mandatory respondent, 
CS Wind Vietnam. 
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Table 7: Preliminary and Final Calculation Data for CS Wind Vietnam1290 
Subsidy Programs Preliminary 
CVD Ad 
Valorem Rate 
Final CVD  Ad 
Valorem Rate 
Income Tax Preferences under Chapter V of Decree 
24 
0.29% 0.29% 
Import Duty Exemptions on Imports of Spare Parts 
and Accessories in Industrial Zones 
0.02% 0.40% 
Import Duty Exemptions on Imports of Raw Materials 
for Exporting Goods 
2.12% 2.16% 
Total 2.43% 2.84% 
 
Based on the above table of results, the final CVD rate calculated for CS Wind 
Vietnam was 2.84 percent. As in other previous cases, the program of import duty 
exemptions on imports of raw materials for exported goods accounts for a very large 




In summary, through these three CVD investigations, one lesson learned is that 
a respondent must carefully consider the potential economic impact of withdrawal from 
cooperation with Commerce in a CVD investigation. Moreover, a respondent must 
consider the potential impact of its withdrawal on other companies. In addition, in a 
CVD case, the role of the GOV is crucial to the outcome of an investigation. It is 
extremely important for the GOV to respond promptly, timely, and accurately to 
Commerce’s questionnaires. The GOV must coordinate well with those companies that 
are selected as mandatory respondents to develop and carry out a consistent strategy 
 
1290 Attachment I, Preliminary Calculations, Public Information, Preliminary Determination of 
Countervailing Duty Investigation of Utility Scale Wind Towers from Vietnam: Calculation 
Memorandum for CS Wind Tower Co., Ltd., ITA, Department of Commerce, Investigation C-552-826, 
Public Version, E&C O/IV: DF, December 6, 2019; Attachment I, Final Calculations, Public 
Information, Final Determination of Countervailing Duty Investigation of Utility Scale Wind Towers 
from Vietnam: Calculation Memorandum for CS Wind Vietnam Co., Ltd., ITA, Department of 
Commerce, Investigation C-552-826, Public Version, E&C/OIV: DF, June 29, 2020. 
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for engaging in the proceeding, in order to achieve the best results for the mandatory 
respondents, and also, to some extent, for the best interests of all industry in Vietnam. 
 




This case is important because, as of October 2021, it is the most recent case 
that Commerce has concluded on the existing subsidy programs provided by the GOV. 
It is also very useful for the GOV to understand why Commerce has repeatedly 
determined some programs to be countervailable subsidies. Importantly, in this CVD 
investigation presented the first instance in which Vietnam was found to have provided 
Vietnamese exporters and producers with a new type of subsidy, a so-called currency 
undervaluation (or currency manipulation, as alleged by the U.S. Government). As with 
prior cases, the author will focus on key issues of this CVD investigation such as 
countervailable subsidy programs and Commerce’s selection of internal or external 
benchmarks in measuring each specific subsidy. The author also analyzes the issues 
related to Commerce’s determination regarding the GOV’s currency-undervaluation 
subsidy and its implications for Vietnam. 
 
5.4.6.2. Case Summary 
 
Following a petition filed by the U.S. Petitioner (representing the United Steel, 
Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service 
Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC (commonly known as the United 
Steelworkers)) in May 2020, Commerce initiated a CVD investigation against Vietnam 
in June 2020, concerning imports of passenger vehicle and light truck tires (“Passenger 
Tires”), which are classified as new pneumatic tires, of rubber, with a passenger vehicle 
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or light truck size designation.1291 This CVD case was accompanied by a concurrent 
investigation concerning whether Passenger Tires from Vietnam and other countries 
such as Korea, Taiwan and Thailand were dumped on the U.S. market.1292 
Six years earlier, the same U.S. Petitioner had also requested for concurrent AD 
and CVD actions against Passenger Tires from China; and as a result, Chinese exporters 
and producers of Passenger Tires have been subject to both AD and CVD orders since 
August 2015.1293  
In relation to the CVD investigation of Passenger Tires from Vietnam, 
Commerce selected the top two exporters and producers of Passenger Tires that were 
exported for consumption into the U.S. market. According to Commerce, in light of 
resource constraints, it could not examine all exporters and producers from 
Vietnam.1294 Thus, Kumho Tire (Vietnam) Co., Ltd. (“KTV”), and Sailun (Vietnam) 
Co., Ltd. (“Sailun”), the two top exporters or producers by volume of the Passenger 
Tires under investigation, were selected as mandatory respondents for individual 
examination.1295 For those companies that were not selected as respondents, because 
they were not individually examined, Commerce determines an estimated all-others 
rate. Such a rate is normally called All-Others Rate, which is an amount equal to the 
weighted average of the estimated subsidy rate established for individually examined 
respondents KTV and Sailun, excluding any zero and de minimis rates and any rates 
based entirely under section 776 of the Act.1296 As observed in previous CVD cases, 
 
1291 Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Initiation of 
Countervailing Duty Investigation, 85 FR 38850 (June 29, 2020). 
1292 Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires from the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Initiation of Less Than-Fair-Value Investigations, 85 FR 38854 (June 29, 
2020). 
1293 Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires from the People's Republic of China: Amended 
Final Affirmative Antidumping Duty Determination and Antidumping Duty Order; and Amended Final 
Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Countervailing Duty Order, 80 FR 47902 (August 
10, 2015). 
1294 Countervailing Duty Investigation of Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires from the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam: Respondent Selection, ITA, US Department of Commerce, Investigation C-552-
829, ADCVD Ops/Office I/TES, PUBLIC VERSION (June 8, 2020). 
1295 Id. at 5. 
1296 Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Preliminary 
Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Alignment of Final Determination with Final 
Antidumping Duty Determination, 85 FR 71607 (November 10, 2020). 
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the role of the GOV in a CVD proceeding is very important. To achieve a favorable 
outcome, the mandatory respondents and the GOV must fully cooperate with 
Commerce in all stages of the proceeding. For instance, if either the GOV or any 
mandatory respondent fails to cooperate or disregards any questions asked by 
Commerce, or fails to submit information timely, that non-cooperation or untimely 
filing could result in a very high CVD rate due to the application of AFA. 
The legal grounds for Commerce to continue the application of the CVD law to 
imports from Vietnam as an NME country were based mainly on its arguments in 
PRCBs from Vietnam, and as permitted by the Nonmarket Economies Act of 2012.1297 
Since Vietnam has been designated an NME country, in this Passenger Tires CVD case, 
Commerce continued to use the NME methodology for calculating the CVD rates for 
the individually examined mandatory respondents. That means Commerce continued 
to use interest rate benchmarks, input benchmarks and land benchmarks to calculate 
the benefits conferred to KTV and Sailun as mandatory respondents. 
In May 2021, Commerce announced its final affirmative determination that 
Passenger Tires from Vietnam benefited from a range of government subsidies, 
including income tax benefits, import duty exemptions on imports of raw materials for 
exported goods, exemption of import duties for imports into industrial zones, and 
preferential rent for areas with difficult socioeconomic conditions.1298 In addition, 
Commerce determined that KTV and Sailun both received benefits from provision of 
natural rubber for less than adequate remuneration.1299 More importantly, it is the first 
time Commerce has reached a conclusion that Vietnam’s currency undervaluation is a 
countervailable subsidy.1300 According to Commerce, “This finding includes 
 
1297 Decision Memorandum for the Preliminary Affirmative Determination: Countervailing Duty 
Investigation of Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 85 
ITADOC 71607 (November 10, 2020) [hereinafter Passenger Tires CVD Prelim IDM]. 
1298 Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Final Affirmative 
Countervailing Duty Determination, 86 FR 28566 (May 27, 2021) [hereinafter Passenger Tires CVD 
Final Determination]; See also Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the 
Countervailing Duty Investigation of Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires from the Socialist 




Commerce’s first affirmative findings regarding a currency-related subsidy involving 
the conversion of U.S. dollars into Vietnamese dong at an undervalued exchange 
rate.”1301 But the GOV’s counsel reiterated that “the U.S. lacked the authority to treat 
currency undervaluation as a subsidy.”1302 He also claimed that “the calculation of a 
precise rate of benefit from a so-called undervalued currency is arbitrary and capricious 
as there is no universally accepted methodology for quantifying how much a currency 
is undervalued on a bilateral basis.” 
Under the final determination, KTV and Sailun received respective final CVD 
rates of 7.89% and 6.23%, and the other non-selected companies received an All Others 
Rate of 6.24%.1303 In the companion AD final determination, KTV, Sailun and four 
other companies (including Kenda Rubber (Vietnam) Co., Ltd.; Bridgestone 
Corporation; Bridgestone Tire Manufacturing Vietnam LLC; and The Yokohama 
Rubber Co., Ltd.) all received a rate of zero percent.1304 However, the other companies 
eligible for a Vietnam-wide entity rate received an AFA rate of 22.27% (after 
adjustment for a subsidy offset).1305 These companies were assigned with an AFA rate 
because Commerce found that they withheld information, failed to provide information 
timely, and impeded the proceeding by not submitting Quantity and Value information 
requested by Commerce.1306 
Below, the author presents a table showing the final CVD rates for KTV and 
Sailun with corresponding ratios for each subsidy program from which each respondent 
benefited. The objective is to show the level of importance of each subsidy program in 
 
1301 ITA, Press Release, U.S. Department of Commerce Issues First Analysis of Currency 
Undervaluation as a Countervailable Subsidy, available at https://www.trade.gov/press-release/us-
department-commerce-issues-first-analysis-currency-undervaluation-countervailable, accessed on 
August 22, 2021. 
1302 Jennifer Doherty, Law360, Commerce Affirms Duties Based on Currency Manipulation, May 24, 
2021, LexisNexis accessed on August 22, 2021. 
1303 Passenger Tires CVD Final Determination, supra note 1300, at 5. 
1304 Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Final 
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 86 FR 28559 (May 27, 2021). 
1305 Id. 
1306 Decision Memorandum for the Preliminary Affirmative Determination in the Less-than-fair-value 
Investigation of Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 86 
ITADOC 504 (December 29, 2020). 
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contributing to the total aggregated CVD duty for each mandatory respondent in this 
investigation. 
 
Subsidy Programs KTV KTV Ratio Sailun 
Sailun 
Ratio 
1. Import Duty Exemptions on Imports of Raw 















3. Natural Rubber for LTAR  0.06% 1% 0.11% 2% 
4. Preferential Rent for Areas with Difficult 







5. Currency Undervaluation  1.69% 21% 1.16% 19% 
6. Income Tax Benefits  0.42% 5% n/a  
7. Tax Benefits for New Investments  n/a  2.78% 45% 
Total  7.89% 100% 6.23% 100% 
 
From the above table, one observes that the programs related to tax benefits, 
import duty exemptions, preferential land rent, and currency undervaluation account 
for a high proportion of all countervailable subsidy programs that the mandatory 
respondents received. Typically, Commerce uses benchmarks to calculate the amount 
of a benefit in the following categories of subsidies: (i) grants, loans, and loan 
guarantees (see section 3.2.1.2.2) and (ii) provision of goods or services at LTAR (see 
section 3.2.1.2.3). Referring to the above Table, the two subsidy programs including 
natural rubber for LTAR and preferential rent for areas with difficult socioeconomic 
conditions fall into category (ii): provision of goods or services at LTAR. To measure 
the benefits received from these two subsidy programs, Commerce used input 
benchmarks and land benchmarks. In this Passenger Tires CVD case, for the first time, 
Commerce decided to use an internal benchmark to calculate the net subsidy rate 
related to provision of natural rubber at LTAR. Nevertheless, like in other CVD cases, 
Commerce still used out-of-country benchmarks in calculating the net countervail-able 
subsidy related to provision of preferential land rent in Vietnam. Finally, KTV and 
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Sailun were not found to have received any countervailable subsidy under category (i): 
grants, loans, and loan guarantees. 
 
5.4.6.3. Use of Benchmarks 
 
5.4.6.3.1. Interest Rate Benchmarks 
 
As a matter of practice, Commerce usually selects an external market-based 
interest rate benchmark instead of using internal interest rates of Vietnam. Commerce 
has reasoned that domestic interest rates in Vietnam are distorted due to the 
predominant role of the GOV in the banking sector through (i) its direct and indirect 
ownership, and (ii) its interest rate control, policy, plans, and administrative 
guidance.1307 To come to such a conclusion, Commerce conducted a separate analysis 
of Vietnam’s financial system1308. From its findings in this comprehensive review, 
Commerce concluded that interest rates in Vietnam are still largely set or influenced 
by the GOV and cannot be used as a benchmark for CVD purposes.1309 
Notably, Commerce compared the current Vietnamese banking sector with the 
actual situation in 2013, when Commerce conducted the first review of the Vietnamese 
banking sector in the Frozen Warmwater Shrimp CVD case (“2013 Review”). 
Specifically, Commerce found that the number of state-owned commercial banks 
(“SOCBs”) operating in Vietnam has not significantly changed since the 2013 Review 
and that the share of loans provided by SOCBs in the Vietnamese banking sector has 
 
1307 Decision Memorandum for the Preliminary Affirmative Determination: Countervailing Duty 
Investigation of Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
(October 30, 2020) [hereinafter Passenger Tires CVD Prelim IDM]. Commerce’s similar reasoning was 
previously used in Certain Frozen Warmwarter Shrimp from Vietnam. See Certain Frozen Warmwater 
Shrimp from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Preliminary Countervailing Duty Determination, 78 FR 
33342 (June 4, 2013), and accompanying Preliminary Decision Memorandum (PDM) at 1213, 
unchanged in Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Final 
Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, 78 FR 50387 (August 19, 2013). 
1308 Countervailing Duty Investigation of Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires from the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam, Analysis of Vietnam’s Financial System (issued on October 30, 2020); attached 
with a memorandum on “Review of Vietnam’s Financial Sector for Countervailing Duty (CVD) 
Benchmarking Purposes” (issued on May 12, 2020). 
1309 Id. Review of Vietnam’s Financial Sector for Countervailing (CVD) Benchmarking Purposes, at 28. 
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remained constant over the preceding six years.1310 In fact, the number of SOCBs has 
decreased from five to four following the 2013 Review; currently there are four big 
SOCBs: Agribank, the Vietnam Joint Stock Commercial Bank of Industry and Trade 
(VietinBank), the Joint Stock Commercial Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam 
(Vietcombank), and the Bank for Investment and Development of Vietnam (BIDV).1311 
However, Commerce found that such SOCBs still have some degree of government 
ownership and continue to play a dominant role in the commercial banking sector.1312 
Accordingly, through its major ownership of each of Vietnam’s SOCBs and policy 
banks, the GOV was found to control 47% of the banking sector.1313 With respect to 
the interest rates in Vietnam, Commerce continued to reaffirm its conclusion in the 
2013 Review that Vietnamese interest rates are not market-determined.1314 In 
particular, the GOV, through its ministerial agency, State Bank of Vietnam (“SBV”), 
still used its administrative orders such as circulars, decrees and decisions in order to 
impose interest rate controls on banks and to allocate credit throughout Vietnam.1315 
For example, the SBV’s imposed an interest rate cap of 5.5% on all VND denominated 
demand and short-term deposits (1-6 months), which was found to cause distortion.1316 
In addition, the SBV has also controlled commercial lending rates via direct lending 
rate caps.1317 For instance, the SBV’s Circular No. 39 provides that the rate set by both 
parties in a loan agreement shall not exceed the maximum interest rate decided by the 
SBV’s governor to meet certain funding demands.1318 According to Commerce, this 
regulation means that the SBV has full discretion to set interest rate caps at any time.1319 
 
1310 Id. at 2. 
1311 Id. at 7 and 9. The decrease came in 2015 when BIDV acquired Bank of Mekong Delta, one of the 
SOCBs listed in the 2013 review. 
1312 Id. at 9. 
1313 Id. 
1314 Id., at 14-20. 
1315 Id. at 14. 
1316 Id. at 15. 
1317 Id. at 16. 
1318 Id. See also Circular of the State Bank of Vietnam prescribing lending transactions of credit 
institutions and/or foreign bank branches with customers” (No. 39/2016/TT-NHNN), Article 13, Section 
1. 
1319 Id. at 17. 
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Further, Commerce found that the GOV imposed controls over sector-specific lending 
rates as well.1320 For example, there have been specific regulations on determining 
lending rates based on priority sectors such as agriculture, export goods, business 
operations serving high tech enterprises, business operations serving production, and 
business operations of small and medium enterprises (“SMEs”).1321 As of 2019, the 
short-term interest rate of 6.5% has been applied to such priority sectors, and the rates 
of 6.8% to 9% have applied to other non-priority sectors.1322 Finally, Commerce 
realized that the GOV has implemented certain reforms in stabilizing the Vietnamese 
banking sector and meeting macro-economic growth targets.1323 However, according 
to Commerce, it is more important for Vietnam to conduct an institutional change and 
reduce the chronic and systemic state intervention in the banking sector or otherwise 
make the banking sector more market-determined.1324 Unfortunately, such a reform is 
not seen anywhere in the GOV’s most recent roadmap for the development of 
Vietnam’s banking sector from 2018 to 2025 with an orientation to 2030.1325 Under 
this plan, the GOV’s goal is to maintain the dominant role of SOCBs in the 2018 to 
2025 period as one of a “key and dominant force in scale, market share and ability to 
regulate the market.”1326 The state will continue to have a “dominant role” in the 
management of SOCBs and maintain its government ownership of at least 65% of their 
total voting shares.1327 
In summary, at this time the GOV’s continued significant intervention in the 
banking sector as analyzed by Commerce makes it difficult to prove that the interest 





1323 Id. at 2. 
1324 Id. 
1325 Decision on Approving the Strategy to Develop Vietnam’s Banking Industry to 2025, Orientation to 
2030” (No. 986/QD-TTg), Government of Vietnam, August 8, 2018, Article 1 (i) 2a; Id. at Article 1(II) 
7(a). 
1326 Id. at 26. 
1327 Id. 
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Thus, it is likely that Commerce will continue to use external interest rate benchmarks 
for this CVD proceeding and for future CVD actions against Vietnam in general. 
 
5.4.6.3.2. Input Benchmarks 
 
Ordinarily, Commerce uses benchmarks within the exporting country to 
measure whether a government-procured good, service, or land has been provided for 
less than adequate remuneration (LTAR). Commerce regards such in-country 
benchmarks as Tier-One benchmark.1328 But Commerce almost always finds NME-
based benchmarks unreliable or not reflective of a functioning market. Thus, 
Commerce usually goes to Tier Two, which are global benchmarks.1329 However, too 
often, Tier-Two benchmarks are not specific and result in uncertainty and opportunities 
for distortion. And, in the case of goods or services such as land and electricity, 
Commerce often resorts to Tier-Three external benchmarks, which are essentially 
benchmarks in a single surrogate country. Tier-Three external benchmarks also allow 
Commerce to measure the adequacy of remuneration by assessing whether the 
exporting government price is consistent with market principles.1330 Unfortunately, the 
U.S. laws and regulations do not provide any specific guidelines for application of Tier-
Three external benchmarks. So, Commerce has a broad discretion in its assessments to 
determine whether adequate remuneration has been paid in one country based on 
market forces in an entirely different country. 
In this Passenger Tires CVD case, both mandatory respondents purchased 
natural rubber as an input material for manufacturing the subject merchandise.1331 So, 
the question is which benchmark is to be used to measure the benefit of the provision 
of natural rubber. During the investigation, it was found that the supplier of natural 
rubber to the respondents was a state-owned company, namely Vietnam Rubber Group 
 
1328 19 CFR 351.511(a)(2)(i). 
1329 19 CFR 351.511(a)(2)(ii). 
1330 19 CFR 351.511(a)(2)(iii). 
1331 Passenger Tires CVD Prelim IDM, supra note 1299, at 10. 
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(VRG), making natural rubber arguably a “government-procured good”.1332 Although 
VRG is a state-owned company, however, the GOV successfully proved that the market 
for natural rubber is not distorted by government predominance in the market, and that 
the GOV does not intervene in the natural rubber market.1333 Based on the GOV’s 
submitted information, Commerce determined that the market for natural rubber is not 
distorted through the GOV’s predominant role in the market via VRG, and nor does 
the GOV intervene in the market, specifically by implementing controls on imports and 
exports. Accordingly, Commerce determined that market prices from actual 
transactions within Vietnam may serve as a Tier-One benchmark. This was notable 
because it marked the first time that Commerce agreed to use an internal benchmark to 
calculate the benefit from the provision of an input sourced in Vietnam.  
Based on the selected Tier-One benchmark, Sailun’s actual prices paid for 
purchasing natural rubber from VRG were admitted and it finally got a countervailable 
subsidy rate of 0.11% ad valorem.1334 With respect to KTV, Commerce preliminarily 
found that KTV had no purchases of natural rubber from private producers, nor did 
KTV import any natural rubber.1335 In the preliminary stage, KTV reported all its 
purchases of natural rubber were from a producer that is majority-owned by entities 
controlled by the GOV.1336 Then, Commerce selected UN Comtrade import data, which 
was submitted by KTV, as the appropriate benchmark for KTV. At the final 
determination, Commerce continued to use the UN Comtrade import prices submitted 
by KTV on the record as the basis for the benchmark, but have added 5 percent VAT 
 
1332 Id. 
1333 Id. In particular, the GOV successfully proved that it “does not issue any laws or policies to control 
or govern the pricing of natural rubber”, that it “does not impose any restriction on the production or 
development of natural rubber capacity or interfere in the decisions of natural rubber producers on how 
to develop their capacity or production volume”, and that there “have not been any price controls or 
established any price floors or ceilings for the natural rubber during the POI or the prior two years.” Id. 
1334 Id. at 20. Sailun’s CVD rate of 0.11 percent in the preliminary determination is remained unchanged 
in the Final Determination. See Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires from the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam: Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, 86 FR 28566 (May 21, 2021) 
[hereinafter Passenger Tires CVD Final Determination]; Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final 
Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires 
from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam [Passenger Tires CVD Final IDM] (May 21, 2021). 
1335 Id. Passenger Tires CVD Final IDM, at 37. 
1336 Id. 
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and 3 percent of import duties, to calculate the benefit received by KTV.1337 
Accordingly, KTV finally received a subsidy rate of 0.06% ad valorem for provision 
of natural rubber for LTAR.1338 
 
5.4.6.3.3. Land Benchmarks 
 
The three-tier benchmark analysis is also used by Commerce in determining the 
extent of any countervailable benefit received from provision of land at LTAR. In its 
practice, Commerce concluded that it could not use any Tier-One Vietnamese land 
prices or Tier-Two world market prices for purposes of benchmarking land-use rights 
in Vietnam. Instead, Commerce routinely uses out-of-country benchmarks or Tier-
Three external benchmarks to measure the subsidy benefit from the provision of land 
to Vietnamese producers under investigation. The application of Tier-Three external 
benchmarks is usually based on the conclusion that the GOV controls all land use rights 
in Vietnam, and therefore, the land prices in Vietnam are not market-determined 
benchmarks.1339 Commerce had previously reached the same conclusions in the PRCBs 
and Frozen Warmwarter Shrimp CVD cases.1340 In the previous cases, Commerce 
found that (i) the GOV had placed restrictions on leasing rights, (ii) the GOV had 
significant control over the supply of land on the market through conversions, and (iii) 
the GOV (but not the market) determined land allocations.1341  
 
1337 Passenger Tires CVD Final IDM, supra note 1300, at 39. 19 CFR 351.511(a)(2)(iv) provides on “Use 
of delivered price” that in measuring adequate remuneration under the internal benchmark scenario, 
Commerce will adjust the comparison price to reflect the price that a company actually paid or would 
pay if it imported the product. This adjustment will include delivery charges and import duties. So, at 
the final determination, Commerce agreed with the Petitioner that the preliminary determination did not 
include import duties and VAT. 
1338 Id. at 4. 
1339 Passenger Tires CVD Prelim IDM, supra note 1299, at 11. 
1340 PCRBs Final CVD Decision Memo, supra note 1111, at Comment 9; PCRBs Final CVD Decision 
Memo, supra note 1239, at Comment 6. 
1341 PCRBs Final CVD Decision Memo, supra note 1111, at Comment 9. 
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In this Passenger Tires CVD case, Commerce also conducted a separate 
analysis of Vietnam’s land market subsequent to 2009 (“Land Analysis Memo”).1342 
According to the Land Analysis Memo (consisting of 400 pages), Commerce found 
that, although modest reforms had taken place (e.g., improvements in the use-rights of 
some landholders, although rights of rural landholders remain severely restricted), the 
reforms have not addressed the fundamental institutional factors that underlie the 
GOV’s monopoly control over land use, which precludes landholders from putting their 
land to best use and realizing the market value of their landholdings.1343 Commerce 
reaffirmed that all land in Vietnam is still owned by the Vietnamese government.1344 
Accordingly, the GOV is the sole supplier of land-use rights in the primary land market 
and directly sets those prices on a non-commercial basis.1345 In addition, the GOV was 
found to indirectly distort prices of land in the secondary market through restrictions 
and limitations on land-use and land-use transfers.1346 Thus, the GOV ultimately 
decides whether and how land is used in Vietnam under a unified but decentralized 
land planning system.1347 Such factors, according to Commerce, do not reflect the 
market outcomes in Vietnam. For such reasons, Commerce determined that it cannot 
use any Tier-One, domestic Vietnamese land prices for purposes of benchmarking the 
government provision of land-use rights in Vietnam.1348 Further, Commerce 
determined that since land located and sold outside of Vietnam is not simultaneously 
available to an in-country purchaser, Tier-Two global prices are not suitable as 
benchmarks for land-use rights either.1349 So, when the global prices are inapplicable, 
according to the Tier-Three approach, Commerce will normally measure the adequacy 
 
1342 Countervailing Duty Investigation of Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires from the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam, Analysis of Vietnam’s Land-Use Rights (issued on October 30, 2020); attached 
with a memorandum on “Benchmark Analysis of the Government Provision of Land-Use Rights in 
Vietnam for Countervailing Duty Purposes” (issued on May 17, 2020) [hereinafter Land Analysis 
Memo]. 





1348 Id. at 3. 
1349 Id. 
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of remuneration by assessing whether the government price is consistent with market 
principles.1350 When applying this rule, Commerce found that the legal procedures for 
government land valuation are vague by design and there is thus significant scope for 
government discretion in their implementation.1351 The result is that government-
determined prices are not consistent with market principles, but rather with the 
government’s controlling and allocating land use on an administrative basis in the 
pursuit of policy objectives, which do not reflect commercial considerations.1352 From 
such findings, Commerce finally determined to use land-use prices outside Vietnam as 
an appropriate basis to determine the extent to which land-use rights are provided for 
LTAR in Vietnam.1353 
In selecting a benchmark for land, Commerce analyzed comparable market-
based prices in another surrogate country at a comparable level of economic 
development within the geographic vicinity of Vietnam.1354 Commerce decided to use 
the land prices in India, which were provided by CBRE Group, Inc., for valuing land 
rents in this Passenger Tires CVD investigation.1355 In particular, for KTV, Commerce 
selected Kolkata, which is in West Bengal, as the location with the “closest population 
density” to Binh Duong, the province in which KTV’s head office and tire production 
facility are located.1356 For Sailun, Commerce selected Hyderabad, which is in Andhra 
Pradesh, as the location with the “closest population density” to Tay Ninh, the province 
in which Sailun is located.1357 In the final determination, Commerce affirmed its 
preliminary determination that KTV and Sailun received preferential rent as a result of 
their locations in areas with difficult or especially difficult socioeconomic 
conditions.1358 Consequently, by using the selected land benchmarks as explained 
 








1358 Passenger Tires CVD Final IDM, supra note 1300, at Comments 10 and 11. 
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above, Commerce calculated the benefit from the preferential rent by comparing the 
rent that either KTV or Sailun paid to a benchmark rate from the Indian surrogate city. 
Finally, Sailun received a net countervailable subsidy rate of 2.14% ad valorem 
(accounting for 34% of its total CVD rate), and KTV received a net countervailable 
subsidy rate of 5.16% ad valorem (accounting for 65% of its total CVD rate).1359 
In certain situations, the selection of Tier-3 benchmark is not accurate. For 
example, in the case of KTV, Commerce used rental rates for one Indian city, Kolkata, 
as Tier-3 benchmark for measuring the benefit from KTV’s land-use rights. According 
to KTV’s counsel, Kolkata was selected because it is located in the Indian state of West 
Bengal, which has the “closest population density” to Binh Duong province in 
Vietnam.1360 However, instead of using average land-rental rates for the entire state of 
West Bengal, Commerce used rental rates for a single city, whose population density 
is many multiples of that of the province and town in which KTV’s facility is 
located.1361 Another piece of evidence potentially showing the risk of inaccuracy is that 
the population density of Kolkata is approximately 39 times that of Binh Duong 
province, and approximately 20 times that of Ben Cat Town.1362 
 
5.4.6.4. Other Countervailable Subsidies 
 
Besides the subsidy programs pertaining to preferential land rents and the 
provision of natural rubber for LTAR, import duty exemptions on imports of raw 
materials for exported goods were also determined to be a countervailable subsidy. This 
subsidy program has repeatedly been found in most of the CVD investigations against 
Vietnam. In practice, import duty reimbursements for imported raw materials for goods 
to be exported are governed by several Vietnamese laws and regulations. Under the 
 
1359 Id. at 4. 
1360 Countervailing Duty Investigation of Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires from Vietnam - Case 
Brief of Kumho Tire (Vietnam) Co., Ltd., Case No. C-552-829, AD/CVD Operations, Office I, Public 
Version (March 9, 2021), at 11. 
1361 Id. at 12. 
1362 Id. at 13. 
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program, import duty exemptions are provided for imported raw materials that are 
incorporated into exported goods or are directly used in the processing of such 
goods.1363 The GOV reported to Commerce that KTV and Sailun received import duty 
exemptions under this program.1364 In prior investigations, Commerce always 
concluded that the GOV does not have in place a system to confirm which inputs are 
consumed in the production of the exported products and in what amounts, including a 
normal allowance for waste.1365 During this investigation, the GOV conceded that it 
had not made any changes to that system since the last time it was investigated in 2017; 
however, the GOV stated that this situation differs from those in prior determinations 
regarding this program because in this case the GOV conducted an inspection of actual 
inputs involved to confirm which inputs were consumed in the production of the 
exported product.1366 Nevertheless, Commerce continued to find that the GOV’s 
system does not meet Commerce’s regulatory requirements under 19 CFR § 
351.519(a)(4)(i) for calculating a benefit on an amount other than the total amount of 
exempted duties.1367 Finally, Commerce determined that the import-duty exemptions 
used by KTV and Sailun are countervailable because they confer a benefit equal to the 
total amount of the duties exempted.1368 
Another program found to be a countervailable subsidy was corporate income 
tax preferences. Under this program, the GOV provided tax preferences to support 
newly established investment projects of certain sectors or satisfying certain criteria 
under the GOV’s corporate income tax regulations.1369 One mandatory respondent, 
Sailun, was found to have received tax benefits under this program. On this basis, 
Sailun was subjected to a CVD rate of 2.78%.1370 
 
1363 Passenger Tires CVD Prelim IDM, supra note 1299, at 13-14. See GOV’s IQR at Exhibit A-4-1. 
1364 Id. 
1365 Passenger Tires CVD Final IDM, supra note 1300, at 35. See also e.g., Wind Towers Final IDM, 
supra note 1266, at Comment 2; and LWS Final IDM, supra note 1266, at Comment 2. 
1366 Passenger Tires CVD Final IDM, supra note 1300. 
1367 Id. at 36. 
1368 Id. 
1369 Passenger Tires CVD Prelim IDM, supra note 1299, at 13. 
1370 Passenger Tires CVD Final IDM, supra note 1300, at 3. 
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5.4.6.5. Currency Undervaluation Subsidy 
 
Four months before the CVD investigation of Passenger Tires from Vietnam 
was initiated, Commerce issued its Modification of Regulations Regarding Benefit and 
Specificity in Countervailing Duty Proceedings (“Final Rule”).1371 Commerce’s new 
regulations have paved the way for it to investigate a foreign government’s “currency 
undervaluation” as a countervailable subsidy for purposes of CVD proceedings. The 
Final Rule is controversial because it has been promulgated by Commerce itself 
without any amendment to the U.S. CVD law. Notably, Commerce acknowledged that 
neither the Tariff Act of 1930 (as amended) nor Commerce’s existing CVD regulations 
specify how to determine the existence of a benefit or specificity when Commerce is 
examining a potential subsidy resulting from the exchange of currency under a unified 
exchange rate system.1372 The controversy of Commerce’s new regulations will be 
discussed in the conclusion below.  
Notably, the Final Rule clarifies how Commerce “determines the existence of 
a benefit resulting from a subsidy in the form of currency undervaluation,” and clarifies 
that “companies in traded goods sector of an economy can constitute a group of 
enterprises for the purposes of determining whether a subsidy is specific.”1373 The Final 
Rule is applicable to all segments of proceedings initiated on or after April 6, 2020.1374 
The “all segments of proceedings” language means that the Final Rule can be applied 
to all CVD initial investigations and administrative reviews or new shipper reviews as 
of April 6, 2020. 
Technically, Commerce added a new regulation providing that Commerce will 
determine that a countervailable currency undervaluation subsidy benefit exists where: 
 
1371 Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, “Modification of Regulations 
Regarding Benefit and Specificity in Countervailing Duty Proceedings”, 85 FR 6031, February 4, 2020, 





(1) a country’s currency is undervalued during the relevant period; (2) there has been 
government action on the exchange rate that contributes to a currency undervaluation; 
and (3) the amount of local currency a firm receives in exchange for U.S. dollars is 
greater than the amount the firm would have received if the country’s nominal, bilateral 
U.S. dollar exchange rate were consistent with the equilibrium real effective exchange 
rate (“REER”).1375 In essence, these new regulations established a methodology to 
identify whether a foreign manufacturer benefited from its government’s actions that 
led to the currency undervaluation. 
With the publication of Commerce’s new regulations on currency 
undervaluation at this time, it is likely that U.S. petitioners representing domestic 
industries will be willing to make use of it in their new subsidy allegations or even in 
CVD administrative reviews against subject foreign exporting countries, especially 
against NME countries such as China and Vietnam, where their banking sectors are 
still controlled by their governments. 
In fact, in its petition against Vietnam in the Passenger Tires CVD case 
submitted in May 2020, the U.S. Petitioner, among other allegations, claimed that the 
GOV provides countervailable subsidies to exporters of Passenger Tires from Vietnam 
by undervaluing its currency through government action on the exchange rate between 
the U.S. dollar and the Vietnamese dong.1376 Specifically, the U.S. Petitioner affirmed 
that Commerce’s new regulations, which are effective on or after April 6, 2020, apply 
to this subsidy investigation.1377 
In its final determination, Commerce came to an affirmative determination that 
the GOV committed an act of undervaluing its currency, and that such undervaluation 
 
1375 Id. at 6043. See also 19 C.F.R. § 351.528. 
1376 Roger B. Schagrin et al., Counsel to the United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, 
Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC, Petition for the 
Imposition of Countervailing Duties pursuant to Section 701 and 731 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as 
amended, Volume VI, Information Related to Vietnam - Countervailing Duties, Public Document, DOC 
Investigation NO. C-552-829, May 13, 2020, at 38. 
1377 Id. 
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constituted a financial contribution, that is specific and provided a benefit.1378 
Commerce’s determination is based on the following key findings. 
Financial contribution: Commerce mentioned that in prior CVD cases, it has 
found Vietinbank and Vietcombank to be state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs).1379 
Further, the GOV’s submitted documents on record show that Vietinbank and 
Vietcombank are SOCBs with 64.46% and 74.8% majority government ownership, 
respectively.1380 In addition, Commerce’s Memorandum of Vietnam’s Financial Sector 
also shows that state ownership and control has been observed at the highest level of 
SOCBs’ corporate structures.1381 Thus, Commerce concluded that the GOV is able to 
control the decisions of these SOCBs through a board of members appointed by 
Communist Party of Vietnam, and the banks are vested with government authority.1382 
Accordingly, for all foreign currency exchange transactions involving Vietinbank and 
Vietcombank, Commerce found a direct financial contribution by an “authority” under 
the CVD law in the form of a direct transfer of funds.1383 
With respect to private banks, notably, Commerce found that through the 
GOV’s various laws and regulations, private banks, like GOV state-owned banks, must 
exchange USD for dong for any party wishing to do so, and the rates for that exchange 
must be within the rate of +/-3 percent to +/-1 percent as established by the State Bank 
of Vietnam (SBV).1384 In other words, the SBV sets the official exchange rate within 
this narrow band.1385 Therefore, aside from the direct financial contribution through 
SOCBs, Commerce found that based on the GOV’s implementation of laws and 
decrees, the GOV requires private banks to exchange currency within a narrow 
exchange rate, thereby entrusting or directing private banks to provide dong at an 
 
1378 Passenger Tires CVD Final IDM, supra note 1300, at 8. 
1379 Passenger Tires CVD Final IDM, supra note 1300, at 20. See also VN Shrimp CVD Final Memo, 
supra note 1246, at 14; PRCBs Preliminary CVD Determination, supra note 1096. 
1380 Id. See GOV’s IQR at Exhibit F-1. 
1381 Passenger Tires CVD Final IDM, supra note 1300. 
1382 Id. at 21. 
1383 Id. 
1384 Id. at 22. 
1385 Id. 
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undervalued rate.1386 Accordingly, Commerce concluded that the GOV entrusts or 
directs private banks to provide this financial contribution.1387 
As a result, Commerce determined that (i) the exchange of currency by 
authorities under section 771(5)(B) of the Act and (ii) the exchange of currency by 
private Vietnamese and/or foreign owned banks, entrusted or directed by the GOV 
under section 771(5)(B)(iii) of the Act, constituted financial contributions in the form 
of direct transfers of funds to both mandatory respondents KTV and Sailun.1388 
Specificity: Commerce found that the subsidy is predominantly used by the 
group of enterprises constituting the traded goods sector.1389 As explained by 
Commerce, due to the GOV’s inability to provide certain data which Commerce 
requested for its evaluation, Commerce relied upon the data submitted to the IMF by 
the SBV to analyze whether the exchange of foreign currency is disproportionately or 
predominantly used by the traded goods sector.1390 Based on the IMF data, Commerce 
estimated the total proportion of USD inflows Vietnam has received in the POI through 
the following four major channels of exchange: (a) exports of goods, (b) exports of 
services, (c) various forms of portfolio and direct investment, and (d) earned income 
from abroad.1391 Additionally, in order to account for USD inflows which may not have 
resulted in currency conversion, Commerce discounted Vietnam’s exports of goods by 
the amount of intermediary goods inputs.1392 After such an adjustment, Commerce 
found that among the four channels, the vast majority (71.94 percent) of USD inflows 
coming into Vietnam during the POI came from exports of goods.1393 As a result, 





1389 Id. at 23. 
1390 Id. 
1391 Id. at 23-24. 
1392 Id. 
1393 Id. at 24. See also Memorandum, “Countervailing Duty Investigation of Passenger Vehicle and Light 
Truck Tires from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Calculation Based on USD Inflows Calculation,” 
dated concurrently with Passenger Tires CVD Prelim IDM. 
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predominant users of the GOV’s currency undervaluation subsidy, and thus, this 
program is de facto specific under the CVD law.1394 
Findings of undervaluation, government action and benefit: Pursuant to the 
Final Rule, normally Commerce will make an affirmative finding of undervaluation 
only if there has been government action on the exchange rate that contributes to that 
undervaluation.1395 In other words, finding of a government action on the exchange rate 
that contributed to the undervaluation is a prerequisite to the finding of undervaluation. 
In its next step, after making such an affirmative finding of undervaluation, Commerce 
will determine the existence of a benefit after examining the difference between the 
“nominal, bilateral United States dollar rate consistent with the equilibrium REER,” 
and the “actual nominal, bilateral United States dollar rate during the relevant time 
period, taking into account any information regarding the impact of government action 
on the exchange rate.”1396 Pursuant to the Final Rule, the U.S. Department of Treasury 
(“Treasury”) will be asked by Commerce to provide an evaluation and conclusion 
regarding the issues of undervaluation, government action, and the U.S. dollar rate 
gap.1397 Commerce acknowledges that Treasury has considerable experience and data 
that are relevant to such an analysis of currency undervaluation.1398 Treasury explained 
that in 2019 there was a gap between Vietnam’s REER and its equilibrium REER.1399 
Further, Treasury found that the GOV’s actions on the exchange rate had the effect of 
undervaluing the dong relative to the U.S. dollar by 4.7 percent.1400 With respect to 
government action, Treasury also concluded that Vietnam’s undervaluation in the POI 
was exclusively a result of government action.1401 Consequently, based on Treasury’s 
 
1394 Id. 
1395 19 CFR 351.528(a)(2). 
1396 19 CFR 351.528(b)(1). 
1397 19 CFR 351.528(c). 
1398 Final Rule, supra note 1373, at 6037. 
1399 Passenger Tires CVD Prelim IDM, supra note 1299, at 24. 
1400 Id. 
1401 Id. at 24-25. 
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evaluation and conclusion, Commerce determined that Vietnam’s currency vis-à-vis 
the U.S. dollar was undervalued during the POI by 4.7 percent.1402 
Calculating the amount of benefit: Based on the provision of the Final Rule, 
Commerce calculated “the difference between the amount of currency the firm received 
in exchange for United States dollars and the amount of currency that firm would have 
received absent the difference referred to in paragraph (b)(1) of this section” by 
applying the 4.7 percent undervaluation reported by Treasury to each currency 
exchange transaction reported by KTV and Sailun during the POI.1403 For each 
respondent, Commerce then aggregated the total benefits in USD based on the sum of 
these individual transactional during the POI.1404 Using this benefit as a numerator, 
Commerce then calculated a subsidy rate for the exchanges of currency by dividing the 
benefits obtained by each respondent during the POI by that respondent’s total sales 
conducted in USD.1405 On that basis, Commerce determined a net countervailable 
subsidy rate of 1.69% ad valorem for KTV and a net countervailable subsidy rate of 
1.16% ad valorem for Sailun during the POI.1406 
The Government of Vietnam has strongly rebuked Commerce’s determination 
that Vietnamese exporters of passenger tires were subsidized by a currency 
undervaluation. Immediately after the release of Commerce’s final determination, 
Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Le Thi Thu Hang said that “Vietnam doesn’t dump nor 
subsidize its automobile tires for exports and doesn’t manipulate currency to gain unfair 
advantage in international trade.”1407 The most critical issue that the GOV raised is the 
statutory authority of Commerce to promulgate the Final Rule in order to countervail 







1407 Reuters Asia Pacific, Vietnam denies subsidizing tires, rejects U.S. filing, May 27, 2021, available 
online at https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/vietnam-denies-subsidising-tires-rejects-us-
finding-2021-05-27/, accessed on September 10, 2021. 
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experts have commented on in the process of Commerce’s making the Final Rule.1408 
The GOV argued that Commerce lacks legal authority to investigate and countervail 
this so-called currency-undervaluation program.1409 A GOV’s representative in the 
public hearing argued that currency undervaluation cannot be characterized as a 
countervailable subsidy under the WTO’s Subsidies Agreement because of three 
reasons: (1) the undervaluation of currency is not a financial contribution under the 
Subsidies Agreement; (2) the undervaluation of currency does not create a benefit 
under the Subsidies Agreement; (3) undervaluation of currency, if any, is not a policy 
under Article 2 of the Subsidies Agreement.1410 Further, the GOV’s counsel argued that 
Commerce lacks statutory authority due to the fact that numerous legislative attempts 
to amend the Act to provide such authority have all failed.1411 This counsel explained 
that if the Act already provided statutory authority to treat an undervalued currency as 
a countervailable subsidy, then it would not have been necessary to make numerous 
attempts to revise the law to provide such authority.1412 Thus, the counsel argued, 
Commerce’s unilateral actions to promulgate the Final Rule for treating an undervalued 
currency as a specific subsidy and setting out the method for calculating a benefit from 
currency undervaluation are unlawful and void.1413 However, Commerce rejected all of 
these arguments and found that Commerce was acting in accordance with the U.S. CVD 
law, specifically the Act and Commerce’s regulations. Commerce confirmed that the 
CVD law fully implements the United States’ obligation under the Subsidies 
Agreement. Further, Commerce reiterated that it is the Act and Commerce’s regulations 
 
1408 During the rulemaking process prior to the publication of the Final Rule, two commenters claimed 
that Commerce lacks the statutory authority to change its approach without Congressional change to the 
Tariff Act of 1930, as amended. According to these two commenters, the proposed rule is unlawful 
because Congress failed to approve legislation that would specifically deem currency undervaluation as 
a countervailable subsidy. See Final Rule, supra note 1373, at 6033. 
1409 Morris, Manning & Martin, LLP, Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires from the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam: GOV’s Case Brief, Investigation Case No.: C-552-829, Public Version, March 10, 
2021 [hereinafter GOV’s Case Brief], at 4. 
1410 United Sates of America, Department of Commerce, Public Hearing, In the matter of: Passenger 
Vehicle and Light Truck Tires from Vietnam., Case No. C-552-829, Public Document, Friday, April 16, 
2021. 
1411 GOV’s Case Brief, supra note 1411, at 19. 
1412 Id. 
1413 Id. at 21. 
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that have direct legal effect under U.S. law, and not the WTO Agreements or WTO 
reports.1414 As a result, Commerce said the GOV’s WTO-related arguments had no 
merit in the proceeding.1415 Commerce rejected the arguments that the legislative 
attempts to amend the Act supported the conclusion that Commerce lacks the statutory 
authority to treat currency undervaluation as a countervailable subsidy.1416 
Commerce’s position relied upon the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling that “Congressional 
inaction lacks persuasive significance because several equally tenable inferences may 
be drawn from such inaction, including the inference that the existing legislation 
already incorporated the offered change.”1417 Therefore, Commerce determined that the 
fact that there have been such legislative attempts that failed is not relevant to 
Commerce’s interpretation of the Act as it currently stands.1418 From this reasoning, 
Commerce continued its arguments that Congress authorized it, through the CVD law, 
to countervail injurious subsidies, regardless of what form they take.1419 Also, the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979 authorized Commerce to administer CVD investigations, and 
therefore, Congress intended for Commerce to have the authority to address currency 
undervaluation.1420 In other words, Commerce sought to establish that it has broad 
discretion within its administration of the CVD law in order to promulgate new 
regulations including currency-undervaluation regulations. 
Another important and controversial point was Commerce’s finding of 
specificity. Commerce found that the GOV’s currency-undervaluation subsidy is 
predominantly used by a group of enterprises that buy or sell goods internationally, 
constituting the traded goods sector. And as a result, Commerce found this program is 
de facto specific. The GOV did not agree with this finding and argued that “the traded 
 
1414 Passenger Tires CVD Final IDM, supra note 1300, at 8. 
1415 Id. 
1416 Id. at 9. 
1417 Id. See Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 187 
(1994) (Central Bank of Denver). 
1418 Id. 
1419 Id. at 10. 
1420 Id. 
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goods sector is too broad to constitute a specific group of enterprises.”1421 In particular, 
the GOV explained that the traded goods sector accounts for a significant portion of 
the Vietnamese economy. According to GOV, since members of the traded goods 
sector are in virtually all industries of the Vietnamese economy, any alleged subsidy 
provided to such a group would be spread throughout the entire Vietnamese economy, 
rendering it non-specific.1422 However, Commerce rejected the GOV’s arguments and 
stated that “there need not be shared characteristics among the enterprises that comprise 
a group,” and therefore, “it does not matter if these enterprises represent unrelated 
industries.”1423  
In sum, Commerce’s finding that the undervaluation of currency is a 
countervailable subsidy is a controversial determination. Commerce’s determination 
could be appealed at the U.S. Court of International Trade, or challenged at the WTO. 
Vietnam or China or any other country similarly targeted, would have plausible claims 
that Commerce’s determination with respect to a currency-undervaluation subsidy is 




In this case, Commerce continued to use external benchmarks to measure the 
benefits of the land rents. With respect to the land system in Vietnam, Commerce 
continued to conclude that the GOV controls all land use rights and influence all land 
prices, and therefore, there is no useable market benchmark from within Vietnam. 
But, notably, Commerce for the first time agreed to use an in-country Tier-One 
benchmark to calculate the benefit received from the provision of natural rubber (a raw 
material for goods to be exported) that a respondent, Sailun, purchased from a state-
owned enterprise. The reason that Sailun was able to succeed in convincing Commerce 
to accept a Tier-One benchmark is that the GOV offered’ close cooperation in 
 
1421 GOV’s Case Brief, supra note 1411, at 33. 
1422 Id. at 32-33. 
1423 Passenger Tires CVD Final IDM, supra note 1300, at 20. 
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providing persuasive records and data for Commerce’s review during the CVD 
investigation. Specifically, the GOV provided data indicating that the volume of natural 
rubber produced by the sole state-owned rubber company was relatively small 
compared to the volume produced by all producers in Vietnam and compared to the 
volume of imports of rubber into Vietnam. Furthermore, the GOV established the 
absence of laws, policies, controls or government interventions with regard to the 
production, import, and export of natural rubber. Thus, Commerce determined that 
market prices for natural rubber transactions within Vietnam may serve as Tier-One 
benchmarks. While this is only one case, it nevertheless stands in contrast to 
Commerce’s repeated determinations to not rely on domestic prices as tier one 
benchmarks in CVD investigations against China. This shows that the GOV’s strong 
cooperation in a CVD investigation is crucial to a favorable outcome for the 
respondent. 
As for which interest rate benchmarks to select, Commerce conducted an 
analysis of Vietnam’s banking system to see whether there is still government 
intervention as to or dominance in the operations of state-owned banks and private 
banks. From its analysis, Commerce continued to conclude that the GOV still maintains 
substantial intervention and dominance in the banking sector. Thus, the interest rates 
used for commercial loans in Vietnam are not considered market-determined rates. As 
a result, Commerce decided to continue the use of external interest rate benchmarks in 
measuring benefits received from lending programs in current and future CVD 
investigations. With respect to the alleged lending programs in this CVD investigation, 
Commerce did not find any related countervailable subsidies provided to Sailun and 
KTV. 
Some programs such as import duty exemptions on imports of raw materials for 
exported goods and corporate income tax benefits for new investments are frequently 
and repeatedly treated by Commerce as countervailable subsidies. It is puzzling that 
Vietnam seems to be slow to adapt to Commerce’s regulatory requirements for these 
programs to reduce the CVD rates for the exporting companies under investigation. 
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Another possibility is that Vietnam gives greater priority to attracting foreign 
investments than to such adaptation, or that it seeks the best possible way to support 
both foreign and Vietnamese investors that engage in import and export activities. 
Lastly, Commerce’s determination on currency undervaluation is an important 
ruling for Vietnam as well as other countries currently exporting to the United States 
market. Those countries with a similar policy related to undervaluing currencies could 
become targets for potential CVD investigations by Commerce. Commerce’s 
modification of its regulations regarding an undervalued-currency subsidy, 
accompanied with its affirmative finding of countervailable undervalued-currency 
subsidy in this CVD case against Vietnam, could trigger future legal disputes at both 
U.S. judicial courts and international dispute settlement bodies. In fact, on September 
8, 2021, KTV filed a complaint at the U.S. Court of International Trade to challenge 
Commerce’s final determination.1424 KTV contested that Commerce’s determination to 
impose CVDs to address a foreign-government’s currency practices was “arbitrary and 
capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.”1425 This litigation will unfold in the coming months. It is 
inevitable that this and similar litigation will drag on for years because the issue of a 
currency-undervaluation subsidy is a rather new and complicated one that requires the 
participation of many experts and professionals with high expertise in banking and 
financial sectors. 
Particularly in Vietnam, those enterprises involved in exporting activities to the 
U.S. market are potentially subjects affected by Commerce’s affirmative 
determination. Especially for those exporters that are subject to U.S. AD and CVD 





1424 Kumho Tire (Vietnam) Co., Ltd. v. United States, 1:21CV00397 (C.I.T. 2021), available on 
Westlaw; accessed on October 1, 2021. 
1425 Id. 
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Chapter 6. Recommendations 
 
6.1. Vietnam’s Trajectory Towards a Market Economy 
 
After more than 30 years of Doi Moi, Vietnam has transformed itself from a 
centrally planned economy towards a globally integrated, “socialist-oriented” market 
economy. Vietnam’s commitment to pursue and perfect its socialist-oriented market 
economy was affirmed by the Communist Party of Vietnam (“CPV”) in 2017. ⁠1426 To 
unify the perception of this socialist-oriented market economy within Vietnam, CPV 
clarified that in a socialist-oriented market economy, “the State plays a role of 
orienting, building and perfecting economic institutions; creates a fair, transparent and 
healthy competitive environment; uses tools, policies and resources of the State to 
orient and regulate the economy, promote production and business, and protect natural 
resources and the environment; [and] develops cultural and social fields.” ⁠1427 CPV 
further explained that “the market plays a key role in effectively mobilizing and 
allocating resources, which is the main driving force for releasing productive power; 
State resources are allocated according to strategies, master plans and plans in line with 
the market mechanism.” ⁠1428 Importantly, CPV also insisted on the requirement to 
“clearly define and properly implement the position, role, function and relationship of 
the State, the market and the society in accordance with the market economy; ensure 
the socialist orientation.”1429 ⁠Thus, the relationship among the State, the market, and 
the realization of a socialist-oriented market economy in Vietnam is tied to the ongoing 
 
1426 Resolution No. 11-NQ/TW of June 3, 2017, at the 5th Conference of the Central Executive 
Committee of the 12th term, on “perfecting institutions of the socialist-oriented market economy” 





economic transition; this is major relationship that needs to be carefully considered, 
and its maintenance is “a strategic task to perform.” ⁠1430 
Following Vietnam’s accession to the WTO in 2007, as of June 2020, Vietnam 
has been recognized by 71 other countries around the world as a country with market 
economy. ⁠1431 The recognition of market economy status awarded by these countries 
supports the position that Vietnam has been regarded as an economy in which market 
prices are determined by free competition. Concurrently, Vietnam has also 
demonstrated to many countries that it has been making impressive economic 
transformations, although such an economy may not be deemed a full-fledged market 
economy according to the concept of a free-market economy employed by the United 
States. Indeed, with the United States, although it is an important trading partner of 
Vietnam, there have been many difficulties stemming from the government-influenced 
nature of Vietnam’s economic institutions as well as from the relationship between the 
State and the market, all of which may discourage the United States from reclassifying 
Vietnam as a country with a market economy. To be sure, the Government of Vietnam 
(“GOV”) has the objective of being recognized by the United States as a market 
economy country, a designation that would have great economic impact along 
Vietnam’s course of bilateral trade normalization between the two countries. The 
following sections will set forth various recommendations for the GOV to undertake in 




1430 Tran Hong Minh, Director of Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM) and Director of 
Aus4Reform Program, Mối Quan Hệ giữa Nhà Nước và Thị Trường và Cải Cách Thể Chế Kinh Tế ở 
Việt Nam [The Relationship between the State and Market and Economic Institutional Reform in 
Vietnam in English language], Aus4Reform Program, Hanoi (2019), available at 
http://st.aus4reform.org.vn/staticFile/Subject/2020/04/27/sach-_nha-nuoc-thi-truong-the-che_da-
sua_27161804.pdf, accessed on October 22, 2020. 
1431 VCCI’s WTO Center, “List of countries recognizing Vietnam as market economy (June 2020)”, 
Advisory Council on Trade Remedies - VCCI, available at https://chongbanphagia.vn/danh-sach-cac-
quoc-gia-cong-nhan-viet-nam-la-nen-kinh-te-thi-truong-62020-n21072.html, accessed on October 22, 
2020. 
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6.2. Vietnam’s Quest for Market Economy Status in the United States 
 
As discussed in Section 5.2.2, U.S. trade law provides a basis for treating 
Vietnam as a market economy country. Congress has delegated great discretion to 
Commerce to make such a decision. To that end, the author recommends that the GOV 
continue to strengthen its diplomatic and trade relations with the U.S., and particularly 
that in diplomatic discussions, the GOV voice its desire that the U.S. confer market 
economy status upon it. 
The U.S. and Vietnam established diplomatic relations 25 years ago, trade 
normalization has been in progress 2001, and the current relationship remains 
essentially a comprehensive partnership. In a visit to Vietnam this year, Vice President 
Harris reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to “a strong, prosperous, and 
independent Vietnam, as well as free, open, healthy, and resilient Indo-Pacific 
region.”1432 The Vice President launched a new CDC Southeast Asia Regional Office 
in Hanoi and emphasized the U.S. government’s efforts to promote economic and 
opportunity.1433 These are promising steps towards the development of the sort of 
relationship that may ultimately enable Vietnam to receive market economy treatment. 
Indeed, Vietnam has established strategic partnerships with other countries such 
as Japan (2006), South Korea (2009), the U.K (2010), and Germany (2011).1434 In 2010, 
the then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton proposed the idea of a bilateral strategic 
partnership with Vietnam, that idea resurfaced in 2021.1435 The GOV should consider 
taking this opportunity to develop such a partnership. 
 
1432 United States, Briefing Room, “FACT SHEET: Strengthening the U.S.-Vietnam 
Comprehensive Partnership,” The White House, Statements and Releases (August 25, 2021), available 
at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/25/fact-sheet-
strengthening-the-u-s-vietnam-comprehensive-partnership/, accessed on October 25, 2021. 
1433 Id. 
1434 Le Hong Diep, “How many strategic partners are enough for Vietnam?”, Vietnamnet Bridge, (April 
26, 2013), available at http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/government/71780/how-many-strategic-
partners-are-enough-for-vietnam-.html, accessed on October 25. 2021. 
1435 Carlyle A. Thayer, “The US-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership: what’s in a name?”, Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute, The Strategist (July 31, 2013), available at 
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-us-vietnam-comprehensive-partnership-whats-in-a-name/, 
accessed on October 25, 2021. See also Alexander L. Vuving, “Will Vietnam Be America’s Next 
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Of course, under the current trade regime, it is ultimately Commerce that must 
determine that Vietnam has a market economy. And, as discussed in Section 5.2.2, 
despite Vietnam’s economic transformation, Commerce currently takes the position 
that Vietnam’s economy does not operate on market principles, and that prices and 
costs in Vietnam are not market-driven. So, the GOV should take certain steps, 
discussed below, in order to persuade Commerce that Vietnam has sufficient 
characteristics of a market economy country to warrant that designation. As discussed 
in Section 5.3, although Russia and Ukraine have had their fair share of difficulties 
during their economic transitions, they were still granted market economy status by 
Commerce, so it is not implausible that Vietnam could realize the same. And China’s 
failed efforts at seeking market economy status also provides a profound lesson for 
Vietnam in choosing its strategy: China focused on winning disputes in the WTO, 
essentially hoping that by winning a dispute with the EU, the result of that dispute 
would in turn cause the U.S. to bestow market economy status. But the global trade 
regime is not so easily overcome: Vietnam should instead position itself to request a 
changed-circumstances review directly with Commerce, presuming that Vietnam has 
taken certain steps to increase the likelihood of a favorable result from that review.  
In Section 5.2.2, the author discussed Commerce’s application of the six-factor 
test to determine market economy status. If Commerce applies the six factors strictly 
as it has in the past against Vietnam and China, it is unlikely that Vietnam would 
receive market economy status in the near future. But Vietnam should focus on certain 
factors that it can more easily control, such as by taking steps to improve currency 
convertibility and reducing state control over the allocation of resources, particularly 
within the banking sector and as pertains to land transactions. 
Regarding currency manipulation or undervaluation, Vietnam is already taking 
some steps. Commerce’s finding of currency undervaluation in the PVLT Tires case 
was discussed in Section 5.4.6; apart from that, the USTR also launched a Section 301 
 
Strategic Partner?”, The Diplomat (August 21, 2021), available at https://thediplomat.com/2021/08/will-
vietnam-be-americas-next-strategic-partner/, accessed on October 25, 2021. 
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investigation to decide whether any trade action should be taken against Vietnam.1436 
However, Vietnam quickly reacted to the Section 301 investigation and successfully 
entered into an agreement with the U.S. Department of the Treasury, promising to the 
U.S. that the State Bank of Vietnam would henceforth allow Vietnam’s currency to 
move in line with the development of Vietnam’s financial and foreign exchange market 
and with Vietnam’s economic fundamentals.1437 This cooperation is emblematic of the 
relationship that Vietnam should continue to cultivate with the USTR and the Treasury 
Department regarding Vietnam’s currency valuation. This relationship will help 
Vietnam both in the context of specific CVD investigations and in its long-term goal 
of attaining market economy status.  
The author also recommends that Vietnam continue to take steps to permit 
privatization, although the Government of Vietnam prefers to call it “equitization,” the 
idea being that the GOV has converted state-owned entities (“SOEs”) into joint stock 
companies in which the state remains a majority shareholder.1438 As required under its 
international commitments, especially under free trade agreements, Vietnam is 
committed to create a level playing field for all forms of business. Therefore, Vietnam 
has attempted to decentralize its government control and cut its state ownership in 
SOEs (e.g., under CPTPP).1439  
 
1436 Office of the USTR, Initiation of Section 301 Investigation: Vietnam’s Acts, Policies, and Practices 
Related to Currency Valuation, 85 FR 63637 (October 8, 2020). This investigation was pushed by the 
Trump Administration with the purpose of increasing import tariffs against Vietnam’s exporters and 
producers. 
1437 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Joint Statement from the U.S. Department of the Treasury and 
the State Bank of Vietnam,” Press Release, Statements & Remarks (July 19,2021), available at 
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0280, accessed on October 26, 2021. See also Office of 
the USTR, Determination on Action and Ongoing Monitoring: Vietnam’s Acts, Policies, and Practices 
Related to Currency Valuation, 86 FR 40675 (July 28, 2021). 
1438 Breaking down the figures of SOEs, in which 81.1% of the stake was held by the government, 70 
enterprises had a state holding of over 90% of charter capital, including 15 large groups and corporations 
– such as Petrolimex (95%), VnSteel (93.6%), Viet Nam Airlines (95.5%), Airports Corporation of Viet 
Nam (92.5%), Lilama (98%), and Viglacera (93%) (Ministry of Finance 2018). See Le Ngoc Dang, Dinh 
Dung Nguyen, and Farhad Taghizadeh-Hesary, “State-Owned Enterprise Reform in Vietnam: Progress 
and Challenges”, ADBI Working Paper Series, No. 1071, January 2020, available at 
https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/562061/adbi-wp1071.pdf, accessed on October 26, 
2021. 
1439 CPTPP is the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, which is a 
free trade agreement with eleven members, including Australia, Brunei, Darussalam, Canada, Chile, 
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Vietnam should consider changing the concept of “equitization.” In practice, 
Vietnam has attempted to unwind direct ownership in key sectors, but the process of 
privatization is still sluggish and behind schedule. Some obstacles that the SOEs under 
an equitization schedule may face pertain to land-use rights. This is important because 
land-use rights are a key factor in determining an SOE’s valuation for investors during 
the process of equitization. For example, Agribank (one of the largest state-owned 
commercial banks) has encountered obstacles in getting approval from the Ministry of 
Finance to continue to use its real property throughout the equitization process due to 
its large size.1440 Thus, Vietnam should consider providing an expedited privatization 
process by easing regulations and procedures pertaining to the valuation of land-use 
rights.  
Vietnam’s state ownership in SOEs is still significant, accounting for 28% of 
GDP, and if including state-owned commercial banks (“SOCBs”), it accounts for 34% 
of GDP; while foreign enterprises account for 18% of GDP, and private enterprises 
accounts for less than 10%.1441 Speeding up the privatization process would help 
Vietnam compare more favorably to other market economy countries. 
In the modern market economy, the role of the state remains very important. 
But the role should be to stabilize the macroeconomy (not microeconomy), to establish 
a legal framework and enforcement apparatus for the market to function well, and to 
overcome defects and failures of the market in order to ensure equal development 
 
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. Under CPTPP, Vietnam made a 
commitment that SOEs must operate under market mechanisms. See Vietnam Investment Review, “SOE 
divestment a priority in CPTPP era,” January 30, 2019, available at https://vir.com.vn/soe-divestment-
a-priority-in-cptpp-era-65586.html, accessed on October 27, 2021. 
1440 Luu Huong, “Divestment slow off the blocks for banks,” Vietnam Investment Review, April 13, 
2021, available at https://vir.com.vn/divestment-slow-off-the-blocks-for-banks-83651.html, accessed on 
October 26, 2021. 
1441 Trung Kien, Tiếp tục hiện đại hoá nền kinh tế, phát triển kinh tế tư nhân [Continuing to modernize 
the economy, developing the private economy], Electronic News Portal of Ho Chi Minh City Party 
Committee, February 15, 2021, available at https://hcmcpv.org.vn/tin-tuc/tiep-tuc-hien-dai-hoa-nen-
kinh-te-phat-trien-kinh-te-tu-nhan-1491874739, accessed on October 26, 2021. The data and 
information in this news article is from an interview with Professor Vo Dai Luoc, former director of the 
Institute of World Economy, Academy of Social Sciences, talked to the website portal of the Party 
Committee of Ho Chi Minh City on this issue. 
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opportunities for every business entity. The state can still achieve such goals without 
holding a large proportion of state ownership in SOEs and SOCBs. 
Notably, under the Constitution of Vietnam, land is public property owned by 
the entire people and managed by the State; land is also considered a “special resource 
of the nation.”1442 Vietnam’s land law stipulates that the land is owned by the entire 
people and is uniformly managed by the State on behalf of the owners.1443 Through a 
system of State agencies, land price frameworks are issued every five years for each 
type of land and for each region.1444 The land price frameworks serve as the basis for 
each province or city to determine appropriate land price tables as a reference for land 
users and for the purpose of land management (e.g., for calculation of land use fees, 
land use tax, land allocation, and land rents).1445 However, in reality, market land prices 
are always higher than the state’s land price frameworks.1446 There are also temporal 
limitations upon land allocation, limits for the scale of land allocation, and fixed 
restrictions regarding the purpose of land use. These restrictions on land use were 
integral to CVD determinations discussed in Sections 5.4.1.4.2 and 5.4.6.3.3. In order 
to continue on its quest for market economy status, Vietnam needs to change its land 
pricing evaluation mechanism. To that end, Vietnam should reform the system of land 
pricing to be based on marketable supply and demand of land rather than on State-
issued frameworks and tables. Importantly, because all land is stipulated as being 
owned by the people, land rents and land allocation should be transparent and based on 
voluntary agreements between land users and the State, or, in the event that business 
 
1442 The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, passed on November 28, 2013, by the 13th 
National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, at its 6th session [hereinafter 2013 Vietnam 
Constitution], at Articles 53-54. 
1443 Land Law No. 45/2013/QH13 promulgated by the National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam on November 29, 2013 [hereinafter Vietnam Land Law], at Article 4. 
1444 Id. at Article 113. 
1445 Id. at Article 114. 
1446 VVFC, Vietnam Appraisal, Những bất cập và hệ lụy [Inadequacies in land prices and consequences], 
available at http://www.vvfc.vn/tin-nganh/nhung-bat-cap-trong-gia-dat-va-he-luy.html; see also Viet 
Hoa, TP.HCM: Kiến nghị Thủ tướng bỏ khung giá đất [Ho Chi Minh City: Proposing that the Prime 
Minister repeal land price frameworks], Phap Luat News, September 14, 2020, available at 
https://plo.vn/thoi-su/tphcm-kien-nghi-thu-tuong-bo-khung-gia-dat-938366.html, accessed on October 
26, 2021. 
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enterprises gain greater land-use rights, agreements between such enterprises and 
farmers, for instance. 
In short, Vietnam needs to develop its conceptualization of itself. Although 
private ownership of land will be at odds with Vietnam’s concept of socialism, Vietnam 
will struggle to achieve market economy status if it does not more clearly delineate 
private land-use rights and permit market factors to determine land rents and the 
parameters for land transactions. Regardless, Vietnam should continue to clarify what 
it means to have a socialist-oriented market economy. Doing so will only help Vietnam 
as it continues its progress from a transition economy to a full-fledged economy. 
 
6.3 The Market-Oriented Industry & Mix-and-Match Approaches 
 
Section 4.3.2.4.1.2 discussed the market-oriented industry (“MOI”) theory, 
which, if employed by Commerce, would permit the use of a market economy 
methodology in calculating CVD against Vietnamese producers within certain 
industries even if Vietnam on the whole lacks market economy status. However, 
Commerce’s current test for recognizing an MOI is too strict: it is “all-or-nothing,” that 
is, market-determined prices must be paid for all significant inputs within the industry. 
One may hypothesize an example that could pass this test: if Apple, for instance, 
opened a factory in an export processing zone in Vietnam, at which it manufactured 
phones and laptops for exporting back to the U.S., it might be able to pass the test 
because within export processing zones there is much less state control within the 
markets, and Commerce might then be able to conclude that all significant inputs (even 
land and labor) were paid at market prices. To increase the likelihood that Commerce 
will employ the MOI test, Vietnam should continue to ensure that export processing 
zones are home to market-driven prices and costs. Vietnamese producers in a CVD 
investigation may also consider arguing the extent to which individual inputs are 
“significant”; although the MOI test requires all significant inputs to be at market 
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prices, there is some discretion built into Commerce’s determination as to what is a 
significant input. 
Even better would be if Commerce were to adopt the “mix and match” 
approach, as it appeared to do in the Tires case when it applied Tier-1 (in-country) 
benchmarks to natural rubber as an input because the respondents showed that the 
market for that specific input was not distorted by government intervention.1447 To 
successfully persuade Commerce to use this approach in future cases, Vietnamese 
exporters and producers should develop a strategy of sourcing inputs from suppliers at 
prices that are demonstrably market-driven; or, when sourcing inputs from a SOE, they 
should, as with the natural rubber in the Tires case, show that the government’s 
presence in the input market did not have the effect of distorting it.  
 
6.4. The Use of Tier-3 Benchmarks 
 
The author further recommends that Commerce cease the use of Tier-3 
benchmarks, because these benchmarks may be inaccurate and, in any event, their use 
is always uncertain and unpredictable. Vietnamese enterprises can plan for the 
possibility of the imposition of ADD and CVD, but it is very difficult to anticipate the 
CVD rates that Commerce may decide to impose if Commerce looks to Tier-3 
benchmarks to calculate them. This in turn makes it difficult for an enterprise to know 
whether it is worth exporting goods to the U.S. market in the first place, or perhaps 
whether it is worthwhile to participate in a CVD proceeding once one has begun. This 
has further consequences that the GOV should take into consideration because one 
enterprise’s decision not to participate in a CVD proceeding may result in an 
unfavorable determination that then harms other potential entrants to the market who 
are at least preliminarily subject to that same CVD determination against their exports 
to the U.S. 
 
1447 See supra, Section 5.4.6.3.2. 
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Imposing CVD rates using Tier-3 benchmarks also goes beyond the purpose of 
the CVD law; the CVD law is meant to ensure fairness in the global trade arena, but 
using unpredictable third-country benchmarks borders on punitive. Nor is the rationale 
behind such use very strong: Commerce reasons that in nonmarket economies, prices 
may be subject to distortion, but there is distortion from tax breaks and subsidies even 
within market economies as well. 
 
6.5. Recommendations for Vietnamese Enterprises 
 
Finally, the author provides certain recommendations for Vietnamese 
enterprises. First, they should be cautious with Chinese investors who move factories 
to Vietnam for the purpose of exporting products similar to those that are currently 
subject to AD or CVD order against China. In the past, there have been several 
circumvention cases that result in unfavorable AD or CVD determinations for the 
exporter.1448 Second, when exporting to the U.S. market, Vietnamese enterprises should 
consider hiring trade counsel to advise on strategies and plans and to prevent potential 
risks (such as unfavorable or overly costly AD or CVD proceedings) early on. Trade 
counsel can help exporters to develop business practices that will make compliance 
with a U.S. investigation easier, less costly, and more likely to result in a favorable 
outcome. Third, even businesses that have not been sued or investigated should 
maintain clear and transparent accounting systems that are independently audited. As 
seen in the Circular Welded Carbon-Quality Steel Pipe case, maintaining books to 
American standards permitted easy onsite verification of the respondents’ submitted 
data, which in turn helped to facilitate a determination that the respondents had not 
received countervailable subsidies.1449   
 
1448 See supra, Section 5.4.3. Products that are subject to AD/CVD orders from certain countries can be 
investigated by Commerce for circumvention where those products were made from parts from a subject 
country and completed or assembled in a third country or the United States. 
1449 See supra, Section 5.4.2.5. 
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Fourth, Vietnam’s Trade Remedy Authority has put in place an “early warning 
system” for potential trade remedy actions.1450 Businesses should ensure that they 
receive frequent updates from this system to be well prepared for any imminent 
investigations. And when an investigation occurs, businesses should promptly consult 
with trade counsel to answer Commerce’s questionnaires in a timely and cooperative 
manner. As seen in the Steel Wire Garment Hangers, Steel Nails, and Laminated 
Woven Sacks cases, failure to cooperate with Commerce in an AD or CVD 
investigation can have unfavorable consequences for the respondents. The litigation 
process may last for 12 to 18 months, but businesses should remain involved until the 
final determination to avoid being subject to the use of adverse facts available (“AFA”) 
or being subject to a Vietnam-Wide Entity rate rather than a more favorable rate that 
would have resulted from continued participation in the proceedings.1451  
Fifth, businesses should ensure that they participate in both Commerce’s 
proceedings and in the parallel injury proceedings in the ITC. As seen in the Certain 
Frozen Warmwater Shrimp case, even if Commerce finds the existence of a 
countervailable subsidy, the ITC may still determine that there is no actual or 
threatened injury to American industry. The business under investigation should 
consult with trade counsel to determine which investigation has better odds of a 
favorable outcome, in order to efficiently allocate resources that are available to 
litigating the proceeding. 
Sixth, in a CVD proceeding, businesses should recognize the importance of the 
role of the GOV in explaining and proving the nature of alleged subsidy programs. That 
means that when an investigation commences, businesses must work together with 
other respondents and must call upon the GOV to help produce a coordinated and 
cooperative response that clearly conveys the extent to which government programs 
may, for example, be generalized rather than industry-specific and thus not subject to 
 
1450 Trade Remedies Authority of Vietnam, TIN CẢNH BÁO SỚM (EARLY WARNING NEWS), 
available at http://www.trav.gov.vn/default.aspx?page=news&do=browse&category_id=116d0b73-
1399-4d78-91d9-bd883c1421c8, accessed on October 26, 2021). 
1451 See supra, Section 5.4.3.4. 
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CVD.1452 Relatedly, the GOV should hire professional trade counsel to prepare legal 
briefs, participate in hearings, and coordinate with respondents’ counsel. 
Seventh, businesses should avoid participating in government programs that 
have been determined to provide countervailable subsidies. As discussed in Sections 
5.4.1, 5.4.3, 5.4.5, and 5.4.6, programs such as preferential land rents, import duty 
reimbursement for imported raw materials for Exported goods, and preferential rent for 
areas with difficult socio-economics conditions are frequently deemed to provide 
countervailable subsidies. Businesses should weigh the potential short-term benefits of 
participating in such programs against the potential long-term cost of being subject to 
a higher CVD rate as a result. 
Eighth, and finally, enterprises that export to the U.S. market should consider 
diversifying their debt portfolio and taking loans from an array of domestic commercial 
banks rather than only from one or two SOCBs. This will reduce the likelihood that 
terms-of-credit will be treated as a countervailable subsidy in a CVD proceeding. 
In sum, businesses and the GOV should work with Commerce during any CVD 
proceeding, both to produce a favorable result from that proceeding and to encourage 
Commerce to use a more favorable methodology in carrying out the proceeding. The 
author hopes that Commerce will employ greater use of the “mix and match” approach 
rather than categorically employing the nonmarket economy methodology in 
calculating CVD rates. And in the longer run, the author hopes that, as the GOV 
continues to make economic transformations, Commerce will recognize the existence 
of market-oriented industries within Vietnam. In time, with strengthened diplomatic 
and trade relations, perhaps it is possible that Vietnam may receive market economy 
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